THE INFLUENCE OF IRAQ ON THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS OF KUWAIT AND BAḤRAIN 1920 - 1961

submitted by
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Dedication

To the faithful people in the Gulf who are working day and night for the creation of a future in which mankind will be able to participate in the construction of a humane civilisation, without dependence on any power in the world. To those people I would like to present this thesis.

Acknowledgements

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I also wish to thank the many others whose assistance was invaluable, and the University College of Bahrain, which made this work possible. My special thanks are due to Miss A. Croydon for reading the thesis. My thanks also to Sheila Westcott, Secretary of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies for her kindness and to Daphne for typing this thesis.

Finally, I wish to thank my family for their sacrifices. Without doubt I alone, however, am responsible for any errors either of omission or commission.

30th March, 1984 S.K. Hashim

Contents

SUMMARY

The intention of the present work is to produce an analytical study of the influence of Iraq on the nationalist movements of Kuwait and Baḥrain from 1920-1961.

This study concerns three neighbouring countries, all situated in the Gulf region. There are reasons for temporal and geographical limitations.

First: Research begins in 1920 because there were two major incidents in Iraq in that year. The first was the decision of the League of Nations regarding the British mandate over Iraq, announced on the 28th April 1920. The second was the outbreak of the 1920's uprising on the 30th June, manifesting Iraqi opposition to British rule. Thus, the failure of the Iraqi uprising in October 1920 made it possible for Britain to impose her influence there in addition to the Gulf Shaikhdoms. At the same time the complexity of Iraqi society made it an ideal training ground for British Officials in administration during the mandate period. Those who had proved themselves in Iraq were prepared as Political Agents for Bahrain and Kuwait. Major H.R.P. Dickson and Major C.K.Daly were amongst the most successful.

The investigation closes in 1961, because Iraq's role as an influential and model state for the people in the Gulf had by then significantly diminished.

Second: The geographical limitation of this work is based on the fact that migration between the three

countries was necessitated by existing social and trade relations; that Iraq claimed sovereignty over Kuwait and Baḥrain, and that modern administration and public sevices were first introduced into the region in Baḥrain and Kuwait. .

Finally, the development of nationalist movements in all three countries was similar: nationalism was guided by religious leaders, notables and merchants, in the 1920's and 1930's; and, at the same time, pan-Arabist trends influenced the opposition movements. The first rebellion outside these countries in the Gulf did not take place until 1938, in which year the Shaikh of Dubai successfully repressed the Dubai Nationalist Movement.

The material in this thesis is divided into three principle parts dictated by major events, and the whole is prefaced by a historical introduction. The introduction is intended to retrace the historical role of Iraq in the Gulf region during the Ottoman era and its influence on Kuwait and Bahrain. A brief discussion of the circumstances which allowed Iraq to shape the nationalist movements of Kuwait and Baḥrain during the period in question is included.

The period which this work covers (1920-1961) can be divided into three phases. The first part, which consists of two chapters, examines the effects of Iraqi resistance to British influence on the nationalist movements of Kuwait and Bahrain from 1920-1939. The ambitions of the Iraqi regime in Kuwait and Baḥrain and the British resistance to these ambitions are included. Social, cultural and trade relations between the countries under review are examined.

The two chapters of the second part discuss Iraqi policies and the Kuwaiti and Baḥrainī nationalist reform movements from 1939-1958. Economic development and its effects on the socio-political transformation of Baḥrain and Kuwait is included in this discussion.

The chapters of the third part examine the impact of Iraqi policy on the nationalist movement of Kuwait and Bahrain from 1958-1961, when the republican regime began. The role of the Iraqi nationalist movement in the preparations for the revolution of the 14th July 1958 is followed and the ideological differences and competition for power between elements of the Iraqi nationalist movement described. The effects of Iraq's claim to Kuwait on Iraq's influence and the condition of the nationalist movements of Kuwait and Baḥrain are included in the analysis.

The conclusion of this work attempts to deduce the results of Iraq's contacts, relations and ambitions in Baḥrain and Kuwait from 1920-1961.

Introduction

At the end of the 18th century Baḥrain became a bone of contention between the major powers in the Gulf: the ᶜOmānis, the Wahhābis and a little later in 1822, the Persians joined the competition. In 1799, the ᶜOmānī vessels attacked and occupied Baḥrain, which had discontinued payment of taxes levied upon all vessels passing from India through the Straight of Hormuz.(1) At the same time the Wahhābis had extended their power to the coast, and the Shaikhs and tribes of the mainland were either allies, or their vassals. In 1809, combined ᶜUtūbi and Wahhābi forces invaded Baḥrain and expelled the ᶜOmānis.(2) These external invasions, the civil war between the two factions of the al-Khalīfa family and the irresponsible acts of their entourages, compelled a large number of Baḥraini families to emigrate to neighbouring Shaikhdoms and districts to protect their lives. Qaṭar, Qais Island, al-Qaṭīf, Hasā, Bushire, Linja, Muḥammara (Khurumshahr) and Baṣra were places of refuge. For example there are today districts of Muḥammara and Baṣra named after the Baḥraini refugees and a number of present-day Iraqis have relatives in villages in Baḥrain.(3)

The situation in Kuwait, however, was different. It grew rapidly after the formation of the Shaikhdom in 1752, both in economic strength and in population. Economic and demographic development of Kuwait was due mainly to the

transfer of the British offices of the East India Company to Kuwait from Baṣra during the years 1776-1779, 1792-1795 and 1821-1822. A number of refugees from Baṣra came to Kuwait during these periods.[4] These refugees were landowners, merchants and businessmen, and they brought with them their wealth and experience. In Kuwait, they became active in commerce and eventually in shipbuilding.[5] The experience of the merchants, and the use of their capital promoted the shipbuilding industry and her advantageous geographical position made it possible for Kuwait to be the commercial centre of northern central Arabia. Moreover, Kuwait's support of the Ottoman authorities against rebels in Muḥammara and Baṣra during the nineteenth century increased the property of the Kuwaiti population in Baṣra due to gifts from the authorities. This reinforced social and commercial links between Baṣra and Kuwait.[6]

The increase of Kuwait's merchant fleet, which was involved in trade between Kuwait and Baṣra, Iran, India, South Arabia and East Africa, in addition to involvement in pearl fishing, enhanced the economic and political position of the Kuwait Shaikhdom.[7]

The British influence in the Gulf began with commercial activities and ended with a political relationship, as in the case of the protection agreements with Baḥrain in 1880 and 1892, and with Kuwait in 1899. After the defeat of the Turks in the First World War, Ottoman influence in the area ceased and was replaced by British dominance frustrating the ambitions of the Persians

and Wahhābis. As far as Britain was concerned, these were the most disruptive powers in the region. The Wahhābi blockade and invasion of Kuwait in the 1920's and 1930's, and their attacks on Shi^{c}i villages in Baḥrain during the 1920's threatened British influence and the security of Baḥrain and Kuwait.

The threat of the Ottomans and the rivalries within the ruling families of Baḥrain and Kuwait made it possible for Britain, the most influential foreign power in the Gulf, to assume the responsibility for the protection of Baḥrain and Kuwait. The protection agreements not only allowed Britain to safeguard her political and commercial influence in the region, but also gave her opportunity to restrict the control of the rulers even on the natural resources, preventing them from negotiating with foreign representatives without advance permission from British representatives in the region. Although the protection system assured the territorial security of the Shaikhdoms and guaranteed the future of the traditional regimes, the subjects were victims in the same way as under the old repressive tribal hierarchy.

Great Britain was prepared to recognise Ottoman sovereignty over Kuwait in return for Ottoman acceptance of British protection according to the agreement of July 1913. Furthermore Great Britain was also prepared to recognise Shaikh Mubārak as Turkish Qā'im Maqam, but the outbreak of the First World War prevented the ratification of the agreement.[8]

When the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the First World War, Turkish influence in the Arab world was replaced by French and British control. Mesopotamia, now known as Iraq and consisting of the three former Ottoman provinces, came under the British mandate. Thereafter the Gulf became effectively a British lake, despite a number of unsuccessful Persian attempts to restore her control over Baḥrain.

Iraqi resistance to the British invasion from 1914-1920 became a model to neighbouring countries. Baḥrain and Kuwait were sympathetic to Iraqi uprisings against the British Army. During the period from 1920-1961 there were close trading and social relations between Iraq, Kuwait and Baḥrain. This is examined in detail in this study.

Sources and Secondary Works

This work is based upon a variety of sources in Arabic and English. The primary sources included governmental publications such as the Administration Annual Reports of Baḥrain from 1936-1961 and the official gazette al-Kuwait al-Yawm: al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya. A number of interviews were carried out with Iraqi, Kuwaiti and Baḥraini intellectuals, politicians and lecturers. The British public records of the India Office and the Public Records Office in London were the most important primary sources for Chapters 1-4, owing to the British role in regional politics.

Most of the primary material - letters, telegrams,

memoranda, political and administrative reports, extracts from Iraqi, Egptian and Syrian newspaper reports on the leading personalities of the countries under review and texts of mutual agreements - was collected from the British Public Records Office. Particular reference has been made to confidential reports sent by the Political Agents, Political Residents and British Ambassadors in Baghdād, to each other and to India and Foreign Offices in London during the period 1912-1951. Similar material relating to the countries under review was found in the British India Office. Translations from these sources have been recorded as written, and were made by employees of the Political Agencies in Baḥrain and Kuwait, and the British Embassy in Baghdād. Unless so attributed in the notes, the translations are the researcher's own.

Interviews with participants in nationalist activities have been used throughout. ʿAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr, interviewed in Kuwait in 1982, was the speaker for Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭani (K.S.W.),in 1938-39, for example, and founded al-Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Qawmi in 1952. Ibrāhīm Fakhru was a leading member of the Nationalist Movement in Baḥrain in 1938 and in 1954-1956. The details about persons interviewed may be found in Appendix I.

The materials of the secondary works are Arabic and English printed in theses, academic treatises, periodicals, newspapers, and ordinary books. However, there are currently no secondary works which deal in detail with the interactions between Iraq and the nationalist movements in Kuwait and Baḥrain. Such references as are made to this

subject are generally of peripheral interest. For example, Ḥanna Batātu, in his book "The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq", has made a considerable contribution to our understanding of Iraqi politics, but adds nothing to our knowledge of Iraq's involvement in Kuwait and Baḥrain. Majīd Khadduri, in his important books, only briefly discusses the subject under review. Muḥammad Jasim Muḥammad, in his M.A. thesis entitled "al-ᶜAlaqat al-Iraqiyya al-Khalījiyya 1958-1978", also fails to examine the involvement of Iraq in Kuwait and Bahrain in any depth. Indeed, it may be said that this subject has not previously been explored by scholars in any profundity.

Footnotes to the Introduction

1. Faroughy, A. Bahrain Islands, New York, 1951, p.72; Adamiyyat, F., Dr. Bahrain Islands, Frederick A. Praeger Inc., Publishers, New York, 1955, p.36.

2. Faroughy, A., op.cit., pp.73-4; Adamiyyat, F.,Dr., op.cit., pp.37-38; Belgrave, J.H.D., "A brief survey of the history of the Baḥrain Islands", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, vol.39, 1952, pp.57-68, reference in pp.65-66.

3. Professor ʿAbdul Amir Muḥammad Amīn, lecturer in contemporary history in the Education College of Baghgdad University, is an example.

4. Al-Rashīd, A., Tarikh al-Kuwait, Manshurat Dār Maktabat al-Hayat, Beirut, 1978, p.107; Adamiyyat, F., Dr., p.34; Lockhart, L. "Outline of the History of Kuwait", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 1947, vol.34, pp.262-274, reference in p.264.

5. Al-Ibrāhīm, H. Al-Kuwait: Dirasa Siyasiyya, Muʿassasat Dar al-ʿUlūm, Kuwait, 1980, pp.35-36.

6. Khazʿal, H.,Tarikh al-Kuwait al-Siyasi, vol.1, Beirut, 1962, p.77, al-Rashīd, A., pp.120-121.

7. Bowen, R., "The Pearl Fishers of the Persian Gulf", Middle East Journal, 1951, vol.5, part 2, pp.161-180, reference in p.179.

8. The text of the Treaty is available in Hurewitz, J.C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East,(New York, 1956), vol.1, pp.269-272; IOR : R/15/1/711/3, report for 1913, pp.131-132.

Part One

(Chapters One and Two)

Iraqi Policy
Towards the Nationalist Movements
in Kuwait and Bahrain
1920-1939

Chapter One : Kuwait

1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KUWAIT AND IRAQ

It was Britain that created the opportunity for Kuwait to emerge as an independent Shaikhdom by offering British protection. At the ᶜUqair Conference (27th November to 3rd December, 1922)[1] the boundaries of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were drawn, under the supervision of Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner for Iraq. On the 26th January 1923 Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ (1921-1950), the ruler, ratified the agreement which had been reached during the conference for the delineation of the Najd-Kuwait frontiers.[2] On 30th April 1923 the British Government informed the ruler of Kuwait that she recognised the frontier with Iraq claimed by Kuwait.[3] In the Treaty of Lausanne signed on 24th July, 1923, Turkey renounced formally all rights over and titles to the territories situated outside those laid down in that treaty. In the same treaty the Turkish Government agreed to the separation of the Arab provinces (Syria and Iraq) from her territories.[4] The western and northern frontiers of Kuwait were formally defined in the Iraq-Kuwait Convention on Boundaries in 1932,[5] along the lines of the frontiers laid down in the 1913 Anglo-Turkish convention. Shortly after the 1932 convention Iraq became independent from the British Mandate in accordance with the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 30th June 1930.[6] The British dominance over Iraq through the mandatory administration of 1920-1932 made it possible for her to protect both her influence and the monarchical rule in Kuwait, while Iraq had lost all legitimate rights to her

former territory. Although the demarcation of the boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait protected the independence and sovereignty of this Shaikhdom from any Iraqi attempt to dominate it, the natural links between the two peoples and the progress of the Iraqi nationalist movement ensured the continuing influence of Iraq beyond the traditional cultural level.

(a) Social relations, Kuwaiti properties in Southern Iraq, the question of water transfer, the official exchange visits.

The Holy Cities in Iraq were of sufficient religious importance to have attracted Kuwaiti pilgrims, both Shi^c^i and the Sunni minority, since the emergence of Kuwait. Furthermore Kuwaiti students were sent to study at the religious and secular schools at Najaf, Karbala, Baghdād and Baṣra. After the introduction of modern education - represented by the Mubārakiyya School in 1912 and the Aḥmadiyya School in 1921, - the first group of Kuwaiti students was sent to Iraq in November 1924. It consisted of six students: Fahad al-Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ went to Raḥmaniyya School in Baṣra; the rest of the students[7] joined al-A^c^ẓamiyya[8] College.[9] The second student's mission was sent to Iraq in 1939. It consisted of five students, whose grants to study at Dār al-Mu^c^allimīn al-Rīfiyya (the Rural Teachers' Institution, Baghdād) were paid by the Iraqi Government. The students were: Ṣāliḥ ^c^Abdul Malik al-Ṣāliḥ, Badr Sayyid Rajab al-Rifa^c^i, ^c^Abdul ^c^Azīz Sulaimān al-Dousari, Khālid ^c^Abdul

Laṭīf al-Musallam and ᶜAbdulla ᶜAbdul Laṭīf al-Muṭawwaᶜ.[10] In response to a Kuwaiti request the Iraqi Ministry of Education sent Mr. Adrian Vallance to Kuwait in 1939 and 1940 in order to inspect the schools and to submit a report to the Government.[11] The Iraqi school curriculum had been used in Kuwaiti schools until 1943 when it was replaced by the Egyptian, after the arrival of Egyptian teachers in 1942.[12]

Iraqi newspapers and journals were regularly sent to Kuwait, especially after the formation of the al-Nādi al-Adabi (the Literary Club) and al-Maktaba al-Ahliyya (the Native Library) in 1923. Al-Hātif, al-Nās, al-Thaghr, al-Sijil, al-Bilād, al-Zamān and al-ᶜUmrān had the largest circulations.[13] A number of Egyptian newspapers arrived in Kuwait after the establishment of these cultural institutions: al-Ahrām, al-Balagh, al-Muqaṭṭam, al-Jihād, al-Miṣri, al-Dustūr, al-Kashkūl, al-Hilāl, al-Manār, al-Laṭā'if al-Muṣawwara, al-Siyasa al- Usbuᶜiyya.[14]

This cultural dependence of Kuwait upon Iraq developed vital channels of communication. The links strengthened political ties and consolidated sympathetic relations between the peoples.

The development of transport and communications encouraged mutual visits during the 1930's. Furthermore, there was a certain amount of intermarriage between Iraq and Kuwait and Kuwait's cultural traditions were influenced by Iraq's in dialect, eating habits, music and even dress. Baṣra and Baghdād therefore became business, cultural and tourist centres for Kuwait. Between 1930 and 1950 there

was considerable emigration from Iraq, especially Baṣra to Kuwait, motivated by the high cost of living in Iraq, and the loss of political freedom there, and by the availability of well-paid employment in Kuwait, where the programme of social expansion contrasted with Iraq's repression.[15] The majority of the emigrants lived in an area called <u>ᶜushairij</u>.[16] A number of prominent Kuwaiti families already had Iraqi origins, having descended from emigres from Zubair and Baṣra, settling in Kuwait in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The al-Ḥamad, al-Naqīb, al-Rifāᶜi, al-Thuwaini, al-Ibrāhīm, al-Qirṭās, al-Mindīl and al-Qinaᶜāt families all had Iraqi roots.[17]

The Kuwaiti ruling family, al-Ṣabāḥ, owned a number of date gardens in Fao and Baṣra on the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab. Some of these gardens were given to the Kuwaiti rulers by the Ottoman authorities as rewards for their loyalty; others were bought by the al-Ṣabāḥ rulers. For example, Shaikh Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ (1896-1915) purchased the Bashiyah date garden and the "Faddaghiyeh" estate in 1908 from subjects of Baṣra.[18] The al-Ṣabāḥ used to visit the estates and gardens especially during summer.[19] These large date gardens brought the Kuwaiti rulers an annual revenue of about 7,000,000 rupees.[20]

Kuwaiti notables and merchants followed the al-Ṣabāḥ example and purchased a number of gardens in the same area as the al-Ṣabāḥ properties, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The political Agent at Kuwait reported on 12th March 1938 that about 35 Kuwaiti families had date gardens in Iraq.[21] The al-Ṣaqr, al-Muṭair and

al-Ḥumaidi families purchased date gardens in the south province of Iraq. The al-Ṣaqr family had the largest number of gardens, and were known in Kuwait and Baṣra as "Muluk al-Tamr" (the Kings of date).[22] The existence of these properties benefitted the Kuwaiti merchants and strengthened trade relations between the two states. Kuwaiti ships played a considerable role in the movement of trade between Baṣra and the Gulf ports as well as between Baṣra and the western ports of India (Bombay and Karachi) and the eastern ports of Africa. The Kuwaiti merchants exported dates from the Baṣra gardens to the aforementioned ports by sea.[23]

Undoubtedly these transactions consolidated social and commercial relations between the peoples of Kuwait and Iraq and prepared for the influx of intellectual and political ideas from Iraq into Kuwait.

Lack of drinking water was one of the principal difficulties which faced the inhabitants of Kuwait in the first decade of this century. The population increased gradually during the Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ era. Before this period, the inhabitants depended on well water at Naqra, al-Shamiyya and al-Dasma. The water was brought to the town from these areas by donkey, and was delivered individually to the houses.[24] From the beginning of this century until the early 1950's, however, the town relied on water from Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab. Water supplies arrived by boat.

During the 1920's and 1930's Kuwait's need for Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab water continued and became a complicating factor in relations between the two states. The Iraqi government

used this question to put pressure on the ruler of Kuwait in order to achieve some of its objectives in Kuwait, e.g. the elimination of smuggling from Kuwait to Iraq. It was one of the principal causes of contention between Kuwait and Iraq, and will be examined in detail on page 22. One of the issues raised by the Iraqi officials was the poor conditions of the waterboat nakhūdas who sailed between Kuwait and Fao. In September 1937 the waterboats were delayed for several days by the chief customs officer at Fao. This prompted the ruler of Kuwait, Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir, to complain to the British Political Agent in Kuwait, stating in his letter that:

> "We have ordered the owners of water vessels which bring water from Shatt el Arab (sic), to be quick and not to get delayed. Their reply is that they always try their best boats, but that when they fill their boats with water and return to the Customs House, they do not get their permit from the Director of Customs at Fao, and are thus detained for 12 to 15 hours or even more. This causes much inconvenience to the town".(25)

Various attempts were made to find a solution to the problem, but without progress. The solutions suggested during the 1930's were various. Shaikh Aḥmad proposed that water should be piped from Zubair in Iraq territory to Kuwait by an Iraqi-Kuwaiti Company.(26) The British were aware of the possibility of an Iraqi claim to Kuwait, and expected that the success of such a project would provide Iraq with potential blackmail material to threaten Kuwait with stoppage of the supply from Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab. The British believed also, that if they lost control of Shaṭṭ

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
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MAP OF KUWAIT

TO ACCOMPANY THE MILITARY REPORT ON THE PERSIAN GULF

Map No. 2.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.



Survey Section No. 686 Feb. 1940—150.

Scale 1 inch to 16 miles or 1:1,000,000.

al-ʿArab in war, it would be of relatively little importance to keep control of Kuwait.[27] Therefore, when Captain G.S. de Gaury, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, expressed his surprise to the Kuwaiti ruler regarding his water project, the ruler replied that this would be only "in the last resort".[28] The British were aware that the Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab supply would still be under Iraqi control, but less so than if there were a pipeline for immediate stoppage.[29]

The second possible solution was the expansion of the local supply of water from wells. Regarding this proposal the British Residency in the Gulf suggested that if there were reasonable prospects of a supply from this source a local company might be formed to undertake the project. The British Residency believed that from the strategic and political point of view a local supply would be distinctly preferable to a piped supply from Iraq.[30] The Kuwait Oil Company, an Anglo-American concern, on 23rd December 1934, after protracted negotiations, obtained an oil concession from the ruler.[31] The Kuwait Oil Company agreed to help Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir, by leaving down piping relevant to any water supply discovered during the geophysical survey in the water in 1936-37. No water was found, but officials of the company informed the ruler that wells might exist at points at which their drilling - in particular west and north-west from Kuwait town, i.e. between the al-Batin and Jahra village, and near al-Liyah.[32] Co-operation between

the Kuwait Oil Company and the ruler was encouraged by the British authorities in the Gulf in order to solve the water problem and bypass Iraqi sources.

The British anxiety from Iraq's prospect of influence in Kuwait increased when mutual projects between Iraq and Kuwait were developed. Amongst these projects were: the Kuwaiti-Iraqi Motor Transport Company based in Kuwait. At the end of April 1925 Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir granted a motor transport concession to Sayyid Ḥamīd Bey al-Naqib, by which, in return for constructing and maintaining the road from Jahra in Kuwait to the Iraq frontier at Ṣafwan, he had a monopoly of the trasportation of passengers and goods by motor car for a period of fifty years. The length of this road was about 100 miles.(33) The capital of the company amounted to 100,000 rupees, shares were available to residents of Kuwait at 100 rupees. Al-Naqīb was the head of the Administrative Council of this company.(34) After obtaining this concession from the Shaikh of Kuwait Sayyid Ḥamid Bey al-Naqīb requested the government of Iraq to improve the section of the road from Ṣafwan to Zubair for the use of company traffic.(35) Communications between Kuwait and Iraq were greatly improved by the opening of modern roads, and the establishment of an efficient motor service between Kuwait and Zubair from the 4th Sha^cbān 1344 A.H.(1926).(36)

The Kuwait-Iraqi Electric Supply Company which was established in Kuwait on 18th December 1933 was another example of a joint Iraqi-Kuwaiti concern.(37) These joint projects were alarming to the British in that they

threatened to increase Iraqi influence in Kuwait; Britain therefore opposed the proposed pipeline from the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab to Kuwait.

Despite the retention of certain joint projects the persistence of smuggling from Kuwait into Iraq jeopardised the Iraqi economy and weakened the relationship between the two countries.

(b). The Smuggling Question and its Impact

From the emergence of Kuwait as an ᶜUtūbi Shaikhdom in 1752, until 1946 when the first shipment of crude oil from Kuwait was made, trade and pearl fishing were the backbone of the Kuwaiti national income. The Kuwaitis made trading voyages with Iraqi dates, loaded in Baṣra, to the coasts of India and East Africa, usually making either two Indian, or one East African voyage annually. The majority were in trade with India, with an occasional diversion to East Africa. From India they were accustomed to bring back shipbuilding materials, coir for cordage and Malbar teak; from East Africa mangrove poles (used in roof construction), from either the delta of the Rufija River, in Tanganyka, or from the port of Lamu in Kenya. At the same time trading voyages to ᶜOmān and Ḥaḍramut, carrying passengers in addition to goods, were made. Ships, called dhows, adapted to deep sea voyages were used. There were several types including Baggals and latterly, the more secure Booms.(38)

In 1939 Kuwait had 106 dhows. These averaged about 100 tons - the largest being 300, and the smallest about 75

tons, according to European measurement. Their average value, at that time, was around 10,000 rupees, the approximate equivalent of $3,000.[39] During the same year, there were upwards of 10,000 qualified deep-sea sailors in Kuwait. The average salary was about 135 rupees ($40) for a nine month voyage, whilst the merchant owner received about 11,000 rupees.[40]

There were three seasons in the pearl fishing year: the al-ghaws al-kabīr (great diving), averaging four months, from June to the first week of October; the second called al-ghaws al-barid (cold diving), running from April to May; the third called the mujannah, running from October to March.[41]

In 1896 there were estimated to be 600 pearling vessels in Kuwait out of a total of 2,700 vessels in the Gulf region employing about 3,500 persons.[42] Despite the dangers of the diving operation (sharks and dawls - a jellyfish-like creature amongst others) only 100 rupees could be expected for the whole season (equivalent to about $35 or 50 rupees per attendant).[43] A very wide profit margin was maintained by the nakhudas and merchants - the feudal lords of the pearling trade.

After the First World War a number of incidents occurred which devastated the principal sources of national income. The first one was the appearance in quantity of Japanese cultured pearls in the world markets in the early 1920's. Although the importation of cultured pearls into the Gulf was prohibited, nevertheless great damage was done to the export market. The pearl merchants in the Gulf had

difficulty in competing with the price of cultured pearls.[44] This competition coincided with another crisis - the world depression of the early 1930's; the pearl market slumped further, beginning the decline which proved fatal. As a direct result, thousands of divers and attendants found themselves out of work, numerous pearl fishers turned to trading ships for employment as sailors travelling to India and Africa.[45] The Administrative Report of the Political Agency in Kuwait for the year 1935 records the slump:

> "The industry remained very low owing to the slump in the pearl market and resultant decrease in pearl diving. Boats are now cheaper than they have been for many years and the best builders in the town will make a dhow or smaller sailing boat for a third of the price charged a few years ago. The pearling vessels this year put into commission numbered about 250 as compared with 300 in 1934, and 750 in the hey day of pearling in the years just after the Great War of 1914-1918."(46)

However oil production created employment opportunities in Kuwait; many withdrew from the marine industries after 1938 and joined the oil company where wages were higher than in the traditional jobs. During the same period Saudi restrictions of trade between Kuwait and interior of Najd (by a land blockade extending for about twenty years from 1919-1939) were frequently in operation and trade activities in Kuwait declined. Not surprisingly, Kuwaiti merchants became interested in smuggling goods into neighbouring territories: Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and Iran when possible.

In order to understand the smuggling question in its

proper perspective it must first be appreciated that, of the states bordering on the Gulf, there were two distinct groups holding diametrically opposed policies concerning customs tariffs:[47] on the one hand Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia subscribed to the theory that the whole object of a tariff was to increase the revenue of the state, they therefore instructed their customs departments to make duties as high as possible. On the other hand Baḥrain, Qaṭar,Kuwait and Dubai, acting on behalf of the Trucial coast generally, believed that low tariffs would increase trade in their ports, to the definite detriment of the high tariff countries. All these low-tariff states lay on the western shore of the Gulf.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the second group of states with customs duties as low as 4 per cent ad valorem attracted consideable trade in consumer goods and that their inhabitants would engage in smuggling into neighbouring countries possessing high tariffs.[48] Iran always maintained by far the highest customs tariff amongst her neighbours, at times as much as 200 per cent ad valorem on some kinds of goods with Saudi Arabia the next highest at approximately 100 per cent tariff on some goods. Iraq, with her more moderate customs duties, was therefore the least abused by smuggling; smugglers preferred the country offering the highest returns.[49]

The development of the Iranian Navy made it more dangerous than before to run illicit cargoes to Iran. The business was mostly in the hands of Tangistani tribesmen, who sailed across from Iran to Kuwait with cargoes of

grain, fruit, oat fodder and <u>ᶜabā</u> cloth. They returned with tea and sugar. Those who supplied them in Kuwait were mostly Iranian merchants long settled in Kuwait, who had contacts on the other side. Cargoes were paid for in Kuwait and were run to the coast of Iran, between Lingah and Bushire, the carrier dividing the profits when goods were sold.(50) This smuggling provided opportunities for illegal emigration from Iran to the Gulf Shaikhdoms. The reform movement of 1938-39 in Kuwait vehemently opposed emigration from Iran which threatened to overwhelm the indigenous community.(51)

Much contraband also left Kuwait destined for Najd, sometimes carried by camel directly across the southern borders. At other times, still by camel, it was carried west into the southern Iraqi desert, then, when the caravan passed Qaṣīm, the camel trains were broken up, and parties of two or three aimed swiftly for Qaṣīm across the intervening desert. The most common method of smuggling into Najd, however, was for dhows to take cargoes down the coast to the vicinity of Jinneh Island and Abu ᶜAli, where there were a host of convenient shoals and hiding places. From thére cargoes were landed on the mainland, where the starving ᶜAwāzim, Bani Khālid, ᶜAjmān and Muṭair tribes arranged to transfer goods to Najd with the aid of relatives in Kuwait, who were eager to co-operate if it could be done in reasonable safety.(52)

Iraq was the third most common target. What contraband did go from Kuwait across the borders proceeded either by small dhow to the entrance of Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab and

to the upper reaches of Khor ᶜAbdulla, or by camel and donkey across the western frontier of Kuwait. The first method was usually managed as small traders from various villages on the Iraqi side of the lower reaches of the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab came down to Kuwait in small boats or balam which contained crews of four to five men each. They found the goods cheap, as compared with the cost and trouble of getting the same articles in Baṣra. The cost was probably about a quarter of what they would have to pay in their own country. These boats came to Kuwait laden with fruit, vegetables, firewood, etc., for all of which Kuwait was dependent on Iraq. The crews would try to return under cover of night, either by entering the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab and crawling past Fao customs post, or by dumping their cargoes on the boggy mud-flats at the head of Khor ᶜAbdulla and in the palm belt of the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab in hamlets where collaborators could take over and conceal the goods.(53)

The second method involved nomadic tribes. For six months in each year nomadic tribes, including the Muntafiq from Iraq, entered the territory of Kuwait. Some 15,000 people, male and female, entered Kuwait after the first fall of rain in November, and spread themselves over the whole country from Ṣafwan to the neutral zone and as far west as Rigai in the Baṭīn. These nomads sent parties into Kuwait town to sell their sheep, wool and clothing. Part of this was, of course, for their own legitimate needs, but a large proportion was for passing on to collaborators, who came down from the Euphrates from as far west as Samāwa,

and lived with the nomads until they could run their purchases across the western frontier of Kuwait. These collaborators were all tough and well-armed people, resembling the nomads themselves. They arrived with plenty of money and either came into the town and bought for themselves, or deputed the nomadic tribal women to do so. The smuggled goods usually found their way to the thickly-populated tribal country on both sides of the Euphrates; little of it entered the town.(54)

Smuggling from Kuwait into Iraq caused a difficult dispute between the two states, especially during the 1930's, when the smuggling operations included arms used during popular rebellions in the mid-Euphrates.(55) The British officials in the Gulf region made full reports on arms smuggling between Sa^cudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. These reports emphasised that no arms were imported into Kuwait by sea.(56) A secret report of the British forces in Iraq emphasised the fact that arms were being imported into Iraq in very large quantities; that the tribes were re-arming; and that this constituted a potential danger to the Iraqi government, in view of the weak administrative control in the majority of the Southen Liwas. The same report questioned the possibility of arms reaching Iraq whether via Kuwait or not.(57) T.C. Fowle, the Political resident in the Gulf reported that the means of passage of ammunition to tribesmen in Iraq were through the underpaid servants of Ibn Saᶜud and thence through Saᶜudi tribesmen amongst whom were merchants of Qaṣīm, who transferred arms to Samāwa and Muntafiq areas where the merchants of Karbala

and Najaf had long-standing pre-war connections with the merchants of Qaṣīm, and through soldiers of the Iraqi army.[58]

Major Edmonds, the British Adviser in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior considered the following story to be proof of rifle marketing in Kuwait as a result of his conversation with Iraqi tribesmen:

> It was quite a frequent occurrence for an Arab to buy a rifle in Kuwait for 5 or 6 and to travel with it to Iraq, where he would sell it for about twice that amount. The fact was that Kuwait had become a recognised market where Arabs, whether would-be smugglers or not, went to purchase arms."(59)

The Political Resident in the Gulf, T.C. Fowle, shared Major Edmond's views regarding the availability of arms for sale in Kuwait, but at the same time the former emphasised that the latter shared the views of the British authorities in the region that arms did not enter Kuwait by sea.[60]

The continuation of the smuggling trade, including arms, from Kuwait into Iraq, had a harmful effect on Iraq's security and economy, and gave Iraq an excuse to intervene in Kuwait. Yāsīn al-Hāshimi, a prominent politician who was Minister of Finance in 1933, estimated the Iraqi loss in customs revenue, resulting from the illegal trade via Kuwait at £30,000. Al-Hāshimi handed this information to Sir Francis Humphreys, His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in the form of a report.[61]

The authorities of Iraq, on the one hand attempted to co-operate with the ruler to stop the smuggling operations,

and on the other sought to use the smuggling question to achieve some influence in Kuwait. Iraq could not achieve her ambitions in Kuwait on the principle of the united front of Arab nationalism,(62) because of the ruler's opposition to, and fear of Iraq's overtures and because of existing British dominance in the Gulf region. The British opposed any sort of competition in the Gulf Shaikhdoms in accordance with the exclusive agreements with the tribal regimes.(63)

The smuggling trade disturbed Kuwaiti-Iraqi relations for three decades beginning in the 1920's. It is evident that smuggling from Kuwait into Iraq was directed mainly by Iraqis for the benefit of people in Iraq.(64)

Kuwait maintained a low customs tariff - a 5 per cent ad valorem duty on all goods entering Kuwait fixed by Shaikh Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ - to enable her to compete with other Shaikhdoms including Baḥrain and Dubai. There was a common policy of supplying the needs of the Bedouin world of Arabia of view of the contrasting policy in Iraq these Shaikhdoms became popular cheap markets for the Iraqi nomad population. These, financed and assisted by the river tribes of the Euphrates, had found it clearly to their advantage during the existing depression to come down to Kuwait to buy and sell.(65)

Iraq objected to the lost taxes, and requested Kuwait to prevent Iraqi tribesmen entering Kuwait territory, or failing this, to accept an Iraqi customs official in Kuwait, half of whose pay would come from Iraq, to act as customs Director, whose duty inter alia, would be to fix a

trade quota of imports sufficient for the needs of the Kuwaiti population.(66)

Kuwait's reply was that, she had just as much right to develop her small and meagre trade with the outside world as her bigger neighbour had, and that to accede to Iraq's demand even if it were possible to do so, would be tantamount to committing political suicide.(67)

Clearly Iraq's only course was to place a line of customs posts on the frontier, and by a system of tribal and police patrols to herself prevent the smuggling activities. Kuwait replied with an objection to being left "with Iraq's baby" and refusing to "poke out her eye with her own finger".(68)

As a small vulnerable country Kuwait was in danger of disaster in the face of economic sabotage by three neighbouring countries in the 1920's and 1930's. Bin Saud's "land blockade" had reduced her customs revenue from 13 lacs to 1 lac(69) of Rupees in 10 years (1923-1933).(70) Iran refused to accept Kuwait's low rate of duty, and to recognise her independent right to fix tariffs, then requested Kuwait to abandon her trade with the hinterland tribesmen.(71) In fact the national income of Kuwait before oil production derived largely from customs duty on transit trade. Therefore the absence of customs duty would lead to economic disaster in Kuwait.

Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir the ruler of Kuwait adhered tenaciously to his position that he was willing to negotiate a special anti-smuggling agreement with the Iraqi Government once he had reached an agreement with the Saudi

Government regarding the lifting of their blockade. He believed that if an agreement with Sa^{c}udi Arabia could be ratified and the blockade lifted, Kuwait's financial position would improve. At the same time the ruler emphasised that the smuggling trade would continue if the transit trade to Iraq through Zubair was fully taxed by Iraqi customs authorities.(72)

The Iraqi Government pressurized the Kuwaiti ruler to submit to its demand:(73)

a). The Shaikh's rights to his Bashiyah and Faddaghiyah Estates were contested by claimants who were considered by the Shaikh to have been instigated by the Iraqi Govenment in 1932.

b). In the same year the Iraqi Government imposed full taxation on the Shaikh's date gardens at Fao and export duty on produce from these gardens exported to Kuwait for the Shaikh's household use. These had hitherto been exempt under the istihlāk (consumption) law of 1931. It was reported that these taxes and duties were actually extracted from the ruler. Nevertheless the British Government had given the ruler of Kuwait in 1914 an undertaking that these properties should be exempt in perpetuity from taxation.(74)

c). It was reported that the Iraqi Government put obstacles in the way of, and levied fees upon Kuwait water-boats which brought drinking water for the town from the Shaṭṭ al-^{c}Arab.

d). In 1933 rioting and sabotage broke out amongst labourers on the ruler's date gardens at Fao. Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir declared that these disturbances were incited by the Mutaṣarrif, the Provincial Governor, of Baṣra under the orders of the Iraqi Government.

e). Several cases of attacks by Iraqi armed launches on Kuwait sailing craft alleged to be smuggling goods into Iraq were reported.

As Kuwait was under British protection, and Iraq had an alliance with Britain, the British government wanted to deal with the two neighbouring states cautiously. The Government of India explained the difficulty in taking a decision:

> "It will obviously be difficult to persuade the Shaikh to cut his own throat financially by co-operation with Iraq to prevent smuggling altogether. On the other hand, if no solution can be found, the Iraqi Government may be driven to impose a complete blockade which will force His Majesty's Government to intervene in a rather difficult situation".(75)

The ruler declared his inability to accept Iraq's proposals for financial reasons and feelings of mistrust, and suggested that an Iraqi customs official should visit Kuwait to confer with him. This, in turn, was declined by the Iraqi Government. The tension between the two neighbouring states was increased by Iraq's launch attacks on Kuwaiti sailing vessels. Angered by the customs delays the British Ambassador in Baghdād suggested that a conference be held in Baghdād. The conference was to have been been attended by Iraqi customs officials and the

Shaikh's Customs Director, assisted by the Political Agent in Kuwait and the Political Resident in the Gulf, but it fell through due to the Shaikh's feeling that the "dice would be too heavily loaded" against him in any conference held in Baghdād. He asked for the conference to be held in Kuwait where he would himself conduct Kuwait's case; he offered also to tighten up security very considerably to prevent sea smuggling (by means of receipted Way Bills, etc).(76) From a British point of view, Iraq could put an end to the smuggling trade from Kuwait into Iraq by one or more of the following measures: reducing her high customs tariffs; employing Kuwaiti Bedouin to end smuggling (as bin Saʿud had); placing customs posts along her frontiers (there were no customs posts for lengths of 100 miles or more); patrolling borders with armed cars; forbidding Iraqi merchants to import cargoes marked "Baṣra option Kuwait"; forbidding export to Kuwait of "bonded" cigarettes and tobacco, which the exporters brought back into Iraq, with the assistance of Iraqi tribesmen in their pay.(77)

The Iraqi point of view was that the Iraqi Government should take control of the Kuwaiti customs, impose the Iraqi tariff and compensate the ruler for whatever he might lose through such an arrangement. The Iraqi Government maintained this stand between 1932 and 1939.(78) The ruler of Kuwait, however, was evasive and avoided giving a direct reply.(79)

Early in 1934 an effort was made by Britain to persuade the ruler to send a representative to a conference at which inter alia ideas of this kind were to be

discussed, but he extricated himself from this at the last moment and the conference was abandoned.(80) In the autumn of the same year an informal conference between Iraqi representatives and the ruler was held in Kuwait on the 23rd September under the aegis of Lt.Col. G. Loch, the acting Political Resident in the Gulf. The Iraqi representatives were Dr. Nājī Bey al-Aṣīl and Taḥsīn Bey ʿAlī, Mutaṣarrif of Baṣra. They discussed with him the same Iraqi proposals, but he was unwilling to accept them.(81) Therefore the conversations resulted in no agreement.(82)

The Iraqi authorities were disappointed by the failure of the ruler of Kuwait to co-operate with them regarding the smuggling question. They decided to strengthen security and to protect their own territories from the smugglers' activities. From the 5th May 1934, the Iraqi police began to patrol the frontiers with armoured cars which led to a number of incidents within Iraqi territory.(83) In November 1936 another Iraqi endeavour aimed to resolve the dispute of the illegal trade when Dr. Nājī al-Aṣīl the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs visited the ruler of Kuwait, on his way to Riyadh. The Iraqi Minister discussed with the ruler and the Political Resident in the Gulf Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations especially the illegal trade. Al-Aṣīl declared to the Political Agent in Kuwait that after his discussion with the ruler he was convinced that the Mutaṣarrif of Baṣra's report and other reports about arms smuggling, were entirely erroneous.(84)

Al-Aṣīl's uncritical attitude towards the Kuwaitī

Government was accepted by T.C. Fowle the Political Resident in the Gulf.

> "Presumably as Foreign Minister, Naji al-Asil was the best authority on the subject".(85)

In reply the Kuwaiti ruler declared to Dr. al-Aṣīl during their meeting that he had issued an order forbidding natives of Kuwait to engage in arms smuggling into Iraq. Both the ruler and the Political Resident promised to tighten the control on smuggling in general,(86) but in practice the ruler did nothing.(87)

The continuation of the smuggling trade jeopardised not only Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations but also Iraqi-British relations. Iraqi newspapers such as al-Istiqlāl (the Independence) and al-Sijil (the Register) published articles calling for the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq in order to eliminate unsolved problems with Kuwait, such as the smuggling trade.(88) When Tawfīq al-Suwaidī, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited London in October 1938, he discussed with the British Government issues in dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. Before the arrival of the Iraqi Minister he communicated a memorandum to the United Kingdom Delegation at Geneva to serve as a basis for his discussions with the British Government. Suwaidi raised in Section 3 of this memorandum, the question of the legal status of the Shaikhdom of Kuwait and made certain alternative suggestions for the solution of the problem of the smuggling and illegal arms traffic from Kuwait into Iraq. The suggestions were: a customs union between Iraq

and Kuwait; the cession to Iraq of the northen part of Kuwait in order to facilitate police manoeuvres; and combined preventative operations.[89] The Iraqi Minister had three conversations in the Foreign Office held on the 4th October and was accompanied by Major Edmonds, the Adviser in the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior in the second conversation. During the conversations Suwaidī indicated that he did not wish to insist on discussing the question of the international status of Kuwait, but that he strongly urged that further efforts should be made to eradicate what the Iraqi Government considered their legitimate grievances in the matters of smuggling and arms traffic from the Shaikhdom.[90] Al-Suwaidī and Edmond embarrassed the British team when they gave proofs of arms smuggling incidents in their statements that Kuwait was in fact used as a centre at which arms could conveniently be bought. Nevertheless the British Government had in the past always taken their responsibility for checking the arms traffic in the Gulf.[91]

Regarding arms smuggling the British representatives in these conversations gave sympathetic consideration to the suggestion, made by Major Edmonds, that the sale of arms in Kuwait should be subjected to same strict form of Government control. Regarding the al-Suwaidī's proposals the British Government did not give any promise of satisfaction but maintained that careful consideration had been given to the possibility of taking action on the lines suggested by Major Edmonds to the effect that, since the main case for smuggling into Iraq was the low level of the

Kuwaiti tariff, the difficulty might be overcome if the Kuwaiti customs tariff were increased to the level of the Iraqi tariff.[92]

The British Government did not accept al-Suwaidī's proposals for the following reasons:[93]

a). From the political point of view the formation of a customs union between the two countries was undesirable, since such an arrangement between a large state, like Iraq, and a small state, like Kuwait, might be expected to undermine the independence of the Shaikhdom. Moreover, the introduction in Kuwait of the higher Iraqi tariff level might threaten Kuwait as a centre of genuine trade.

b). The acceptance of the second proposal would lead to the loss of about one-third of Kuwaiti territories - this would lead to insuperable difficulties.

c). Regarding the third suggestion, the British Government informed al-Suwaidī in 1937 that Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir had agreed to negotiate a special anti-smuggling agreement with the Iraqi Government once he had reached agreement with the Saᶜudi Government regarding the raising of their blockade, and agreement was expected to be reached soon.

The British Government was of course aware that it was for the Iraqi Government in the first place to ensure that smuggling into their territory did not take place.

She informed the Iraqi Minister that, the British Government had never objected to any measures taken by the Iraqi Government to put down illegal traffic from Kuwait, so long as Kuwait's territorial rights were not infringed. It was reported that the British Government had intimated to al-Swaidī that,

> "according to expert opinion given to His Majesty's Government in confidence (by Sir John Ward, Director of the Port of Basra), the Iraqi Authorities could give smuggling from Kuwait a decisive blow if they were to take certain additional measures (daily patrols by aeroplanes and armoured cars on the land, and by revenue cutters at sea)"(94)

The Foreign Office described the difficult position of Britain vis-a-vis the two neighbouring countries caused by the smuggling problem:

> "Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that the consistent refusal of the Shaikh to take, or even to discuss, any practical measures to co-operate with the Iraqi Government in this matter is not consistent with the relations which normally exist between neighbouring countries. Nor can it be denied that His Majesty's Government must accept some degree of responsibility in the matter since, but for their protection of the Shaikh, the Iraqi Government would no doubt find the means of inducing him to adopt a more accommodating and friendly attitude. In view, indeed, of the special relationship of His Majesty's Government to Koweit (sic), and of their alliance with Iraq, His Lordship regards the existing position as particularly unfortunate, since it inevitably raises doubts in Iraq as to the extent to which it is possible to rely on the friendship of His Majesty's Government, and their willingness to provide their ally with reasonable assistance in the protection of Iraqi interests"(95)

Early in 1939 arms smuggling from Kuwait into Iraq was controlled owing to the vital role of British officials

in Iraq and Kuwait in imposing restrictions on gun-runners in the two neighbouring countries. Therefore T.C. Fowle the Political Resident in the Gulf reported on the 23rd February 1939 in a letter to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, at New Delhi that,

> "The sale of rifles is prohibited in the town. As you are aware Kuwait town on the land side is surrounded by a wall and there are guards at each of the three gates. No Bedouin is permitted to bring a rifle into the town without a written permit which is only given when a rifle is in need of repairs. Rifles which do not need repair are left in charge of the guards at the gates. There are three armourers in the town who do not manufacture arms but only repair them. All incoming and outgoing merchandise is examined immediately upon arrival at the Customs House which is situated just inside the main gate. This gate is the only gate by which merchandise is allowed to pass"

Finally, he ended his report,

> "The control of arms in Kuwait is adequate, and I have no suggestions to offer under this head"(96)

Significantly, the elimination of arms smuggling from Kuwait into Iraq was due to the formation of a disciplined Police Force late in 1938 which was one of the achievements of the first Legislative Council (July-December 1938).(97) Moreover the success of the nationalist reform movement after the formation of the Legislative Council alarmed both Britain and the ruler with the prospect of a revolutionary movement possibly supported by Iraq, against the tribal regime. It was this fear which dictated the arms import/export restrictions, especially on the part of the Shaikh who had given the security of Kuwait more

attention. But at the same time smuggling such articles as coffee, tea, sugar, tobacco, continued.

The impact of the smuggling business on Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations is evident from a Telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Baghdād to the Foreign Office,

> "From what all the Iraqi Ministers I spoke to when I was in Baghdad last February said to me,...they are in a state of intense irritation about the Kuwaiti smuggling and... this issue dominates all their relations with Kuwait"(98)

Clearly, the negative attitude taken by the ruler of Kuwait to all the Iraqi government's efforts and proposed solutions stemmed from two concerns: firstly, his realisation of the importance of customs duties to the revenue of the state and its dependence upon the activities of the merchantile classes; secondly, his fears of a development of Iraqi influence in Kuwait, which might threaten his independence.

(c) Other aspects of Iraq's efforts to co-operate with Kuwait.

Iraq was the first Arab country to attempt to practice the concepts and doctrines of Arab nationalism in the early period of this century as expressed in the objectives of the twenties revolution. The programmes of the secret societies Jam^ciyyat al-^cAhd al-^cIrāqī (the society of Iraqi covenant) and Jam^ciyyat Ḥaras al-Istiqlāl (the society of Guardians of Independence) established in 1919 emphasised Arab unity.(99) Arab Nationalist concepts arose in Iraq in the 1930's and were put into practice in

the Arab Nationalist Policy of Yāsīn al-Hāshimī's Government (March 1935 - October 1936) with King Ghazi's personal support. This phenomenon will be examined in detail in Section Three of this chapter. The efforts to co-operate with Kuwait stemmed from this policy. Despite British obstacles and the reluctance of Aḥmad al-Jābir to consolidate relations between the two states, the Iraqi Government continued its diplomatic and propagandist pressure on Kuwait to solve mutual problems.

The British authorities responsible for affairs in the Gulf region, in India and in London, always saw these efforts in terms of their effect on British interests. Iraq's efforts would end British influence not only in Kuwait but in the Gulf region generally. As the tribal regimes of the Gulf Shaikhdoms associated their future with British influence in the region, the Iraqi Government was prevented from reaching its goals. There were a number of fields in which the Iraqi Government proposed co-operation.

The Kuwait Post Office was opened in January 1915, while the Kuwait Telegraph Office was opened on the 4th December 1916.(100) By a strange anomaly Iraq took over the British telegraph line which joined Baṣra to Kuwait, when the Post and Telegraph Administration in Iraq was made over to the Iraq Government.(101) With effect after the 1st August 1921 the Kuwait Post Office was transferred to the Iraq Postal Department, and Iraqi postal rates and regulations were brought into force. It was reported that the change was most unpopular in Kuwait, owing to the enormous increase in the rates of postage, and also to the

temporary loss of Kuwaiti control. However it was hoped that the privileged facilities, such as the value Payable Postage system and Telegraphic Money orders, which it had enjoyed as an Indian Post Office,[102] would continue. The presence of the British Mandate in Iraq from 1920-1932 was responsible for the Iraqi take-over. The ruler of Kuwait was apparently never consulted, and the curious spectacle of an Iraq Post and Telegraph office with its staff in Iraqi uniforms in the centre of Kuwait Town was established.[103]

The actual Post and Telegraph office in Kuwait continued to be maintained and run by the Iraqi Government, though the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations as an independent country had made the continuance of this arrangement highly undersirable to both the Britain and the ruler of Kuwait. Negotiations had therefore been progressing within the British Government with a view to the transference of the Post Office to the Government of India, and for a British owned wireless station to be set up in Kuwait, in place of the present land line. It was regretted by Britain that this important matter was not settled in 1931 and that negotiations were still dragging on.[104]

The Ruler of Kuwait objected to a state of affairs which weakened his authority gradually, and requested that a British Post Office and Wireless Station be given to him in place of the Iraqi ones, but neither was granted.[105] Noticeably, Shaikh Mubārak agreed in a treaty of the 26th July 1912 that he was debarred from allowing a foreign

power to place a post or telegraph office in his Shaikhdom.(106)

To assure the Iraqi interests in Kuwait Ja^cfar Pasha al-ᶜAskarī, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a letter to the ruler of Kuwait via the British Embassy in Baghdād and British Residency in Bushire, No. 6056, dated the 12th September, 1932, regarding the proposals of the Iraqi Government on the future administration of the Kuwait postal, telegraph and telephone services. In response the British Embassy in Baghdād reported that the Shaikh of Kuwait had replied that he was prepared to enter into an agreement with the Iraqi Government for the Iraqi Post and Telegraph Department to administer these services on the following conditions:

"(a) The agreement to run for a period of fifteen years only.

(b) The Iraqi Government to pay to the Shaikh of Kuwait an annual subsidy of Rupees 16,200 for the privilege of administering the postal, telegraph and telephone services in Kuwait

(c) The Shaikh of Kuwait to enjoy the personal privilege (to be confined to successive Heads of the State only) of sending <u>private</u> telegrams free of charge. (The Shaikh explains that the cost of these would be limited to a maximum of Rs.200 per month).

(d) The Shaikh to enjoy free personal use of the Kuwait-Zubair-Basra telephone line

(e) A connection to be carried to Jahra village from the Kuwait-Zubair-Basra telephone line about to be constructed.

(f) The agreement to contain a clear admission on the part of the Iraqi Government that their administration

> of the postal, telegraph and telephone services of Kuwait is by consent of the Kuwait Government and confers no political or other rights on the Iraqi Government."(107)

The Iraqi Government responded to these conditions with the followng observations, reported in a note from the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy in Baghdād:

> "1. The agreement should be concluded for a period of twenty years.
>
> 2. As it is unlikely that the Kuwait Post Office will produce considerable profit, the Iraqi Government are unable to make payments for the grant to them of a concession to undertake certain services for the Shaikh of Kuwait.
>
> 3. The Iraqi Government are unable to agree that the Shaikh of Kuwait may enjoy the privilege of transmitting telegrams free of charge, because no authority in Iraq enjoys such a privilege.
>
> 4. It is impossible to agree to the Shaikh of Kuwait using the Kuwait-Zubair-Basra line free of charge, in view of the reasons stated in paragraph 3 above.
>
> 5. The extension of the Kuwait-Zubair-Basra telephone line, the construction of which will be started shortly, to the village of Jahra may be agreed to
>
> 6. The request for a plain admission to be given by the Iraq Government to the effect that administration by them of the Kuwait postal, telegraphic and telephonic service is undertaken only with the consent of the Government of Kuwait, may be conceded."(108)

The British were alarmed at the prospect of the petty dispute disrupting communication.

"I suggest, therefore, that I be authorised

to approach the Shaikh and point out that it is to his interests, as well as those of His Majesty's Government that speedy communication be maintained between Kuwait and the outside world, the lack of which might have serious consequences in times of crisis."(109)

The Post and Telegraph office in Kuwait continued to be maintained and run by the Government of Iraq in accordance with the new proposals of the ruler of Kuwait accepted by the Iraqi Government. This arrangement between the two neigbouring countries continued from the 3rd May 1933 through to 1940. The ruler of Kuwait continued from 1936 to press the Political Agent to continue negotiations with the Cable and Wireless Co. He disliked the presence of the Iraqi Post Office in his Country.[110] In January 1940 the owners of the Cable and Wireless Company concluded negotiations with the ruler for the management of the Post and Telegraph office after the completion of a wireless station.[111]

The anti-Iraqi feelings of the ruler of Kuwait increased when the Iraqi press published hostile attacks on Kuwait during 1938.[112] In a conversation between the Political Agent H.R.P. Dickson and the ruler Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir showed his irritation at Iraq's continued administration of the Post and Telegraph office. The former reported that when he asked the ruler whether he was sure that the mercantile community of Kuwait would agree to be without a telegraph office he replied:

"of course, seeing that they all as well as their Ruler, are nervous of Iraq and her well known aspirations."(113)

Two Iraqi construction projects also aimed at strengthening relations between the neighbouring states, Iraq and Kuwait; the extension of the Iraqi railway system through Kuwaiti territory to the coast in Kuwait Bay, and the construction of a port there under Iraqi control.(114) The British official view in the region, and in London, reflected apprehension over the Iraqi projects. The British authorities considered that the execution of such a plan might lead to a great extension of Iraqi influence in Kuwait and so make it increasingly difficult to maintain the integrity of the Shaikhdom. Furthermore, in view of the great interest taken by the British Government in the maintenance of the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab, it appeared doubtful whether it was from this point of view desirable that the Iraqi Government should develop on the coast of the Gulf a port which could reduce the amount of shipping using the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab.(115) According to the British official analysis of the Foreign Office, the execution of the above Iraqi projects would cause a territorial dispute over Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab. In fact the Iraqi Government realised that the potential dangers of Iranian interference with shipping in the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab and the Rooka Channel, should hasten preparation for an alternative outlet to the sea in Kuwait.(116) However it was clear to the British Government that the Iraqi Government would not force their suggestions on Kuwait.(117) After discussions in 1938 between the different British authorities concerned with the Gulf, the

British view could be summarised: In the first place, the construction of a port in Kuwait lay under Iraqi control, coupled with an extension of the Iraqi railway thereto, would be open to objection on the ground that if such a project was executed, the Shaikhdom would tend to fall gradually under Iraqi influence. Therefore the British would not agree to allow any foreign power to create any sort of influence in the Gulf Shaikhdoms connected with Britain by special agreements. In the second place, a British protected shaikhdom (Kuwait) should not become dependent economically on Iraq to too great an extent. Furthermore, the development of the port would no doubt involve the granting of privileges which would tend to assume a political character such as freedom from Kuwait customs control. It seemed very unlikely that the Iraqi Government would agree that Kuwait, a comparatively insignficant shaikhdom, should have any considerable role in their new port.(118)

In the third place, the British Admiralty believed that the effect of the scheme would be to precipitate aggression between Iran and Iraq, which could hardly be regarded as serious as long as Anglo-Iraqi alliance was maintained. As a result any Iranian aggression on Iraq would lead to British interference to protect Iraq. However the British were the biggest purchasers of Iranian oil, and oil supplies to Britain would be effected by tension or war between Iran and Iraq, causing danger to the traffic of Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab and hence to its continued

existence as a navigable river as far as Baṣra.[119]

In the fourth place, a port at Kuwait, an alternative to Baṣra, would possess certain attractions, and might well prove to be a valuable complement to plans to consolidate relations between Egypt, Iraq and Palestine. This situation would lead to the reinforcement of anti-British groups in the region.[120] Therefore the British decided to discourage the projects of the Iraqi Government.[121]

However, the British decision emphasised that as far as developments were concerned in this locality in the future, it would be desirable that the port and the railhead should remain under the control nominally of the Shaikh, and actually of his British advisers.[122] The British decision emphasised that,

> "In particular the possibility of Kuwait eventually becoming an oil producing centre may lead to improvements in port facilities for commercial purposes, and in such an eventuality it would be most desirable for the strategic requirements to be borne in mind."(123)

British reports stated that there was Iraqi influence in Kuwait, represented by the Kuwaiti's who accepted Iraqi suzerainty, although they were a minority. The majority resisted any attempt at Iraqi domination.[124] Finally, they suggested that, the most suitable place for establishing an Iraqi port would be Khor ᶜAbdulla, (named on the map Khor Zubair). Therefore the British authorities permitted the ruler of Kuwait to negotiate formally with Tawfīq al-Suwaidī, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the creation of an Iraqi port.[125] But unfortunately

unresolved hostilities, especially after the public support of the King Ghazi and Iraqi press to the Nationalist reform movement in Kuwait in 1938-39, hindered agreement between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Governments.

When a suggestion was made at the beginning of 1930 that an Iraqi Vice-Consul should be appointed at Kuwait, the British Government replied that they were not prepared, having regard to the exclusive Agreement of 1899, to sanction the appointment of foreign consular representatives. The matter was not pursued by the Iraqi Government.(126) In addition to the negative attitude of Britain toward the Iraqi request Kuwaiti opposition to any foreign representation was strong - especially from the ruler of Kuwait.(127) From the British point of view, the appointment of a foreign consular representative in Kuwait would make it difficult to refuse a similar concession to the Iranian and the Saᶜudi Governments. During a meeting held at the India Office on Monday, the 9th October 1933, to consider the question of foreign consular representation in the Gulf, Lieutenant Colonel T.C. Fowle, the Political Resident in the Gulf said that,

> "the Shaikh of Koweit (sic) had been in the past and would still be very strongly opposed to any foreign representation in his state."(128)

Public knowledge of Iraq's ambitions led Britain to oppose official visits between Iraq and the Gulf Shaikhdoms. Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir visited Baghdād on the 21st August, 1932, on a private visit to King Faiṣal. The Political Agent at Kuwait accompanied him as far as Baṣra.

The Shaikh was well received by the King, and by all officials with whom he came into contact. The visit may be said to have been successful as far as it went. On his departure the ruler was invested with the order of the Rafidan First Class.(129) The newspaper "al-Ikhā'al-Waṭanī" (the National Brotherhood), the mouthpiece of Hizb al-Ikha al-Waṭanī" (the National Brotherhood Party) published an article referring to this visit and its effects on the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait. The same article mentioned that the ruler longed to seize the opportunity, through intermarriage, for strenthening the relationship between the two countries, so that the customs barrier, "founded by the dividing foreigner" should be once and for all removed. Moreover the same article added,

> "also that differences and passport formalities should be done away with resulting in the flags of both nations being hoisted side by side on buildings and palaces, and so enabling the Arabs to leap the first barrier that prevents progress and prosperity."(130)

When King Faiṣal wanted to return the visit, the British officials studied the motives and the potential outcome of such a visit. The arguments were various: King Faiṣal, it was thought, should realise that Kuwait had special relations with Britain, and he should not visit without an intimation to that effect to the Ambassador at Baghdād.(131)

Moreover, it became clear to the British officials at the India office that various factors indicated that King Faiṣal wished to attempt to bring Kuwait gradually into

closer connection with Iraq, and that he would favour anything which tended towards the unification of the Gulf Shaikhdoms under his own aegis.(132)

Furthermore, the British C.I.D. opinion, as laid down in 1929, was that:

> "as regards Kuwait, it is better on the whole that... while endeavouring to secure so far as possible that Kuwait shall not be identified with Iraq, we should defer the establishment of a formal protectorate until circumstances appear to make this more clearly desirable."(133)

Above all, Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, the Political Agent at Kuwait told the Shaikh's Secretary that the British Government would raise no objection to the visit, provided that it was a private one; that any proposal of a visit should come through the proper channel i.e. the Ambassador in Baghdād. These provisions stemmed from the special relations which Kuwait had with the British Government.(134)

Finally, the Political Agent explained the same views to the ruler of Kuwait later after dinner, when he took the Shaikh aside. The latter replied,

> "If you mean that I am to inform King Faisal of what you have told me, should he ask to visit my state, why, then you are mistaken: such action is entirely your Government's business. The reply I shall send will be 'Your Majesty is welcome and doubly welcome, any other course would be unfriendly and not in accordance with Arab ideas of hospitality."(135)

It was typical of the relationship between the ruler and British officialdom that he should outspokenly resent advice tendered, being already restricted by the exclusive

agreement of 1899, but obediently bow to pressure in his conduct.

As a result of their analysis, the British Government was entirely against any closer connection between Iraq and Kuwait.[136] In addition, the British officials suggested that any desire on the part of King Faiṣal to visit the Gulf Shaikhdoms should be firmly discouraged.[137] Finally, the ruler of Kuwait informed the Iraqi King that the visit should be private and there would not be an official welcome.[138] The Political Agent at Kuwait reported that King Faiṣal had made no move in the matter, nor had he any intention of visiting Kuwait in summer 1933.[139] King Faiṣal died on the 8th of September 1933 before he achieved his desire to visit the Gulf Shaikhdoms, including Kuwait.

The ruler later received a letter from Ḥāmid al-Naqīb, one of the Iraqi notables at Baṣra and Kuwait, stating that the Iraqi Foreign Minister was proceeding to Riyadh, on June the 24th or the 25th, 1939, travelling via Kuwait. Al-Naqīb hoped that the Shaikh would entertain the Foreign Minister, and that the opportunity would be taken to discuss Kuwaiti-Iraqi affairs. Al-Naqīb suggested that, if the Shaikh did not wish to entertain the Foreign Minister, he (al-Naqīb) would put him up in his house in Kuwait. The ruler answered that he would be pleased to entertain the Foreign Minister as his private guest but that he could not on any account discuss Kuwaiti-Iraqi affairs.[140]

The conclusion of this argument clarified some of the

fundamental elements of the relationship between the two neighbouring states, and shed some light on the relations between the Gulf Shaikhdoms in general. At the same time the discussion examined the Iraqi policy to create co-operation between the two peoples. These attempts failed on the grounds of British dominance in the region. Britain had considered the Gulf a "British Lake" since the beginning of this century, and she would not allow any power to weaken or threaten her position in the region, whether regional or external.

The negative response to Iraq's initiatives caused dissent in Kuwait and frustration in Iraq. The nascent Kuwaiti Nationalist Reform movement (founded by Kuwaitis educated in Iraq) was given extensive media support in Iraq, and the patronage of King Ghazi. Links between the leaders of Kuwait's Nationalist Movement and the Iraqi Nationalist Movement were established.

2. The Reform Movement of 1921: Its origins and effects on the Socio-political Structure.

Shaikh Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ had broken with the traditional procedures of succession. Since 1752, the ruler of the Shaikhdom had been elected from the Royal family, by the upper classes. Mubārak killed his two brothers, Moḥammad (the preceding ruler) and Jarrāḥ, and seized power after their murder in 1896. The fratricide was motivated by resentment at Moḥammad and Jarrāḥ's arrogation of power, their withholding of money and also by suspicion of Yūsuf al-Ibrāhīm a merchant and notable, of great influence with the Royal family.(141) From that time

the position of the mercantile class was threatened by a tyrannical policy which weakened their influence. No longer did Kuwaiti politics revolve around the direct influence of the merchants on the ruler.(142)

Mubārak therefore signed the exclusive agreement of 1899 with Britain without any consultation with the mercantile class.(143) Further, he co-operated, to the point of participation, with the British army during the first military operation in Southern Iraq at the beginning of the First World War, again without the consent of the mercantile class.(144) It was not surprising that the ᶜulamā' in Kuwait opposed the ruler's conduct. Their opposition was based on religious solidarity with the Ottomans, in response to the Sultan's call to Muslims for al-Jihād (the religious battle). Soon after Britain had conquered Baṣra, a small uprising erupted in Kuwait, early in April, 1915, during the absence of Shaikh Mubārak at Moḥammarah. Upon his return, Mubārak summoned Shaikh Moḥammad Shanqīṭī, a Moorish doctor of religion, who was preaching al-Jihād within Kuwaiti territory. Mubārak gave Shanqīṭī a description of his relations with the British Government and the views he held with regard to the Turks, and informed him in forcible language that any further conduct of the kind reported would lead to his execution. Shanqīti disappeared from Kuwait forthwith and has not returned.(145)

Significantly, the Kuwaiti uprising coincided with the Najaf uprisings in 1914 and 1915.(146) The Kuwaiti

movement may well have been influenced by Iraqi popular resistance to the British Army.

Shaikh Sālim Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ (1917-1921) continued the despotic line introduced by Mubārak. As a result of his provocation of the British and the Saᶜudi's and because of the upheaval of the war, social and economic conditions deteriorated. The British Government's sea blockade imposed after the 22nd February 1918 hindered the flow of trade. A British blockade officer, Lieutenant D.V. McCollum, and four other naval representatives landed at Kuwait on the afore-mentioned date to control the blockade arrangements. It was reported that the British action against Kuwait was due to the fact that Kuwait was being used as a base for supplying goods to the Turks and to the tribes ranged on the Turkish side after 1917.(147) The sea blockade on the 3rd November 1918 under the orders of general headquarters on conclusion of the armistice with Turkey, but the shipping restrictions as regards exports from India to Kuwait remained in force at the end of the year. Nevertheless Shaikh Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ issued a notice proclaiming his friendship with the threat that anyone acting against the British Government in word or deed would be dispossessed of property and be exiled from Kuwait.(148) Moreover Shaikh Sālim was compelled to deport Yūsuf al-Duwairī(149) to Bombay on the 29th August 1918 after the receipt of the Civil Commissioner's message(150) through the Political Agent.(151) The land blockade imposed by the Saudi Government from 1919 and the aforementioned sea blockade intensified the decline.

The merchants, notables and ᶜulamā' the most important groups in Kuwait outside of the ruling families - were disappointed by the misguided policy of the ruling family. These groups disagreed with the Shaikh and reasserted their right to be consulted on matters involving serious decisions.(152)

The twenties uprising in Iraq was the manifestation of Iraqi opposition to renewed occupation by the British Army, after the evacuation of the Turkish Army. The rebels valued their liberty sufficiently to resist, despite the inadequacy of their weaponry. There was no comparison between the equipment and ammunition of the British Army and the rebels, although ammunition was reportedly being sold to the latter from Kuwait.(153)

The Iraqi uprising was guided by the ᶜulamā', notables, tribal shaikhs and intellectuals. The most considerable achievement of this uprising was the formation of a national constitutional and parliamentary government, headed by King Faiṣal I, and the creation of national unity; all of which provided a sympathetic forum for a Nationalist Party views and an opening for the formation of a modern Iraqi Nationalist Movement. The positive achievements impressed the Islamic World and encouraged the people in the Gulf region to oppose despotic rule in the Shaikhdoms.

A strong reaction against a foreign dominated autocratic rule, coupled with the enticement of the successful twenties uprising in Iraq, encouraged the upper classes in Kuwait and Baḥrain(154) to lead the Nationalist

Reform Movements to press for democracy.

The sudden death of Shaikh Sālim Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ on the 23rd February, 1921, when the heir apparent, Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ, was at the head of a peace mission in Najd (on the subject of the Sa^c udi land blockade) provided the opportunity for the mercantile classes to start their movement.(155)

On the of 24 February a representative body of the mercantile class assembled at Nāṣir al-Badir's home to discuss the question of succession and to determine their own role in political questions.(156) They presented their demands in the form of a petition to the ruling family. The petition informed the al-Ṣabāḥis that the signatories accepted their peaceful rule in Kuwait, and nominated for succession Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir, Shaikh ^c Abdulla al-Sālim and Shaikh Ḥamad Mubārak.(157) The nominees were the most prominent and capable of rule amongst the ruling family. The petition emphasised the traditional groups' wishes to participate in political decision-making, as had traditionally been the case, in the form of a small elected council. To this the al-Ṣabāḥis agreed, and it was decided that Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir, who was then in Najd, should be acclaimed ruler on his return, provided that he too agreed to this condition.(158)

Shaikh Aḥmad arrived in Kuwait on the 24th March and was accepted as the new Ruler of Kuwait by the al-Ṣabāḥ family the same day. On the 25th a meeting of the traditional leading groups was called; these also accepted

him; his tactful speech having made a very favourable impression. He made an agreement with the people to the effect that:

> First, Criminal cases would be decided only in accordance with the Shari^ca.
>
> Second, in the event of appeal, the written statements of both parties and the Qadi's judgment would be submitted to the <u>culama</u>, whose decision would be final.
>
> Third, if both parties in a dispute agreed beforehand to accept the arbitration of a third party, the arbitrator's decision would hold.
>
> Fourth, the ruler would consult his people in all matters affecting the town (sic), both internal and external.
>
> Fifth, if anyone had any suggestion to make for the benefit of the town or people, he would lay it before the ruler, who would consult his people and, if they approved, would adopt the proposal".(159)

Finally, a council of advisers, consisting of twelve members, was elected in April 1921 but no time was fixed for it to meet - the intention being that it should only do so when the Shaikh wished to discuss any matter, or when the members wished to lay any matter before him.(160)

Although the consultative council was accepted by the new ruler it gradually dissolved after two months for several reasons. Amongst these were the lack of political experience of the members and the opposition of both the ruling family and British officials to a council which threatened the omnipotence of the al-Ṣabāḥ.(161) The formation of this council in Kuwait was considered the first step towards the modernisation of the tribal political system in Kuwait. It seems likely that the

reform movement of Kuwait of 1921 was influenced by the objectives of the 1920's uprising in Iraq, which had emphasised the importance of a constitutional and parliamentary government.

The reform movement of 1921 was the first opposition movement not only in Kuwait but also in the smaller Gulf Shaikhdoms. It attempted to protect the prestige and the influence of the mercantile class, which provided the backbone of the economic structure. The principal factors causing the failure of this movement were: the extent of illiteracy in Kuwaiti society; the absence of national consciousness; and poor communication between the leading group of the opposition and the mass of the population. After this abortive attempt, the new ruler continued in the same manner as his predecessor.(162)

3. The Reform Movement of 1938-1939

Iraq's influence on cultural and political thought in Kuwait became more potent during the 1920's and the 1930's. The presence of Kuwaiti students at the modern and traditional schools,(163) and the regular arrival of the Iraqi newspapers to Kuwait such as al-Sijil, al-Zamān, al-Bilād, al-Thaghr, al-ᶜUmrān and al-Hātif sustained Iraqi-Kuwaiti cultural communications.(164) The mutual exchange visits of the ᶜulamā' and intellectuals contributed to Iraqi influence.

Furthermore Iraqi newspapers and journals became the outlet not only for the literary productions of Kuwaitis, but also for political essays which criticised and attacked

the virtual dictatorship in Kuwait.

If the uprising of the 1920's of Iraq exerted an indirect influence on Kuwait's 1921 reform movement, later events in Iraq had direct effects on the nationalist reform movement of 1938-39. A number of factors catalysed the movement. These were: the internal situation in Kuwait, political and ideological development in Iraq and the external effects of these developments.

After the failure of the early reform movement, various developments occurred which were to foster the creation of political opposition. These developments were:

Firstly, the growth of cultural and political consciousness. The formation of al-Nādī al-Adabī (The Literary Club), on the 14th of August 1923, marked the foundation of the cultural movement in Kuwait.(165) Iraqi and Egyptian newspapers arrived regularly in the library of this club. The members were influenced by the activities of the political parties in Iraq and Egypt. In spite of the prevalence of illiteracy in Kuwaiti society the club discussed many of the questions which occupied intellectuals in more progressive countries. The question of women and their role in society was raised, following the Egyptian intellectual movement of Qāsim Amīn, Huda Shaᶜrāwi and Ṣafiyyah Zaghlūl which called for the liberation of women. As a result of such activities the club played a significant role in the propagation of cultural and political enlightenment among Kuwaitis.(166)

Furthermore on 20th June 1928 al-Rashīd, edited Majallat al-Kuwait(167) the first Kuwaiti journal, which

published articles by prominent Arab intellectuals. These scholars included Shakīb Arsalān, Shaikh Moḥammad Rashīd Riḍa - the owner of the Journal al-Manār, Maḥmūd Shukrī al-Alūsī, ᶜAbdul Qādir al-Maghribī and ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Thaᶜālibī.(168) The appearance of these articles in the pages of the Kuwaiti journal during that period demonstrated the development of cultural and political thought in Kuwait; and also the belief of Kuwaitis in cultural and intellectual unity among Arab nationals.

It became the sole journal in the smaller Gulf Shaikhdoms to publish the literary productions of Arab intellectuals.(169) Although it was produced for only two years, it assisted in the propagation of cultural consciousness not only among Kuwaitis, but also in the Gulf region as a whole.(170)

Moreover, the formation of the public library al-Maktaba al-Ahliyya in Kuwait in 1936 created new opportunities to spread cultural enlightenment.(171)

These internal channels of the cultural movement, in addition to the educational services of al-Mubārakiyyah and al-Aḥmadiyyah schools, and the group of students who graduated from the Iraqi schools, formed the generation which led the cultural and political activities during the 1930's, 1940's and 1950's.(172)

Above all, the Iraqi press provided the means for Kuwaiti writers and poets to publish their productions before the creation of the Legislative Council on 6th July 1938;(173) it became the organ of what the British referred to as "the Kuwait Secret Society", officially named -

Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī.(K.S.W.)[174]

Secondly, the growth of Iranian emigration to Kuwait, especially the illegal exodus during the 1920's[175] and 1930's,[176] caused discontent among the indigenous community. Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ employed Iranian police and, it was said, encouraged Iranian immigration in order to enable him to control his own people.[177] In 1938 the number of Iranians amounted to about 10,000.[178] The Kuwaitī Arabs were concerned by the growth of Iranian influence. Mulla Ṣāliḥ, the Shaikh's State Secretary from the 1920's, himself an Iranian Shiᶜi by origin, gave Iranians a means of access to the head of the state in case of grievances.[179] Amongst the Iranians who occupied senior jobs was ᶜAbdulla, the son of Mulla Ṣāliḥ, who was the Government representative of the Kuwait Oil Company after 1936.[180] Moreover, early in 1939 the ruler permitted the Iranians to establish their own school. He offered 2,000 Rupees as a yearly contribution and ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim, then his heir, contributed 500 Rupees to the same project.[181] At the same time regulations were laid down to restrict visits by non-Kuwaiti Arabs.[182] These restrictions were laid down by the British Consul.[183]

Thirdly, the Saᶜudi blockade which began in 1919 and the Ikhwan raid on Kuwait (1928-1932), weakened Kuwait socially and economically, and increased discontent over the Shaikh's authority as well.[184] During the 1930's Ibn Saᶜud's blockade, rather than ceasing, had increased in

severity, and was literally strangling Kuwait to death.(185) The closeness of this blockade coupled with the complete failure of the 1931 Kuwait Pearl Season, for the third year in succession, had reduced Kuwait to such a state of poverty and economic distress that it had required all the skill and patience of the ruler to prevent the rasher members of al-Ṣabāḥis from attempting retaliatory measures, in the form of intrigue with the border tribes, and to dissuade his leading merchants from leaving Kuwait and transferring their business elsewhere.(186) As a result the Shaikh pointed out that his own notables and merchants in Kuwait were continually attacking him on the subject of the British Government's attitude,

> "You stand by the English Government" they sneered, "what has the English Government done for you in the matter of your date gardens, or in the matter of Ibn Sau^cd's blockade which is now ruining us".(187)

Fourthly, the lack of public and social services provided a target for criticism of the Government until 1938, the medical services were carried out by the American Mission Hospital.(188) The Administration Report of 1938 described the health services in Kuwait as follows:

> "the only hospital in Kuwait is that of the American Mission to Arabia, which has 12 beds for males and 12 for females. There is no X Ray but an electrically-lit operating table. Charges are made for medicine and for all attentions, including those to out-patients, and even the poor - and they are very poor in Kuwait - have to bring something in kind, if not in cash".

The same report described the treatment of the American

Mission to the ruler as follows:

> "Shaikh Ahmad, by one of the conditions whereby the American Mission were allowed to establish themselves, receives for himself, and for his household, free treatment at their hospital."(189)

The Iraqi newspaper al-Sijil reported also on 27th May 1938, that, each morning its compound was full of patients from Kuwait including the rich, whose wealth was extracted from them by every possible means. They were compelled to come to this hospital as there was no other, although it lacked proper and sufficient materials. The ruler helped the directors of the hospital by allowing them to import materials duty-free. They were even allowed to import religious books duty-free, although the Shaikhdom normally demanded customs duty on all books imported or exported from Kuwait, even the Holy Koran.[190]

Prominent Kuwaitis pressed for the establishment of a Kuwait State Free Hospital. The project, however, was not realised until 1939 when the Government of Kuwait employed a Syrian doctor, named ᶜUmar Salaāmi Meheddawī,[191] and invested £60,000, in the establishment.[192]

As a result of the development of cultural and political enlightenment in Kuwait through educational and cultural institutions there was popular demand for the modernisation of the educational system. The mercantile and notable class formed, in fact, the backbone of Kuwait's economy - they owned the vessels which enabled trade and the pearl industry to function. The same classes had been pressing for schools and free hospitals since Shaikh Mubārak's (grandfather of Aḥmad al-Jābir) reign but they

had met with opposition from him. The diplomacy of the notables and merchants had prompted them to name the school "Mubārakiyya" in 1912 after him, despite his frustration of the plans, and to call the next school "al-Aḥmadiyya" in 1921 to remind Aḥmad al-Jābir of the credit even slow progress could bring.(193) Nevertheless, the mercantile class financed the educational services out of their own resources until 1939, when education became free in the four Boys' Schools and in the one Government Girls' School.(194) This achievement was due to the nationalist reform movement of 1938-1939. When oil production began in October 1938, the royalties allowed the Shaikhdom to improve educational and health facilities during the presence of the Legislative Council.

Fifthly, in the late 1930's Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir ruled entirely autocratically without consulting even his own family.(195) This conduct was coupled with the tyranny of his entourage over the administration. The increase of their influence over the administration created a breach between the ruler and his subjects, and contributed to the development of the opposition movement. In this entourage were Mulla Ṣāliḥ the Shaikh's elderly secretary, and his son ʿAbdulla. In addition to his old secretary, the ruler employed ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar as a private secretary, a young Syro-Egyptian in 1935.(196) It was reported by the Political Agency at Kuwait in 1938 that, the private secretary had been working formerly for the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in Beirut; however he was most unpopular in Kuwait, where he was alleged to have been

an Italian Agent.[197] Nuṣf Yūsuf al-Nuṣf the Director of the Municipality after 1934, who succeeded Sulaimān al-ᶜAdasānī, and Khālid al-Zaid, a merchant, were included.[198] The most influential person in the clique was Mulla Ṣāliḥ. He was the government it was said.[199] The Political Agency described the ruler's conduct and the reaction of the powerful groups:

> "However that may be the Ruler, in recent years, has spent less and less time at work, and more and more time with his Private Secretary,(200) and others equally despised by the Notables, in the 'private' quarter of Kuwait, the area of pavilions, and places of amusement, where they play flip billiards etcetera".(201)

Finally, the backward administration and especially the corruption in justice was a chief cause of public resentment against the regime, as almost every member of the public, in some way or another, was affected. The administration was controlled mainly by one of the ruler's cousins, and his son-in-law, Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Jābir. He was Permanent President of the Municipality, Magistrate (the Deputy of the Ruler and Town Administrator), Chief of Police, Director-General of Education, and Collector of Land Customs. Mulla Ṣāliḥ had worked closely with this administrator. The most effective apparatus in the Administration was the Courts, which were divided into the Magistrate, the Qaḍīs (Sunnī and Shīᶜī) - the Sharᶜ Court; the Merchants' Arbitration Court, the Sea Captains' Arbitration Court and the Minor Cases Court; the latter controlled by a member of the ruling family. Although Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Jābir, the Magistrate, formed an

association against corruption in justice in the early 1930's there was not a serious attempt at eradicating profitable arbitrary fining. The political agent quoted (Administration Report of Kuwait 1938) the example of Aḥmad bin Farḥan a notable pearl merchant. Bin Farḥān postponed a summons from Shaikh ᶜAbdulla, who "immediately went himself (to the merchant) and put his 'Shumagh' around his neck and lashed him very severly and ordered him to pay a fine of Rupees 5,000." The agent remarked that the merchant and his family left Kuwait for Zubair shortly after this incident "cursing Kuwait and its justice."(202)

Meanwhile, Iraq became the model progressive state in the Gulf region in the 1920's, owing to its modern political structure. A constitutional and parliamentary government was established within a decade after the formation of modern rule; eleven pro- and anti-regime parties were established.(203) The parties were formed and organised by a social elite; in fact tolerance of them reflected the status of the politicians involved, but they were also under the influence of the Iraqi intelligentsia, the theoreticians of the Iraqi Nationalist Movement. The powerful classes at that time consisted of the tribal shaikhs, notables and merchants, ex-Sharifian (Hāshimite) officers, moderates of the intelligentsia and the ᶜulamā'.

Between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a number of Iraqis who qualified at the military secondary school and other schools at Baghdād went to Istanbūl for further education. They graduated from the

Military Academy and other elite institutions in Istanbūl.[204] ᶜAbdul Muḥsin al-Saᶜdūn, Nurī al-Saᶜīd, Jaᶜfar al-ᶜAskarī, Jamīl al-Midfaᶜī, ᶜAlī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī, Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, Ṭaha al-Hāshimī, Mawlud Mukhlus, Moḥammad Ḥilmī and ᶜAli Riḍa a-Ghazāl, all of whom were educated in Istanbūl, played an important role during the Hāshimite regime in Iraq.[205] As Ottoman citizens they worked in civil and military jobs in Turkey after their graduation. For example ᶜAbdul Muḥsin al-Saᶜdūn served first as an aide-de-camp to Sultan ᶜAbdul-Ḥamīd, and then for ten years as a member of the Ottoman Parliament. He belonged to a well-known Sadah[206] family in Baṣra.[207] Yāsīn al-Hāshimī[208] - son of Sayyid Salmān the Mukhtār (chief) of the Barūdiyyah quarter of Baghdād, entered the Military Academy at Istanbūl in 1902. After his graduation he joined the Turkish Army, to win wide repute as a soldier during the First World War. In 1917 he led the Twentieth Turkish Division against the Russians in Galicia with "great success",[209] attracting the attention of Wilhelm II, Emperor of the Germans, who is said to have personally recommended his promotion to Major-General.[210] In the spring of the following year he commanded the Ottoman troops at Salt and ᶜAmmān, where, said the British "he proved too good a strategist for us."[211] Through these shining military abilities, Yāsīn won powerful support among Iraqi officers.[212]

The Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) seized power through the army in the spring of 1908. The turkification policy advocated by hardliners of the C.U.P.

threatened the cultural identity of other nationalities, including the Arabs. In response Arab people in civil and military jobs established, a number of societies between 1908 and 1913, in order to protect the cultural and social heritage of the Arab people and to unite against the new Turkish policy. Jamᶜiyyat al-Ikā' ᶜal-ᶜArabī al-ᶜUthmānī (the Society of Turko-Arab Brotherhood), al-Qaḥtaniyyah Society, al-ᶜAhd (the covenant) Society were examples. A large number of Arab politicians and military officers including Iraqis who established these societies at Istanbūl, Constantinople, Damascus, Cairo, Paris and Mosul.(213) Such people participated together with King Faiṣal I in the formation of the modern state of Iraq after 1921; with them they transferred to the modern state their political and military experience. Yāsīn al-Hāshimī formed Ḥizb al-Shaᶜb (the People's Party), and ᶜAbdul Muḥsin al-Saᶜdūn formed Ḥizb al-Taqaddum (the Progress Party) in 1925.(214) The presence of these parties spread political and national consciousness in Iraq. The activities of the opposition parties during the mandate era (1920-1932) concentrated on their demands to abandon the mandate treaty of the 10th October 1922 with Britain. Al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī al-ᶜIrāqī (The Iraqi National Party) headed by Jaᶜfar Abu al-timman (since 1922) and Ḥizb al-Shaᶜb headed by Yāsīn al-Hāshimī were the leading opposition parties. When Nurī al-Saᶜīd the Premier (March 1930 - October 1932) signed the Treaty of Preferential Alliance,(215) with Britain on 30th June 1930 the leaders of the opposition parties formed a united front and five months later, on the 22nd-23rd

November 1930, signed the "Covenant of Brotherhood" with the object of overthrowing the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.(216) The People's party had by then been enlarged by the inclusion of anti-British elements and had given way to Hizb al-Ikhā' al-Watanī (The National Brotherhood Party).(217) Iraqi independence had been achieved as a result of the resistance of the Iraqi nationalist movement to the Mandate Treaty. The new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which restricted Iraqi independence motivated the opposition groups to continue their resistance to the treaty. In the early 1930's Arab unity was the slogan of the National Brotherhood Party.

After Shaikh Ahmad al-Jābir's private visit to Iraq on the 21st August 1932, the newspaper al-Ikhā' al-Watanī (The National Brotherhood), the mouthpiece of the party of the same name, published an article entitled "a suggestion for uniting Iraq and Kuwait" on the 20th Muharram 1353 A.H. (i.e. the 15th May 1933) describing the popular view in Kuwait and Iraq towards each other, as follows:

> "Family connections between us both are numerous. Each one is sufficient enough to unite and make of us one nation. Our relationship with this brotherly princedom (sic) is based on one religion, the same language, customs and manners, in addition to the fact that we have one and the same aim in life, while lastly geographically we stand the same. What the Kuwaiti says the Iraqi understands, what the Iraqi adopts the Kuwaiti follows, what is complained of by the Iraqi, is likewise complained of bitterly by the Kuwaiti. Were we to unite and join together we would become a power that could not be repulsed, seeing that we have determination to claim our rights. Our brothers the Kuwaitians (sic) have experienced certain incidents (218) that have happened (sic) quite recently and now

know that separation from us is undesirable, they have discovered that had they been a part of a strong government with her aeroplanes, army and fighting equipment they would not have suffered such a heavy casualty roll and loss of so many youths, within the very walls of Kuwait whilst defending the Emirate. Thus, our nation now feels it necessary to support and aid her brother the Kuwaitian (sic). Iraq and her people feel that to come and defend the Kuwaitian can no longer be avoided. This feeling first had its inception in the brains and the hearts, but now the time for action has come. The Iraqi Nation would be blameworthy, were it not to render a helping hand, and combine her efforts with those of her brother."(219)

Ḥizb al-Ikhā' al-Waṭanī was in power at that time, represented by Rashīd ᶜAli al-Gailani the Prime Minister (March - October 1933). This article therefore expressed the formal Iraqi viewpoint towards Kuwait for the first time in the independence era. It called for unity, despite an attack on the al-Ṣabāḥ family by the Newspaper Ṣawt al-Ahali (Voice of the People), No. 42 the mouthpiece of the Ahali group of Baghdād on 24th May, 1934.(220)

Further, the activities of political parties in Iraq concentrated on the achievement of independence during the 1920's. As a result of the ratification of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of June 1930, which introduced new restrictions and made independence meaningless, the political parties disappeared and were replaced by new political groups. The new groups fought for the elimination of these restrictions through the amendment of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. These new groups were: the Ahāli, the Communist and the Nationalist groups,(221) which emerged due to a combination of factors: the continuation of competition for power between the same

prominent politicians who had attempted to monopolise power in the former regime; the unrest amongst young people caused by spreading corruption; the growth in the number of young politicians who had graduated from western universities and had been influenced by the ideology and the techniques of western political parties; finally, the urgency of the Palestinian question.

The new political groups provided the ideological structure of the political parties which led the struggle for the next period. The most important group during the 1930's was the Nationalist.

The Arab Nationalist ideology developed in Iraq during the 1930's through the Arab Nationalist principles of a large number of Iraqi politicians and military officers in power who had founded Arab societies in Turkey, in other Middle East countries and Paris and had participated also in the Arab Great Revolution of 1916. The concepts of Arab Nationalism also spread in Iraq during the 1930's when the leaders of Ḥizb al-Ikhā' al-Waṭanī seized power in the government. This party controlled the government for three periods. The first two were during the premiership of Rashīd ʿAlī al-Gailānī (March - September; September - October 1933), and the third was during the premiership of Yāsīn al-Hāshimī (March 1935 - October 1936).[222]

Al-Muthannā Club, an institution established in Iraq in the 1930's played a considerable role in the propagation of Arab Nationalist concepts. The formation of this club was due to the activities of a number of Iraqi

intellectuals and politicians, followers of Arab Nationalism, and to the impressive record of Yāsīn al-Hāshimī's Arab Nationalist Government. Moḥammad Mahdi Kubbah and Moḥammad Ṣiddīq Shanshal were founder members of this club. The principal objective of the club was the advancement of Arab Culture and Arab Nationalism in Iraq. It was established in 1935, and began publication of a weekly newspaper al-Muthannā, on 27th August 1936.(223) Wiḥdat al-Thaqāfa al-Qawmiyya (The Unity of the Arab Nationalist Culture), al-Rūḥ al-Qawmī (the Arab Nationalist spirit and al-Qawmiyya (Nationalism) were published in the newspaper in 1936 and early 1937.(224)

Certain Kuwaitis: ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd al-Saniᶜ, Sulaimān al-ᶜAdasāni and Ḥāmid al-Naqīb, made contact with the club. They composed a cell which opened communication between the nationalist groups in Iraq and the opposition movement in Kuwait in 1936. The formation of the underground political group Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī (K.S.W.) in the same year in Kuwait was due to the vital anti-state propaganda of this cell.(225)

Various aspects of Arab Nationalist policy were introduced by the Hāshimī Government.(226) Jamᶜiyyat al-Difāᶜ ᶜAn Filistīn (The Palestine Defence Society) was established in 1936 under the presidency of Ṭahā al-Hāshimī.(227) Al-Hāshimī was Chief of General Staff during the government of his brother Yāsīn al-Hāshimī.(228) Taha worked actively to develop this society, and the al-Muthannā Club in Baghdād became a

centre for it.[229]

The cultural and propagandist activities of the League were supplemented by fund-raising in support of the Palestinians.[230] Many Kuwaitis appreciated these activities and contributions from Kuwait amounted to about 7,830 Rupees.[231] The Iraqi newspaper al-Istiqlāl (The Independence) published on the 16th September 1936 an article entitled al-Kuwaitiuūn Yatabarrᶜūn Li-Filistīn (Kuwaitis contributing to Palestine),

> "a committee headed by Shaikh Yusuf bin Isa was composed in Kuwait to collect aid for Palestinians with the Secretariat of Sayyid Ali al-Sayman, and the membership of Mohammad al-Humaidi, Khudair al-Shaᶜbān, Mohammad al-Thinayyan and Mohammad al-Ahmad al-Ghanim."(232)

The committee held two meetings attended by notables and merchants, at which about 400 Iraqi Dinars were collected. The same article stated that Kuwaiti women had encouraged aid for the families of the Palestinian dead.[233]

Moreover, al-Ṣāniᶜ stated that in 1936 there was a nationalist group which supported the Palestinian revolution. Money and arms were collected from Kuwaitis by them and were sent to the rebels through Baṣra.[234] Undoubtedly, the increase in the number of school teachers at the Kuwaiti schools and the presence of Palestinian teachers in these schools after 1935 helped to spread consciousness of the Palestinian question among Kuwaitis.[235]

The formation of Jamᶜiyyat al-Thaqāfa al-ᶜArabiyya (the Arab Culture Society) in Baghdād and Cairo in the early 1930's to arrange communications between writers and

intellectuals in the two countries justified Iraq's support to Arab Nationalism. The idea of the society arose when a number of lecturers and students from the faculty of Arts at the Egptian University visited Iraq in February 1931. The Egyptian Academic delegation was headed by the well-known writer Aḥmad Amīn.(236)

Under the ambitious command of Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, with his exemplary military and political reputation, the army and the air force expanded to enable Iraq to cope with foreign aggression, and factories were to be opened to supply the army with its material needs. During Yāsīn's Government the Iraqi army had 72 combat planes, five ships and 23 thousand soldiers.(237) Among the most significant projects in the programme of defence was the promise of a new paramilitary youth movement to be incorporated in the educational system for the purpose of "raising a generation of citizens, filled with a spirit of sacrifice, duty and dedication to progress and system."(238) Colonel Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣabbāgh was appointed Director and General Trainer for the Futūwwah.(239)

In the press and even in parliament al-Hāshimī was represented as the "Father of his People", and, denoting even wider ambitions, the "Bismarck of the Arabs." The originator of this campaign and its chief propagandist, as in the case of the Futuwwah Movement, was Rafā'īl Buttī, editor of the newspaper al-Bilād. In a typical editorial written in June, 1936, Butti compared al-Hāshimī with Bismarck and detailed the Prussian Chancellor's contributions to the creation of a unified German State.

The implications were not difficult to draw. Bismarck, the editor maintained, had utilized the army as the backbone of his movement, and with it, had established the Prussian State on a firm basis and accomplished the unification of Germany and its expansion to the north and the south. Referring to al-Hāshimī as "the man of the hour", a man of decisiveness and strength, the writer called upon him to unite the citizens of Iraq and to make Iraq the focus of Arab nationalism.(240) The unification of Arab culture was one of al-Hāshimī's objectives. The participation of Arab teachers from Lebanon, Syria and Palestine in the Iraqi schools consolidated al-Hāshimī's Arab Nationalist policy.(241) Furthermore, al-Hāshimī encouraged Arab intellectuals to visit Iraq and deliver speeches about Arab Nationalism. ᶜAwnī ᶜAbdul-Hadī, Ibrāhīm ᶜAbdul Qādir al-Mazinī and 'Asᶜad Dāghir were the best known Arab visitors to Iraq.(242)

Perhaps the greatest credit to the al-Hāshimī Government, and certainly its most popular policy was the unlimited support given to the Palestinians in 1936. Iraq gave financial aid, arms, ammunition and volunteers.(243) The Egyptian Journal al-Fuṣūl published an article in July 1947 outlining the policies of Arab countries towards Palestine, and contrasting these with the positive action of the Iraqi Government in reserving 10,000 Iraqi Dīnārs in 1936 as a contribution for the families of Iraqi volunteers in Palestine. The presence of Ṭahā al-Hāshimī in the Ministry of Defence as Chief of General Staff facilitated the formation and execution of a

pro-Palestinian policy. Arms were transferred from Czechoslovakia to the Palestinian rebels directly.(244) Ṣalaḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣabbagh, ᶜIz al-Dīn Shawwa, Fahmī Saᶜeed, Maḥmūd al-Durrah were the most prominent of a number of army officers involved in arms transfer. These officers organised the military revolt of 2nd May 1941, two of them were executed for their roles.(245) Above all al-Hashimi supported the Syrian Revolution against French dominance.(246)

Although Yāsīn al-Hāshimī was one of the most radical Arab Nationalist leaders; it was the commitment to practical Pan-Arabism especially in respect of the Palestine question, which led to his deposition by a military coup d'etat. The British were implicated by their failure to take action against the coup from their bases in Iraq, and by their frequent strongly worded opposition to the Palestinian aid. The Bakr Ṣidqī coup was the Iraqi Army's first intervention in politics.(247) Yāsīn's Government had practised a nationalist policy, partly to ease dissatisfaction with the violent military operations which had suppressed the tribal uprisings of the Middle Euphrates (1935-1936) and partly because of popular opposition to the conscription law.(248)

Yāsīn al-Hāshimī became an influential proponent of Arab Nationalism in the Gulf region, commanding the respect of radical elements in the area, and troubling the western stronghold. A memorial service held in Baghdād on 18th February 1938 after his death on the 21st January 1937 in Beirut, illustrated the nature of his reputation; it was

attended by the new Prime Minister and members of his council, Syrian and Palestinian officials including the well-known anti-imperialist Akram Zu^caitor. British diplomats claimed not to have received invitations, their attendance would in any case have been an embarrassment to both sides considering the content of addresses made by the Syrians and Palestinians. Despite the anti-western nature of the occasion, major political figures sent messages: The Mufti of Jerusalem, Naḥḥās Pasha of Egypt, the Prime Minister of Trans-Jordan, the Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia and the Rector of al-Azhar University. The British Ambassador described the occasion somewhat sourly:

> "Nuri Pasha was the principal speaker. He played with effect the part of Antony at Caesar's burial with Bakr Sidqi as the honourable Brutus, and his audience, and he himself, were moved to tears by his peroration on the general ingratitude of all peoples towards their great public men."(249)

The frequent military coups d'etat that followed that of the 29th October 1936 impaired social and economic life in Iraq. The instability of the regime and the ruler's vulnerability to democratic opposition persuaded him not to co-operate with Iraq. The unrepresentative constitution and the British dominance in Kuwait contrasted with the ascendancy of Arab nationalism in Iraq, where the Ahali group held power. The interference of the Iraqi army in political affairs deepened mistrust between the two countries. The ruler's tacit acceptance of the smuggling trade from Kuwait into Iraq damaged the Iraqi economy. The Kuwaiti Government's hostility to Iraq led to the

deportation of Iraqi workers and the discontinuation of the policy of employing Iraqi teachers,[250] despite their work since the formation of the Mubārakiyya school in 1912.[251] King Ghazi (the 8th September 1933 - the 3rd April 1939) who succeeded to the throne at 21 years, was politically inexperienced and impressionable, with the result that the monarchy was unable to play as successfully a stabilising role as it had during the reign of Faiṣal I. Possibly, it was King Ghazi's ineffectuality at home that led him to bid for influence through the claim to Kuwait, and through the campaign on behalf of Palestine and Syria. The claim to Kuwait was a manifestation of Pan-Arabism;Ghazi co-operated with the Kuwaiti opposition, mainly at that time the K.S.W., towards a union. There may also have been resentment at the rejection of Iraq's proposed solutions to mutual problems. The despotic rule in Kuwait motivated the K.S.W., and the Arab Nationalist King Ghazi to co-operate against the backward regime. Success, it was intended, would facilitate the Iraqi annexation, whilst in the interim democratic rule would be established in Kuwait. Although Ghazi's radical nationalism created considerable prestige for him, internally and regionally, it also earned him the enmity of western and pro-western factions. Ghazi's indiscreet propaganda was certainly an embarrassment to the conservative Nurī al-Saᶜīd, who was pressurised by the British to silence the King Ghazi Radio. His death was reported as the result of a car crash into an electricity pylon. However rumour implicated both al-Saᶜīd and the British; the outrage to

public opinion resulted in the killing of the British Consul at Mosul one day after the crash.(252)

King Ghazi's personal foreign policy was explained as the attempt to fulfill his father's ambition to annex the Gulf Shaikhdoms and Syria to the throne.(253)

Iraqi newspapers started in 1932 to publish various articles about Arab unity, the concepts of Arab nationalism and the dictatorship of the ruler of Kuwait. In addition Qaṣr al-Zuhūr wireless at Baghdād (The private broadcasting station of King Ghazi) was significant. This Radio Station broadcast a stream of propaganda against the ruler of Kuwait, criticising his administration, encouraging the rebels in the town, supporting the K.S.W. and urging the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq. Although the K.S.W. was suppressed on the 10th March 1939, the broadcasts continued the attack till the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April 1939.(254)

The British Government was annoyed by Ghazi's anti-Kuwait campaign. The British Ambassador at Baghdād began in February 1939, to press the Iraqi Government to put a stop to the press and wireless campaign against Kuwait. The British Embassy described on the 20th April 1939 the task of Nurī al-Saᶜīd the Premier (December 1938 - April 1939):

> "He had at once set about trying to put matters right, but had found it an exceedingly difficult task. When he went to the Palace in the morning the king would promise to be good, but in the evening His Majesty was apt all too easily to be persuaded by the young men, including his wireless operators, with whom he associated at that time of day (the Prime Minister

> strongly suspected that some of these were in the pay of the German Legation) to defy the advice of his Ministers and to believe that he was serving the best interests of the Arabs and the cause of Arab unity by broadcasting extremist nonsense about Kuwait, Palestine, Syria and, on occasions, Transjordan. Almost daily, and often in the middle of the night, King Ghazi was sending for or telephoning to the Prime Minister and pressing him to take steps to deal with Kuweit (sic). What His Majesty wished should be done was never clear but, since the suppression of the abortive rising against the Sabah family, he had been flattered by constant pressure which was being put upon him to help the Kuweitis who had been banished or who had fled into Iraq."(255)

The Government of Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, the temper of King Ghazi, and the intransigence of the ruler of Kuwait all created favourable circumstances for the development of the Kuwaiti Nationalist reform movement, but also for the interference of Iraq. Hence the desire of the opposition movement in Kuwait to consolidate its position.

The Kuwaiti Nationalist Reform movement had been encouraged not only by the King Ghazi Wireless (as it was called in Kuwait) and the Iraqi press, but had also been supported by other Arab and foreign media. These were, to quote from the Political Resident's list:

> "the Arab press, such as: The Orient Arab Italian Agency (Cairo), Al-Ahram (Cairo), Al-Ayaam (Damascus), Al-Bachir Beirut, Alef Ba (Damascus), Beirut (Beirut), Bureau Arabe d'information (Damascus), Bureau National Arabe (Damascus), Al-Shabab (Aleppo), Al-Ittihad Al-Misri (Alexandria), Minbar al-Shark (Cairo), al-Mokattam Cairo, al-Nahar (Beirut), Al-Rabita al-Arabia (Cairo), Palestine (Jaffa), Nafur Islam (Buenos Aires)."(256)

During 1938 all these newspapers attacked Aḥmad al-Jābir and his administration more or less violently.

The Shaikh of Kuwait and other rulers of the Gulf Shaikhdoms were annoyed by the contents of articles in the press. T.C. Fowle the Political Resident in the Gulf quoted an example of the articles from press cuttings in his report to the India office in London on the 8th July 1939, which undoubtedly embarrassed the rulers of the Gulf Shaikhdoms.

> "The Shaikh of Kuwait and the Princes of the Arab countries seem to believe that the countries they rule with the support of foreigners are farms they inherited from their fathers. The inhabitants are slaves oppressed by their Shaikhs and Amirs. If the foreigners were to withdraw their support the Amirs and Shaikhs would be helpless before their subjects."(257)

However the Political Resident did not specify the name of the newspaper which carried the article.

The formation of the Legislative Council in Kuwait on the 6th July 1938 was welcomed by the Arab press especially the Iraqi newspapers, because it restricted the Shaikh's autonomy. References were made to the fact that,

> "the authority of the people is above that of the Government."(258)

The daily political Arab Nationalist and anti-British Iraqi newspaper <u>al-Mustaqbal</u> (the Future) issued by the lawyer Yūnis al-Sab^{c}āwī,(259) published an article on the 16th July 1938 entitled "Kuwait's step towards civilisation". The writer described the formation of the Kuwaiti Legislative Council, as a happy step towards civilisation.(260) The most sympathetic to the Kuwaiti Nationalist reform movement, the weekly Iraqi newspaper <u>al-Sijil</u> (the Register) congratulated the Kuwaiti people on

their important popular achievement.(261) Moreover, the Egyptian weekly newspaper al-Rābiṭa al-ᶜArabiyya published in Cairo, carried another article sympathetic with the Kuwaiti achievement, entitled "Kuwait News" on the 17th August 1938. It stated:

> "The Legislative Council is proceeding on the work of drafting a foundational law which will become the Dastoor (Constitution) of Kuwait shortly. We are glad to announce on the pages of this weekly that the Iraq Government are sympathetic with that Reform Movement..."(262)

Before the establishment of the Kuwaiti Legislative Council, the Iraqi Newspaper al-Istiqlāl published frequent critical articles describing the backward tribal rule in Kuwait. The most important article supporting K.S.W. in Kuwait was published in this paper on the 26th April, 1938, it stated,

> "The new movement in Koweit(sic) gives pleasure and gratification to every Arab, because it will yield results most beneficial to the inhabitants of Koweit themselves. Perhaps they realise the happy future awaiting them if the present movement is maintained and is directed towards co-operation with Iraq with whom certain Arab countries are desirous of union. Such an idea has often been in the minds of youth of Koweit and has been received with approbation and support in Arab quarters. Iraq is in a position to turn the backward principality of Koweit into a prosperous progressive and civilised country".

The same writer concentrated on the expected results of the proposed unification between Iraq and Kuwait,

> "Having regard to its geographical and commercial position Koweit, if annexed to Iraq, would become a junction of international communications and an excellent port".

Finally, he ended his article:

> "We leave it to the people of Koweit themselves to appreciate this fact. At the same time we are entitled to sympathise with the (present) movement in Kuwait, and will be glad to see it yield the desired results and attain the objects sought".(263)

The second propagandist element to support the Kuwaitī movement was the Italian Arabic Radio. Prior to the signing of the Anglo-Italian Agreement on the 16th April, 1938 the Kuwaitī Government was attacked from Bari and the reforms of the nationalist movement were upheld. The attacks were discontinued for the duration of the 2nd World War.(264)

Lastly, support came from the German Arabic Radio Propaganda. The broadcasts commenced on the 25th April 1939 and continued until the end of the Second World War. Cursory references to Kuwait as a British Colony ("British Colonisation there as in Baḥrain".) were expanded to more detailed condemnations of the British control of the administration in Kuwait.(265)

These were the circumstances surrounding the use of the reform movement between 1938 and 1939 in Kuwait. Undoubtedly, Iraq's sympathetic role through her propagandist campaign activated this movement more than any other external factor. The partial success of the movement had encouraged people in other Gulf Shaikhdoms to demand the same reforms (Baḥrain(266) and Dubai) in the same period.

At the same time repressive domestic policy continued despite the formation of Municipal, Educational and Health Councils, in 1934, 1936 and 1939. Although initially the government allowed free elections, within a limited scope, these were rapidly curtailed. As a result of the opinions and activities of some prominent nationalists in the Education Council, and because of the wide influence of the ruler's entourage, the latter council was dissolved by the ruler. The Municipal Council resigned in protest. A new Municipal Council failed to win the acceptance of the new opposition. This attitude of the opposition group was in reaction to the ruler's decree of 1357 A.H. (1938) which ordered the electors not to vote certain persons to the Fourth Municipal Council. These persons were named in this decree.[267]

The tyrannical Kuwaitī administration had jurisdiction even over the courts where the appointment of the ruler's relatives and representatives ensured his personal control. In the spring of 1938 a number of articles were published in the Iraqi newspapers, al-Sijil and al-Zamān under the pen-name "Kuwaitī". These articles contained the social, political, economic and administrative demands of the Kuwaitī Nationalist Reform Movement organised by the K.Š.W.[268] In response to these articles the private secretary of the ruler wrote an open letter to the Iraqi Press, published in al-Zamān in April 1938. In this he advised the Iraqi newspapers not to interfere in the internal affairs of a friendly Government and to stop the unfriendly propaganda which incited

Kuwaitis against their government.(269) On the 12th April 1938, the newspaper <u>al-Sijil</u> published an article entitled <u>Hawl Bayān Sicartair Amīr al-Kuwait</u> (About the Proclamation of the Secretary of the Kuwaiti Ruler)(270) defending the ruler's administration. In addition, the same newspaper published an article on the 27th May 1938 entitled "Be Gentle O Editor of al-Sijil", signed by one of the ruler's entourage. It began, in the official British translation:

> "As to your bewailings, you newspaper man advocates of education, lovers of reforms and supporters of personal independence for individuals, you should know that there is a wide space between you and the demands of His Highness, our Amir the Preux Chevalier, may God preserve him, and his Chief Justice of the Courts, Shaikh Abdulla al-Jabir, who penalises anyone who does not come to his Court. With the first messenger he sends notice, a fine for delaying, of a few thousands of rupees, a matter which has necessitated some of those so penalised to flee away from Kuwait, and take refuge at Zubair.
> We of the entourage, do not care in the least about such resentful persons, know, you poor journalist, that Kuwait is proceeding on the way which pleases the entourage of her Amir, whether it pleases or angers you, O supporters of those foolish Kuwaiti youths".(271)

The reference to 'refuge at Zubair' pointed at the Kuwaitī Aḥmad bin Farḥān, a notable pearl merchant abused for his delay. It was a measure of the entourage's disquiet, that such a written response appeared. The bigotted tone of the address complements the lack of an attempt to disprove the accusations of corruption, and whilst the miscarriage of justice is not admitted, the writer openly dismisses the possibility of democratic procedures.

Public abuse of justice aggravated the situation and forced the influential classes to shoulder the responsibility for ending repression and passing comprehensive reforms through a legislative council.

The opposition group reacted with the formation of a new underground K.S.W. in the mid 1930's, known as Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī. It began with twelve leaders, and grew to have about 200 members. These people represented the core of the nationalist movement. They were educated, the majority upper class with a minority of middle and working class members who were dissatisfied with the repressive reign of the ruler's entourage.(272) The majority of members were between twenty and thirty years old.(273)

The K.S.W., attempted to arouse the populace and called on the people to "struggle for freedoms". Efforts to spread their convictions were rapidly successful; writings appeared on the street walls of Kuwait abusing the ruler and threatening his deposition. In spite of the efforts of the Kuwait night watch, the perpetrators were not discovered.(274) Secret leaflets were printed at Baṣra and distributed in Kuwaiti streets by members of the K.S.W. In Baṣra the Kuwaiti resident members of K.S.W. were responsible for the preparation of the leaflets with the co-operation of editors of al-Zamān and al-Sijil.(275) In July 1938 after the formation of the Legislative Council members of this Council and other K.S.W. members sent open letters to Ṭahā al-Fayyāḍ the editor of al-Sijil thanking

him for his great support to the Kuwaiti movement. The letters were published in al-Sijil on the 15th July 1938.(276) ᶜAbdul Laṭīf al-Ṣāliḥ al-ᶜuthmān, Moḥammad Aḥmad al-Ghānim, Marzūq bin Shamlān, Moḥammad al-Ṣāliḥ, Moḥammad al-Barrāk, Moḥammad ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Munayyis, Fahd a-ᶜUjail, Fahd Ḥamad al-Khālid, Misāᶜid al-ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Kulaib, ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Būdi, Abdul Muḥsin al-ᶜAqīlī, Sayyid ᶜAbdul Laṭīf al-Ṭabāṭabāi were Kuwaitī residents, active in the K.S.W., in Baṣra.(277) The pamphlets contained violent attacks on the autocratic rule of Kuwait - specifically mentioning the brutal flogging of Moḥammad al-Barrāk after his arrest in the early spring of 1938 for his refusal to betray his colleagues.(278) Iraqi newspapers published articles by members of the K.S.W., under pseudonyms supporting the rebels' cause. Al-Zamān published an article entitled "Kuwait and the demands for the improvement of their country" on the 11th April 1938,

> "We, in a previous letter, published the demands of the Kuwaitis, which they submitted to His Highness the Emir of Kuwait for the improvement of their country from the economical, civilized, and the educational point of view."(279)

The Iraqi newspapers al-Sijil, al-Istiqlāl, al-Zamān, al-Karkh, al-Mustaqbal, sympathised with the Kuwait Nationalist reform movement of 1938-1939.(280) The newspaper al-Sijil, for example, became the mouthpiece of the K.S.W., most of the articles written by K.S.W., members were published in it. In a number of important articles published on the 1st, 8th, 15th, 22nd and 29th April 1938, the K.S.W., representatives demanded general reforms. The

same articles occasionally reappeared in other sympathetic newspapers.(281) Sultan Ibrāhīm al-Kulaib(282) a nationalist notable volunteered to become the Agent of al-Sijil in July 1938.(283) As a result of the increasingly close co-operation between al-Sijil and the K.S.W in particular, after the publication of the reformist's demands, the Kuwaiti Government forbad the distribution of this newspaper and also the Iraqi Majallat al-Kifāḥ in April 1938.(284) The open letters of gratitude to Ṭahā al-Fayyiāḍ al-ᶜĀnī, the editor of al-Sijil, and the temporary moratorium on the distribution of this paper in Kuwait, reflected the campaigning of this paper for the Kuwaiti Nationalist Reform Movement.

Despite the setback, many newspapers continued their attacks on the Kuwaiti Government's reactionary policy.(285) The Iraqi newspapers in particular sustained the opposition movement.(286) The articles were written by K.S.W. members and pro-reform Iraqis, whether residents in Basra or in Kuwait. Aḥmad al-Jābir's dictatorship and the influence of his entourage over the administration motivated the Iraqi people and the Government to back the opposition movement. The Iraqi newspaper al-Istiqlāl had published extremist articles against Kuwaiti.'s regime since 1936, advocating reform and threatening the Kuwaiti regime. One of these articles, entitled Ḥarakat al-Kuwait Wa ᶜAṭf al-ᶜIrāq (Kuwait's Movement and Iraq's sympathy) published on Tuesday the 26th April, 1938, was written by an

unidentified Iraqi sympathiser. The writer described the general situation in Kuwait and his views towards it as follows:

> "It pains Iraq to behold on her borders an Arab territory with an excellent geographical position and yet in a backward state, deprived of means of education and of health and economic organisation. Iraq, who is unable to conceal her strong feelings, is anxious that the sister people of Koweit (sic) should join in the general awakening movement which has taken place in the majority of Arab countries, in order that they may, through their national gifts and the favourable position of their country participate in the wide field of Arab national endeavour. Any existing obstruction and obstacles can be overcome by persistent endeavour. Work towards this end will strengthen confidence in the ultimate success of the attempts at reform now being made by the youth (287) of Koweit..."(288)

This article reflected Iraq's policy towards Kuwait: on the one hand Iraq's aspirations and, on the other sympathy, which could, eventually, aid in the achievement of their nationalist objective. The persistence of similar unwarranted and unfriendly attacks by the Iraqi press on Kuwait's administration confirmed this policy. The Iraqi press constantly referred directly or indirectly to Kuwait as being an integral part of Baṣra Liwa. The failure of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Governments to solve the mutual problems, especially, the smuggling trade, including arms, was partly responsible. The first Iraqi propagandist campaign against Kuwait's administration had began in <u>Ṣawt al-Ahālī</u> (the voice of the People) of the 7th May 1934, <u>al-ʿIrāq</u> of the 18th June 1936, <u>al-Karkh</u> of the 22nd June and <u>al-Nās</u> of the 2nd July 1936.[289] It is possible to say that Iraq's official sympathy with the K.S.W. was not surprising. At

the end of October 1934 Major F. Holmes of the Kuwait Oil Company visited Baṣra where he met Yūsuf Ghānima the Iraqi Finance Minister at that time. They were on friendly terms. The two friends held conversations in Baṣra regarding the possibility of applying for an oil concession in the southern Iraqi province (Baṣra Liwa). Colonel Dickson the Political Agent at Kuwait reported Holmes' impression of the conversation,

> "After some further 'oil' talk, Yusuf Ghanima turned to the question of the status of Kuwait, and condemned in no uncertain terms the "stupid obstinacy" of the Shaikh (Ghanima's words) in his dealings with his well meaning 'mother state' of Iraq. He harped on the fact that the Shaikh was blind and could not see that Kuwait's interests were bound up with Iraq."(290)

Dickson related also that the Iraqi Minister touched the problem with Kuwait Post and Telegraph arrangements and the proposed railway line through to Kuwait. Dickson reported Holmes' views,

> "Major Holmes said that he could not say why he was regaled with the above, but suspected that the game was to get him to do a little bit of 'propaganda' for Iraq with the Shaikh. What Major Holmes did not like however, was the contemptuous way with which the Finance Minister all the time referred to 'little Kuwait and her Shaikh' - as Major Holmes, 'Anyone hearing Mr.Yusuf Ghanima might easily have supposed that Kuwait was a miserable little village on the borders of Iraq and her Shaikh a petty chieftain, with a lot of wind in the hoad'."(291)

Further, it is interesting to note that during the debate on the Iraq-Iran Treaty held in 1937 in the Chamber of Deputies, it was reported that,

> "one leading Deputy referred to the possibility of Kuwait being used as Iraq's outlet to the sea."(292)

Moreover, King Ghazi's personal belief in Arab Nationalism provided a fourth channel of propaganda in the form of Qasr al-Zuhūr Wireless Station in Baghdād, which broadcast violent attacks on the Kuwaiti royal entourage and gave encouragement to the K.S.W. Regarding King Ghazi's Wireless(293) the Political Agent in Kuwait reported some of its remarks about Kuwait, broadcast on the 12th February 1939 as follows:

> "The announcer said before giving 'internal news', 'I shall speak about Kuwait and its Council',(294) and added that the Qasr az-Zihour (sic) station would, in the future be used for propaganda about the condition of the Arab states of the Gulf, although on this particular night his talk would be about Kuwait and its Council only. He attributed to one of the Council the saying that Kuwaitis would fight for their freedom and went on about Arab unity in the customary Iraqi way. In spite of the length of his talk it was difficult to grasp any clear meaning, except that he was making propaganda for Iraq."(295)

At the same time the Iraqi newspaper al-Bilād (the Country) described the vital support of the same radio to K.S.W. members in an article entitled "Kuwait Youth Applauds King of Iraq" published on 17th February 1939,

> "subsequent to the statements published in Iraqi press and the broadcasts made by the Qasr az-Zuhūr (sic) Radio Stations about the current affairs in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti youth listening in shouted for the Iraqi King's longevity and declared him to be the monarch of the anticipated united Arabia."(296)

In addition to King Ghazi's Wireless the Kuwaiti youth listened to the Italian Arabic Radio Propaganda and German Arabic Radio Propaganda which continued to attack

British Colonialism and the backward rule in Kuwait. These broadcasts provided much needed external support for the Kuwaiti nationalist reform movement.(297) An important piece of evidence to justify the Iraq's official sympathy with Kuwait's opposition movement, emerged when the Iraqi newspaper al-Nās, having altered its allegiance from the K.S.W., tried to counteract the attacks made against Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir and his administration in the Iraqi press, and said that Kuwaitis were satisfied with the policy of their government. After the formation of the Legislative Council the same paper published an article on the 11th July 1938. The writer attempted to insinuate that the movement was instigated by the British, with imperialistic aims and warned the Kuwaitis to beware.(298) The editor of al-Sijil accused the newspaper al-Nās that it was bribed by the Kuwaitī regime, nevertheless it had published the Kuwaitī demands for reform and had attacked the autocratic rule in Kuwait.(299) The al-Nās articles motivated Kuwaitī residents and K.S.W. members in Baṣra to telegraph the Iraqi Premier, the Ministers of interior, and the editors of the newspapers al-Istiqlāl, al-Karkh, al-ᶜIrāq, al-Akhbār, al-ᶜIqāb and al-Zamān. They protested against the attitude of al-Nās towards their movement.(300)

In response to the telegram from Kuwaitis in Baṣra, the Iraqi newspapers published their protests with sympathetic comments, whilst the Iraqi Director of Publicity and Publications sent the following warning to the editor of al-Nās, which appeared in its pages on the

1st August 1938,

> "To,
> The lawyer Abdyl(sic) Hafidh Mohammad al-Mulla, the responsible director of 'An-Nās' newspaper,
>
> As you have published in the issue of your paper No.459 of 11.7.38 an article which comes within the meaning of para 3 of article 12 of the law of publications, I am directed to inform you that the Hon'ble the Minister of the interior has confirmed service of warning to you for the above mentioned article.
>
> It is required of you to publish this warning in the first number to be issued of your paper in the place appointed by the law."(301)

Undoubtly such positive action gave inspiration to the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement and strengthened its liaison with both the people and the government of Iraq. Iraq's sympathy with the Kuwaitī movement was welcomed by the Arab press. The Egyptian weekly newspaper al-Rābiṭa al-ʿArabiyyah (the Arab League) reported on the 17th August 1938 that the warning of the Iraqi Government to the Baṣra newspaper al-Nās was an indication of its sympathy with the Kuwait nationalist reform movement.(302)

The last source of publicity came as a result of the strategic importance of Baṣra. Certain Kuwaitis had properties such as date gardens and houses in this district, amongst them were the al-Ṣabāḥ family, al-Ṣaqr, al-Muṭair, al-Humaiḍī.(303) Some of the opposition leaders of Kuwait had also taken Baṣra as a base for their political activities as previously mentioned.

In the early 1930's there had been twenty-one daily

and weekly Iraqi newspapers published in the three provinces of Iraq (Baṣra, Baghdād and Mosul). Three of them were native to Baṣra, the weekly al-Sijil and al-Nās and the daily al-Thaghr. All three co-operated with K.S.W., members living in Baṣra, al-Nās changing allegiance in July 1938. The two latter papers were moderately nationalist; al-Sijil was more committed to nationalism and was anti-British.(304) The K.S.W.'s co-operation with the Iraqi politicians and King Ghazi facilitated the establishment of Maktab al-Diᶜāya Wal-Nashr fil Khalīj al-ᶜArabī (the Propaganda and Publicity Bureau in the Arab Gulf) in Baṣra, to defend the future of the Arab people in the Gulf region.(305) Kuwaitis, Iraqis, Baḥrainis and other people from the Gulf Shaikhdoms were members of the early Bureau. The violent repression of the nationalist reform movement in Baḥrain, Kuwait and Dubai and the continuation of autocratic rule in these shaikhdoms motivated the intelligentsia of the Arab Nationalist movement to establish the propagandist organisation. ᶜAbdul Qādir al-Sayyāb, the new editor of al-Nās (elected deputy for Baṣra in June 1939), a moderate nationalist hostile to the ruler of Kuwait and supporter of the reform movements in the Gulf, submitted an application for official permission for the Bureau to the Ministry of the Interior, in February 1939, which was accepted, and the Bureau was established in the same month.(306) The K.S.W., used the Bureau, and its earlier methods to put pressure on the ruler to accept its demands and grievances. Jamᶜiyyat Anṣār ᶜArab al-Khalīj (the society of the Gulf Arab Partisans) was established in

Baṣra in February the same year by the same members and for the same purpose as the Bureau.(307)

The increased activities of Kutlat al-Shabāb al Waṭanī (the K.S.W.) coincided with various internal disturbances resulting from the continuation of suppressive measures, which in spreading discontent among the subjects, eased the task of the Kuwaiti opposition movement. Foremost amongst these incidents were:

a). ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniᶜ an Arab Nationalist and founder of K.S.W., was imprisoned in September 1937. He was accused by the Kuwaiti Government of publishing an article on the 10th September 1937, in the Iraqi newspaper of Baṣra al-Nās, attacking the Political Agent, written by al-Ṣāniᶜ. He was released after a year, owing to the activities of K.S.W. members which led to a reconciliation between the ruler and the notables, who finally convinced the ruler to release him. Al-Ṣāniᶜ became the first Kuwaitī political prisoner.(308)

b). The inhuman treatment of the K.S.W. member and Kuwaitī resident in Baṣra, Moḥammad al-Barrāk, who was arrested and was publicly, brutally flogged on the 20th and 21st Muḥarram,1357 A.H. (the 22nd and 23rd March 1938).

The Political Agent reported that Aḥmad al-Jābir was "all the time hidden at Bayān, his country residence, seven miles away, and did not come to town. The situation was saved for him by the wise intervention of his ancient secretary Mulla Ṣāliḥ."(309) Mulla Ṣāliḥ made the arrest

of al-Barrāk on behalf of the ruler in the hope of extracting details of K.S.W. membership propagandist activities. Leaflets and graffiti called for reform, abusing the ruler and threatening his deposition. Mulla Ṣāliḥ's punishment was curtailed by the interference of Captain de Gaury, the Political Agent in Kuwait.(310) This early incident was followed by an attempt by security men to arrest three prominent merchants as a result of al-Barrāk's confession during the flogging.(311)

As a result of such gross tyranny, several Kuwaitis left their country for Iraq in panic. The Political Resident in the Gulf reported on the 18th June 1938, that de Gaury had informed him that the Iraqi press had commented on the brutal flogging of al-Barrāk and on the departure of Kuwaitis to seek safety in Iraq.(312) Further, one party headed by a merchant and notable Yusuf al-Marzūq, then a member of the Legislative Council, enquired indirectly of the Political Agent in Kuwait, whether they might be given British Nationality.(313)

The people's discontent against the ruler's entourage increased as a result of the disquieting incidents. A change of ruler to Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim, British protection or unity with Iraq were suggested as possible solutions.(314)

At the same time members of the al-Ṣabāḥ family sympathised with the reform movement, being intensely dissatisfied with the very small allowances which the head

of their family gave them.The Political Agent described the ruler's financial conduct in his letter to Bushire on the 19th March 1938 as follows:

> "Since the Shaikh allocates to the State or Municipality for public services extremely little of his income, which is identical with that of the state, he has saved a very large sum and bought estates abroad, and his parsimony is a by-word in Kuwait."(315)

Undoubtly, this dissatisfaction consolidated the position of the opposition leaders, who capitalised on their advantage.

The Iraqi press attacks persisted,(316) resulting in the ruler's secretary's open letter, quoted on p.87, advising non-interference.(317) It was the publication of the Nationalists' reform demands that had finally provoked a response.(318)

Later Ṭahā al-Fayyiāḍ al-ᶜĀnī the editor of the newspaper al-Sijil received a similar article ᶜAlā Mahlik Sahib al-Sijil al-'Aghar (Be Gentle Editor of al-Sijil) as quoted on pp.87. Before proceding to the defence of justice already quoted, the author makes a general assertion of the Shaikh's integrity:

> "In your last issue there was an article against the firm and erect pole of Rulership in Kuwait in which you directed bitter criticism against innocent and heroic administration of the state."(319)

British discontent with the backward administration and the behaviour of the ruler's entourage, especially following the al-Barrāk incident, created a climate in which British officials could sympathise with the reform movement. Nevertheless Britain had special relations with

the rulers of Kuwait through the exclusive Agreement of 1899 and they had the responsibility of protecting the country and the al-Ṣabāḥ family as a whole. However, they could not allow the head of a ruling family to endanger the stability of the state. They did not want any internal upheaval or external powerful country to threaten their position. As a result they decided to authorise the Political Agent in Kuwait on the 14th and on the 25th April, 1938, to warn the ruler of the dangers he was running and to encourage him to adopt a more liberal attitude in the administration.(320)

The following are the points of T.C Fowle the Political Resident in the Gulf,

> "His Highness will appreciate that since in these days popular democratic movements exist in most countries if not all, one should now be starting at Kuwait. Experience has shown that the best way to deal with such movements is not mere repression which cannot be continued indefinitely as the movement gets stronger, but the maintenance of law and order combined with a sympathetic guidance of the movement into useful channels of activity. His Majesty's Government feel that the risk of a repetition of the present unfortunate incident (321)would be considerably lessened if His Highness would associate himself more both with his family and his people in his administration, and in giving this advice His Majesty's Government take into account that the normal practice of government amongst Arab peoples from time immemorial is for the latter to be associated in some form or other with their Shaikh in the affairs of the state."(322)

When the Political Agent met Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir to discover his reaction and to advise him of the British attitude, the ruler denied the existence of a popular or democratic movement in Kuwait. When Captain de Gaury

criticised the flogging of al-Barrāk he said that "al-Barrāk was punished as he deserved and that was that." With regard to closer co-operation in the administration, with his family and people he said he thought the co-operation was already sufficient, and that no alteration was desirable.(323)

Further, Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir did not welcome the British suggestion of the appointment of an adviser, and said to the Political Agent in reply to the earlier British proposal, that the Kuwaitī Government was able to do what it wished.(324)

The activities of the K.S.W. continued along the same channels - violent attacks on the ruler's Government and entourage. Additionally, Taḥsīn ᶜAlī the mutasarrif of Baṣra (1933-1938) a nationalist, and tacit supporter of the K.S.W. was especially active in openly advocating Iraq's interference. Kuwait he said, "was really a province of Iraq." The mutaṣarrif's view corresponded with the Government's towards the ruler's lack of co-operation in solving mutual problems. As mutasarrif for five years, Taḥsīn ᶜAlī had the opportunity to study carefully the existing problems. He concluded that the annexation of Kuwaitī territory to Iraq would be a practical solution to the long standing problems and also would relieve Kuwait from dictatorship.(325)

The accumulation of press criticism from Iraq and other Arab countries, radio attacks by the Ghazi Radio Station and the Italian Arabic Station, and the considered

views of well placed Iraqi officials compelled Britain to commence a programme of partial democratisation.

Consequently, the Political Resident in the Gulf sent a letter to the ruler, emphasising the advice which the British had already given him through Captain de Gaury, during the conversation on the 13th June 1938, regarding his co-operation with his family and people in his administration.(326) The Political Resident reported on the 18th July 1938 that his advice had been leaked to the bazaars through the ruler's Secretary. The news was welcomed by the upper classes, "one of whom when calling on de Gaury, thanked him for the advice tendered", according to the Political Resident.(327)

As a result, Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī (K.S.W.) sent a delegation consisting of three of the leading merchants of Kuwait - ᶜAbdulla Ḥamad al-Ṣaqr, the brilliant political leader of K.S.W., Moḥammad Thunayyān al-Ghānim, and Sulaimān al-ᶜAdasānī who had a large following. They met the ruler on the 2nd July 1938 and submitted a letter to him requesting the formation of a free elected Legislative Council.(328)

The delegation met the ruler twice; he accepted their demands as a particular result of the sympathetic Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim's persuasion. On the second night the heads of the 140 leading families of Kuwait met at al-Ṣaqr's dīwān, and elected fourteen persons to form the Legislative assembly of Kuwait under the presidency of Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ.(329) The results of the elections appeared in the Iraqi press.(330) Al-Sijil for

example published an article on the 18th July 1938 entitled Fawz al-Kuwaitiyyīn bi-maṭālibihim (The victory of Kuwaitī reforms).(331)

Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir was disturbed by the erosion of his authority. Consequently, through his palace clique: the secretaries, the Director of Municipality and a merchant called Khālid al-Zaid, he made a last desperate effort to win followers. Large bribes and various privileges were offered to any one who would default from the council. These efforts were fruitless and merely brought further odium on the ruler and his clique. The election of Shaikh ʿAbdulla al-Sālim to the presidency of the council provided a powerful ally from within the Royal Family. The members of the council and their colleagues prepared a constitutional draft, and submitted it to the ruler for ratification on the 4th July 1938. The members of the council and the ruler, with the palace clique, met together in the ruler's dīwān for the usual morning coffee, and for a final trial of strength.(332) Captain de Gaury reported the meeting as follows:

> "The members of the council demanded His Highness' formal approval, in writing, of a council, which veritably he had sanctioned, but it now seemed had secretly tried to undermine. They spoke of his being misled by a few persons with private ambitions, against the wishes of the majority of his countrymen and against the interest of his family, which he neglected in favour of a few ignoble cronies. His Highness asked them what would be the outcome if he withheld his approval 'in that case' said one of the leaders rising to his feet, and others with him 'we bid you farewell.' His Highness quickly denied that he intended to disapprove."(333)

Captain de Gaury continued his description of the situation and stated that,

> "In fact, their trump card had he done so, was ready, in the form of a petition, to be signed by all the notables, and presented at this Agency, asking for direct British Rule. His Highness then pretended to be, or was persuaded of the worthlessness of Khalid al-Zaid and his clique, and turning upon them, publicly denied him and his followers who were immediately jostled from the Hall, and down the stairway, into the inimical crowd outside. His motorcar had already been burnt."(334)

The ruler attempted to delay legitimising Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī (K.S.W.); he posponed his formal approval of the council for another two days, but finally on the 6th July signed the necessary document.(335)

Captain de Gaury characterised some aspects of the council and his expectations about its role in the improvement of the administration, as follows:

> "The council is composed of experienced men, used to weighing commerical enterprises, and conducting the affairs of their large families, and messages I have already received from them, make me believe that the result of their deliberations, if they obtain a degree of fiscal power, will lead to the administration of the territory on more efficient lines."(336)

Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim, the ruler's cousin and the president of the Legislative Council, had been liberally educated and was enthusiastic for reform. He was open-minded and according to al-Baṣīr a K.S.W. member.(337) After the ruler's approval of the council document - the consitution - ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim called on de Gaury with a copy of the original agreement made between Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir and certain notables of Kuwait

whereby he - the ruler - had promised to form a council as a conditon of his election as Ruler.(338)

The Translator of the Political Agency characterised the first Kuwaiti constitution as follows:(339)

> "I understand that a Dastoor (Constitution) is being prepared by the Majlis (the Council). It consists of a preface and five parts mostly derived from the Egyptian constitution. The preface will contain the description of the flag of Kuwait, that Kuwait is the capital of the state, that the state cannot be divided in parts or territories. That all treaties and agreements with Great Britain will be respected and that Kuwait is under British protection. The five parts are about the equality of all Kuwaitis, the powers of the Majlis, the President, the Magistrates, the Qadhis etc. A clause is to be included empowering the Majlis to make amendments and alterations within a period of one year from the first publication of the Dastoor. It is said that this is to be included as a precaution in case His Majesty's Government may object to some points or may make some suggestions calling for amendments. I also understand that the Majlis intends to adopt the ottoman Majallah of Islamic law, which is now in force in Iraq and syria, the Syrian edition is preferred as it has no additional complcated matter as the Iraqi edition. There will also be a Statute Book for forming new laws which are not included in the Shariᶜat Law."(340)

Undoubtedly, the ruler feared from his knowledge of the council's plans that it might replace him by Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ, consequently the ruler had never summoned the council. Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim himself, as one of the ruling family, felt that the agitation might turn, not only against the ruler, but also against the family as a whole, and was shrewd enough to "trim his sails to the rising wind" as the Political Resident

reported.[341]

The formation of the Legislative Council was considered a triumph for the K.S.W. It motivated the leaders of K.S.W. to establish Nādī Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī (Club of K.S.W.). The programme of this club was published in an article entitled Mīthāq Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī al-Kuwaitī (the charter of the K.S.W.) in al-Sijil on the 12th August 1938.[342] The charter emphasised the spread of Arab Nationalism and Arab Culture. It also recommended Arab unity.[343] The C.K.S.W. was opened on the 16th Jamāda al-Thānī 1357 A.H. (10th August 1938) in the evening. The K.S.W. made a big party on this occasion which was described in an article entitled Nahḍat al-Shabāb fil Kuwait (the Awakening of Youth in Kuwait) written by K.S.W. member ᶜAbdulla bin Ṣāliḥ al-Joᶜān and published in al-Sijil on the 26th August 1938. The writer stated that members of the Legislative Council attended this party and were entertained with music and songs by Boys Scouts during their arrival and their departure from the club in Ṣāliḥiyyah district, Sayyid ᶜAbdul Laṭīf al-Ṭabā Ṭabāī, ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Subaiᶜī, Abdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr, ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-ᶜAli al-ᶜAbdul Wahhāb, ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Ṣāliḥ al Qināᶜī and the "Poet of Youth" Sayyid Aḥmad ᶜUmar ᶜĀṣim were the speakers and K.S.W. members. The cultural speaker of the K.S.W., al-Baṣīr, delivered a fervent extemporary speech, whilst ᶜĀṣim's poetry was welcomed by the crowd.[344] Al-Baṣīr had, on the 8th March 1982, the opening lines impressed on his memory,

حى الشباب وريهم   واهتف بأقوال الشباب

يا نشأ ياركن البلاد   أتتك فاتحة الكتاب

Welcome the youth and their vigour

And shout with the voice of youth O new generation, O the Country's pillar

The preface of the book(345) was given to you.(346)

The C.K.S.W. became the headquarters of local propagandist and cultural activities by K.S.W. members, who became also the connecting link between the people and the Legislative Council.(347)

After the formation of the Legislative Council and the ruler's approval of the constitution of this council, the ruler's role was reduced to that of a nominal head of the Shaikhdom; the council was given insuperable power to ratify treaties, concessions,(348) monopolies and agreements. Nevertheless the council left the signature of such documents to the ruler,(349) consequently the latter attempted to weaken the position of the council and to reduce its authority through intrigues.(350)

Regarding the attitude of the British officials towards the competition for power which emerged between the ruler and the council, a measure of balance between the rivals was maintained - the British position was crucial. The Political Resident in the Gulf, T.C. Fowle, described the British attitude towards the two Kuwaitī sides in his letter of the 18th July 1938, to the India Office,

> "My advice to the Shaikh to form a council naturally fitted in with the plans of the popular party,(351) and is indeed one of the main reasons that for the moment at all events they are extremely friendly towards

us. Had the movement, however come to a head without this advice to the Shaikh, in popular opinion His Majesty's Government might well have been supposed to have supported the Shaikh - tacitly if not actually - and the victory over the latter would have been hailed as one over His Majesty's Government."(352)

The Political Resident continued his description of the British policy towards the ruler and the council,

"Towards the latter we should endeavour to retain their present confidence, so that they turn to us naturally for unofficial advice, while making it clear that we still consider the Shaikh the Ruler, and officially responsible for Kuwait's relations with His Majesty's Government."(353)

The same British Official was satisfied with the formation of this council and its co-operation with the British, when he stated,

"I have no doubt that though the council at present are sincerely pro-British, as time goes by and their position becomes assured, they may display 'nationalistic' tendencies which may at times take an awkward turn. But the council is in being, as a development it was inevitable, and we must make the best of the good start which we have obtained."(354)

The Political resident could not hide his government's fears from Iraq's interference in Kuwait affairs to support K.S.W., when he stated in the same letter:

"One can imagine circumstances in which the council in the course of their struggle with the Shaikh might have bombarded the neighbouring Arab States - especially Iraq - with appeals for help. Iraq at least would undoubtedly have been only too glad for an excuse to meddle in Kuwait's affairs."(355)

As a democratic country Britain could not ignore the people's desire in the gulf to replace the tribal political system with a democratic one. The success of the Kuwaiti

opposition movement stimulated the opposition movements in Baḥrain and Dubai to demand reforms similar to those in Kuwait. Therefore Britain approved of the regional movements, when expedient, in order to pre-empt interference. From a political point of view the Political Resident summarised his views and suggestions towards, these movements in the letter quoted earlier,

> "Such movements will doubtless arise elsewhere on the Arab Coast, and it is obvious that as the chief exponents of democracy His Majesty's Government cannot ally themselves with the Shaikhs to stamp these movements out, even if this were practicable. What we can, and what in my opinion we should do, is to try by exercise of judicious influence, to ensure that such movements come to fruition by a process of 'peaceful change,' as in Kuwait, rather than by violence, and that they should, also as in Kuwait, be well disposed towards us."(356)

The Political Resident believed that the British opposition to these movements would impair their reputation, as well as their future prospects in the region.

4. Problems with the Legislative Council:

It was clear that the creation of the Legislative Council caused competition for power between the new and old forms of administration. The old was represented by Mulla Ṣāliḥ, ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar and others; the new by the council which had considerable influence, in accordance with the constitution. Hence, dissention immediately occurred between the two parties. The council therefore decided not only to dismiss the prominent persons of the

ruler i.e. Mulla Ṣāliḥ and ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar from their posts, but also to deport them from Kuwait. This happened on the 16th August 1938.[357] It was the first achievement of the council in the practice of its authorities. Both secretaries were disloyal to the country, their loyalty was only to their personal interests. The council considered the presence of ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar and Mulla Ṣāliḥ in the Shaikhdom as a real hindrance to its progress, according to al-Baṣīr.[358] The 'Poet of Youth,' Sayyid Aḥmad ᶜUmar ᶜĀṣim described in his poetry the occasion of Mulla Ṣāliḥ and ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar's deportation,

قد طار من أفق الكويت غرابها بئس الغراب

From Kuwait's sky its raven
flew, the miserable raven.[359]

The deportation of the two secretaries had two contradictory consequences. It consolidated the position of the council, at the same time it psychologically weakened the position of the ruler, because he regarded it as a challenge to his power and dignity.

During the conversation between the Ruler, Political Agent and Political Resident of Kuwait on the 19th October, 1938, Shaikh Aḥmad expressed resentment at the council's authorities, which included the distribution of allowances to the ruler and other members of al-Ṣabāḥ ; these had become monthly instead of twice yearly. Further

the ruler had lost control to the remainder of his family with Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim as consultant. Furthermore, although the cheque for all royalties would come to him, he would have to hand over the whole amount, without deduction of any kind, to the council.(360) Moreover the council was to act as the highest court of appeal until an independent judiciary was established according to article four of the constitution. Consequently the ruler attempted to use the power of the British Government to break the council.(361)

Moreover, the British officials did not share the ruler's desire to destroy the council, because it was against their policy(362) They were anxious about the possibility of popular agitation which could at the same time encourage the Iraqis to interfere in Kuwait's internal affairs. Again this could weaken Britain's prestige. The formal British attitude towards both parties was summarised, by the Political Resident:

> "At the present stage a formal pronouncement made with the authority of His Majesty's Government,
>
> (a) that we regard the Shaikh as the constitutional head of the state with whom our official relations will be maintained.
>
> (b) repeating general terms the advice to the Shaikh in regard to consultation and co-operation, and
>
> (c) stating in unequivocal terms our insistence on control of foreign affairs and dealing with foreigners generally."(363)

The above principles indicated the British policy towards the ruler and the council in Kuwait. It became clear that the British were not satisfied with the

council's power, and the members of the council and K.S.W. therefore expected British interference to amend the constitution, especially article 3 which made the Legislative Council the sole repository of authority in Kuwait. The constitution not only reduced the ruler's power but also the British influence, consequently Britain became a source of threat to the existing Legislative Council and its constitution. Britain desired the continuation of the existing council, but only with limited powers.(364)

The activities and even the existence of the council were jeopardised by administrative corruption, the influence of the ruler's clique, the ruler's intrigues and the British reservations over the authority of the Legislative Council. However, the most serious obstacle to the council was the opposition of the Iranian Shīʿīs to the council, on the grounds of the absence of a representative for the Shīʿī among its members.

The Shīʿī community was estimated to be about 18,000 - 27.70% of the total population of Kuwait.(365) These Shīʿīs could be divided into several groups:(366) Iranians, numbering about 10,000; Hasāwīs from al-Hasā province of Sauʿudī Arabia about 3,000; Baḥārnah,(367) Shīʿīs from Baḥrain about 3,000; Fuwadra Shiʿi Arabs who emigrated from Arabia into Persia, and thence back to Kuwait about 1,000; and Shīʿīs of Iraqi origin numbering about 700.(368)

All the Shīʿī had lived peacefully in Kuwait up to the formation of the council, and had participated in the

activities of the K.S.W. before the formation of the Legislative Council, because the demands of the K.S.W. represented the hopes of all communities in Kuwait.(369) However the absence of a Shīᶜī representative on the council created fears of repression among a part of the Shīᶜīs community. These fears were consolidated by the council's legislation against illegal emigration.(370) A number of Iranian Shīᶜīs were deported.(371) The Iranians' sympathy with the ruler motivated the council to reduce their number, whilst the Iranians considered this a racialist movement, according to al-Baṣīr.(372)

The discontent culminated in more than 4500 applicants for British Citizenship being received by de Gaury, as Political Agent at Kuwait. The details of these figures are: Baḥārnah, 983; Hāsawīs, 37; Iranians in Kuwait less than 10 years, 170; Iranians in Kuwait between 10 and 120 years, 3457. The total number was 4647 according to The Political Resident.(373)

These figures indicated that about 80% of the Shīᶜīs who opposed the council were Iranians. The percentage excludes the wives, children and servants of the applicants. Shīᶜīs were occupied in various professions - merchants, police, workers etc.(374) Therefore, they composed a legitimate part of the Kuwaiti Society. When the applictions became known to the council, the members as a result of their lack of political experience, allowed themselves to become rattled and despite de Gaury's advice, issued a public notice to the effect that any one applying for foreign nationality would render himself liable to

deportation. This increased the apprehension of the Shī^c^īs.[375]

Under the instructions of T.C. Fowle the Political Resident in the Gulf, de Gaury the Political Agent at Kuwait accordingly informed the applicants through Sayyid Yūsuf Musawī, the judge of the Shī^c^ī Religious Court, and the accepted head of the Shī^c^ī community.

The British officials in the Gulf region were anxious that the internal situation in Kuwait might have external repercussions. They especially expected the interference of the Iranian Government on behalf of the Iranian Community, in case of ill-treatment.[376] Consequently, the Political Resident and the Political Agent met a representative group of the Legislative Council which consisted of the president and six members in addition to the ruler, on the 15th October 1938. When the Political Resident T.C. Fowle asked what the opinion of the council was on this matter, the deputation had no clear views beyond insisting that Kuwait was Arab territory, and that they wanted it kept as such; free from Iranian intrigue and influence. They said that they could not possibly agree to the demands of the Shī^c^īs which had been for: special Shī^c^ī schools; representation on the Legislative Council; and finally representation on the Municipality Council.[377]

According to Fowle:

> "A single Shi^c^i representative on the council could not affect the council's decisions, but would give the Shi^c^is an opportubity of letting off steam", he continued: "I explained to them the inadvisability of sitting on the safety valve."(378)

The deputation then repeated their original views, and said that in any case the Shī^{c}īs were given a chance to vote at the election of the council. T.C. Fowle replied that,

> "This is true, but owing to the system of voting adopted they were not likely to succeed in having a candidate elected."(379)

After discussion, in which T.C. Fowle stressed that the responsibility for settling the Shī^{c}ī question was in any case a British one, the spokesman of the deputation, the new state secretary, Sulaimān al-^{c}Adasāni, made a comic comment on Fowle's smile of the sectarian dispute, which was transcribed in British documents:

> "They would prefer to keep the safety valve closed, but would, however, do all they could to reduce the head of steam by taking away the fuel!"(380)

The discussion was closed after al-^{c}Adasāni's comment, later on members of the council told de Gaury who reported to the Political Resident that the early dispute was a legacy from the administrative corruption of the ruler, whose secretary Mulla Ṣāliḥ had encouraged Iranian immigration to Kuwait.(381)

Further, the same British officials met the ruler and the deputation on the 11th October 1938 at the Agency. T.C. Fowle informed the deputation of British discontent over the interference of the council in the ruler's authority when they addressed, in September, the Kuwait Oil Company direct. T.C. Fowle explained that the concession was in the name of the ruler, correspondence therefore should be between the ruler and the company. The

Deputation accepted this as a principle, but tried to argue that in routine matters of little importance they should have the right of addressing the company direct so as to save time.(382)

As a result of the power of the Legislative Council according to the first constitution, the influence of the ruler, his entourage and Britain had been reduced.

The far reaching influence of the Legislative Council threatened the positions of the traditional confederates: The ruler and Britain. They decided together to dissolve the Legislative Council. Britain believed that the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Shaikhdom would continue in the hands of the British Government in accordance with the exclusive agreement of 1899, whilst the constitution gave the council insuperable power. The prejudice of the council against the Shīᶜī demands gave the British and the ruler an excuse to dissolve the six month old council. British support to the ruler weakened the position of the council and sustained the ruler's position. Therefore the latter allowed his secretaries ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar then Mulla Ṣāliḥ to return to Kuwait in December 1938. Their arrival consolidated the ruler's prestige and influence as well.(383) On the 17th December 1938 the ruler announced the dissolution of the Legislative Council.(384) Al-Sijil reported on the 6th January 1938 the circumstances which caused the dissolution.

> "The gunboats were very near to Kuwait, the Shaikh brought bedouins from the desert secretly. When he felt that his position

> was strong enough, he asked those reluctant to accept the council to submit a petition to him asking for the council's dissolution. As a result a number submitted petitions requiring this. In response the ruler dissolved the council."(385)

At the end of December the same year another council was established which consisted of twenty elected members instead of fourteen, with Shaikh ʿAbdulla al-Sālim as President once again.[386] The dissolution of the first council was considered the first defeat for the nationalist reform movement and for the establishment of democracy. The former measure led to the replacement of the first constitution by a new one which gave the ruler a power of veto. The new constitution was created by the ruler in February 1939 and approved by the Political Agent and the Political Resident in the Gulf. The latter described it in a secret telegram of the 27th February to the Secretary of the State of Inida,

> "Now constitution is reasonable enough in itself and satisfactory from our point of view, but briefly it turns council from an executive to an advisory one."(387)

The new council never met, owing to the refusal of the members to accept the new constitution. In response the ruler decided to dissolve the council and nominate a new one. He informed the Political Resident in February 1939 that his position was strong enough to do that and de Gaury agreed.[388] Therefore the second Legislative Council was dissolved by the ruler on the 7th March 1939.[389]

The democratic experiment in Kuwait came to a tragic end, engineered by the co-operation between the ruler and the British officials in the region.[390]

The K.S.W. promptly reacted with an effective weapon against the ruler and his allies. This was violent radio and press propaganda from Iraq. It was expected that Iraq had plans to use armed forces to annex Kuwait. This rumour appeared in the last week of February after the conflict between the ruler and members of the Legislative council, caused by their rejection of the new constitution. The Political Resident T.C. Fowle reported on his secret telegram of the 26th February to the Secretary of State for India,

> "Suggestions are thrown out that, if other means fail, Iraq should use armed force to annex Kuwait."(391)

These expectations were confirmed by a number of incursions by the Iraqi police in March, 1939, to Kuwait as far as four miles north of Jahra[392] at the head of Kuwait Bay according to the ruler's report. In the same month it was reported that all traffic from Iraq to Kuwait had been stopped temporarily for two days by the Iraqi authorities.[393] British fears motivated the British Ambassador in Baghdād to meet King Ghazi, the Premier Nurī al-Saᶜīd, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance in March to end Iraq's hostile campaign against Kuwait. The British Ambassador stated:

> "He(394) would be able to advise the Shaikh on how to administer his country and to convince His Highness that the King of Iraq's sole idea was to render assistance in bringing that backward territory up to date. The King then alleged that the Shaikh employed Persian police and encouraged Persian emigrants in order to enable him to control his own people. I denied this and when the Prime Minister went on to say how pleased His Majesty would be to send the

> Iraqi police at any time to help the Shaikh to keep order I rather have thought Kuweit's experience of Iraqi police would have been enough."(395)

Iraq's violent attacks threatened the tribal regimes in the Gulf region. Ibn Sa^c^ud sent a telegram to the ruler of Kuwait expressing apprehension at the rumour of Iraq's plan and asking what steps had been taken by Britain.(396) A large number of Iraqi newspapers made demands for the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, and attacks against the ruler. The ultra Arab Nationalist newspaper of Baghdād al-^c^Irāq, edited by Razzq Ghannām which supported Nurī al-Sa^c^īd, published an article "Kuwait as a part of Iraq" on the 14th February 1939 written by Mahdī Muqallad,

> "Yet he opposes the demands of his country's best elements and youth who have rightly been clamouring for amalgamation with Iraq...Kuwait was only Qaimmakamiya (sic) of Iraq. Its Amir does not even belong to the influential tribe therein. He was a satellite to the Ottoman Sultans who appointed him as governor by decrees. Besides this principality is within the boundaries of Iraq and is, therefore, an Iraqi province while the demand of its inhabitants to be united with Iraq testify to this fact.... sacrifice for the good of the common cause lifts the prestige of leaders."(397)

Further, the Baghdādi newspaper of the same sympathies al-Istiqlāl, edited by ^c^Abdūl Ghafūr al-Badrī, published an article "Kuwait's Plight" on the 17th February the same year,

> "in fact Iraq cannot stand aloof and inactive vis-a-vis the present situation which is about to ruin this Arab principality."(398)

Owing to the dissolution of the first Legislative

council and the ruler's preparation for a new constitution, the leading members of the council and K.S.W., began to announce their reaction publicly through the Iraqi media. The moderate nationalist Tawfīq al-Simᶜānī, the editor of the newspaper of Mosul al-Zamān published an article "Kuwaitīs Demand Self Determination" on the 12th February 1939. The editor stated that from a special visit paid to his office by Kuwaitī youths, such as ᶜAbdulla al-Ṣaqr, Abdulla al-Ṣāliḥ al-Falāḥ and Moḥammad al-Barrāk, he found that the people of Kuwait were passing through a crucial period of oppression and injustice by the ruler's administration.(399)

Further, the editor of Baghdād newspaper al-Istiqlāl published an article which the British translated: "Aggravation of opposition in Kuwait" on the 12th February 1939, he stated,

> "A leading member of the opposition in the Legislative Assembly of Kuwait declared to the agent of the Arab News Agency that, in the event of the refusal of the Amir of Kuwait to grant the country a liberal parliamentary constitution relevant to the principality's needs and the developments in other Arab countries, the people of Kuwait will take a violent attitude that will prove disadvantageous to the Amir himself. We shall never stop demanding the grant of free action to the Assembly that represents the principality, and to urge the people to reject anything arranged at the instigation or by the inspiration of the foreigner which might seem inconsistent and incompatible with the country's interests. Kuwait will consent only to a national free policy and the creation of closer relations with all the Arab states." Said the Kuwaiti spokesman.(400)

Conscious, as the British were, of the power of popular feeling, the K.S.W., was able to take a firm stance

against retrogression. On the 13th February "King Ghazi's Wireless" transmitted further news about Kuwait. According to the staff of the Political Agency at Kuwait the announcer spoke on the following lines:

> "The tension between the Kuwaitis and their Emir has lately increased as a result of the non-recognition by the Emir of the constitution submitted to him by the council recently, because it contained something against the interests of the colonizers. The Emir has formed a new constitution for his country, which he is going to submit to the British representative for approval who lately returned from Amman. The Kuwaiti youths cry for help from all the independent Arab states, and especially from Iraq to which they want Kuwait to be annexed. As regards other Arab countries crying for freedom there is Aden and Morocco."(401)

The frequency of inflammatory Iraqi propagandaist attacks on the Kuwait ruler and his entourage frightened him, whilst K.S.W. morale was raised by this campaign.(402)

The collapse of the Kuwait nationalist reform movement began with the dissolution of the first Legislative Council in December 1938, which was followed by a new constitution in February 1939. The varied elements hostile to the Council co-operated together against the existing members. When the nationalist groups arranged for a demonstration in support of the constitution and the Legislative Council on the occasion of ^{c}Īd al-Aḍḥā 1357 A.H. February 1939, a number of them were arrested by the police and Fidāwiyya (the ruler's bodyguard), while the Iranian Shī^{c}īs crowded around and shouted on behalf of the ruler:(403)

خـرب العـش لا يكـبر طـيره

"Destroy the nest before the bird grows."(404) The Iraqi newspaper al-Difāᶜ al-Qawmī published an article "signs of revolution in Kuwait" on the 16th February 1939. The writer described the violent measures taken against demonstrators. He ended the article by calling upon Arabs to march "for the delivery of their persecuted brothers and for the restoration of Kuwait to the Arab fold", (the editor).(405)

The Propaganda and Publicity Bureau in the Arab Gulf which was re-established in Baṣra in February 1939 was outspoken in its support for the K.S.W. after the dissolution of the first Legislative Council. It began to transmit its views of Kuwaitī affairs to the Iraqi, Arab and foreign press. Raphael Butti, for example a supporter of Nurī al-Saᶜīd and the energetic editor of the Baghdād newspaper al-Bilād, received a telegram from the Bureau containing news of the repression of the K.S.W.. On the 17th February 1939, his paper published the telegram with the title, "Kuwait Youth Applauds King of Iraq" quoted on p. 93. The telegram proceeded from the Kuwaiti youths recognition of King Ghazi's Sovereignty over them:

> "This incensed one ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar (a freemason) to slap one of the young men on the face. This led to an affray which would have resulted in a civil war had it not been for the interference of certain sensible persons. Thereupon the nationalist youth made a demonstration during which they heralded Iraq as the bearer of the standard of Arab nationalism, carrying at the same time placards inscribed with the words 'Kuwait is an integral part of Iraq.' No sooner this took place (sic) then ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar rallied a band of armed rabble and was about to create a nauseating incident".(406)

Links between Iraq and the opposition leaders of Kuwait continued after the dissolution of the council. Consequently the British officials were anxious about their contacts. The most prominent leader of the Kuwaiti oposition was ʿAbdulla Ḥamad al-Ṣaqr. During the second week of February 1939 he visited Iraq with some other politicians. "al-Ṣaqr was in touch with various Iraqi officials and politicians including the court chamberlain" according to the Political Resident, T.C.Fowle.[407] After the departure of the Kuwaiti deputation from Baghdād to Kuwait al-Ṣaqr addressed the following telegram to Najī Shawkat, Minister of Interior which was published in the newspaper al-Bilād on the 17th February 1939 with the title "Kuwait Nationalists' Thanks to Iraq",

> "I and my Kuwaiti brothers approach you with our heartfelt thanks to the Iraqi Government for the cordial reception and sincere hospitality accorded to us. We shall never forget the great interests and the fraternal concern displayed towards our case which affects the Arabs in general and Iraq in particular by His Majesty the King and the Iraqi public."(408)

No doubt the afore-mentioned visit to Iraq at this crucial time for the nationalist movement in Kuwait, indicated Iraq's persistence in protecting the movement. Iraq became a refuge for the leaders of the reform movement. Moḥammad al-Barrāk, the most dynamic member of the K.S.W., according to al-Baṣīr,[409] published a provocative article "Kuwaitis' Thanks to the Iraqi Nation" in the Iraqi newspaper of Baghdād al-Istiqlāl on the 23rd February 1939,

> "I am glad for the nationalist feeling which prevailed in Iraq from Fao to Ninevah and became clear in the press and the Nationalist Radio Station of Qasr al-Zuhur. This encouraged me to believe that the Arab Nation is capable of living in dignity under the sun.
>
> By all means, O sons of Iraq rouse your noble nationalist feelings towards the sons of the 'broken fifteenth Liwa'(410) who became victims of a dictatorial regime. After a long struggle the people of this Liwa insist on being governed by His Majesty King Ghazi.
>
> In the name of Kuwait and its people - old and young - I thank you from my heart, O sons of Arabism and founders of the principles of the Great Faisal, for your triumph which reminds me of the prisoner of ' Ammuryah' who shouted 'Wa Mu tasimah." She was immediately rescued. You are helping your Arab brothers in Kuwait, in accordance with the hopes of the leader of Arabism and founder of Arab unity, the immortal martyr al-Hashimi.(411) Kuwait is a part of Iraq, its natural port and its backbone; its people are calling for your help, shouting 'O Great Ghazi, and the successor of Faisal the founder of glory of Arabism'."(412)

Owing to the continuation of Iraqi solidarity with the K.S.W., the British Ambassador at Baghdād began in February 1939 to press the Iraqi Government to put a stop to the Press and Wireless Campaign against Kuwait. King Ghazi, the Prime Minister Nurī al-Saᶜīd and the chief of the Royal <u>dīwān</u> Rashīd ᶜAli al-Gailānī all promised that this would be done. The Prime Minister put forward a proposal that he should send a private and personal messenger to the Ruler of Kuwait, to express regret for the attacks made on him in Iraq and generally to smooth the Ruler's ruffled feelings. While this proposal was being examined, the disturbances which had occurred in Kuwait,

the dissolution of the second Legislative Council excited Ghazi's close interest; and the Palace Qaṣr al-Zuhūr radio station began to attack Kuwait[413] Moral support from Iraq was a vital defence for the Kuwaitī movement. The defence consisted largely of the broadcasting of popular Kuwaitī defiance, stressing especially the opposition group's desire for Iraqi support.

On the night of the 7th March, the date of the council's dissolution, the Qaṣr al-Zuhūr Wireless Station of Baghdād broadcast as follows:

> "We have received a telegram from Kuwait sent by about ten Kuwaiti youths whose names we shall not mention, giving an account of the present situation there, which we deem it necessary to read. The Kuwaitis, and especially the Youths, do not recognise the protection. The history of Kuwait is a great testimony. No one represents Kuwait except its free-born deputies. We are Iraqis by flesh and blood. Our history supports the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq. We live, and die under the Hashimite Flag. Down, down the despotism, and the colonisation. Long live Iraq.
>
> Venerable King! O brave Army! A cry from the core of the heart. Is there anyone to say,'Here I am'? Hasn't the time come that you should weep for Kuwait with tears of blood? O people and sons of Iraq save Kuwait. Rescue us. We are breathing our last. Where is the zeal? Where is the sympathy? Where is the nobility? Matters came to a head. The situation became grave. O Ghazi! Help! What humbleness! Had we been monkeys, our conditions would not have been accepted by them (monkeys)'."End.(414)

While nationalist Kuwaitis were disappointed by the collapse of their movement, a Kuwaitī resident in Baṣra and K.S.W. member Moḥammad al-Munayyis returned to Kuwait. The Political Agency reported:

"While affairs were still unsettled al-Munais (sic) arrived, and harangued a crowd and distributed leaflets declaring the ruling family deposed. The next morning when Mohammad al-Munayyis was being taken to prison under arrest, a revolutionary ex-member of the council, Yusuf al-Marzook, and another follower of the council party (sic), Muhammad al-Qitami, endeavoured to secure his release. There was a scuffle and Muhammad al-Qitami fired on the police, and Yusuf drew and aimed his revolver. The police returned the fire and mortally wounded Muhammad. Yusuf was wounded in the foot. The guard and other tribal followers of the Shaikh then immediately set up a hullabaloo and threatened the crowd."(415)

On the same day the 10th March, a trial was staged and Munayyis was convicted, sentenced to death, and immediately executed by shooting in the main town square, al-Ṣafa, where his body was hung.(416) It was reported that the main reason for al-Munayyis' execution was his opposition, on behalf of the members of the Legislative Council, to returning an offical document which contained the first constitution and was signed by the ruler. This incident took place at al-Ṣaqr's dīwān when Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim, on behalf of the ruler, asked the opposition leaders to return the document, after the dissolution of the second council.(417) The announcer of the Qaṣr al-Zuhūr Radio Station, broadcast the Kuwaitī news on the evening of the 11th March 1939, the day after the disturbances, recorded by the British Embassy in Baghdād:

"We have received many telegrams from Basra and Kuwait from men and youth. One of them reads as follows: 'The volcano in Kuwait has exploded. Mohammad al-Munais (sic) hanged, Mohammad bin Qitami shot, many others wounded and the members of the Majlis (Council) imprisoned. The request to be

> rescued by their brethren, the Iraqis'."(418)

Such outspoken solidarity was typical of the Iraqi response to the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement; vociferous propaganda was equalled by prompt action.

The incidents of the 10th March perpetrated by the Kuwaitī Government constituted the last breath of the 1930's nationalist reform movement. Several of them fled to Iraq, but those who did not escape were imprisoned. Among them were: Sayyid ᶜAli Sayyid Sulaimān al-Rifāᶜi, Mashᶜān al-Khuḍair al-Khālid, Ṣāliḥ al-ᶜUthmān, Yusuf al-Marzūq, Sulaimān al-ᶜAdasāni and ᶜAbdul Laṭīf al-Thunayyān, all of whom were members of the first Legislative Council. These nationalist leaders were held in chains; they were badly treated and kept in prison until 1943.(419) It was said that Ibn Saᶜud called for their execution, but the British refused.(420)

The amendment of the constitution was generally considered a hostile action by the ruler against the people and their representatives. It transferred the position of the council from a Legislative to a consultative role. The dissolution of the second Legislative Council was recognised as a public threat to the nationalists reform movement, and in fact nationalists fled from Kuwait driven by the long upheld, and finally successful, suppressive policy. ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr remembered the threat to his own safety, recounting it in 1982:

> After the suppression of the nationalist reform movement ᶜAli Khalifa al-Sabah the Director of Security informed my father that tomorrow his son Abdul Razzaq would be

> publicly flogged "Don't worry! I will help him to flee to safety." He had given my father a passport and next day I fled from Kuwait to Basra with the Director's assistance, where I spent a month at Abdulla al-Saqr's house.(421)

The British Officials dismissed the strength of pro-Iraqi feeling in Kuwait with accusations of self-interest. They accused the following prominent nationalist leaders of hoping to avoid payment of certain sums due to the ruler by deposing him, through joining Iraq. There were supposed to have been between 10 and 80 of them under the leadership of ᶜAbdulla al-Ṣaqr:(422)

	Rupees owed
ᶜAbdulla al-Ṣaqr	95,000
Yūsuf al-Marzūq	24,000
Yūsuf al-Ghānim	1,50,000
Moḥammad Shahīn al-Ghānim	40,000
Ṣāliḥ ᶜUthman Rāshīd	5,000

The British officials reported that ᶜAbdulla al-Ṣaqr and Yūsuf al-Ghānim had been promised "contracts for the Kuwait port etc., by the Iraqis."(423)

In fact again Iraq became a refuge for the opposition leaders after the collapse of their movement. The presence of the leaders in Iraqi cities, especially Baṣra and Baghdād after the suppression, confirmed Iraq's support to the nationalist reform movement.

As a result of the growth of illegal emigration from Iran and also the development of immigrant influence in

Kuwait under the supervision of the ruler, Kuwaitī Arab nationalists were anxious that their nationals could find themselves in a situation similar to that of the Palestinians.[424] "There is of course a considerable Persian minority in Kuwait about which the previous Iraqi Governments made enquiries," the India Office reported on the 5th April 1939.[425] At the same time Iraq was considered by Kuwaitīs at that time to be 'the fortress' of Arab nationalism. The ruler's oppression, British influence, the growth of the Iranian community and the belief of the K.S.W. in the principles of Arab Nationalism motivated Iraq to support the reform movement as a step towards an Iraqi takeover. Britain and the ruler co-operated together against the K.S.W. because their influence was threatened.

To recaptitulate: the ruler of Kuwait hindered Iraqi efforts to resolve mutual problems between the two countries, therefore the coalition between the K.S.W. and Iraq was necessary above all to achieve satisfactory communications, and to halt the annual loss of an estimated £30,000 through smuggling.[426]

The K.S.W. considered Iraq a vital instrument in strengthening its position - a further pressure compelling the ruler to submit to democratic procedures and liberal policies. Consequently, the frequent Iraqi police incursions into Kuwait territory during March 1939, following the smugglers, were interpreted by British officials in the region as a scheme to occupy Kuwaitī territory.[427] T.C. Fowle the Political Resident in the

Gulf stated in telegrams on the 27th March 1939 that he was of the opinion:

> following on failure of Iraqi engineered outbreak in Kuwait, some scheme was hatched by extremists encouraged by German influence, for despatch of Iraqi armoured cars into Kuwait territory.(428)

The British noted that T.C. Fowle's analysis was corroborated by the Royal Air Force intelligence officer of Baṣra who had been sent to the Air Ministry in the same month.[429]

The new mutaṣarrif of Baṣra had increased the British disquiet over Iraqi intentions. ʿAlī Maḥmūd Shaikh ʿAlī was known to the British as "an extreme nationalist and contributor to al-Istiqlāl's attacks on British policy."[430] The British biographical notes are consistent in anticipating problems from him, that of 1939 ends:

> In February 1939 he was appointed mutasarrif of Basra, where he soon began to make troubles for the Shaikh of Koweit.(431)

The repetition of Iraqi incursions into Kuwait substantiated claims of British inaction. The Political Resident was concerned about "the damage to British prestige in Arabia."[432] Therefore the British Ambassador at Baghdād requested the Iraqi Government in a note on the 25th March 1939 to apologise to the Kuwaiti ruler. This did not happen although King Ghazi proposed to send an envoy to the ruler.[433] However, there is legitimate doubt that King Gazi had a plan of invasion. Muṣṭafa al-Najjār[434] in an article "The Modern Political Unionist Efforts in the Arab Gulf" published in the journal

al-Khalīj al-ᶜArabi 1975, claimed that King Ghazi went no further than ordering the mutaṣarrif of Baṣra to hold the police force on alert until he received further orders from King Ghazi.(435) It appears that King Ghazi may have had a desire to occupy Kuwait but made no firm plans. His unexpected death on the 3rd April eased the hostility between the two countries. The propagandist campaign against the Kuwaiti Government ceased. The Qaṣr al-Zuhūr Wireless Station was handed to the Government and the K.S.W., Ghazi's ally in Kuwait, had already been suppressed.

After the collapse of the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement and after the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April 1939 the tribal regimes in the region came together in joint opposition to Iraq. In the Kuwaiti intelligence summary No.5, for the period from the 1st to 15th March 1939, de Gaury, the Political Agent, reported that the ruler received congratulatory telegrams from Ibn Saᶜud, Emir ᶜAbdulla of Transjordan, the ruler of Baḥrain, the Sultan of Muscat, as well as other Arabian notables.(436) The Political Resident commented on the rulers'co-operation,

> "In the case of Ibn Saᶜud this feeling is doubtless inspired by genuine fear lest Iraq should become too powerful by seizing Kuwait, which if anybody is to seize, he would undoubtedly like to be the power who does it, and in the case of all, who are autocrats of varying degrees, by an antipathy to popular movements."(437)

Notwithstanding the short duration of the Legislative Council, considerable achievements and reforms were made during the period of power from July to December 1938.

These achievements covered economic, social, cultural and political affairs. The number of reforms was estimated at about 31.[438]

The principal mistakes of the movement were that the members of the first Legislative Concil were not the core of the K.S.W., their election was due to their financial position and not to their political and cultural experience. Nevertheless there were some qualified politicians among them. The exclusion of a Shīʿī representative despite Shīʿī membership of the K.S.W. created a schism in society, and friction between the communities. This action was coupled with the Council's attempts to reduce the predominantly Shiʿite Iranian community in Kuwait. The Iranian Shīʿī had actively campaigned against the Legislative Council, requesting British citizenship. Restrictions were imposed on their immigration to Kuwait and a number of illegal emigrants were deported. In response the Shīʿī Iranians supported the ruler instead of the Council. These measures together led to sectarian agitation which weakened the position of the movement. It was this internal disagreement, the absence of national unity, that facilitated Britain's liquidation of the Legislative Council. Moreover the leaders of the movement attempted to resist the political and religious influence of Saʿudi Arabia in Kuwait, according to al-Baṣir.[439] The temporary success of the Kuwaitī movement threatened the existing tribal regimes in the Gulf region on the one hand and the British influence on the other, The exchange of congratulatory telegrams

between the rulers in the region and Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir reflected their fears and hostility to democracy and the popular movements. Undoubtedly, British officials appreciated those attitudes which harmonised with their policy in the region.[440]

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER ONE

1. IOR: R/15/1/713/3, report for 1922

2. IOR: R/15/1/713/4, report for 1923

3. Loc. cit

4. Hurewitz, J.C., The Middle East and Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record, 1979, pp.325-336; see also Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol.XI (Delhi 1933), pp.266-267

5. Hay, R., "The Persian Gulf States and their Boundary Problems", 1954, 120 Geographical Journal, pp.433-445

6. al-Saᶜīd, N., Arab Independence and Unity, Baghdād, printed at the Government Press 1943, pp.37-42

7. They were Sulaimān Muhammad al-ᶜAnzi, Maḥmūd ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Dousari, Khalid Sulaimān al-ᶜAdasānī, Ahmad ᶜUmar ᶜAlī, ᶜAbdul Karīm bin Muḥammad al-Badr.

8. One of the Islamic education institutions at Baghdād at that time.

9. Personal interview with ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr (see Appendix 1) on the 8th March 1982 in Kuwait

10. Loc.cit. See also the daily UAE newspaper al-Khalīj No. 1515, the 4th June 1983, p.10

11. IOR: R/15/1/719/1, report for 1939; R/15/719/2, report for 1940

12. Personal interview with Aḥmad Zain al-Saqqāf (see appendix 1) on the 14th March 1983 in Kuwait.

13. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr in Kuwait on the 8th March 1983; IOR: R/15/715/2, report for 1932, pp.57-58 and R/15/1/715/3 report for 1933, p.66

14. Majallat al-Kuwait, No.215, the 16th April 1972 according to an interview with Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Jābir al-Ṣābah by a correspondent of the paper. Al-Ṣabāh had been elected Chairman of the al-Nādi al-Ādabī, pp.22-3

15. Batātu, H., The Shaikh and the Peasant in Iraq 1917-1958, Ph.D. thesis Harvard University, April 1960, p.157

16. Personal interview with Khālid al-Rūmī (see appendix 1) in March in Kuwait

17. Personal interview with al-Saqqāf on 14th March 1982 in Kuwait

18. IOR: R/15/1/715/2, report for 1932, pp.57-8

19. IOR: R/15/1/714/2, report for 1926, p.37

20. IOR: R/15/1/712/4, report for 1918, p.62

21. F.O. 371/21832/P.Z. 2372/78, confidential express letter of the 12th March 1938 from the Political Agent (P.A.), Kuwait to the Political Resident (P.R.), Bushire

22. Personal interviews with al-Basīr, al-Saqqāf and Jāsim al-Ṣaqr (see appendix 1) in March 1982 in Kuwait

23. Personal interview with al-Ṣaqr on 15th March 1982 in Kuwait

24. al-Qināᶜi, Y.I., Ṣafaḥāt min Tārīkh al-Kuwait Dār Saᶜd, Cairo, 1365 A.H. - 1946, p.75

25. F.O.371/20774, translation of a letter No.R/15/650, dated the 22nd September 1937, from His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait to the P.A., Kuwait; see also F.O.371/16852, translation of a letter No. R/3/1235, dated the 13th Jamāda Thāni (sic) 1352 A.H.(3rd October, 1933) from His Excellency Shaikh Sir Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāh, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. Ruler of Kuwait, to the Political Agent, Kuwait in the same topic.

26. F.O.371/20774, Confidential memorandum from Captain G.S. de Gaury the P.A. Kuwait to the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, dated the 14th November 1937

27. F.O.371/21813, letter of the 30th November 1938 from Dudley Ryder to R.T. Peel, India Office, London

28. F.O.371/20774, Confidential Memorandum from Captain G.S. de Gaury the P.A. Kuwait to the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, dated the 14th November 1937

29. F.O.371/21813, Confidential Letter of the 13th October 1938, from T.C. Fowle the P.R. in the Persian Gulf to R.T. Peel, the India Office, London

30. Loc. cit.

31. IOR: R/15/715/4, Report for 1934 and R/15/1/715/5, Report for 1935

32. F.O.371/20774, Confidential Memorandum of the 14th November 1937 from G.S. de Gaury the P.A. in Kuwait to the P.R. in the Persian Gulf

33. IOR: R/15/1/714/1, Report for 1925, p.78

34. Al-Rashīd, A., Tārīkh al-Kuwait, Manshūrāt Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayah, Beirut, 1978, p.279

35. IOR: R/15/1/714/1, Report for 1925

36. IOR: R/15/1/714/2, Report for 1926; al-Rashīd, A., op.cit., p.279

37. IOR: R/15/1/715/4, Report for 1934; F.O.371/21813, confidential letter of the 13th October 1938, from T.C. Fowle, the P.R. in the Persian Gulf to R.T. Peel, the India Office, London.

38. Villiers, A., "Some Aspects of the Arab Dhow Trade," Middle East Journal, Vol.2, No.4, October 1948, pp.399-416

39. Ibid., p.399

40. Ibid., p.416

41. Bowen, R., "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf," Middle East Journal, Vol.5, No.2, 1951, pp.161-180 reference on p.170

42. Ibid., pp.168-169

43. Ibid., pp.174-178; Shehāb, F., "Kuwait; A Super Affluent Society." Foreign Affairs, Vol.42, April 1964, pp.461-474, reference on p.463

44. IOR: R/15/1/713/2, Report for 1921

45. Bowen, R., op.cit., pp.164, 179; see also, "Marine Industries of Eastern Arabia," Geographical Review, Vol.XLI, 1951, pp.384-400, reference on p.400

46. IOR: R/15/1/715/5, Report for 1935

47. F.O.371/16852/E3688/2079/91, Report by Colonel Dickson, the P.A. Kuwait, on the subject of smuggling from Kuwait June 1933

48. Loc. cit.

49. Loc. cit.

50. Loc. cit.

51. Al-Ṣaqr, J., Harakat al-Majlis (the Council Movement of 1938-1939): A lecture delivered in February 1982, at Rābiṭat at Ijtimāᶜiyyīn (the Sociologists League) in Kuwait.

52. F.O.371/16852/E3688/2079/91, Report by Colonel Dickson, the P.A. Kuwait on the subject of contraband from Kuwait

53. Loc. cit.

54. Loc. cit.; IOR: R/15/1/715/4, Report for 1934, p.52

55. F.O.371/21813/P/Z/4474/1938, letter of the 21st May 1938, from G.S. de Gaury, P.A. Kuwait, to the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Bushire; IOR: R/15/1/713/1, report for 1920, p.80; IOR: R/15/1/715/5, Report for 1935, p.50

56. F.O.371/21813/E5705/75/51, Letter of the 19th October 1938, from the Foreign Office to the Under Secretary of State, India Office.

57. F.O.371/21813/P.Z. 5537/38, Secret report of the 28th June 1938 from R.J. Slade for Air Vice-Marshall Commanding British Forces in Iraq, Air Headquarters, Ḥabbāniyyah.

58. F.O.371/21813/P.Z.7094, Confidential letter of the 7th October 1938, from T.C. Fowle, the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Camp, Kuwait to R.T. Peel, the India Office, London; F.O.371/21813/P.Z. 5537/38, Confidential Express letter of the 21st July 1938 from the Political Resident, Bushire to the Air Officer Commanding British Forces in Iraq, Ḥabbāniyyah; F.O.371/23180, Confidential letter of the 12th January 1939 from T.C. Fowle, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, to R.T. Peel, the India Office, London.

59. F.O.371/23180/P.Z.8198, Confidential letter of the 29th November 1938, from T.C. Fowle, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to R.T. Peel, the India Office, London.

60. Loc.cit.

61. F.O.371/16852, Confidential memorandum of the 11th July 1933, on the customs position between Iraq and Kuwait by Yāsīn Pasha, handed to Sir Francis Humphrys.

62. Examined in detail in Section 3, pp.111-225

63. Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol.XI (Delhi, 1933), pp.181-267; Persian Gulf, confidential handbook prepared under the direction of the Historical section of the Foreign Office, No.81, pp.39-54

64. F.O.371/20774/E6776/29/91, Kuwaiti-Iraqi smuggling: a meeting was held at the Foreign Office on Monday, the 21st November 1937.

65. IOR: R/15/1/715/4, Report for 1934, p.52.

66. Loc.cit.

67. Loc.cit.

68. Ibid., p.53

69. One lac is equivalent to 100,000 Indian Rupees.

70. IOR: R/15/1/715/4, report for 1934, p.53

71. Loc.cit.

72. F.O.371/21813, Note E: Smuggling from Kuwait into Iraq; F.O.371/20774/E6776/29/91, Kuwait-Iraqi smuggling: A meeting held at the Foreign Office on Monday, the 21st November 1937.

73. IOR: R/15/1/715/3, Report for 1933, pp.65-66.

74. IOR: R/15/1/715/2, Report for 1932, p.57.

75. F.O.371/23180, Telegram, of the 26th January 1939, from the Government of India, External Affairs Department to Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

76. IOR: R/15/1/715/3, Report for 1933, p.66

77. Loc.cit.

78. F.O.371/21813/E1605, letter of the 15th March 1938, from James Morgan (British Embassy, Baghdād), to H.L. Baggallay.

79. Loc.cit.

80. Loc.cit.

81. Loc.cit.

82. IOR: R/15/1/715/4, Report for 1934, p.53

83. F.O.371/21813/E1605, letter of the 15th March 1938, from James Morgan (British Embassy), to H.L. Baggallay

84. F.O.371/21813/P.Z. 4474/1938, Confidential express letter of the 7th June 1938, from the P.R., Bushire to the Air Officer Commanding, British Forces in Iraq, Ḥabbāniyyah; IOR: R/15/1/716, Report for 1936, p.37

85. F.O.371/21813/P.Z. 4474/1938, op.cit

86. F.O.371/20774, letter of the 31st August 1937 from the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs to British Charge d'Affairs in Baghdād

87. F.O.371/20774, Despatch of the 3rd September 1937 from the British Embassy Baghdād to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire

88. Al-Istiqlāl, No.2883, the 25th September 1936, p.1; al-Sijil, No.99, the 10th June 1938, pp.6-8

89. F.O.371/21813/E5705/75/91, letter of the 19th October 1938, from the Foreign Office, London to the Under-Secretary of State, India Office.

90. Loc.cit.

91. Loc.cit.; F.O.371/21813, letter of the 23rd March 1938, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baghdād, to the British Embassy, Baghdād; F.O.371/20774, extract from local press dated the 3rd June, 1937: al-Bilād, smuggling in the south; F.O.371/20774/P.Z.6870, telegram of the 18th October 1937, from the P.R in the Persian Gulf to Secretary of State for India; F.O.371/23180/P.Z.8198, Confidential letter of the 29th November 1938, from the P.R.,Bushire to R.T. Peel, the India Office, London.

92. F.O.371/21813/E5705/75/91, letter of the 19th October 1938, from the Foreign Office to the Under-Secretary of State, India office.

93. F.O.371/21813, Note E., Smuggling from Kuwait into Iraq.

94. Loc.cit.

95. F.O.371/21813/E5705/75/91, letter of the 19th October 1938, from the Foreign Office to the Under-Secretary of State, India office.

96. F.O.371/23180/P.Z.1602/39, Confidential express letter of the 23rd February 1939, from the office of the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Kuwait to the Secretary to the Government of India in the External Affairs Department, New Delhi.

97. See appendix 2.

98. F.O.371/2074/E2094/29/91, telegram, No.39 R (saving) of the 10th April 1937, from Sir A. Clark Kerr, Baghdād.

99. For the details of the formation of these societies

and their programmes, see al-Hasani, A., al-Thawra al-ᶜIrāqiyya al-Kubrā, the fifth editin, Matbaᶜat Dār al-Kutub, Beirut, 1982, pp.65-82; Amīn A.M., and others, Tārīkh al-Iraq al-Muᶜāsir, Baghdād University, 1980, pp.17-19; al-Rāwi, I., Min al-Thāwra al-ᶜArabiyya al-Kubrā Ila al-ᶜIrāq al-Hadīth, Dār al-Kutub, Beirut, 1339 A.H. - 1969, pp.52-53

100. IOR: R/15/1/712/1, Report for 1915, p.51 and IOR: R/15/1/712/2, Report for 1916, p.75

101. IOR: R/15/1/714/6, Report for 1930, p.62; IOR: R/15/1/715/1, Report for 1931, p.70

102. IOR: R/15/1/713/2, Report for 1921, p.68.

103. IOR: R/15/1/715/1, Report for 1931, p.70

104. Loc.cit.

105. Loc.cit.

106. Aitchison, C.U., op.cit., No.XL., p.264

107. F.O.371/16848, Letter of the 10th January 1933, from the British Embassy, Baghdād, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baghdād

108. F.O.371/16848/E1843/454/91, Despatch No.17 of the 24th March 1933 from Sir E. Humphrys, Baghdād, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, regarding Iraqi observations re the proposed agreement of the future administration of the Kuwait postal, telegraphic and telephonic service.

109. F.O.371/16848/E3578/454/9, letter No.616-S of the 7th June 1933 from the P.R. in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India.

110. IOR: R/15/1/716, Report for 1936, p.35; IOR: R/15/1/717, Report for 1937, p.36

111. IOR: R/15/719/2, Report for 1940, p.29

112. IOR: R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.28

113. F.O.371/16848/E3708/454/91, letter of the 25th May 1933, from Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, P.A., Kuwait, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

114. F.O.371/21860, letter of the 30th March 1938, from the British Embassy, Baghdād to the Viscount Halifax.

115. F.O.371/21860/E2094/2094/93, letter of the 2nd May 1938, from the Foreign Office to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

116. Loc.cit.

117. Loc.cit.

118. F.O.371/21860/E3467/93, letter of the 10th June 1938, from S.H. Phillips to Foreign Office.

119. Loc.cit.

120. F.O.371/21860/E4145/2094/93, Secret letter of the 12th July 1938, from Charles Evans, Air Ministry, to the Foreign Office.

121. Loc.cit.

122. Loc.cit.

123. Loc.cit.

124. F.O.371/21860/P.Z.6414/1938, Express letter of the 10th September 1938, from the officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the Secretary to the Government of India, External Affairs Department, Simla.

125. F.O.371/21860/E5879/2094/93, letter of the 19th October 1938, from the Foreign Office to the India Office; F.O.371/21860/E6868/2094/93, letter of the 21st November 1938, from Foreign Office to the Secretary of the Admiralty.

126. F.O.371/16853/P.Z.6349/33, Report on a meeting of Minister Provincial held at India Office on Monday, 9th October 1933, to consider the question of foreign consular representation in the Persian Gulf; IOR: R/15/5/315/P.Z.6349/33

127. Loc.cit.

128. Loc.cit.

129. IOR: R/15/1/715/2, Report for 1932, p.58

130. F.O.371/16852. A suggestion for uniting Iraq and Kuwait; F.O.371/16852, confidential letter of the 1st June 1933 from the P.R. in the Persian Gulf to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla

131. F.O.371/16848/P.Z.3615/1933, letter of the 23rd May 1933, from the Residency, Bushire, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla

132. IOR: R/15/5/158/E6535/6054/91, letter of the 29th December 1932, from the Foreign Office to Francis Humphrys.

133. Loc.cit.

134. IOR: R/15/5/158, letter of 9th May 1933, from the P.A., Kuwait to the P.R. in the Persian Gulf.

135. Loc.cit.

136. IOR: R/15/5/158/E6535/6054/91, letter of the 29th December 1932, from the Foreign Office to Francis Humphrys.

137. Loc.cit.

138. F.O.371/16848/P.Z.2076/1933, letter of the 17th March 1933 from the Residency in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary to the Government of India, New Delhi.

139. IOR: R/15/5/158, Confidential letter of the 9th May 1933, from the P.A., Kuwait to the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

140. F.O.371/23181, Telegram of the 22nd June 1939, from the Political Resident, in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for India, regarding telegram from Political Agent, Kuwait.

141. al-Rashīd, A., op.cit., pp.138-145.

142. Ibid., pp.190-198; see also the article entitled "al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Dīmuqrātiyya fil-Kuwait" (the Nationalist Democratic Movement in Kuwait) published by ᶜAbdul Latīf al-Duᶜaij & Ahmad Diyain in the daily Kuwaiti newspaper al-Siyāsa (the Politics) on the 22nd and 24th March 1972.

143. Personal interview with al-Saqqāf on the 14th March 1982 and with al-Wuqayyān in March 1982 in Kuwait.

144. IOR: R/15/1/711/3, Report for 1913, p.131; R/15/1/711/4, Report for 1914, pp.60-61.

145. IOR: R/15/1/712/1, Report for 1915, p.52

146. Al-Wardi, A., Lamahāt Ijtimaᶜiyya min Tārīkh al-ᶜIrāq al-Hadīth, Vol.5, Part 2, Around the Uprising of the Twenties, Matbaᶜat al-ᶜArab al-Baghdādiyya, Baghdād, 1978, pp.267-268.

147. IOR: R/15/1/712/4, Report for 1918, pp.58-61.

148. Ibid., p.61.

149. A number of the most anti-British group in Kuwait, Shaikh Sālim's succession placed him in full power.

150. The British Civil Commission at Baghdād was Sir Percy Cox, then the High Commissioner for Iraq.

151. IOR: R/15/1/712/4, report for 1918, p.62; personal interview with Fahad Yūsuf al-Duwairi (see appendix 1) on the 8th March 1982.

152. See article entitled "al-Hayāt al-Fikriyya Wa al-Siyāsiyya fil Kuwait" (the Political and Intellectual life in Kuwait), published in the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Hadaf (the Aim) No.475 on the 28th January 1971.

153. IOR: R/15/1/713/1, Report for 1920, p.80; personal interview with al-Baṣīr on the 8th March 1982 in Kuwait.

154. To be examined in the 2nd chapter.

155. IOR: R/15/1/713/2, Report for 1921, p.65.

156. Al Qināᶜī, Y. al-Multaqaṭāt, Printing Office of Kuwaiti Government, Seven parts in two volumes, without date, p.38; IOR:/15/1/713/2, report for 1921, p.65.

157. Loc.cit.

158. Loc.cit.

159. Loc.cit.

160. Loc.cit, al-Qināᶜī,Y., op.cit., p.38. Members of the Consultaive Council were Ḥamad al-ᶜAbdulla al-Ṣaqr - the Chairman, Shaikh (religious leader) Yūsuf bin Isa al-Qināᶜī, Sayyid ᶜAbdul Raḥmān Sayyid Khalaf al-Naqīb, Hilal bin Fajḥān al-Muṭairī, al-Hāj Shamlān bin ᶜAli bin Saif, Shaikh (religious leader) ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Rashīd, Khalīfa bin Shāhīn al-Ghānim, Aḥmad al-Fahad al-Khālid, Aḥmad bin Ṣāliḥ al-Humaidī, Marzūq al-Dawūd al-Badr, Ibrāhīm bin Muḍaf, Mashᶜan al-Khuḍair al-Khālid. Al-Ṣaqr was elected Chairman by the members of the Council. See Khazᶜal, H.K., Tarīkh al-Kuwait al-Siyāsi, vol.5, part, 1, Published by the Library of ᶜAbdul Munᶜim Mughniya and Sons, Beirut, 1970., p.14.

161. Ibid., pp.17-18.

162. Ibid., p.18; IOR: R/15/1/713/2, Report for 1921, p.65; Personal interview with ᶜAbdul Razzaq al-Baṣīr on 8th March 1982, in Kuwait.

163. Personal inteview with al-Duwairi on 8th March, 1982. See Appendix I.

164. Personal interview with ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr on 8th March 1982.

165. The founders of al-Nādī al-Adabī were: Sulaimān al-Fadil., Sarḥān al-Zaid, Moḥammad Sulaimān al-ᶜUtaibi, ᶜAbdul-Muḥsin ᶜAbdulla, ᶜAbdulla al-Falāḥ, Mohammad al-Bathath, Sayyid Moḥammad Sayyid ᶜUmar, Ḥasan Zaid al-Naqīb, Saᶜad al-Maniᶜ, ᶜAbdulla al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ, Khālid Ḥamad al-Mishāri, ᶜAbdulla al-Khalīfa al-Ṣabāḥ, Hajji Jāsim Hājj, ᶜAbdul Raḥmān Isḥāq, Aḥmad al-Sakkūni, Saᶜdūn al-Yaᶜqūb, ᶜAbdulla Zaid al-Khālid, ᶜAbdul Ḥāmid al-Ṣāniᶜ, Ibrāhim Jabir al-Fadil, ᶜAbdulla al-Jābir was elected President and Isa bin Sālih al-Qināᶜī the Director of this Club. Personal interview with al-Ṣaniᶜ on 7th March 1982, see Appendix I; see also al-Rashīd, A., op.cit., pp.375-6.

166. Interview with Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ, Majallat al-Kuwait (Kuwaits Journal), No. 215, the 16th April 1972.

167. Later produced from Baḥrain, after al-Rashīd's unofficial exile.

168. ᶜAbdulla, M.H., Ph.D., al-Ḥaraka al-adabiyya wal-fikriyya fil-Kuwait, Rābiṭat al-ᶜUdabā' bil-Kuwait, 1973, pp.183-185.

169. Ibid., pp.184-185.

170. Ibid., p.188.

171. Ibid., pp.349-350.

172. Personal interview with al-Ṣaniᶜ on 7th March 1982.

173. Al-Sijil, No. 91, the 15th April, 1938.

174. The Common name of the leading opposition group.

175. Al-Jāsim, N.A., al-Taṭawwur al-Siyāsī wal-iqtiṣādī Lil-Kuwait, a published M.A. thesis, publisher unknown, 1973, p.190.

176. IOR: R/15/4/3/5, Confidential, No. 214, Political Agency, Kuwait, the 13th September 1933.

177. F.O. 371/23181/P.Z. 1978/39, letter of the 5th April, 1939, from India Office to Foreign Office.

178. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of the 19th October, 1938, from T.C. Fowle, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Camp Kuwait, to the India Office, London.

179. Loc.cit.

180. Al-Sijil, No. 119, the 4th November 1938, p.14; F.O. 371/21833, Administration of Kuwait.

181. Al-Sijil, No. 127, the 24th February 1939, p.14.

182. Ibid., No. 90, 8th April, 1938, p.9; No. 99, 10th June 1938, p.12.

183. Loc.cit.; F.O.371/21832, Newspaper translation: al-Zamān, 3rd April, 1938 - a new movement in Kuwait.

184. IOR: R/15/1/714/4, Report for 1928, pp.63-67; IOR:R/15/1/714/5. Report for 1929, pp.55-62; IOR: R/15/1/714/6, Report for 1930, pp.59-62; IOR:R/15/1/715/1, Report for 1931, pp.56-58; IOR: R/15/1/715/2, Report for 1932, pp.56-57.

185. F.O. 371/16838/E16/16/91, Confidential Report on P.R's. visit to Kuwait on 29th November 1932.

186. IOR: R/15/1/715/1, Report for 1931, p.55.

187. F.O.371/16838/E16/16/91, Confidential Report on P.R.'s visit to Kuwait on 29th November 1932.

188. IOR: R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.27; IOR: R/15/1/719/1. Report for 1939, p.26.

189. F.O. 371/21833, Report of the Administrtion, Kuwait, 1938.

190. Al-Sijil, No. 97, of 27th May, 1938, pp.8-9.

191. IOR: R/15/1/719/1, Report for 1939, p.26.

192. IOR:R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.27.

193. al-Sijil, No. 97, of 27th May, 1938, pp.8-9.

194. IOR: R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.27.

195. Ibid., p.26.

196. IOR: R/15/1715, Report for 1935, p.27.

197. F.O. 371/21833, Administration Report Kuwait, 1938.

198. IOR: R/15/1/715/4, Report for 1934, p.48; F.O. 371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July, 1938, from the Residency, Bushire, to India Office, London.

199. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 22nd August, 1938 from The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, to the India Office, London.

200. ᶜIzzat Jaᶜfar.

201. F.O. 371/21833, Administration Report of 1938, Kuwait.

202. Loc.cit. Further details of corruption in administration in al-Sijil, No. 97, 27th May 1938, pp.8-9.

203. Amīn, A.M. and others, Tārīkh al-Irāq al-Muᶜāsir, Baghdād University, Baghdād, 1980, pp.25-29; Ḥasan, M.H., Mohammad Mahdī al-Basīr...Shāᶜiran, Dār al-Rashīd Lil-Nashr, Baghdād, 1980, pp.50-52.

204. Batātu, H., op.cit., p.188; Kelidār, A., The Integration of Modern Iraq, Croom Helm, London, 1979, pp.68-69.

205. Al-Rāwī, I., Min al-Thawra al-ᶜArabiyya al-Kubrā ila al-ᶜIrāq al-Hadīth, Dār al-Kutub, Beirut, 1969, p.53.

206. Sādāh descended from Ḥasan and Ḥusain, sons of ᶜAlī and Fāṭimāh (grandsons of Moḥammad the Prophet), while the Hāshimīs descended from the Bani Hāshim, the clan of the Prophet.

207. Al-Suwaidī, T., Wujūh ᶜAbra al-Tarīkh, Manuscript undated written in early sixties, p.34.

208. His real name before his adherence to the Hāshimites in Syria in 1918 was Yāsīn Ḥilmi (quoted from al-Suwaidī, T., op.cit., p.41).

209. Batātu, H., The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, Princeton University Press, 1978, pp.195, 196.

210. Al-Suwaidī, T., op.cit., p.41.

211. Batātu, Ḥ., op.cit., p.196 (quoted from Great Britain 'Confidential' Personalities, Baghdād and Kāḍmain, 1920, p.72)

212. Batātu, Ḥ., op.cit., p.197.

213. Al-Rāwī, I., op.cit., pp.25-60; Khadduri, M., "ᶜAzīz ᶜAli Misrī and the Arab Nationalist Movement", Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 4, 1965, pp.140-163.

214. Amīn, A.M., and others, op.cit., p.28; Batātu, Ḥ., op.cit., p.188.

215. Which replaced the mandate treaty and guaranteed restricted independence to Iraq.

216. For the text of this treaty see al-Saᶜīd, N., op.cit., pp.37-42; Hurewitz, J.C., The Middle East and Africa in World Politics, A Documentary Record, vol.2, 1979, pp.421-424.

217. Batātu Ḥ., op.cit., pp.1159-1160.

218. Referring to the Najdīs or the Ikhwān raids on Kuwait during 1928-1932 as mentioned.

219. F.O.371/16852, an article published in the newspaper al-Ikhā' al-Waṭanī, the 20th Muḥarram 1352 A.H. (15th May 1933)

220. The first Iraqi underground socialist group, established in the early 1930's it seized power in the government for a short period after the first coup d'etat of 29th October, 1936.

221. Al-Wakīl, F.H., Jamāᶜat al-Ahālī fil-ᶜIrāq, Dār al-Rashīd lil-Nashr, Baghdād, 1980.

222. Al-Qaisi, S.A., Yāsīn al-Hāshimī Wa Dawrohu fil Siyāsa al-ᶜIrāqiyya between 1922-1936, vol.2 University of Baghdād, 1975, pp.148-166, 183-288; Marr, P.A. Yāsīn al-Hāshimī: The Rise and Fall of a Nationalist, A study of the Nationalist Leadership in Iraq, 1920-1936, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Submitted to Harvard University, 1966, pp.192-363.

223. Amīn, A.M., and others, op.cit., p.108.

224. Al-Muthannā, No. 1, the 27th; No. 12, 12th November 1936; No. 21, 23rd January 1937.

225. Personal interview with al-Ṣāniᶜ on 7th March 1982.

226. Marr, P.A. op.cit., pp.305-309 the programme of the al-Hāshimī Government.

227. Amīn, A.M., op.cit., p.109.

228. F.O. 371/23217/E4745/4745/93, the leading personalities of Iraq for the year 1939.

229. Amīn, A.M., op.cit., p.109.

230. Loc.cit.

231. Al-Sijil, No.97, 27th May, 1938 and No.98, 3rd June, 1938.

232. Al-Istiqlāl, No. 2901, 16th September 1936.

233. Loc.cit.

234. Personal interview with Faiṣal ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniᶜ, on 7th March 1982, at Kuwait.

235. IOR: R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.27; IOR: R/15/1/719/1, Report for 1939, p.26.

236. Amīn, A., Hayātī, Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyya., 1966, pp.259-268;

Al-Ḥuṣarī, S., Mudhakkirātī fil-cIrāq Second volume, 1927-1941, Dār al-Talīca., Beirut, 1968, pp.72-80.

237. Al-Qaisī, S.A., op.cit., pp.240-243; Marr, P.A., op.cit, p.305.

238. Majmūcat Qawānīn Wa Andima., Niḍām Raqm Khasīn, Wizārat al-cAdliyya., 1935, pp.222-225.

239. Al-Qaisī, S.A., op.cit., p.251. The term futuwwah deriving from the Arabic fata (youth). Originally denoted those qualities associated with honour, courage, generosity and liberality.

240. Al-Bilād, 26th June 1936. Similar articles were published by the same paper on 28th May; 5th June, 27th June, 11th September, and 15th December 1935; from 6th to 9th June 1936.

241. Al-Ḥuṣarī, S., op.cit., p.72; remarks of Ṣādiq al-Bassām the Minister of Education in the al-Hāshimi Government published in the newspaper al-Istiqlāl, on 21st January 1940.

242. Al-Qaisī, S.A., op.cit., p.275.

243. Al-cUmari, K., Mudhakkirāt Khair al-Dīn al-cUmari, unpublished, vol,. p.85; vol.2, p.182, 240; Mushtaq, T., Áyyām al-Nakbah, Beirut, 1937, pp.140-141.

244. Al-Qaisī, S.A., op.cit., p.271.

245. Al-Durrah, M., al-Harb al-cIrāqiyya al-Biraiṭāniyya., 1941, Beirut 1969, pp.71-72.

246. Al-Balāgh al-Mawṣiliyya, 26th January 1939; the Syrian newspaper al-Qabas, 2nd November 1936; al-Istiqlāl, 21st January 1940.

247. Al-Jabha al-Shacbiyya al-Baghdādiyya., 21st January 1952.

248. Al-Qaisī, S.A., op.cit., pp.218-239

249. F.O. 371/21846, letter of 22nd February, 1938 from the British Ambassador, Baghdād, to Anthony Eden.

250. The Iraqi Newspaper al-Istiqlāl, 2nd May, 25th September, and 2nd October 1936, 17th May 1938; al-Sijil, No. 95, 12th April 1938

251. IOR: R/15/1/711/2, report for 1912, p.113.

252. Khadduri, M., *Independent Iraq* (1932-1958) Oxford University Press, London, 1960, pp.141-142.

253. Personal interview with Najāt ^{c}Abdul Qādir al-Jāsim (see appendix 1) March 1982 in Kuwait; F.O. 371/23181, despatch of 20th April 1939 from the British Embassy, Baghdād to Viscount Halifax.

254. IOR: L/P & S/12/4584, Confidential letter of 8th July, 1939, from The Residency, Bushire to the India Office, London.

255. F.O.371/23181, despatch of 20th April, 1939, from The British Embassy, Baghdād to the Viscount Halifax.

256. IOR: L/P & S/12/4584, Confidential letter of 8th July, 1939 from The Residency Bushire, to the India Office, London.

257. *Loc. cit.*

258. *Loc.cit.*

259. Al-Sab^{c}āwi was the most progressive Arab Nationalist leader to participate in the Military Revolt of 2nd May 1941, he was then executed. For details see al-^{c}Umari, K., *Yūnis al-Sab^{c}āwi*, Dār al-Rashīd Lil-Nashr, Baghdād, 1980.

260. F.O. 371/21833, Translation of articles and extracts from Iraqi newspapers.

261. *Al-Sijil*, No. 102, 1st July, p.16; No. 103, 8th July, 1938.

262. F.O. 371/21833, Translation of an extract from the Egyptian weekly newspaper *al-Rābita al-^{c}Arabiyya*, Cairo, dated 17th August 1938.

263. F.O. 371/21832, Enclosure in Baghdād despatch No.188 of the 28th April. Extract from Local Press, *al-Istiqlāl*, 26th April, 1938.

264. IOR; L/P & S/12/4584, Confidential letter of 8th July 1939, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London;

265. F.O.371/21832, Confidential Express letter of 22nd March 1938, from the Officer of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Camp Bahrain to the Secretary of State for India, London; F.O.371/21832, Note by Sir T.C. Fowle, dated on 14th April 1938.

IOR: L/P & S/12/4584, Confidential letter of 8th July 1939, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London.

266. To be examined in the second chapter.

267. Al-ʿAdasānī, K., Nisf ʿĀm Lil-Hukm al-Niyābī fil-Kuwait, unknown publisher, 1978, p.5.

268. Al-Sijil No.90,91,92 and 93, the 8th, 15th, 22nd and 29th April 1938; al-Zamān, 3rd and 11th April 1938.

269. F.O.371/21832, R.A.F. Monthly Intelligence Summary, The Press and Kuwait

270. Al-Sijil No.95, 12th April 1938.

271. F.O.371/21832, Translation of an article in the Basra Weekly newspaper al-Sijil No.97, 27th May 1938.

272. Al-ʿAdasānī, K., op.cit., pp.6-7; Al-Ṣaqr, J., Harakat al-Majlis (the Council Movement) of 1938-39. A lecture delivered in February 1982, at the Sociologist Club in Kuwait.

273. Al-Sijil No.109, 26th August, 1938, p.8.

274. F.O.371/21832, Confidential Express letter of 22nd March 1938, from the Political Resident, Bushire (at Baḥrain) to Secretary of State for India, Lodnon.

275. F.O.371/21832 Confidential letter of 18th July 1938 from the Residency, Bushire to the India Office, London.

276. Al-Sijil No.104, 15th July 1938, pp.5,16.

277. Ibid., No.105, 22nd July 1938, p.12; F.O.371/21833, Translation of a warning which appeared in the Baṣra newspaper al-Nās on 1st August 1938.

278. F.O.371/21832 Confidential letter of 18th July 1938, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London.

279. F.O.371/21832, Translation of an article in the Iraqi newspaper al-Zamān, dated 11th April 1938, Baghdād; al-ʿAdasānī, K., op.cit., p.6; al-Sijil No.95, 12th April 1938.

280. F.O.371/21833, Translation of articles and extracts from Iraqi newspapers.

281. Al-Zamān, 3rd and 11th April 1938.

282. Then member of the Legislative Council.

283. Al-Sijil No.104, 15th July 1938, p.16.

284. Ibid., No.95, 12th April 1938, p.21; IOR: R/15/1/718, report for 1938, p.28.

285. IOR: R/15/1/716, report for 1936, p.36; F.O.371/21832, Translation of articles published by al-Zamān on 3rd and 11th April 1938.

286. The Iraqi newspapers which sympathised with the Kuwaiti reform movement were: al-Karkh (22nd June 1938, al-Stiqlāl (26th April 1938), al-Zamān (3rd and 11th April 1938).

287. The Nationalist Reform Movement led by K.S.W.

288. F.O.371/21832 British extract from Local Press, al-Istiqlāl, 26th April 1938.

289. F.O., 371/17861, Confidential letter of 29th May 1934, from Lt. Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, P.A., Kuwait to the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Bushire; IOR: R/15/1/716, report for 1936, p.36.

290. F.O.371/17819, Confidential letter of 17th November 1934, from Lt. Colonel H.R.P. Dickson, P.A., Kuwait to the P.R. in thePersian Gulf, Bushire.

291. Loc.cit.

292. F.O.371/21832, Extract from Section IV (Kuwait) of R.A.F. Monthly Intelligence Summary of May 1938.

293. The common name of this radio station in Kuwait.

294. The Legislative Council.

295. F.O.371/23181, Confidential report of 13th February 1939, from the Political Agent, Kuwait to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

296. F.O.371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Bilād of 17th February 1939; al-Sijil No.125, 10th February, p.8, No.128, 3rd March 1939, p.8

297. IOR: L/P & S/12/4584, Confidential letter of 8th July 1939, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London.

298. Al-Sijil No.98, 3rd June, pp.2,3,4; No.105, 22nd July 1938, pp.7-8.

299. Ibid., No.98, 3rd June, pp.3-4; IOR: R/15/1/716, Report for 1936, p.36.

300. Al-Sijil No.105, 22nd July 1938, pp.7,12.

301. F.O.371/21833, Translation of a warning in the newspaper al-Nās of Baṣra on 1st August 1938.

302. F.O.371/21833, Translation of an extract from the Egyptain weekly newspaper al-Rābita al-ʿArabiyya, Cairo, 17th August 1938.

303. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr on 9th March; al-Ṣaqr on 15th March 1982.

304. F.O.371/232181 British List of Local Iraqi Newspapers.

305. F.O.371/23181, Confidential letter of 24th March 1939, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London.

306. Al-Sijil No.128, 3rd March 1939; F.O.371/23181 Confidential letter of 24th March 1939, from the Residency, Bushire to the India Office, London; F.O.371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Istiqlāl of 12th February 1939.

307. Al-Sijil No.125, 10th February, p.8; No.127, 24th February 1939, pp.13-15.

308. IOR:R/15/1/717, Report for 1937, p.37; personal interviews with Faiṣal ʿAbdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniʿ on 17th March and with ʿAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr on 9th March 1982 in Kuwait.

309. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 19th March 1938 from Captain de Gaury, the Political Agent, Kuwait, to T.C. Fowle, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

310. Loc.cit; the Kuwaitī daily newspaper al-Hadaf, 14th February 1967, article written by Ṭāriq Moḥammad al-Barrāk; al-Sijil No.87, 11th March 1938, pp.1,2,3; F.O.371/21832, a comprehensive report on the present administration of Kuwait, of 13th June 1938, from de Gaury, the P.A., Kuwait to T.C. Fowle, the P.R., Persian Gulf, Bushire.

311. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 19th March 1938 from Captain de Gaury, Kuwait to T.C. Fowle, the P.R., in the Persian Gulf.

312. F.O.371/21832, Confidential express letter (Air Mail) of 18th June 1938, from the P.R. Bushire, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

313. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 19th March 1938

from Captain du Gaury, P.A., Kuwait, to T.C. Fowle, P.R., in the Persian Gulf.

314. F.O.371/21832, Confidential express letter of 19th March 1938 from the P.A., Kuwait to Britconsul, Bushire.

315. Loc.cit.

316. F.O.371/21832 Note by T.C. Fowle dated 14th April 1938.

317. Al-Sijil No.95, 12th April 1938, pp.8-9; F.O.371/21832, Extract from Section IV Kuwait of R.A.F. Monthly Intelligence Summary of May 1938 (The Press and Kuwait).

318. See appendix 2.

319. Al-Sijil No.97, 27th May 1938, pp.8-9; F.O.371/21832, Translation of an article in the Başra weekly newspaper al-Sijil of 27th May 1938.

320. F.O.371/21832/E1832/1642/91 copies of two notes of 14th and 25th April 1938, sent by the P.R. in the Persian Gulf to the P.A., Kuwait.

321. Al-Barrāk's flogging

322. F.O.371/21832/E1832/1642/91 Note by Sir T. Fowle, dated 25th April 1938.

323. F.O.371/21832 letter of 13th June 1938 from the P.R., Kuwait to T. Fowle the P.A., Bushire.

324. Loc.cit.

325. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July 1938 from the Residency to the India Office, London; IOR: R/15/71/4. Report for 1934, p.53; al-Sijil No.115, 7th October 1938, p.11.

326. F.O.371/21832, letter of 18th June 1938 from the P.R. in the Persian Gulf to His Highness, Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Ṣābāḥ, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Ruler of Kuwait; F.O. 371/21832 letter of the 13th June 1938, from the P.A.,Kuwait to the P.R., Persian Gulf, Bushire.

327. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July 1938, from the Residency, Bushire to the India Office, London.

328. Loc.cit; al-ᶜAdasānī, K., op.cit., pp.7-8, letter of Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī, dated 30th Rabīᶜ al-Thānī, 1357 A.H.(27th June 1938), cited on the same pages.

Loc.cit; al-ᶜAdāsānī, K., op.cit., pp.8-9. The following were the names of the representatives; Mohammad al-Thunayyān al-Ghānim (general merchant and owner of cargo sailing boats), ᶜAbdul Latīf al-Thunayyān al-Ghānim, ᶜAbdulla Ḥamad al-Ṣaqr (general merchant), Yūsuf bin Isa (a well known religious person and former Qadi of Kuwait - known as "the reformist"), Sultān bin Ibrāhīm al Kulaib, Mashᶜān al-Khuḍair al-Khālid (tea, sugar and rice merchant), Sulaimān al-ᶜAdasānī (former Mayor of Kuwait; broker of exchange; founder of the Kuwaiti secret society then Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Watani-K.S.W.), Sayyid ᶜAlī Sayyid Sulaimān (tea, sugar merchant, a partner in the Kuwait Landing Company and leading member of the K.S.W.), Ṣāliḥ al-ᶜUthmān al-Rashīd, Mishāri Hasan al-Badr, Khālid ᶜAbdul Latīf al-Ḥamad, Yūsuf al-Humaidī, Yusuf al-Marzūq, Mohammad al-Marzuq. The first member was replaced by Moḥammad bin Shāhīn al-Ghānim as a result of the former's resignation.

330. Al-Karkh (3rd July), al-Mustaqbal (16th July) 1938

331. Al-Sijil No.103, 8th July 1938, pp.10-11.

332. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July 1938 from the Residency, Bushire to the India Office, London.

333. Loc.cit.

334. Loc.cit.

335. Loc.cit.; al-ᶜAdasānī, K., op.cit., pp.10-11.

336. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July 1938, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London.

337. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr on 8th March 1983.

338. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July 1938, from the Residency, Bushire to the India Office, London; al-ᶜAdasānī, K., op.cit., pp.9-12.

339. See appendix 3.

340. F.O.371/21833 Note by Agency Interpreter.

341. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July 1938, from the Residency, Bushire to the India Office, London; IOR: R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.27.

342. See appendix 4.

343. Al-Sijil No.107, 12th August 1938, p.4

344. Ibid., No.109, 26th August 1938, pp.8-9.

345. The poet compared the formation of the Legislative Council with the name of the first Sura (holy lesson) in the Kuran, and congratulated K.S.W. members on this analogy.

346. Personal interview with al-Basīr on 15th March 1982, al-Baṣīr said that Aḥmad was a nationalist poet, known as the poet of youth, who published his work in al-Baṣra newspapers: al-Nās, al-Sijil and al-Thaghr. His father Sayyid ʿUmar was a Turkish emigré from Izmīr. He and his wife were amongst a number of teachers who campaigned for the modernisation of al-Katātīb (the ordinary Arab school).

347. Loc.cit.

348. The oil concession had been offered to the Anglo-Iranian and Gulf Oil Companies in 1934.

349. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July 1938, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London. See also appendix 3.

350. Loc.cit.

351. K.S.W.

352. F.O. 371/21832, Confidential letter of 18th July 1938, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office.

353. Loc. cit.

354. Loc. cit.

355. Loc. cit.

356. Loc. cit.

357. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 22nd August 1938, from the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Camp Karachi, to India Office, London.

358. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr on the 9th of March 1982, in Kuwait.

359. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr on the 15th of March 1982 in Kuwait.

360. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 29th October 1938, from the Residency, Bushire to the India Office, London; F.O. 371/21833. Note by P.A., Kuwait on a conversation between His Highness the Shaikh of

Kuwait, on the 19th of October 1938 and the Hon'ble the P.R., P.A. Kuwait, being present.

361. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 22nd August, 1938, from the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Camp Karachi, to the India Office, London.

362. Loc. cit.

363. Loc.cit.

364. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 29th October 1938, from the Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London.

365. 65,000 persons according to the estimation of the Political Residency.

366. Each community of Kuwaitī Shīᶜīs had their own ma'tam (funeral house) named after the community's roots.

367. The Majority of them were shipbuilders and related to a suburb of Manāma Naᶜīm, where the majority of Bahraini Carpenters live.

368. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 19th October 1938, from the Office of the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Camp Kuwait, to the India Office, London.

369. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr on the 8th of March 1982 and with ᶜAbdul Ṣamad al-Turky on 13th March 1982.

370. Al-ᶜAdasānī, K., op.cit., pp.32-33.

371. Al-Ṣaqr, J., Lecture, op.cit.

372. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr on the 8th of March 1982.

373. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 19th October, 1938, from the office of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Camp Kuwait, to the India office, London.

374. Al-ᶜAdasānī, K., op.cit., pp.32-33; personal interview with al-Baṣīr on the 8th of March 1982 and with ᶜAbdul Ṣamad al-Turkey on 13th March 1982.

375. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 19th October, 1938, from the office of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Camp Kuwait, to the India Office.

376. Loc.cit.

377. Loc.cit.; al-ᶜAdasānī, K., op.cit., pp.41-42.

378. *Loc.cit.*

379. *Loc.cit.*

380. *Loc.cit.*

381. *Loc.cit.*

382. F.O. 371/21833, Confidential letter of 19th October, 1938 from the office of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Camp Kuwait, to the India Office, London.

383. *Al-Sijil*, No. 123, 6th January, 1939, pp.7-8.

384. IOR: R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.27.

385. *Al-Sijil*, No. 123, 6th January 1939, p.8.

386. IOR: R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.27.

387. F.O. 371/23180, Secret telegram of 27th February 1939, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for India; *al-Sijil*, No. 125, dated 10th February 1939, p.10; No. 129, 10th March, 1939, p.1-2.

388. F.O. 371/23180, Secret telegram of 27 February, 1939, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for India; *al-Sijil*, No. 125, 10th February 1939, p.10.

389. IOR: R/15/1/719/1, Report for 1939, p.25.

390. F.O. 371/23180, Secret telegram of 27th February, 1939, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for India.

391. F.O. 371/23180, Secret telegram of 26th February, 1939, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for India.

392. Which is only twenty miles from Kuwait town.

393. IOR: R/15/1/719/1, Report for 1939, pp.26-27.

394. King Ghazi.

395. F.O. 371/23181, Telegram of 25th March 1939, from the British Ambassador, Baghdād (Mr. Houstoun-Boswal).

396. F.O. 371/23180, Secret telegram of 26th February 1939, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary of State for India.

397. F.O. 371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper *al-ᶜIrāq* on 14th February, 1939.

398. F.O. 371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Istiqlāl on 17th February 1939.

399. F.O. 371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Zamān of 12th February 1939.

400. F.O. 371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Istiqlāl of 12th February 1939.

401. F.O. 371/23181/E2383/66/91, Confidential report of 14th February 1939, from the Political Agent, Kuwait, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, at Baḥrain.

402. Al-Sijil, No. 126, 17th of February, 1938, p.16.

403. F.O. 371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Difāᶜ al-Qawmī of 16th February, 1939.

404. Personal interview with ᶜAbdul Ṣamad al-Turky on 13th March 1982 at Kuwait.

405. F.O. 371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Difāᶜ al-Qawmī of 16th February 1939.

406. F.O. 371/23181, Translation of an article published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Bilād of 17th February 1939.

407. F.O. 371/23180, Secret telegram of 26th February 1939, from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, to the Secretary of State for India.

408. F.O. 371/23180, Translation of a telegram addressed to Sayyid Nagi Shawkat, Minister of Interior, by Sayyid ᶜAbdulla al-Ṣaqr on his departure from Baghdād for Kuwait, and published in the Iraqi newspaper al-Bilād of 17th February, 1939.

409. Personal interview with ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr on 8th March 1982, at Kuwait.

410. A common name for Kuwait in Iraq until the present.

411. Reference_ to the Arab Nationalist Policy of Yāsīn al-Hāshimi's Government.

412. Al-Istiqlāl, 23rd of February, 1939, p.4

413. F.O. 371/23181, Letter of 20th April, 1939, from the British Embassy, Baghdād to Viscount Halifax.

414. F.O. 371/28181, Report on a news broadcast by the Qaṣr al-Zuhūr Wireless Station of Baghdād, on the night of 7th March 1939.

415. IOR: R/15/1/719/1, Report for 1939, p.25.

416. Loc.cit., Personal interview at Kuwait with al-Baṣīr, al-Ṣaqqāf., al-Wiqayyān, al-Ṣāni^{c} and al-Ṣaqr, in March 1982.

417. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr, al-Ṣaqqāf, al-Ṣāni^{c} in March 1982.

418. F.O. 371/23181, Report on broadcast from Qaṣr al-Zuhūr, Baghdād, on the evening of the 11th of March 1939.

419. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr, al-Ṣaqqāf and al-Ṣāni^{c} in March 1982.

420. Loc.cit.

421. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr, on 8th March 1982 in Baṣra.

422. F.O. 371/23181, Confidential letter of 24th March 1939, from the Residency, Bushire to the India Office; F.O. 371/23181, P.Z.1978/39, letter of 5th April, 1939 from India Office to the Foreign Office.

423. Loc.cit.

424. Personal interviews with al-Baṣīr, al-Saqqāf and al-Wiqayyān in March 1982 at Kuwait.

425. F.O. 371/23181, P.Z. 1978/39, letter of 5th April, 1939 from the India Office to the Foreign Office

426. See pp.40-41.

427. Loc.cit., IOR: R/15/1/719/1, Report for 1939, pp.25-26.

428. F.O.371/23181/E2906/66/91, Transmit copy of Persian Gulf telegram No. 246 of 19th April 1939, to the Air Ministry.

429. Loc.cit.

430. F.O. 371/23217/E4745/4745/93, Confidential report on the leading personalities in Iraq of 27th June 1939, from Sir B. Newton, the British Ambassador, Baghdād to Viscount Halifax.

431. Loc. cit.

432. F.O. 371/23181/E2854/66/91, Letter of 6th April 1939, from the Political Residency to the Foreign Office.

433. F.O. 371/23181, Telegram of the 25th of March 1939 from the British Ambassador, Baghdād, to the Foreign Office and India Office, London.

434. Director of Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, University of Baṣra.

435. Al-Najjār, M., "*al-Muḥāwalāt al-Waḥdawiyyia al-Siyāsiyyia al-Muʿāṣira fil-Khalīj al-ʿArabi, al-Khalīj al-ʿArabi*," *Journal of the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies*, University of Baṣra, Iraq, vol.5, 1975, pp.61-90, reference on pp.70-71.

436. F.O. 371/23181/E2904/66/91, Confidential letter of 5th April 1939 from the Political Resident, Bushire, to India Office, London.

437. *Loc.cit.*

438. F.O. 371/21833, Improvements introduced by the Kuwait Council since its formation.

439. Personal interview with al-Baṣīr on 8th March, 1982 in Kuwait.

440. F.O. 371/23181/E2904/66/91, Confidential letter of 5th of April 1938, from the Political Residency, Bushire, to the India Office, London.

Chapter Two : Baḥrain

1. Relations between Baḥrain and Iraq during the period under Review

Social, cultural and trade relations existing between Iraq and Baḥrain during the 1920's and 1930's tended to uphold the Iraqi argument for unification. Such ties had existed for a long time, but during this period were consolidated as a result of the advancement in communication and transportation in the world in general and in the region in particular.

Social, Cultural and Trade Relations

Social relations between Baḥrain and Iraq were built on traditional, especially religious, mutually dependent activities. Mass migration from Baḥrain to Iraq occurred with the Shīᶜī emigration during the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. The movement was due to persecution by the ᶜOmānī and Saᶜūdī invaders and the al-ᶜUtūb conquerors.(1) Emigrants, known after their home-country as al-Baḥārnah, settled in Baṣra, Muḥammarah and other cities on the Eastern Coast of the Gulf. Later they migrated to mid-Euphrates cities such as Najaf, Karbala, and to Baghdād as well. Initially the families remained segregated, but gradually prominent members of the community obtained posts in the administration and as religious leaders and led the community towards integration. Although contact with relatives in Baḥrain was maintained, intermarriage began to take place. Some writers emerged and through the publication of their works

became a part of the Iraqi intelligentsia.

The integration was facilitated by constant travelling to and from the holy cities in Iraq. A large number of Baḥrainī pilgrims spent a few months in the holy cities, while a few settled. Some requested burial there. Deep religious and cultural links between Baḥrain and Iraq consequently developed.

Shīᶜīs from many countries were attracted to study in the prestigious religious schools of the holy cities. The schools were religious institutions run by the Shīᶜī and used in particular for the education of Shīᶜī ᶜulamā', similar to the schools in Iran at Qum and Meshed. The Āl-al-Bait Theological College established in Najaf (1924-1930) and Kulliyat al-Fiqh (the Jurisprudence College) also established in Najaf but later, were the best known Shīᶜī religious institutions in Iraq. Consequently all the Shiᶜi ᶜulamā' in Baḥrain tended to graduate from Iraqi schools even before the period under review.(2)

Conversely religious speakers and intellectual Shīᶜīs from Iraq gathered with Shīᶜīs in Baḥrain during the first ten days of Muḥarram to celebrate the revolution of the martyr Ḥusain bin ᶜAlī bin Abī Ṭālib. Religious speakers were paid by the directors of ma'ātim (funeral houses), the centres of this celebration. There were a large number of these centres throughout Baḥrain - where Shīᶜīs settled and religious speakers gave lectures. Among them were a number of Iraqis. These centres played a prominent role in the propagation of nationalist consciousness in the 1930's, their task was to inform the people. Gradually during the

mid-1930's they became political centres for the nationalist movement. Among the speakers who visited Baḥrain was Moḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Najafī better known as Baḥr al-ᶜulūm. When Shaikh Isa al-Khalīfa, the demoted ruler of Baḥrain, died on the 9th of December 1932, Baḥr al-ᶜulūm participated in a public ceremony which was held in Manāma at the Islamic Club on the 20th of January, 1933, in honour of the memory of the late ruler. The speaker violently criticised the powerful influence of Charles Belgrave, the ruler's adviser who operated in practice as Prime Minister. Therefore the adviser stopped the next meeting which was to have been held at the Literary Club at Muḥarraq. The Iraqi speaker was deported immediately, by Belgrave's order.(3) In the 1920's and 1930's educational links developed through Iraqi teachers and experts in Baḥrain. In 1926 and 1927 Abū Khaldūn Sāṭiᶜ al-Ḥusarī The General Director of Education in Iraq reported that he had received letters from Shaikh ᶜAbdulla bin Isa al-Khalīfa, Director of Education in Baḥrain requesting the employment of educational staff. Al-Huṣarī stated that the shortage of teachers in Iraq necessitated contact with Syria, where he himself selected teachers for Baḥrainī schools on behalf of Baḥrainī educational officials. Nevertheless al-Ḥuṣarī selected an accountant from Baṣra for the Education Directorate in Baḥrain in 1926.(4) The establishment of al-Hidāya al-Khalīfiyya boys school in Muḥarraq in 1919, on funds raised through contributions from the upper classes, was the first step in the modernisation of education in Baḥrain. ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Dūrī was one of the

first Iraqi teachers who taught in this school. Until December 1938 there were 10 state schools, with 1,317 students, and forty-five teachers.(5) Mr. C.R.L. Adrian Vallence, then of the Iraq Education Department, visited Baḥrain from the 12th to the 22nd of June 1939, for the purpose of reporting on the Baḥrain Educational Organisation and of advising on its future growth. Mr. Vallence was appointed Director of Education in Baḥrain from 21st November to the 31st of December 1939.(6) Further, the Baḥrain Petroleum Company Limited (BAPCO) had employed Iraqis since the mid 1930's. On the 1st of April 1936 the number of skilled and unskilled Iraqi labourers employed by BAPCO was estimated at about 87. In comparison with other Arab groups, the Iraqi labour communities was large. The only larger contingent was that of the indigenous force, estimated in the same period, at about 2,248, according to Appendix 7.(7)

There were ancient trade relations between the two countries. Baḥrain, despite its reputation as the country of the million date palms, imported dates from Iraq because a large proportion of Baḥrainī dates were smuggled to Qaṭar and those consumed in Baḥrain were imported dried from Iraq where production was high and the prices low. Rice and other commodities were imported as well.

It seems that from the beginning of Faiṣal's I's rule the Iraqi regime had endeavoured to foster formal contacts with the Arab Gulf Shaikhdoms. The attempt failed; since British policy in the Gulf region opposed the formation of diplomatic contacts between the Arab Shaikhdoms and Iraq,

on the grounds that Iraq aspired to, and was capable of, leadership in the Gulf. King Faiṣal's desire to visit Kuwait, Baḥrain and other Gulf Shaikhdoms in the autumn of 1932, for example, was discouraged by the British Government.

Shaikh Moḥammad bin Isa al-Khalīfa, President of the Manāma Municipality and Shaikh ᶜAbdulla bin Isa al-Khalīfa, Director of the Education Department, - both brothers of Shaikh Ḥamad the Ruler of Baḥrain - paid visits to Syria, Palestine and Egypt during the summer of 1934, and on their way back were received in Baghdād by King Ghazi.(8)

Although it was a private visit King Ghazi encouraged such contacts between neighbouring countries. Visits of this kind were usually hindered by Britain and Iran. Britain was aware that exchange visits between Iraq and the lesser Gulf Shaikhdoms would finally unite the countries against the British influence in the region. Rapproachment between Iraq and the Gulf Shaikhdoms would weaken the British position and also frustrate Iranian historical ambitions in the region, especially the claim to Baḥrain established in 1822. An unsuccessful resistance to the British influence in Baḥrain was carried out in 1822 and occasionally afterwards.(9) Consequently when Shaikh Ḥamad bin Isa al-Khalīfa, the ruler of Baḥrain, decided to visit Iraq in 1937 to discuss some questions of common interest with the Iraqi Government, his visit was opposed by Iran. The British Ambassador in Baghdād reported in his telegram of 6th December 1937 that the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs was contacted by his colleague the Iranian Minister

who said that,

> "News had reached the Persian Government to the effect that it was the intention of the Sheikh of Bahrain shortly to visit Baghdad in order to discuss some questions of common interest with the Iraqi Government.
>
> Persian Minister stated that he was to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government considered Bahrain to be an integral part of the Persian Empire and would hold the participation of the Iraqi Government in any such discussins to be an act unbecoming in a friendly neighbour state."(10)

The British Ambassador continued his report stating that the Iraqi Minister had replied that,

> "there was no truth in the report that the Sheikh of Bahrain was coming to Baghdad and that in any case the dispute between the Persian Government and His Majesty's Govenment about Bahrain was not one in which the Iraqi Government had any concern."(11)

This quotation gives an example of the pressures put on Iraq by the Iranian Government as well as by the British when they sabotaged King Faiṣal I's proposed visit to the Gulf Shaikhdoms.

One of the important disputes between Iraq, Kuwait and Baḥrain during the 1920's and 1930's, which emerged as a result of the Turkish evacuation from the region, was the nationality question; the Iraqi Government regarded the inhabitants of both Kuwait and Baḥrain as ex-Ottoman subjects, as a result of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement signed in July 1913. Nevertheless the Ottoman Government had renounced in this treaty all claims to Baḥrain, but retained suzerainty over the territory of Kuwait. This Agreement was not ratified and its provisions could not be held ever to have been operative.(12) The dispute became

serious when the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs despatched a letter to the British Embassy at Baghdād and requested informatin on the date or dates on which Kuwaiti nationality and Baḥrainī nationality were constituted, and also the date on which each of these two nationalities was separated from Ottoman nationality.[13] Owing to the frequent visits of pilgrims - who used to stay between 2-3 months in the holy cities, - cases of birth in transit developed. These cases raised the nationality question before Baḥrainī and Kuwaitī Nationality Law was produced in 1937. The creation of the Kuwaitī and Baḥrainī Nationality Law caused the intervention of the Iraqi Government, to claim the inhabitants of Kuwait and Baḥrain as Iraqi nationals.[14]

From the British point of view, the inhabitants of both Kuwait and Baḥrain remained technically Ottoman subjects until the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne on 6th August 1924, when under the provisions of Article 3, both Shaikhdoms were finally and completely detached from Turkey. From that date, under Article 30, the inhabitants of these detached territories became "nationals of the state to which such territory is transferred." Hence it would appear that the date of the creation of both Kuwaiti and Bahrainī nationality was the date on which the Treaty of Lausanne came into force.[15] Consequently, it would also appear that there was no possible justification for the Iraqi claims.[16] The Baḥrain nationality law, and the law regarding ownership of Immovable Property in Baḥrain by foreigners, were issued by the British Government on the

17th of February 1937,[17] as a result of Iraqi and Iranian claims to sovereignty over Baḥrain, and were part of the reforms which were carried out in Baḥrain during the 1920's and 1930's.[18]

2. The Rebellion of 1923: Its motives, and its effects

The emergence of the nationalist reform movement in Baḥrain was due principally to three factors: the spread of nationalist consciousness through a number of channels; the increase of British dominance in Baḥrain and dissatisfaction with the fossilised administration. Nationalist consciousness spread in Baḥrain during the period in question through dīwāns, clubs, ma'ātim and Mosques. The traditional club (Majlis or dīwān) was the usual local meeting place for the discussion of internal and external affairs. There was a library in each dīwān, which contained, besides books; copies of Arab newspapers and journals, especially those from Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Shaikh Ibrāhīm al-Khalīfa's dīwān in Muḥarraq was the best known.

Among the journals found at al-Khalīfa's dīwān were: al-Ahrām, al-Muqattam, al-Hilāl, al-Manār, al-ᶜUrwah al-Wuthqā. These journals began to arrive in Baḥrain in the last decade of the nineteenth century, from India through the pearl merchants.[19] The first progressive step taken to modernise the traditional clubs was the formation of the Iqbāl Awāl Club in 1913 at Manāma, in

reaction to the development of the religious activities of the American Mission in Baḥrain. The formation of this club coincided with the formation of the Charitable Society at Kuwait in the same year and for the same reasons to resist the influence of the American Mission in the region non-violently, through the progagation of Islamic concepts among the people.(20) The founders of these two cultural institutions in Baḥrain and Kuwait became the leaders of the Islamic reform movement in the region which sympathised with the Ottoman Sultan and was opposed to Western domination of the Islamic World.

The formation of the Literary Club in Muḥarraq in 1920 was a further achievement (of the) of the Baḥrainī intelligentsia. The establishment of this club in Baḥrain and Kuwait in 1923 reflected the effects of Iraqi culture - similar clubs were establsihed in Baṣra in 1912 as part of the Arab enlightenment movement of the time. The propagation of the concepts of Arab nationalism was due to the cultural activities of this club during the 1920's and the mid 1930's. The founders represented the new generation who were captivated by western political thought and the Arab liberation movement. Undoubtedly these people differed in their beliefs and views from the Islamic people who had established the Iqbāl Awāl Club. The founders of the second club led the nationalist reform movement in the 1920's and 1930's.(21) Moḥammad ʿAbdulla al-Khalīfa, the President, and the well-known Baḥraini poet ʿAbdulla al-Zā'id, the Vice-President, Khālid Moḥammad al-Faraj, a well-known Kuwait nationalist poet and teacher in the

al-Ḥidāya al-Khalifiyya School, Aḥmad al-Shirāwi, Saᶜad al-Shamlān, Ibrāhim ᶜAbdulla Kamāl were the most active founder members.(22)

The creation of the Islamic Club in 1928 reinforced the cultural movement in Baḥrain. This coincided with the return of a number of Baḥraini graduates from Islamic Universities in Egypt and India. Moḥammad Ṣāliḥ Yusuf, Kamāl al-Mihzaᶜ, Aḥmad Ḥasan Ibrāhim, Khalil al-Mu'ayyad, Sālim al-ᶜUrayyiḍ joined early and became active members.(23) The new blood enlarged the cultural activities and contributed to the club's success. The constitution of the club emphasised the importance of Islamic cultural solidarity.(24) The constitution of the Muslim Youth Society of Egypt was the inspiration of the founders. This society was established in Egypt in 1927.(25) The Islamic Club became prominent after its recognition by the Government of Baḥrain. Shaikh Mubārak bin Ḥamad became the President.(26) The emigration of ᶜAbdul ᶜAziz al-Rashid, a Kuwaiti reformist, to Baḥrain extended the cultural influence of the club. ᶜAbdul ᶜAziz al-Rashid edited a journal, <u>Majallat al-Kuwait</u>, which became on his arrival in Baḥrain the mouthpiece of the Islamic Club. A numer of Kuwaitis became members: Yūsuf bin Isa al-Qināᶜi, Sulaimān ᶜIsa al-Qināᶜi, Sulaimān al-ᶜAdasāni, ᶜAbdul Ḥamid al-Ṣāniᶜ and one Saᶜudi Moḥammad Zainal. The Kuwaiti ruler and Hilāl al-Muṭairi, a Kuwaiti notable and merchant, contributed to the funds.(27)

These institutions became the cultural channels between Baḥrain and other Arab countries: Iraq, Egypt,

Palestine and Syria. A number of respected Baḥrainī writers and poets such as ʿAbdulla al-Zāʾid were invited to these countries at the end of the 1920's, their activities sustained cultural links between these countries and the Baḥrainī intelligentsia. During this visit the cultural organisation in Cairo "the Eastern League" decided to bestow membership of this League on the Bahrainī delegates and to regard them as representatives of Gulf Arab Culture in the League.(28) These three cultural institutions played a remarkable role in the spread of nationalist and Islamic concepts among the people. The Iqbāl Awāl Club was dissolved a few months after its formation for its hostility to British policy.(29) The Literary and Islamic Clubs were dissolved for financial reasons in 1936, but the new al-Ahlī Club, which was established in Manāma in 1938, continued along the same cultural lines as the Literary Club.(30)

The proliferation of bookshops in Baḥrain after 1919, beginning with the Kamāliyya Bookshop in Manāma, made the arrival of Arab and foreign books, newspapers and journals possible. It had direct contacts with publishers in Cairo, Baghdād, Damascus and Beirut.(31)

Modern education began with the creation of the two al-Hidāya Schools, the first was in Muḥarraq in 1919 and the second was in Manāma in 1923.(32) Through the participation of Arab teachers from Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Iraq in educational projects in such schools the concepts of Arab nationalism were disseminated.

During the first sixty years of this country the ma'ātim were, at times of crisis, centres of political decision-making for the opposition movement, in addition to the clubs. The religious speaker in his lecture would discuss social, economic, cultural and political affairs, attempting to analyse Arab and Islamic Affairs in general; an indirect commentary on internal affairs was common. The large number of them in Baḥrainī cities and villages assisted the enlightenment movement. There were more than sixty ma'tam forty years ago - compared to nearly a hundred at the present time.(33) These religious centres played a considerable role in the development of the nationalist consciousness. They were the main centres of information for the illiterate element of the population.

The resistance of the Egyptians, Iraqis and Indians to British dominance after the First World War had not been without effect on the Baḥrainī people who became intensely dissatisfied with the backward administration.
The intelligentsia in particular responded to the educational and cultural initiatives of Iraq; and was receptive to the currents of revolt in India, Iraq and Egypt, as they had been to the spread of democratic opinion in Europe.(34) Imported newspapers added to the impact, before and after the First World War. A considerable number of these came from Egypt, India, Iraq, Persia etc., and disseminated ideas of democracy completely opposed to the antiquated and autocratic rule of the Gulf Shaikhdoms.(35) Baḥrain was a large trading centre, especially for the Pearl Market. Therefore, the influx of

foreigners each pearling season created opportunities for the inhabitants and foreigners to exchange views on cultural and political affairs in the Arab and Islamic Worlds.(36) The slump in the Middle East pearl market, and new trade agreements led a number of Baḥrainī pearl merchants to visit Western European countries on business. This provided an introduction to other political systems.(37)

Both cultural interaction and the idealogical stimulus of the revolutions and uprisings in neighbouring countries created a liberal climate for the Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement.

Thirdly, racial and sectarian disharmony in society contributed towards the growth of the nationalist reform movement. Shīᶜīs, both Arab and Iranian, composed the greater part of the Baḥrainī population; Sunnīs, again Iranian and Arab, the remainder. The Dawāsir tribe was amongst the latter community. The Dawāsir emigrated from the Eastern Province of Saᶜūdī Arabia to Baḥrain in the nineteenth century and were recognised as Baḥrainī subjects. Their relations with the Political Agency were strained, as was the case with all recognised subjects of Ibn Saᶜud.(38) Both Iranian and Saᶜudi subjects in Baḥrain had their own Agents.(39)

The Dawāsir used to pay a small diving tax in a reduced form. In the 1920's they resisted direct taxation. For several years these payments had ceased and the ruler was too nervous of Ibn Saᶜud's intervention to insist on them.(40) In May 1922 representatives of the Dawāsir

visited the Saᶜūdī Sultan in Najd and earned his support against the legitimate authority of Baḥrain. The ruler was intimidated by his more powerful neighbour who would undoubtedly support the Dawāsir in resisting reforms "which would touch their pockets."[41] The Dawāsir tribe became a threat to Baḥrainī security, when in 1923 they invaded a number of the Shīᶜī villages such as Barbār, ᶜĀlī and Dirāz as part of the Wahhābī hostility against the Shīᶜīs. During these attacks several were killed, the villages were looted and the women raped.[42] The activities of the Dawāsir tribe were reported to have been supported by Ibn Saᶜud.[43] These disturbances intimidated the Shīᶜī community menacing the security of the shaikhdom in general, and British influence and prestige in particular.

This was only one of the disturbances which troubled Baḥrain during this period of unmodified tribal rule. The following points will clarify the trends of its policy. Sectarian motivated measures and gross repression jeopardised the life, property and above all the self-respect of the inhabitants of Baḥrain, especially the Shīᶜī.[44] It was reported that minor members of the ruling family and their entourages terrorised the people indiscriminately.[45] Date tax, fish tax and <u>Raqabieh</u> tax[46] were collected only from the Shīᶜī, in additin to the normal collection of pearling tax.[47] Consequently a number of petitions were submitted to the Political Resident, the Political Agent and the Ruler of Baḥrain by the Shīᶜīs, asking for justice and equity.[48]

Further, the Ruler tended to by-pass the law courts

although they were staffed by members of the ruling family. Real grievances were therefore aired out of court in the form of demonstrations.[49]

Further, the nākhudās and the pearl merchants upheld the tribal hierarchy and shared the deeply routed sectarian prejudice; their maintenance of the status quo resulted in the victimisation of the working classes: the peasant, divers, fishermen, ship-builders, construction workers and non-skilled labourers.[50] Details were on record of a large number of cases which included illegal killings, for which no one had been brought to trial, and no effort made to enforce justice.[51]

The unjust practices drove whole communities of Baḥraini subject to apply for British protection. It was particularly embarrassing that every prominent member of the Shīᶜite community complained of oppression. The Political Agent in Baḥrain reported in January 1922 that he had received a petition composed by sixtyfour Baḥrainī representatives complaining of injustice and British apathy. The following is the British translation of the petition,

> "After compliments - some time ago we approached the P.R. and you; both verbally and in writing, we informed you of our state. We also sent a petition to Bushire to His Excellency the P.R. We have not yet heard any result, which will pacify our apprehensions and the oppression and tyranny of the rulers increases. Although the whole family of al-Khalifah oppressions (oppresses), yet they are not all alike. Before affairs were in the hands of Shaikh Abdulla and oppression was rife, but when he came to conduct affairs officially, tyranny was practised to such an extent that matters affecting our honour are not safe (this

> implies that womenfolk are not safe) and he even took girls from their houses by force, before their fathers and mothers who could not speak from fear.
>
> Now Shaikh Abdulla is not officially conducting affairs, but behind the scenes he continues with his former power, and more and does not relax his efforts. The reason for this is that Shaikh Easa, his father, and his brother like him and assist him in what he wants to do and Shaikh Esa is today no more than a ring on Abdulla's finger. He helps him in whatever he wants. We beg your Excellency to deliver us from the tyranny of Shaikh Abdulla and other oppression. We beg you in the name of the Prophet Jesus to deliver us as soon as possible from the hands of this tyrant. We have no more patience to endure. You are responsible to God for our welfare."(Sic)(52)

The petition reflected the deep discontent of the Baḥrainī subjects towards the administrative anarchy in Baḥrain and the effects of tribal rule.

Shaikh Isa bin ᶜAlī the ruler was influenced by his wife (Shaikh ᶜAbdulla's mother). She was a domineering woman,[(53)] who ran her own personal trials and imprisoned and punished with total disregard to the most elementary laws. British officials reported that Shaikh Isa was estranged from his Son Shaikh Ḥamad, the heir, as a result of the intrigues of his wife.[(54)] The competition which developed between Shaikh Ḥamad and his brother Shaikh ᶜAbdulla, was instigated by this woman.

The British Role

Britain realised that the continuation of the Baḥrainī regime as it stood would threaten her influence and her prestige in the whole gulf. The British position in Baḥrain was based on treaties which gave her control of

foreign affairs and of foreigners. The British claimed that from these essentials flowed inevitably certain rights and indeed duties to intervene in internal affairs.(55)

Britain attempted to impose her dominance on Baḥrain by modernising the administration and introducing reforms, at the same time she wanted to gain popular support. To achieve these objectives, three well qualified British officials were appointed to the post of Political Agent in Baḥrain between 1919 and 1926. The three British officials were officers who had served in Iraq and had academic training in Arabic language, culture, and society. Captain N.N.E. Bray was appointed between the 2nd December 1918 and the 15th June 1919. After six months Major H.R.P. Dickson succeeded him between 6th November 1919 and 28th November 1920. While Major C.K. Daly who spent the longest period in the post was appointed after Dickson between 1920 and 1926.(56) Daly's efforts to introduce reforms were appreciated and remembered by the peasantry and pearl fishers.(57)

The first British attempt at a reform of the judiciary system, was the "Baḥrain Order-in-Council" which came into force, with effect from 3rd February 1919.(58) This was a law introducing changes in legal procedure, successfully opposed by the <u>ᶜulamā</u>'in 1911 and 1913, then postponed until the end of the First World War. In 1919 Major Dickson, who supported reform established a Joint Court consisting of the Political Agent or his Indian Assistant and Shaikh ᶜAbdulla, as representative of his

father - the ruler. The duty of this court was to deal with cases brought by non-Baḥrainīs against Baḥrainī subjects. The customary council (almajlis al-ᶜurfī) was also established in the same year, to deal with mercantile, including pearling cases, and representing both Baḥrainī and non-Baḥrainī merchants. It was composed of ten members. Under the terms of the Order-in-Council the authority of the appointment to this council was divided between the ruler and the political agent. The ruler appointed five Bahrainī merchants to represent Baḥrainīs and the political agent appointed the other to represent foreign merchants usually Saᶜūdīs, Indians and Iranians.(59) Moreover a Municipal Council, a local government body, was inaugurated by Major Dickson on 1st July 1920, it was composed of eight members representing equally Baḥrainī subjects and foreigners. Four of these were appointed by the ruler and four by the political agent. The Municipal Council was headed by Shaikh ᶜAbdulla, son of the ruler.(60)

Under the terms of the "Baḥrain Order-in-Council" a dual authority was established - hence the ruler's power was reduced. Before its implementation Shaikh ᶜAbdulla bin Isa had visited Britain in 1919, on behalf of his father, in an attempt to persuade the British Government to restore to the ruler the same authority which he had before the "Baḥrain Order-in-Council" had been instituted; but failed in this.(61)

Further developments made direct British interference necessary. There were new British plans to make Baḥrain a military and political centre in the Gulf region, after ...

the beginning of the century.[62] Ibn Sa^{c}ud had begun to support the Dawāsir tribe, the cause of disturbances, owing to his ambitions in Baḥrain.[63] The tradition of Iranian claims to Baḥrain and the proportion of Iranians there, prompted Britain to take into consideration Iran's concern at the continuing oppression of the Shī^{c}ī population.[64]

A further motivation to the British desire for reform was the abuse of power in random and petty ways by junior members of the ruling family.[65] Accusations to this effect were ignored by the ruler, whilst he himself rejected Municipal proposals for reform in the public services. Major Daly reported that,

> "The Municipality of Manama have been trying in vain for the last two years to secure his (the ruler's) consent to a scheme for the supply of water and electric power to the town. The whole Municipal Council supported by nearly all the notables and both of his (the ruler's) sons approached him recently and begged him to give his approval. Though he was not asked to contribute in any way to the cost of the undertaking, and was even offered a royalty on the water, he resolutely refused to agree, and would assign no reason for his refusal which is depriving the inhabitants of much needed benefits."(66)

This sort of conduct convinced the British officials that the old ruler would hinder administrative reforms more than anybody. It was obvious that great difficulties would arise concerning the exploitation of oil in Baḥrain and that the ruler would not personally agree to it except under pressure.[67]

The British realised that Shaikh Isa had arrived at an age when he was no longer capable of ruling alone, and would have to be replaced. Shaikh Ḥamad the eldest son of

the ruler, who was designated heir apparent in 1893 with the approval of the Bombay Government, was the obvious candidate, and in fact the only possible leader acceptable to the inhabitants.(68)

The oppression of the Shīᶜī and their frequent demonstrations and petitions to the Political Agency continued. A warning was given to the ruler by the Political Resident to the effect that he could not expect any assistance in the event of disturbances. This was not without effect upon him.(69)

Discontent spread despite the efforts made by Shaikh Ḥamad and Shaikh ʿAbdulla to pacify the Baḥrainīs, because the junior members of the ruling family continued to perform acts of oppression. A large demonstration occurred when Baḥrainī merchants shut down the bazaar in February 1922, and forcibly released a trader, who had been ill-treated, from a fidāwī (Royal bodyguard). The Political Agent stated on the 13th February 1922 that this action endangered the authority of the al-Khalifīs. In response a number of Baḥrainī representatives such as Moḥammad al-Sharīf, Secretary of the Manāma Municipality and a notable merchant and Yūsuf Kānoo, and Quṣaibī, two other notable merchants met the ruler and made the following demands to improve the situation,

(a) No one except the ruler and Shaikh Ḥamad, to decide cases or to have the right to punish in any way.

(b) Cases which Shaikh Ḥamad cannot decide to the satisfaction of both parties to be referred by him to the Shara'(70) Majlis Al ᶜUrti,(71) or Salifah (72) Court as the case may be.

(c) No one to be dragged off to the ruler's court without notice, but to be served with a summons signed by Shaikh Hamad.

(d) Documents concerning gardens leased to subjects by the Rulng family to be in duplicate, a copy in possession of each party, and to be witnessed by independent witnesses. No conditions other than those written in the document to be enforced.

(e) Steps to be taken to stop the Shaikh's camels being allowed to enter and graze in private gardens.

(f) 'Sakhrah'[73] of donkeys to cease.

(g) The practice of placing calves belonging to the ruling family with Bahraini bakers to fatten free of charge, to cease.

(h) The prison to be put in order and a reasonable house provided for the same."(74)

The Political Agent stated that the ruler accepted some of the demands as the basis for reform. His acceptance remained theoretical, in fact none of the reforms were put into practice.[75]

On 12th July 1922 the Political Resident reported that,

"A large representative deputation waited on me one day when I went to Bahrain and presented a petition which was sent on the Government. A warning was given to the Shaikh and the oppression has been reduced. Letter on the Shaikh and his sons put forward the idea of starting certain reforms."(76)

The letter suggested the equalisation of taxation between Sunnīs and Shīʿīs, the reform of the pearling industry;[77] institution of a regular land revenue, revenue surveys, land registration, the preparation of

records of rights, reform of the Customs House, and the creation of a small Levy Force to enable the ruler to exert his authority.(78)

Shaikh Ḥamad and Shaikh ᶜAbdulla were compelled to realise that tyranny such as they had exercised in the past was, with the spread of democratic opinions, bound to come to an end.(79)

British officials also were convinced that the execution of the reforms would benefit Baḥrain. The Shīᶜī would undoubtedly welcome them. At the same time the British expected resistance from members of the ruling family, the Nākhudās, and the tribal shaikhs - in protection of their interests.

It was clear that the most powerful Sunni tribe, the Dawāsir, who had links with Ibn Saᶜud had become a disruptive element and a hindrance to the reforms, which would endanger them financially. When the news of the proposed reforms was leaked to the bazaar, further contacts were made between the tribal shaikhs of the Dawāsir and Ibn Saᶜud, the latter promised them his support. The ruler of Baḥrain dreaded Ibn Saᶜud's support for the Dawāsir in resisting reforms.(80) The Political Agent in Baḥrain stated that,

> "Shaikh Hamad bin Esa (sic) told me in confidence what he had learnt and I also heard from another well informed source (that) it would appear that Ibn Saᶜud offered to assist them to resist any efforts of the Bahrain Rulers to tax them or to bring them under their effective control. He is said to have promised the alternatives (1) to use his influence to support them

should they resist the Rulers or if they preferred (2) provided them with a suitable habitat in order that they could threaten to leave Bahrain, and in fact, do so if necessary."(81)

Shīcī leaders informed the Political Agent that their community was disappointed at receiving no reply to their petitions to Government. Therefore the Iranian Community and the Arab Shīcī, out of sympathy, kept in close contact. The Political Agent explained the reasons for this sympathy in his letter of 8th January 1923 to the Political Resident,

"A good deal of the agitation for Bahrain to be recognised as an internal part of Persia may, I believe originally be traced to their relations with dissatisfied Bahrainis. As you are aware there are large communities of Bahrainis at Lingah, Muhammarah, and Bandar Abbas, many of whom own property both in Persia and Bahrain."(82)

At the same time the Iranian press began to attack the ruler of Baḥrain and the British Government, accusing the latter of connivance in the victimistion of the Shīcī population. Since the cUtūb confederation had ousted the Iranians, Baḥrain had been claimed as an integral part of Iran.(83) For example the Iranian newspaper of Shīrāz Iṣṭakhr published an article on the 17th September 1922 translated by the British:

"Bahrain is one of the ancient possessions of Persia, containing 365 considerable villages and two large towns Muharraq and Manama, and has 80,000 inhabitants."(84)

Consequently, certain reforms were necessary as far as Britain was concerned, on account of the accusation, frequently made, that the British authorities turned a blind eye to the victimisation of the Shīcī subjects.(85)

The Dawāsir attacks on the Shi^{c}i villages and the conflict which developed between the Dawāsir and the Iranians in Manāma in May 1923 prompted the British authorities to interfere directly in the internal affairs of Baḥrain and put an end to the primitive dictatorship of Shaikh Isa.[86] The British officials in Bushire and Baḥrain who regarded the old ruler as the main hindrance to reform used the sectarian and racial clashes as an excuse to exclude him from power. On 17th May the Political Resident arrived in Baḥrain, and after negotiations with the ruler, convinced him to hand over complete control, including control of the revenue, to his heir-apparent, Shaikh Ḥamad bin Isa. So the ruler was dislodged and his son Ḥamad, who was enthusiastic for reforms, installed by the British officials as Deputy Ruler of Baḥrain.[87] This was the first step in the improvement of the administration and the strengthening of British influence. Shaikh Ḥamad was effectively the sole ruler of Baḥrain after this event, although in deference to his father he remained deputy in name - until the old Shaikh died on the 9th December 1932.[88] The British authorities had ousted the Ruler of Baḥrain for reason besides the fact that he had become a hindrance to modernisation. The anarchic Najdī and Iranian communities in Bahrain were unhappy with Britain's tacit support for Shaikh Isa's malpractices. Competition for power between the two brothers Shaikh Ḥamad and Shaikh ʿAbdulla prompted the British officials to intervene in favour of Shaikh Ḥamad. The British were afraid that if Shaikh Isa were to die suddenly, Shaikh ʿAbdulla, who

supported his father's policy, would seek to ensure that Shaikh Ḥamad did not succeed the old Shaikh. The British believed that introducing reforms would lead to the elimination of sectarian oppression and would at the same time increase British prestige, hence reinforce the British dominance in Baḥrain. The British wanted to demonstrate that an Arab Shaikhdom could advance on western lines under British protection and yet retain its Arab character. The following quotation explains this aspect of Britain's objectives:

> "We must endeavour to take out the British high-lights from the picture and bring the Arab rule of the Shaikh more to the foreground. Speaking generally the British administration's work should tend to become more and more advisory and supervisory."(89)

British anxiety was indeed justified; the inhabitants the reaction was mixed. The Shīᶜī community undoubtedly welcomed the implementation of the reforms, but many of the Sunnīs were in opposition. The Sunnī ruling classes did not benefit from the reforms, which were deeply resented in certain sections of society. In May 1923, the resistance of the upper classes came to a head. Two petitions were collected and submitted to the Political Agent and Political Resident. The petitions expressed anger at the removal of Shaikh Isa; interference in this matter seemed to them to mark an increase in the British role in government. It may be suspected that to a certain extent, the fate of Shaikh Isa was used to cover indignation at the erosion of their own traditional priviliges. The Political Agent reported in 1923 that,

> "A number of cases of confiscation of the property of Shias occurred on the flimsiest pretexts. Practically all the gardens now owned by Al-Khalifeh family have been so acquired during Shaikh Easa's rule, from the original owners. Probably two-thirds of the total date gardens are now owned by Al-Khalifeh, very few of which have been legally obtained."(sic)(90)

The opposition groups consisted of the majority of the ruling family, the Nākhudās, tribal leaders, religious leaders and a number of educated people of the Literary Club. The religious leaders ᶜAbdul Wahhāb al-Zayyānī and Aḥmad bin Lāḥij were the most active.[91] Major Daly commented on the objectives of the opposition groups:

> "The Sunni tribes and pearling Nakhudas hitherto enjoying absolute immunity from control by the Rulers, resented the agitation of the Shias, which they foresaw might eventually lead to the reforms inimical to their interests."(92)

Muḥarraq, where the majority of those taking this stand lived, was the headquarters of the opposition movement and the Literary Club was the centre of its underground political and propagandist activities. Students of al-Hidāya Schools at Manāma and Muḥarraq were encouraged to write secret leaflets attacking British interference, to be distributed at night.[93] Leaflets were posted on the houses of pro-British Bahrainī elements.[94] Between the deposition of Shaikh Isa in May and the beginning of November 1923 two petitions were sent to the Political Residency by the opposition. As a result ᶜAbdul Wahhāb al-Zayyāni and Aḥmad bin Lāḥij were deported to Bomaby. This decision was taken by the Political Resident at the Political Agency in Baḥrain on the 7th

November 1923 during a meeting held by Shaikh Ḥamad (the Deputy Ruler). Shaikh ᶜAbdulla, who was a sympathiser with the petitioners opposition, and all the signatories, sent on the 21st November 1923 a second petition which involved the leading pearl merchants and the Sunnī notables.(95) Al-Zayyānī was a pearl merchant and a religious leader of his tribe; he had opposed British dominance since the beginning of the second decade of the century. It is interesting to note that the above petitioners requested the transfer of Major Daly the Political Agent and the restoration of legitimate authority to the ruler.(96)

At the same time the Shīᶜīs submitted counter petitions supporting Shaikh Ḥamad, Daly and the reforms.(97) The Shīᶜī petitioners expected that the new political developments would improve their social and economic situations, especially since they composed the backbone of the labour force whether in the pearl industry or in the agricultural sector. The Nākhudās, the pearl merchants and the tribal leaders, on the other hand would not benefit from these administrative reforms. In response to the petitions and counter-petitions, the Foreign Office warned on the 14th June 1923, that,

> "the Political Agent of Bahrain must not be tempted to interfere too much and too directly in the Shaikh's affairs, otherwise he may become the actual administrator and not simply a counseller."(98)

The opposition group continued their anti-British

activities in exile through the Indian, Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian press.[99] The Egyptian newspapers al-Akhbār and al-Shūrā, the Syrian newspaper Alif Bā and the Iraqi newspaper Mesopotamia Times were amongst the sympathetic newspapers. The Egyptian newspaper of Cairo al-Akhbār, for example, published an article on the 15th January 1922, entitled "News from East-Baḥrain,"

> "Matters in Bahrain are still in a troubled condition inspite of all the efforts made for the restoration of a good understanding between the local Sheikhs and the Consul,(100) and there are many rumours some of which report the deportation of many of the notables who are said to have been signatories of the letter of complaint sent to the Government. But all of these are not proved, because to make complaints is legitimate among all Nations. We hear that the Sheikh of Bahrain has sanctioned an annual donation to his free school. Let us hope that other chiefs will follow his example, because nothing will improve their condition and safeguard their independence except knowledge."(101)

The leaders of the opposition group encouraged prominent Arab leaders to interfere to restore the authority of the ruler of Baḥrain. Leaders such as King Ḥusain bin ʿAlī, Ibn Saʿud and the Ruler of Qaṭar sympathised with Shaikh Isa - visits were paid to each of them by Mulla Ḥafiẓ Wahbah,[102] the Egyptian who was deported from Baḥrain on the 9th January 1922 for sending anti-British and anti-Hamad articles to the Egyptian and the Iraqi press.[103] Mulla Ḥāfiẓ was employed by the Baḥrainī Educational Department in October 1920 and was appointed headmaster of the al-Hidāyah al-Khalīfiyya School in Muḥarraq.[104] Wahbah had long been recognised as the correspondent and agent of the Egyptian newspaper al-Akhbār

in the Gulf.[105]

In exile ᶜAbdul Wahhāb al-Zayyānī co-ordinated anti-British activities, assisted by Jāsim Moḥammad al-Shīrāwī. The latter was a Baḥrainī sentenced and deported from Baḥrain for creating ill-feeling between the ruler of Baḥrain and the Political Agent, on the 19th November, 1921.[106] Al-Shīrāwī had been a supporter of the twenties uprising of Iraq and an advocate of Arab unity.[107] Co-operation between the deportees and the leading opposition group in Baḥrain continued. The latter group financed the political and propagandist activities of the deportees.[108] Amongst these activites was a petition signed by the Baḥraini deportees and residents in Bombay on behalf of Shaikh Isa, and sent to the Viceroy through the Political Residency at Bushire in May 1924.[109]

All the attempts of the opposition groups to prevent the implementation of reforms failed, because the British authorities in the region were not willing to be seen as the protectors of a blatantly unjust judicial system. With the co-operation of Shaikh Ḥamad and Shiᶜi support, the proposed reforms were effected, in time to prevent the intervention of a third power.

The reform in fact was most beneficial to the largely Shiᶜi working class. The direct intent of British interference was not the protection of the Baḥārnah from sectarian oppression; this injustice did, however, provide an excuse for removing Shaikh Isa, and putting an end to a backward administration - which had become an embarrassment to British Policy.

Fortunately for the British, and for the Shī^{c}ī population, Shaikh Ḥamad was sympathetic to the British reforms. When he visited the Political Agency in July 1924, he spontaneously spoke of his great trust in, and admiration for Daly, during this interview with the Political Resident. The Political Resident stated that,

> "I obtained the impression at our interview that he whole-heartedly approves of the four chief reforms which are under weigh, i.e., in the Customs Administration, the Municipal Sanitation, the revenue settlement which will so much ameliorate the lot of the Shi^{c}i cultivators, and the pearling reforms which will emancipate so many divers, including a majority of negroes, whose lives at present are harder than those of slaves."(110)

As the Political Resident and the new Shaikh agreed, reforms of some kind were necessary, and a large section of society benefitted, to a degree which can be gauged by the list of implemented reforms, reported to the Political Resident by the Political Agent on the 29th August 1929.

"a). A Financial Adviser (C.D. Belgrave) controlling all expenditure and doing his best to limit a too buoyant civil list.

b). A recognised customs department, with which is combind boat registration, collection of pearling licences, passport and port officer's duties.

c). A reformed court consisting of the Adviser and heir apparent, and a lower court composed of the Assistant Adviser and another member of the al-Khalifa

d). Diving reforms: a properly constituted court, supervision of nakhuda's books, and an account for each diver.

e). Land Departments. A survey has almost been completed and when finished surveyors will be reduced.

f). Police under a British Commandant, and no longer under the municipality. They consist of roughly 100 Indian Armed Police, and a local force of uniformed constables, mostly Persians and a force of naturs or night watchmen.

g). Public Works, sea road built, artisan wells sunk, electric light about to be installed.

h). Education, one girls school and four boy's schools.

i). Waqfs. Shi^{c}i Waqfs removed from Qadhis by popular desire and placed in charge of laymen. An attempt by Bahrain Government to do this in 1926 created a riot, but it has now come about by the action of the Shi^{c}is themselves.

j). Municipalities, the Manama Municipality has made great strides and newly created Muharraq Municipality has made wonderful progress."(111)

A greater degree of social equality gradually resulted from the reforms and Baḥrain was brought closer to the ideals of Western democratic society. More questionable however, was the British role in achieving them. The removal of Shaikh Isa marked a watershed in the protection, after which the British were less respectful of the shaikhdom's autonomy.

As a result of the implementation of the reforms, three British officials, Financial Adviser, Police Officer, and Customs Officer were appointed to conduct the institutionalisation of the modern administration. The administration became "more British than in an ordinary Indian State," according to the British themselves.(112) Many educated people, including some members of the ruling family, such as the President of the

Literary Club Shaikh Moḥammad Abdulla al-Khalīfa, redoubled their criticism of the British influence in Baḥrain and their interference in administrative affairs. Khālid Moḥammad al-Faraj a Kuwaitī subject[113] and member of the Literary Club was deported from Baḥrain by Captain Alban, the Political Agent, in Baḥrain, in 1927 for writing seditious articles in the Egyptian papers.[114]

Belgrave, whose principal post was Financial Advisor to the Baḥrain Government, supervised every department of the administration. His omnipotence is evident in the administrative heirarchy, illustrated in appendix 8. It was widely felt that Shaikh Ḥamad was little more than a puppet.[115] Fathullah Abdull Masīḥ an-Ṭākī, the anti-British Journalist and proprietor of the Egyptian newspaper al-ᶜUmrān published an article on the 31st August 1930, describing the role of Belgrave, which was noted and translated by British,

> "The British adviser is the person who rules Bahrain and levies taxes. He collects the rvenues and the customs duties of the country. He orders and he executes, but the Shaikh puts his honoured signature on anything the adviser submits to him, without giving any opinion of his own. ...The Shaikh of Bahrain is therefore the ruler in name whereas all the power is in the hands of the British Adviser who was appointed by the Colonial Office, London. The Shaikh visits the Government Office for half-an-hour every fortnight. From this it will appear that the concession which the British Oil Company obtained in Bahrain was granted by the British and not by the Shaikh; the Adviser is the person who entered into an agreement with the Company. The Shaikh signed the deed of Agreement without knowing what was written and may not have even read the terms of the concession.

> This is what I saw with my own eyes and doubtless one who has been with his own eyes can better tell the facts than one who only heard."(sic)(116)

However much truth there may or may not have been in this article, the main point is that Belgrave's influence over the Government of Baḥrain infuriated the intelligentsia, mercantile and notable classes. Furthermore, as Financial Adviser, Belgrave reduced the maximum advance payment (Tisgām) to pearl fishers, in an effort to counteract the reduced market, and lost working class sympathy.

3. The Rebellion of the pearl fishers in May 1932 and the effects on the socio-political position of the Working Class

Despite opposition, the reforms did improve cultural and social life. New developments at the end of the 1920's and the early 1930's influenced the socio-economic structure of Baḥrain. These developments were the slump in the pearl trade caused by the general depression in Europe, and by the increased competition from Japanese cultured pearls; and the shortage of divers caused by the more attractive conditions of work offered by the emerging oil industry. The pearl diving industry which had been the backbone of the economic structure, was at its lowest ebb.(117) The revenue of the pearling trade had shrunk from £103,333 in 1926 to £5,378 in 1933(118) whereas in former days as many as 2,000 boats worked the pearl banks each season, in 1933 the number had dropped to 436, and the

catch had only a fraction of its former value. This slump was an economic disaster for the Gulf Shaikhdoms, especially Baḥrain. It affected not only the pearl divers and those dependent upon their trade, such as shopkeepers, but also the Baḥrainī Government whose receipts naturally diminished. Consequently the Government was forced to make cuts in its salaries and reduce expenditure on public services.(119)

After the displacement of Shaikh Isa and the installation of his son Shaikh Ḥamad, the pearl industry was reformed in 1924 through co-operation between the new Deputy-ruler of Baḥrain and Major Daly, the Political Agent. It was the most significant of a number of administrative reforms. The new regime had gained the support of the working classes through the reform of the pearling industry, at the expense of the Nākhudās and pearl merchants.

The diving community in Baḥrain contained three classes: the shore merchants who did the wholesale buying and selling and who either owned or financed the boats; the Nākhudās who supervised the pearl fishers and commanded and sometimes owned the boats; and the mass of divers and their helpers "suyoob" (haulers).(120) About 15,000 local divers went out from Baḥrain every season and it was estimated that about 100,000 men from the whole Gulf were employed on the banks every year.(121) This figure explains the impact of the slump in the pearl trade on the socio-economic life of the Gulf people. Although there was strong opposition to the reform of the pearl industry, the

support of the Shi^{c}i and Sunni judges and some merchants encouraged the Government to push the reforms through. The eventual success was mainly due to the keeness and energy of Major Daly.(122)

The principal features of the reform as reported by Belgrave were to do with Sulfah or Tisgām; the amount of advance and the permissible amount of interest payable to the pearl divers was laid down by law, no further changes could be debited against diver. Merchants and boat captains were compelled to keep regular accounts to be checked by diving clerks, authorised by the Government. Every diver was to keep records in a book issued by the Government, showing his account with his captain. Boat captains were forbidden to sell pearls privately; the presence of not less than three of the divers was required. In the case of death, a diver's children were not to be made liable for his debts or bound to his captain as had been the case. The debt was to become an ordinary one against the estate. These laws greatly improved the diving conditions.(123)

The collapse in the pearl trade, especially during 1931, caused prices to be halved. Sulfah or Tisgām(124) was accordingly reduced. The improvements effected by Pearling reforms were counterbalanced by Belgrave's declaration of the pearl diving season of 1932.(125) In the announcement an official Sulfah of Rs.30 per diver and Rs.25 per hauler was fixed for the season.(126) The pearl divers rejected the new lower levels of Sulfah and decided to resist. A deputation of

four was despatched to Belgrave to express their opinions. On arrival they were overpowered by the police, beaten, fettered and imprisoned. This incident took place on the 25th May 1932. The next day a body of some 1500 pearl fishers from Muḥarraq sailed to Manāma and marched in procession to protest to Belgrave. They reached the Police station and shattered its windows in order to rescue one of their imprisoned comrades, ᶜAbdul Wāḥid. The other three members of the deputation could not be found. They withdrew peacefully, embarked and sailed to Muḥarraq. Immediately a Police detachment appeared, commanded by the Political Agent and Belgrave. The Police fired on the pearl fishers: more than two were killed and a large number were wounded.(127) Many of the pearl fishers were arrested, Baḥrainī eye witnesses said.(128) The German Journalist H.J. von Bassewitz who published an article after the clashes: "Swan Song on the Pearl Divers" in a Berlin newspaper violently attacked the inhuman treatment of the Baḥrainī rebels by the British.(129) The British Government described the popular rebellion as "pearl-fishing riots." British officials in Baḥrain could not conceal such popular agitation because Baḥrain was a station on European flights to India, the major territory of the British Empire, and was also an important port for ordinary Gulf maritime traffic.(130) However, the pearling boats left for the banks in the first week of June in the same year. Despite the implementation of the diving reforms the decline of the pearling industry and the world economic crisis early in the 1930's resulted in the

reduction of Tisgām (advance payment) to a level unacceptable to the pearl fishers. The pearl fishers of Muḥarraq resisted on behalf of all their Baḥrainī colleagues. Difficulties of transportation reduced the number of demonstrators.(131) The incidents of May 1932 created ill-feeling against the British officials in Baḥrain, especially Belgrave, who was accused, by the German journalist in the previous article, of directing "the massacre."

The rebellion of the pearl fishers encouraged working class opposition to the government's policy. Their movement coincided with the commencement of oil production in June 1932. The old economic structure was replaced and oil royalties became the backbone of the Baḥrainī economy after 1932. These changes led to the replacement of the old social structure as the increasing BAPCO labour force gradually accumulated influence.

4. Aspects of the development of the Nationalist Reform Movement

It was obvious that the replacement of the former ruler of Baḥrain could not have succeeded in the face of nationalist unity. Illiteracy, tribalism and the pursuit of personal interests widened the gap between religious sects. For example, there had been segregated schools since 1927 for both sects. Until 1935 there were only two primary schools for the Shiᶜi - in Manāma and Bilād al-Qadīm (al-Khamīs). These were financed by the Shīᶜī and not by the Government, although Shaikh Ḥamad gave the

Baḥārnah Rs.5,000 as a contributin to the first Shi^{c}i School established at Bilād al-Qadīm.[132] Shi^{c}is were excluded from the membership of the Board of Education and from the commercial council until 1935. Junior members of the al-Khalīfa family persisted in abusing their traditional rights over the Shī^{c}ī, especially the peasant class. Eventually, two copies of a petition were signed by eight prominent Shī^{c}ī notables and submitted to the ruler and the Political Agent on the 30th December 1934. Three principal demands were made: a code for the Baḥrainī Courts should be drawn up; proportional representation on the Commercial Council and on the Municipalities should be accorded to them; and finally legitimate rights in connection with education should be restored to them.[133]

In response to the petitioners the ruler first requested legitimate authorisation of the signatories by the leading Baḥarnah (Shi^{c}i). This was immediately obtained. Meetings were held in the <u>ma'ātim</u> in Baḥrainī districts. It was decided that the petitioners would press for the employment of the Baharnah by the oil company and in all Government offices; furthermore Ibrāhīm al-^{c}Urayyiḍ[134] was to be proposed as headmaster of the Manama Boys' School.[135]

The beginnings of increased political influence, and the impact of modern ideas in Baḥrain had made the Baḥārnah less fatalistic. The British reported that they had begun to make political demands.[136] The response to the petition came from the ruler, rather than the Political

Agent in January 1935, and although Shaikh Ḥamad made conciliatory promises, the Shīᶜī were sceptical.[137] Of the eight Shīᶜī representatives, the notables from Manāma[138] were chosen to submit a letter on the 30th January 1935 to the Political Agent. They requested an appointment in order to discuss the demands, already included in their petition.[139] When the four Shīᶜī notables of Manāma met the Political Agent on the 30th January 1935, they complained according to the British report of being "more oppressed than they were in Shaikh Isa's era, because in those days they were in darkness, but now they were beginning to see." They compared the spread of the enlightenment in Baḥrain to that of Iraq. They added that Shaikh Ḥamad had become the ruler owing to their support.[140]

The Bahārnah deputation threatened to destroy the bridges on the road to the oil field, and to shut up their shops. This meeting was described by the Political Agent as a "stormy interview."[141] He was not happy with the Baḥārnah deputation's threats during the interview, regarding them as subversive, and dangerous to British prestige and interests in Baḥrain. It was his reaction that was passed on by Shaikh Ḥamad when he warned the four Baḥārnah notables on the 31st January 1935 at the court that they would be held personally responsible for any disturbances.[142] When the eight Baḥārnah envoys met the Political Agent at the Agency on the 2nd February 1935 to complain against the ruler's unreasonable warning, he informed them in accordance with the British policy. The

Political Agent confirmed the ruler's position when he stated that the matters were internal and were the ruler's responsibility. He informed them also that the ruler was attending to their representation in the administrative councils. Finally the Political Agent warned the Baḥārnah envoys that if there was any trouble in Baḥrain, "the eight of them and not the common folk would be held responsible."(143) The British were using tactics calculated to maintain their influence.

However the justice of the Shīᶜī demands could not be ignored, nor intelligent opinion denied: The Baḥrainī Government began to execute the Baḥārnah demands gradually, concentrating on equalisation between all subjects, in both duties and rights.(144) The Baḥārnah movement of 1934-35 fuelled resistance to the subjugation of the peasant class. The system was similar to a feudal one: the majority of gardens belonged to the ruling family and were leased, usually for two years, to Baḥārnah villagers. Owing to the 1934 decline in the price of dates, most landlords allowed their gardens to deteriorate. Consequently the rent of the leases during the beginning of the 1930's had decreased. The tenants complained that they were being harshly treated by the court, which sold their property and gardens in order to satisfy the landlords. They complained also about camels belonging to the ruling family, which were allowed to enter their gardens and destroy their crops.(145)

The conditions resulted in a working class resistance led by the notables which aimed at the improvement of conditions of employment. A large number of villagers were

unemployed, owing to the collapse of the price of pearls. Economic circumstances were significant in the timing of the rebellion, but the coincidence of the Baḥrain rebellion with the tribal uprisings of the mid-Euphrates in 1935 cannot have been accidental. The Baḥārnah opposition leaders followed techniques similar to those of the Iraqi rebels especially the use of intimidation: their envoys threatened to destroy bridges if the Government rejected their demands.

5. The Reform Movement of 1938 and the role of Iraq

The Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement was brought to the fore by a climax in British interference on the 17th May 1923. The failure of this movement was due to vestigial tribalism and sectarianism; the spread of illiteracy and the impositions of imperialism. The intelligentsia who led the nationalist reform movement in 1938, especially those who had participated in the earlier movement (e.g. Sa^cad Abdulla al-Shamlān and Abdulla al-Zā'id) attempted to draw conclusions from the earlier events.

The pearl divers rebellion on the 25th and 26th May 1932 and the Baḥārnah movement of 1934-35 led to the struggle for emancipation of the working class in Baḥrain. The movement of 1934-35 was the achievement of peasant agitation. Both the pearl fishers rebellion and the Baḥārnah uprising paved the way for later, more broadly based, and better organised movements.

The internal changes and the regional developments

created a pioneering atmosphere for the reform movement of 1938. As far as the internal changes in Baḥrain are concerned, it is clear that in the second half of the 1930's there were two contradictory developments in Baḥrain: the propagation of the nationalist consciousness and the consolidation of the autocratic rule by the tribal regime, backed by the British protection. Popular discontent was fuelled by corruption in administration and its attendant disadvantages: the backward system of education; the lack of justice in the courts; the spread of bribery, Belgrave's domination of the state's administration; the economic crisis of unemployment and the trade depression. Despite Baḥrain's progressive reputation in the Gulf Shaikhdoms, spreading liberalism engendered further demands for political transformation.(146)

The following discussion will highlight the major incentives of the Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement of 1938. Obliterating corruption in administration was the objective of the movement, despite the reforms which had followed the displacement of the former ruler. The British authorities and the tribal regime resisted the improvement of the administrative system. The corrupt Baḥrainī courts were unsatisfactory, especially the senior and junior courts where the unprofessional "judges" were appointed from the ruling family by the ruler. The Political Agent reported that.

> "the hearing and disposal of cases are delayed for considerable time and some of case records are lost by lapse of time and carelessness. On many occasions the people have been ordered to file fresh suits and pay the court fees again."(147)

Belgrave, whose official post was Financial Adviser, insinuated himself into the Senior Court. The people resented the monopolisation of these posts by the ruling family. Some of the notables held that none of the judges were competent and that it was unjust that only the al-Khalīfa should be judges. They questioned the right of Shaikh Ḥamad's sons and nephews to judge others.[148]

The situation was further complicated by the disruption of the independent Shī^{c}ī Court. The Shī^{c}ī called for the dismissal of their judges, and requested equality in education, representation and employment. These demands appeared during a meeting held at the political Agency on the 3rd November 1938 attended by the Political Agent and a Shī^{c}ī deputation.[149] Belgrave stated that Manṣūr al-^{c}Urayyiḍ and Sayyid Sa^{c}īd Sayyid Khalaf, members of this deputation dominated the discussion.[150]

The deterioration in educational standards added weight to the claims for reform. The British reported that "not a single boy who passed the final examination and left the school been able to work even as a junior clerk."[151] Dissatisfaction with the educational policy, resulted in calls for the dismissal of the Director Fā'iq Adham, a Syrian.[152]

There were complaints of corruption also within BAPCO's administration. These complaints were based on the employment of Asiatic foreigners, mainly Indians and Iranians who received higher wages, and better conditions,

than Arabs. Briefly, the foreign labourers, both skilled and unskilled, received better treatment than nationals both financially and in other privileges. Matters came to a head when unemployment increased owing to the reduction in the labour force by BAPCO. At this time the divers were already faring badly owing to a poor pearl season, and a further slump in pearl prices.(153) Reduced employment in BAPCO (as appendix 7 shows), like the collapse of the pearling industry, hit Manāma, Muḥarraq and Ḥidd most - the majority of Baḥrainī labourers were from these cities. The local traders and shopkeepers were equally badly affected. Neither was it altogether without effect on the villages which had to sell their produce in these cities.(154)

The unemployment question provided the principal motive for a reform movement. The Nationalist movement aimed to protect national interests in cases of rivalry with foreign companies, which were usually supported by Britain. When, owing to the completion of construction, BAPCO reduced the labour force (see appendix 7) resentment at unequal treatment redoubled. Although foreigners and nationals were made redundant, no efforts were made to retain nationals in preference to foreigners.

Complaints arose also over administrative corruption and mismanagement on Manāma Municipality by its senior staff.(155) The Policy of the Police Department was found to be unsatisfactory: conscription of the Police Force was mainly from non-nationals and was nominally commanded by Belgrave. British officials in Baḥrain recorded a number

of instances of mismanagement and corruption in the Government administration. For instance Mr. Nayran (the Adviser's Secretary of the Municipality) Moḥammad Khalīl (Sptd. Land Dept.) Mr. Jalaluddīn (Passport Officer) and others had interfered indiscriminately in the affairs of the Police Department - hence a lack of discipline which resulted in anarchic behaviour including random arrest. People could be kept in custody by the Police Department before trial unless bribes were handed over. Prohibited drugs, such as opium, could be seized and sold for profit verbal abuse was common, including intimidation to extract payment.(156) Without doubt there was cause for reform.

The pattern of administrative corruption and mismanagement was similar in the state goal. Some of the prisoners in the Fort were chained by "Shaikh Ḥamad's fetters," weighing 14 lbs, a barbarity unique to Baḥrain. The Political Agent reported on the 26th October 1938 that every senior official of the Bahrain Government made use of the prisoners. For instance Mr. Nayran (Adviser's Secretay of the Municipality) used them to clean his latrines, bathroom and car every day. K.S. Moḥammad Khalīl (Land Dept.). Mr. Jalaluddīn (Passport Officer) and others were similarly guilty. Well-to-do prisoners could bribe the Babu (clerk) of the Fort and the Hawaldars in-charge of the prisoners, to avoid work. They could have food brought to them from their houses and buy preferential treatment.(157) Such mismanagement and corruption was not unique to the Police Force and prisons. Only radical

change would satisfy a people who had recently recognised their power.

Public indignation against corruption was inflamed by regional developments. Agitation over corrupt administration in Baḥrain coincided with the success of the reform movement in Dubai, which had in its turn been preceded by that in Kuwait. Both had been supported by Iraq and temporarily by Britain.(158) These achievements abroad provided the Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement with useful material on which to base demands for constitutional reforms in Baḥrain. The administrations of Dubai and Kuwait needed modernisation while the major crisis in Baḥrain were caused by unemployment, the oppression of the working class and the prevalence of inefficiency and corruption.

The British officials in the Gulf region were afraid that the Kuwait Legislative Council might become an example to other similarly ruled neighbours in the same way as Dubai had succeeded Kuwait. In particular they were led by the Iraqi media to anticipate an influx of appeals for help in resisting the autocracy of tribal rulers. Iraq at least would have welcomed an excuse to interfere in the affairs of the Arab Shaikhdoms, especially Kuwait, in accordance with her nationalist policy.(159)

Iraq anticipated that the success of the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement would trigger similar upheavals in the other Arab Shaikhdoms. Iraqi expectations were correct. The success of the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement made a similar reform movement possible in

Dubai.[160] Therefore T.C. Fowle the Political Resident in the Gulf reported that,

> "I would like to stress the fact, which both the shaikhs of the Persian Gulf and ourselves must realise, that the idea of popular movements, such as the present one at Kuwait, has now permeated the Arab state, and must be taken account of. Even on the backward Trucial Coast, at Dubai the opposition party to the Shaikh asked for certain popular reforms."(161)

The reform movement of Dubai was influenced by Iraqi propaganda, and the Pan-Arab press and Qaṣr al-Zuhūr Wireless station (King Ghazi Radio). Violent articles appeared in Iraqi newspapers, like al-Sijil, the most enthusiastic Arab Nationalist newspaper.[162]

The Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement was fascinated by the achievements of the reform movements in Kuwait and Dubai and stirred by the Iraqi media especially the King Ghazi Radio Station.[163] The Political Resident in the Gulf reported that the Iraqi wireless attacks extended as far as Baḥrain and caused much concern to the ruler and his entourage.[164]

The reform movement therefore emerged in an atmosphere of internal political unrest and economic slump and, if this were not sufficient motivation, success in similar conditions abroad and the encouragement of a strong regional power, overcame the force of tradition.

Both Iraqi pro-reform propaganda and the Kuwaitī and Dubai reform movements reinforced the position of the Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement. This movement of 1938 was broadly based - notables, merchants, labourers, students and the intelligentsia. It was a popular movement

which presented the national interest as the priority of a democratic system. It was the first attempt to create Baḥraini nationalist unity. the Baḥraini nationalist reform movement had begun in the 1920's and 1930's, but had then reflected sectarian and tribal interests. The divers rebellion in May 1932 was a precursor of the popular nationalist movement.

Oil royalties produced new opportunities in employment, in BAPCO and the state administration. This led to the emergence of a middle class which became the mainstay of the nationalist reform movement after 1938. The political activities of the Baḥraini nationalist reform movement prompted the statement of H. Weightman, the Political Agent at Baḥrain, on the development of this class:

> "...increased educational facilities in recent years have produced a class of young men with a veneer of education who respond readily to press propaganda, listen to broadcasts and develop political feelings. They believe themselves to be progressive and despite their illiterate parents who, since the youths are earning quite good wages, have lost all influence over them. They are nationalistic, especially since they see foreigners earning more money than they themselves do. They know that they are better educated than the ruling family and are inclined therefore to despise them. They come mainly from Manamah (sic) and Muharraq, and most of them work with the Oil Company, in Government Offices and with firms in Manamah."(165)

The emergence of the Baḥraini nationalist reform movement of 1938 involved a variety of political activities. The movement was initially principally concerned with the political experience of the Baḥārnah

notables of the 1934-35 rebellion. Their new demand for the dismissal of two corrupt judges from the Shīcī Sharac Court, and their proposal of Shaikh Salmān as heir-apparent became the priorities of this movement. The long-standing question of the heir-apparent had created competition between Shaikh Ḥamad and his brother Shaikh cAbdulla during the 1920's. The heir-apparent was not appointed then and there was friction in the ruling family regarding this matter. Shaikh Salmān was the eldest son of the ruler and he was afraid, at least according to the British reports, that if his position as heir apparent was not confirmed during the life of his father, he would lose the opportunity to his uncle Shaikh cAbdulla who was popular in the ruling family and amongst the people. Shaikh cAbdulla's desire for rule was still active.(166)

The activities of the nationalist reform movement began when Yūsuf Fakhrū, a Baḥrainī merchant, invited a number of Baḥārnah notables from Manāma (Muḥsin Aḥmad al-Tājir, Moḥammad cAli al-Tājir, Sayyid Sacīd Sayyid Khalaf and Sayyid Aḥmad al-cAlawī) to attend a meeting at his office. The British believed that Shaikh Salmān bin Shaikh Ḥamad was behind Yūsuf Fakhrū's arrangements; the Shaikh was certainly present when the question of an heir apparent for Baḥrain was raised. This meeting was followed by further gatherings, held in the garden of Shaikh Salmān at Quḍaibiyya(167) Moḥammad bin Yūsuf bin Nāṣir and cAbdul Laṭīf al-Mishārī both notables of Muḥarraq - attended the later meetings in addition to those present at the first.

The Baḥārnah leaders held similar meetings at the house of Aḥmad Khamīs of Sanābis, at the garden of Manṣūr al-ᶜUrayyiḍ' and at the *ma'tam* of Sayyid Aḥmad al-ᶜAlawī in Manāma. The Baḥrainī leaders agreed eventually on the following formula to present to the ruler. The British summarised the demands:

a). The formation of a legislative Committee consisting of three Sunnis and three Shiᶜi members under the presidency of Shaikh Salman.

b). The reform of the Police.

c). The reform of the Bahrain Court.

d). The dismissal of the present Director of Education. (168)

e). The recognition of Shaikh Salman bin Hamad as heir-apparent.

f). The dismissal of the two Shiᶜi *Qadhis* Shaikh Ali bin Hasan and Shaikh Ali bin Jaᶜfar. (169)

g). Gaining priority of Bahraini nationals in recruitment for the Bahrain Petroleum Company.

h). The restriction of liquor as it had been before.

i). The renewed restriction of women's rights.(170)

The last two points sit uneasily with the liberal aspirations of the opposition leaders, but have their roots in tradition and Islamic Culture. They were listed with the administrative reforms by the British without comment, and the distinction may not have been clear to the reformists. Equally the specifically Islamic nature of the last two demands may indicate that their inclusion was intended to reassure the *ᶜulamā*'.

Significantly, the meetings were held during the absence of the ruler and Belgrave. Four days before the arrival of Belgrave, the Sunnī notables in the movement (Yūsuf Fakhrū, Khalīl Mu'ayyad, Yūsuf Kanoo and ᶜAbdul Raḥmān al-Zayyānī) called on the Sunnī <u>ᶜulamā</u>' to support the proposed reforms and to bring them to the notice of the Baḥrainī Government, as a gesture of solidarity with the Baḥārnah Community who supported such proposals. The Sunnī <u>ᶜulamā</u>' response was similar to that of their colleagues from the Shīᶜī (such as Shaikh Bāqir al-ᶜUṣfūr and Shaikh ᶜAbdulla bin Moḥammad Ṣāliḥ) who suggested that the matter should be kept in abeyance until the arrival of Belgrave.[171]

When Belgrave returned to Baḥrain he attempted to discredit the reformists before their claims could be consolidated. Consequently spoke to each sectarian leader in isolation, dissolving the new links between them. It was under Belgrave's persuasion that Shaikh Salmān withdrew his support from the reform movement.[172]

These developments stimulated political and propagandist activities, undertaken mainly by students and the intelligentsia who had been excited by the achievements of the Kuwait and Dubai reform movements. The agitation was intended not only to pressurise the Government but also to bring the issues to the attention of the newly educated people.[173]

Articles began to appear in the Iraqi and Egyptian press, written by local sympathisers or by Baḥrainis, still using pseudonyms for anti-government comment. The Egyptian

weekly al-Rābitah al-ʿArabiyyah published an article on the 14th September 1938, under the title "Gloomy despair in Baḥrain - An ardent call," signed simply Baḥrain, an Arab. The writer attacked the corrupt administration especially the British advisers, singling out Belgrave. He welcomed the Arab struggle for liberation and appreciated the success of the Kuwaitī reform movement, but concentrated on the requirements of the Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement; which he set out as follows:

> "Firstly, the institution of a Legislative Assembly, composed of 20 members with Shaikh Salman as its President.
>
> Secondly, the control of all the affairs of the country: Justice, Municipalities, Customs, Army and Education by the assembly.
>
> Thirdly, the sole resort of the Assembly should be Shaikh Hamad, the ruler of Bahrain.
>
> Fourthly, prevention of intervention in Bahrain affairs by foreigners and the removal of all powers from them."(174)

The Iraqi press co-operated with the Baḥrain youth. On the 14th October 1938 al-Sijil (based in Baṣra) published an article entitled "Baḥrain." The writer analysed social, cultural and political affairs in Baḥrain, and explained the Baḥrainī attraction to Iraq's social and political achievements.(175) On the 11th November the same paper published an article entitled Mata Tastayqiẓ al-Bahrain? (when will Baḥrain awake?), signed again Baḥraini youth. This commentator urged the "Baḥrainī youth" to take responsibility for the right for freedom and democracy.(176) Moreover the King Ghazi Radio Station made several attacks on the dual repression of the traditional

rule and of the British protectorate.[177] The Political Resident reported that the Political Agent stressed his concern over these attacks in a telegram.[178]

The Bahraini movement continued to contact the populace through the distribution of leaflets in the streets, notably on the 23rd October 1938 in the three main cities: Manāma, Muḥarraq and Ḥidd. Their messages were pasted on the doors of shops, Government offices and walls. The following text was reported by the British:

> Congratulations to you, Oh noble public. The oppression will now be waived, you have heard from your leaders and speakers that have proved to you that the oppression is almost over. Be ready and wait further orders. (179)

On the 31st October 1938, the British noted the appearance of another publication in the same town, signed by the rebels of the movement and entitled al-Jabal (The Mountain)[180]

> "We thank the representatives of the nation for this good news which guaranteed the removal of oppression. We are prepared for the issue of the next order." It was signed: the secret Labour Party.(181)

The Baḥraini Government took immediate measures to remove the majority of these leaflets, but their efforts were largely cosmetic. Various more stringent means to control the situation were introduced during the reformists attempts to form a nationalist movement. Although nationalist unity, advocated by this movement was considered to jeopardise the influence of both the ruler and Britain, the demands discussed during the afore-mentioned meetings did not constitute a threat to the

constitution of the monarchy. Nevertheless the Government reacted, under Belgrave's instruction, with tactics designed to dissolve the unity which was the basis of popular resistance.

Firstly a notice to the population was published. Belgrave described the contents in a letter reported by the Political Agent, as,

> "to the effect that the public are forbidden from organising petitions and that whoever has anything to say should ask for an interview and state what he has in his mind." (182)

The British Officials in Baḥrain were convinced of the necessity of administrative reform, but at the same time were anxious about the growth of revolutionary fervour. They realised that the repercussions of the Baḥārnah Movement of 1934-35 were still being felt and should be taken into consideration. The Political Agent suggested that,

> "It is urgently necessary to remove causes for a situation by a 'clean up' of the Bahrain Courts and in particular of the Shiᶜi Shara Court, schemes to provide employment, mainly for the towns and also for the villages, should be examined and put into effect as soon as possible." (183)

As a result the Government attempted to end the Baḥārnah agitation by executing the principal demands of the Shīᶜī in the Sharaᶜ Court - Shaikh ᶜAbdul Ḥusain al-Ḥillī, an Iraqi from Najaf was appointed as Appellate Judge. At the same time, the Shīᶜī request for the dismissal of the corrupt judge Shaikh ᶜAlī bin Jaᶜfar, was answered. His guilt was not disputed; he was known to the British as "a dangerous individual." The disreputable

court clerk was also dismissed without hesitation. Further Shaikh Bāqir al-ᶜusfūr, Shaikh ᶜAlī bin Ḥasan and Shaikh Moḥammad Khairi were appointed judges to the reformed Shīᶜī Sharaᶜ Court.(184)

This was an opportune moment for Belgrave to meet a Deputation of traditional Baḥārnah leaders, such as Manṣūr al-ᶜUrayyiḍ, Sayyid Saᶜīd Sayyid Khalaf, Muhsin al-Tajir and Moḥammad ᶜAlī al-Tājir, to promise Government support for the administrative reforms. Belgrave attempted to alter the demands from nationalist to sectarian ones.(185) It was his intention to dissolve national unity from the outset. The nationalist movement recognised him as the principal obstruction to reform, and as their target, before their ruler. Popular resentment of Belgrave was graphically illustrated by an incident involving the Baḥrain Government's notice announcing the illegality of petitions. This notice was removed in Muḥarraq and Manāma and the ruler's official signature replaced by Belgrave's nickname - al-Thawr al-Aḥmar (the Red Bull) - this symbolic attribution of an anti-democratic law to Belgrave signified the nationalists clear sightedness with regard to the hierarchy.(186) On the 2nd November it was reported by the Political Agent that the following words were found written in chalk on the walls of the Baḥrain Court House:

> "Down, down Adviser
> Down, down these courts
> of justice." (187)

Without doubt this sort of activity disturbed the ruler and the British officials. Although both parties

were convinced of the necessity of administrative reforms, they attempted at first to suppress the activities of the nationalist reform movement. The opportunity to achieve this came when a rumour circulated, in the first week of November 1938, that the Baḥrain labourers of BAPCO might carry out a strike.(188) As a result Saᶜad al-Shamlān and Aḥmad al-Shīrāwi were arrested on 5th November, while the ring leader (as the Political Agent called him) ᶜAli Khalīfa al-Fāḍil, gave himself up on the evening of the second day. These three persons were Arab Nationalist and prominent leaders in the reform movement.

In sympathy with al-Shamlān and al-Shīrāwī, a strike was carried out in the Oil Company by Baḥraini labourers on the 6th November. A large number of Baḥrainis assembled in the Jumᶜa Mosque (Masjid al-Fāḍil) in Manāma and demanded to see the political Agent, H. Weightman who refused them. As a result the demonstrators marched in protest to the city centre. The demonstrators were forced to scatter by a body of Police; a few people received injuries during a charge,(189) and fifteen persons were arrested. Moḥammad Kamal, Moḥammad Foolādh, Moḥammad Sāliḥ al-Shīrāwī, Moḥammad al-Ghurair, Malallah Ṣāliḥ, Ibrāhīm Fakhrو and Sayyid Hāshim Sayyid Ibrāhīm were amongst them. The Government charged them with civil disruption whilst they considered themselves the champions of civil rights. The closure of shops as a result of demonstrations was attributed to fear by the Government and to sympathy by the opposition.(190)

On the 7th November 1938 Belgrave continued his

efforts to weaken unity when he met the leaders of the Baḥarānah and persuaded them of the evils of integration. The Nationalists blamed Belgrave for the appearance of a general notice at BAPCO, to the effect that,

> "men who failed to return to work by Wednesday morning would be liable to dismissal or such action as seemed necessary." (191)

As a result of the Govenment's success in suppressing reformist activities, the opposition groups dispersed, but continued their propagandist activities. Therefore on the 9th November (the same violent week) more notices were posted in various parts of Manāma and Muḥarraq demanding the release of the ring leaders, ordering a strike of BAPCO's employees, the boycott of the Cinema, and threatening those who opposed the "Society of Free Youth."(192) On the 9th and 10th November the Political Agent received two communications by post from Shabāb al-ᶜUmmah. They mentioned that they represented more than five hundred young men, and called on the British to rescue the Baḥrain people from corrupt administration. They demanded the release of the prisoners; the formation of an Educational Council, Court Council and trade unions to protect the rights of the indigenous labour force.(193) The latter demand indicated the effective role of the working class in this movement, and was the first time that the indigenous labour force had claimed such rights. The new wealth had caused changes in the socio-economic structure, which had already been altered by the exploitation of oil reserves and the growth of the

intelligentsia.

It may be concluded that the intelligentsia, the labour force and the notables wanted to capitalise on achievements elsewhere. It was felt that developments in Kuwait and Dubai had demonstrated the possibility of rejecting an unacceptable rule administrated corruptly and inefficiently. The popular demands were hindered by the British and the ruling family who were safe-guarding their interests. Notables, the intelligentsia and the working class played a fundamental role in the creation of nationalist unity. The traditional confederates - The British, the ruling family and their entourage - nevertheless impeded progress. The tribal leaders who sent petitions of support to the ruler on the 24th Ramaḍān 1357 A.H. (November 1938) and on the 15th Shawwāl 1357 (the 8th December 1938)[194] reinforced the position of the ruler and encouraged him to reject the demands of five leading notables who claimed to be representing the desires of the people as a whole. The five notables[195] submitted a memorandum to the ruler which contained five demands:

> "After compliments:-
> we have the honour to submit this letter in connection with the demands which we request the Bahrain Government to grant as we believe that these will give rest to the Government and satisfaction to her subjects.
>
> (i) Education. To form a committee of eight members, four Sunni and four Shias (sic): this committee to supervise education, arrange curriculum of studies for the schools, employ headmasters and teachers from outside and send students abroad.
>
> (ii) Courts. To improve the courts by changing the present magistrates and

to form a bench of three judges, two from the public, viz., one Sunni and one Shia and the third one to be according to the choice of the Govenment, for each Court. To form a special criminal court of one judge only employed from Iraq. He should have good reputation and should be employed temporarily until such time as a Bahrain subject will be able to take his place.

(iii) Municipalities. To improve the Municipalities by appointing Bahrain subjects in municipal employments in place of foreigners.

(iv) Labour Committee. To form a labour committee acknowledged officially by the Government to look after the affairs of Bahrain labourers whether they are employed by companies or any others and to protect their rights.

(v) To avoid any unintentional misunderstanding in future between the Government and the people we request the selection of six persons, three Sunnis and three Shias to represent the people." (196)

The ruler autocratically rejected all these demands, and the ruling family as a whole rejected the idea of the legislative council. When the Political Agent discussed the matter with them they stated that they, the al-Khalīfa, would lose their power through the formation of this council. Their opinions were based on the example of the Kuwaiti Legislative Council. Both the ruling family and the British officials in Baḥrain opposed even the formation of a Consultative Council.

the Political Agent's point of view was:

"If the British Government force the Shaikh to accept a council the public would regard it as a sign that the administration which had been approved by the British Government for so many years had suddenly become a failure." (197)

The ruler's point of view on the Labour Committee was that there was no need for any committee to mediate between his Government and the public. He added that such a committee would embarrass the Government and give rise to disturbances. The British officials in Baḥrain shared the ruler's view.[198]

When the reformist leaders were asked by Belgrave, acting on the desire of the Political Agent, to find out the duties of the Labour Committee, the reformists enclosed a list of duties[199] with a letter to Belgrave on the 29th of Ramaḍān 1357 A.H. November 1938) and also mentioned the grievances of the Baḥrainī Labour Force.[200] Despite the mass support behind the proposals of the Labour Committee, the government ignored them. Although a meeting was held at ʿAwālī on the 10th December 1938 in the Personnel Office of BAPCO, attended by H.Weightman the Political Agent, Belgrave and representatives of BAPCO, it was Shaikh ʿAlī bin Aḥmad who was appointed as the Government representative at BAPCO and not a Labour Committee. The meeting dwelt on trivialities such as the provision of iced water by the company and reviewed only superficially the rights of "class III men" in terms, for example of sick leave. The issue of the proposed code was side-stepped. It was needless to say, not accepted.[201] Nevertheless, the list drawn up by the labourers' representatives was considered to be the first native formula for the rights of the indigenous labour force. It constituted the first truly nationalist achievement of the reform movement and

the first effective challenge to the traditional allies. The plan was frustrated for several reasons. Belgrave successfully broke down co-operation within the popular movement by meeting with the prominent leaders of both sects separately. The Shīʿī Sharaʿ Court was reformed for example, without the implementation of the accompanying proposals for Sunnī Courts. After the reform the Political Agent reported on the 19th November that,

> "The Baharnah dissatisfaction with the Shia Court has been met and the Baharnah, save for the politicaly minded 'townees', are satisfied." (202)

Belgrave, the Political Agent H. Weightman and Shaikh ʿAbdulla the ruler's brother co-operated together against the Popular movement from its beginning. On the 5th Novembr 1938 the Political Agent reported to the Political Resident that,

> "Early in the week Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa and Belgrave came to see me and to talk over the situation. Shaikh Abdullah said that they wanted to put an end to this agitation quickly and that he recognised that there were one or two items in the Administration that needed reform. He thought if these were put right there would remain no justifiable cause for further agitation." (203)

Before the BAPCO labourers' strike took place on the 6th November, Belgrave met a Baḥārnah deputation, according to the Political Agent's report for two hours. Regarding this meeting the Political Agent stated,

> "Their main concern seemed to be to increase Baharnah representation and that they complained that there were too many Arabs in the Baladiyahs (Municipalities) and that the Arabs or Sunnis were being favoured in the schools." (204)

This analysis formed the policy used by the British officials in Baḥrain, especially Belgrave, to divide the leading members through their prejudices. The ruler was supported by the tribal leaders through their petitions and memorandums in November and December 1938.(205) Co-operation between these elements reinforced the supremacy of the British and the ruler, while the lack of nationalist consciousness and the absence of qualified leadership ultimately brought down the movement. The opposition leaders considered that the continuation of Belgrave in his post hindered the progress of the administration. Therefore his dismissal was included in leaflets outlining the popular demands for reform.(206)

The publication of such a demand by the opposition leaders was certainly not without effect on Belgrave's reputation. The arrested leaders were treated badly in prison. ᶜAli bin Khalīfa al-Fāḍil was dismissed from his former position as municipal secretary. Saᶜad al-Shamlān was forbidden to practise in the Baḥrain Courts as a Wakīl (lawyer) Ibrāhīm Kamāl was sentenced to nine months hard labour by the Baḥrain Court. Aḥmad al-Shīrāwī had earlier been warned that he would be forbidden to appear as a Wakīl(207) The ring leaders, Aḥmad al-Shīrāwī, Saᶜad al-Shamlān and ᶜAlī bin Khalīfa al-Fāḍil, were also sentenced to five years.(208)

The Iraqi propaganda against the suppressive policy in Bahrain continued. The popular movement in Baḥrain was discussed in an article entitled "National and Nationalist feeling in Baḥrain" published by al-Sijil on the 6th

January 1939. The writer mentioned the imprisonment of the prominent leaders of the movement and violently attacked Belgrave's barbaric conduct.(209) The same paper published another article "Education in Baḥrain" on the 7th February 1939. The author bitterly criticised the backward educational system in Baḥrain which was controlled by Belgrave and his assistant Fā'iq Adham.(210) On the 17th March the same year the same Iraqi paper published an article "the final youth movement in Baḥrain." The writer described in detail the suppression of the nationalist reform movement in Baḥrain and the trial of its leaders. The author stated that Belgrave was the senior judge of the court which had tried the rebels. Belgrave's influence in the Baḥrain Government was singled out as a major evil.(211)

Iraq's sympathy and encouragement provided the main stimulus to the development of the reform movements in the Gulf region. Internal circumstances, however, played a vital role. In Kuwait and Dubai the administrations were inefficient and inadequate. In Baḥrain state departments had been established but were corrupt and in need of reform. The Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement was a popular movement, because all the classes participated in it except the ruling family and the tribal leaders. It was based on the concepts of nationalist unity, but the tentative beginning of pure nationalism were easily fragmented by Belgrave. It was not anti-monarchist but wanted to consolidate relations between the people and the ruler, on a democratic basis. Belgrave was the principal

hindrance to the activities of the reform movement.

The Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement was led by the upper classes including the ruling family. In this case the lack of nationalist unity was the principal obstacle. The three movements in the Gulf region were motivated and supported by the Arab nationalist beliefs of King Ghazi and by Arab Nationalist groups in Iraq. the socio-economic changes of oil production, in particular the increase in the number of educated people and the sudden unemployment caused by the completion of construction projects provided the radical thought and the resentment for a popular movement. The Kuwaitī and Baḥrainī movements were violently suppressed by the Police Force because they aimed to create a modern administration.

As a result of the growth of the Police Force the Political Agent in Baḥrain stated that,

> "I see no immediate need for the action, beyond the stṛengthening of the security forces (and His Highness (212) has already decided to add one hundred men to the Police) in order to deal with possible factions agitation." (213)

This opinion reflects the British policy towards popular demands for reform. Therefore the future of the people was at the mercy of British influence and despotic ruling families, not only in Kuwait and Baḥrain but also in the rest of the Gulf region.

The reform movements of 1938-39 in the Gulf introduced certain concepts of Arab unity absorbed from Iraq's advocation of Arab nationalism. Iraq's objective was to establish first the political circumstances for this

unity in the Gulf Shaikhdoms, then the leadership of Iraq. Britain and the tribal regimes were therefore under direct threat and realised it. Hence these movements were rapidly suppressed.

FOOTNOTES : CHAPTER TWO

1. See the introduction, p. 4 ; al-Tajir, M.A., Language and Linguistic origins in Baḥrain, The Baḥārnah dialect of Arabic, Kegan Paul International Ltd, London, 1982.

2. F.O.371/23217/E4745/4745/93, Confidential Report of the 27th June 1939, on the leading personalities in Iraq from the British Ambassador, Baghdād, to Viscount Halifax; Great Britain, "Annual Administration Report, Shāmiyyah Division, 1918" Reports of Administration for 1918 of Divisions and Districts of the occupied territories in Mesopotamia, vol.I, Baghdād. 1919, p.87; Jamāli, F., "The Theological Colleges of Najaf," The Muslim World (Hartford), vol.L, No. 1, January 1960, p.15; al-Maḥbūbah, J.B., Madi al-Najaf Wa hādiruhā, vol.3, Maṭbaᶜat al-Naᶜmān, al-Najaf, 1376 A.H. - 1957, pp.375-386.

3. Al-Khāṭir, M., al-Muntadā al-Islāmī, Markaz al-Wathā'iq al-Tarīkhiyyah, 1981, Bahrain, pp.40-41.

4. Al-Ḥuṣarī, A.S., Mudhakkirātī fil-Iraq, vol.1 from 1921-1927, Dār al-Ṭalīᶜah, 1967, Beirut, pp.607-609; IOR:R/15/1/714/1, Report for 1925, p.73.

5. IOR:R/15/1/718, Report for 1938, p.32.

6. IOR:R/15/1/719/1, Report for 1939, pp.29-32.

7. F.O.371/19965, 1935 Annual Report, statement showing Nationality of Employees of the Baḥrain Petroleum company Limited, Baḥrain, on the 1st April, 1936; IOR:R/15/1/715/3, Report for 1935, p.55; R/15/1/716, Report for 1936, p.41.

8. IOR:R/15/1/715/4. Report for 1934, p.56.

9. For details about Iranian Claims to Baḥrain see: Ṣubḥī, A.M., al-Bahrain wa Daᶜwā Iran, Alexandria, 1962; Adamiyyat, F., Bahrain Islands, Frederic A. Praeger, INC., New york, 1955.

10. F.O.371/20780, Telegram of the 6th December, 1937 from the British Ambassador, Baghdād to the Foreign Office, London.

11. Loc. cit.

12. F.O.371/16853/E7589/91, letter of the 23rd November, 1933 from the British Embassy, Baghdād to Sir J. Simon.

13. F.O.371/16853/E7589/7589/91, letter of the 26th

October 1933, from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy, Baghdād.

14. F.O.371/20774, Letter of the 15th March 1937, from the British Embassy, Baghdād to H.L. Baggally.

15. F.O.371/16853/E7589/7589/91, letter of the 23rd November 1933, from the British Embassy, Baghdād to Sir J. Simon; F.O.371/20774/E443/30/91 Confidential letter of the 12th January 1937, from Baghdād Embassy to the Eastern Department.

16. Loc. cit.

17. F.O.371/20774, Baḥrain Nationality Law regarding ownership of Immovable Property in Baḥrain, by foreigners on the 17th February 1937.

18. IOR:R/15/2/127. Note on Reform in Baḥrain by Sir Denys Mary, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, (on Tour), Moḥammarah, the 6th November 1927.

19. Al-Khāṭir, M., al-Kitābāt al-'ūlā al-Hadīthah Limuthaqqafī al-Baḥrain, 1875-1925, Baḥrain, 1978 - 1398 A.H., pp.8,10,14; IOR: R/15/1/711/2, Report for 1912, p.102.

20. Al-Khāṭir, M., al-Muntadā al-Islāmī, 1928-1936, op.cit., pp.13,15,17 & 70.

21. Ibid., pp.13-14

22. Al-Khāṭir, M.,al-Qadi Qāsim al-Mihza^c^, p.165; al-Ansāri, M., Aqṭāb al-Harakah al-Adabiyyah fil-Bāhrain Khilāl al-Mi'at Sanah al-Akhīrah, Baḥrain 1966, p.12; al-Khāṭir, M., al-Kitābāt, op.cit, p.98.

23. Al-Khāṭir, M., al-Muntadā al-Islāmī, op.cit. p.17.

24. Ibid., pp.153-156.ci

25. Ibid., pp.29,48 & 49

26. Ibid., p.29

27. Ibid., p.28,29 & 30

28. Ibid., p.76

29. Al-Khāṭir, M., al-Kitābāt.,op.cit., pp.60,85; al-Khāṭir, al-Qādi al-Mihza^c^, Kuwait, 1975, pp.137-147.

30. Al-Khāṭir, M., al-Muntadā al-Islāmī, op.cit., pp.13,28,29,& 30.

31. *Ibid.*, p.75

32. IOR: R/15/1/714/3 Report for 1927, 34

33. private information

34. IOR: R/15/2/131, Note on the political situation in Baḥrain, November 1921.

35. IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential Memorandum: Baḥrain Reforms, of the 8th January 1923, from the Political Agent, Baḥrain to the Political Resident, Bushire

36. *Loc.cit.*

37. IOR: R/15/2/127, letter of the 31st August 1924, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

38. IOR: R/15/2/131, letter of the 13th July, 1922, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

39. IOR: R/15/1/713/1, Report for 1920, p.67.

40. IOR: R/15/2/131, letter of the 13th July 1922, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

41. IOR: R/15/2/131, letter of the 25th June from the P.R. Bushire to the India Office, London.

42. IOR: R/15/1/713/4, Report for 1923, pp.67-68.

43. *Loc. cit.*

44. IOR: R/15/2/131, Political Agency, Baḥrain, Introduction of reforms in Baḥrain, Government of India, Confidential Printed Correspondence, the 30th December 1921 - 27th July 1924.

45. IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 28th August 1929, from the P.R., Bushire to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla.

46. literally neck tax

47. IOR: R/15/2/127, Letter of the 11th April 1932, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire

48. IOR: R/15/2/131, Petition of the 21st December 1921, submitted to the Political Resident at the Political Agency in Baḥrain.

49. IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 28th August 1929, from the P.R., Bushire to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla.

50. IOR: R/15/2/131, Note on the political situation in Baḥrain, November 1921, by Major C.K. Daly, the P.A.,

Baḥrain; IOR: R/15/2/127, letter of the 31st August 1924, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

51. Loc.cit.; IOR: R/15/2/131, Extract from the memorandum No.34c., the 13th February 1922, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

52. IOR: R/15/2/131, letter of the 27th January 1922, from the P.R., Bushire, to the P.A. Baḥrain.

53. As the petitioners described.

54. IOR: R/15/2/131, Note on the political situation in Baḥrain, No.1921, by Major C.K. Daly, the P. A., Baḥrain.

55. IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 28th May 1929, from the Foreign and Political Department to the P.R ,. Bushire.

56. IOR: R/15/1/712/4, Report for 1918, p.54; R/15/1/712/5, Report for 1919, p.61; R/15/1/713/1, Report for 1920, p.65.

57. Private information.

58. IOR: L/P & S/10/248, "The Baḥrain Order in Council, 1913". p.25; IOR: R/15/1/712/5, Report for 1919, pp.62,64,65.

59. Ibid., pp.61,65.

60. IOR: R/15/1/713/1, Report for 1920, p.70.

61. IOR: R/15/1/712/5, Report for 1919, p.61.

62. IOR: R/15/2/127, Note on Reforms in Baḥrain by Sir Denys Mary, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department (on Tour) Muḥammarah 6th November 1927.

63. IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 28th August 1929, from the P.R., Bushire to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Simla.

64. Loc.cit.

65. IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 27th January 1923, from the P.A., Bushire, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

66. Loc.cit.

67. IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential memorandum, Baḥrain Reforms, of the 8th January 1923 from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

68. IOR: R/15/2/131, Note on the political situation in Baḥrain, November 1921.

69. IOR: R/15/2/131, letter of the 11th April 1922 from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire; IOR: R/15/1/713, Report for 1922, pp.51-52.

70. The religious court

71. The customary court

72. A court reserved for pearling affairs.

73. Forced labour

74. IOR:R/15/2/131, Extract from a memorandum No.34c, dated on the 13th Februaury 1922, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire; IOR: R/15/1/713/3, report for 1922, pp.51-52

75. *Loc.cit.*

76. IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 12th July 1922, from the British Residency and Consulate General, Bushire, to the High Commissioner for Iraq, Baghdād.

77. Requiring the *Nākhudās* to be forced to keep accounts and present them in court if required.

78. Loc. cit., IOR: R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 10th November 1923, from the P.R., Bushire to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi; IOR: R/15/2/127, letter of the 31st August 1924, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

79. IOR: R/15/2/131, letter of the 11th April 1922, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

80. IOR:R/15/2/131, letter of the 25th June, 1922, from the P.R. Bushire.

81. IOR:R/15/2/131, Lettr of the 13th July 1922, from the P.A. Baḥrain, to the P.R. Bushire.

82. IOR:R/15/2/127, Confidential Memorandum, Baḥrain Reforms, of the 8th January 1923 from the P.A. Baḥrain, to the P.R. Bushire.

83. *Loc. cit.*

84. IOR:R/15/2/126, Translation, Newspaper of Shīrāz *Iṣṭakhr* No. 24, of the 17th September 1922.

85. IOR:R/15/2/127, Confidential, Memorandum Baḥrain

Reforms, the 8th January, 1923 from the P.A. Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire.

86. IOR:R/15/1/713/4, Report for 1923, pp. 67-69.

87. Loc. cit.

88. IOR:R/15/1/715/2, Report for 1932, p. 41.

89. IOR:R/15/2/127. Note on reforms in Baḥrain by Sir Denys May, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department (on tour), Muḥammarah, the 6th November 1927.

90. IOR:R/15/1/713/4, Report for 1923, p.67.

91. IOR:R/15/2/127. Confidential letter of the 10th November, 1923, from the P.R., Bushire to the Foreign Secretay to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

92. IOR:R/15/1/713/4, Report for 1923, p.67.

93. Al-Khāṭir, M., al-Kitābāt al-'ūlā, op.cit., p.98.

94. Loc. cit.

95. IOR:R/15/2/107, pp.52-54.
96. IOR:R/15/2/1/61/

97. The Shīʿī petition contained the signatures of 328 influential persons: R/15/2/1/11.

98. IOR:R/15/2/1/70, p.42

99. IOR:R/15/2/114, pp.2-11; R/15/2/106; R/15/2/126: Proscribed Newspapers and Seditious press articles.

100. Major Daly, the P.A.

101. IOR:R/15/2/106, British extract from Arabic newspaper, called al-Akhbār, No. 578 dated the 15th January 1922, printed in Cairo.

102. IOR:R/15/2/107, Confidential letter from the P.A. Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire, pp.58-59.

103. IOR:R/15/2/106, Telegram from the P.R. Bushire to Colonial Office, dated the 16th December, 1923.

104. IOR:R/15/2/106, British translation of a letter, dated the 14th February 1922, from Mulla Hāfiẓ to the Hon'ble the P.R. in the Persian Gulf.

105. IOR:R/15/2/106, Confidential Memorandum of the 22nd April, 1923 from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.A. Kuwait.

106. IOR:R/15/2/104, The decision of al-Shīrāwī's deportation had been taken by the P.A. in Court at Baḥrain; see also R/15/2/107, p.56.

107. IOR:R/15/2/104.

108. IOR:R/15/2/106. Confidential letter of the 10th December, 1923, from the P.A. Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire.

109. IOR:R/15/2/107, Confidential letter from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire, dated the 26th, May, 1924

110. IOR:R/15/2/127, letter of the 24th, August 1924, from the Political Resident, Bushire, to Colonial Office.

111. IOR:R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 29th June 1929 from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

112. R/15/2/127, Confidential letter of the 28th May, 1929, from the Foreign and Political Department to the P.R., Bushire.

113. He was employed as a teacher in the al-Hidāya School of Muḥarraq in 1920 and then as a Clerk at Manāma Municipality.

114. IOR:R/15/2/114, Memorandum of the 17th May, 1930, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.A., Kuwait.

115. IOR:R/15/1/714/2, Report for 1926, p.33; R/15/2/176, p.98.

116. R/15/2/126.

117. R/15/1/715/2, Report for 1932, pp.45-46.

118. Loc. cit.; R/15/1/715/4. Report for 1934, p.27.

119. Belgrave, J.H.D., "Oil and Baḥrain," The World Today, the 7th February, 1951, pp.76-83 reference on p.77.

120. They were illiterate Arabs who were underpaid and overworked by their employers, or the boat captains.

121. F.O.371/16838, Note by Mr. Belgrave, the Financial Adviser to the Baḥrain Government, on Baḥrain Pearl Fishers, of the 10th May 1933.

122. Loc. cit.

123. Loc. cit.

124. The advance payment to the advisers and their helpers.

125. The diving season ran from the 15th of the Moḥammadan month of Muharram until the 15th Jumādā month, which approximately corresponds to the period from May to October.

126. The Indian rupee was then currency in the Gulf region.

127. F.O. 371/16838, Note by Mr. Belgrave, the Financial advisor to the Baḥrain Government, on Bahrain Pearl Fishers, of the 10th May 1933; IOR:R/15/1/715/2, report for 1932, pp.42-44.

128. F.O.371/16838, a Berlin newspaper refering to the pearl fishers in the Baḥrain Islands, an article written by H.J. Von Bassewitz "Swan Song to the Pearl Divers."

129. Loc. cit.

130. F.O. 371/16838/E/1653/55/91, Letter of the 27th March, 1933, from India Office, London to the Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office.

131. Private information.

132. R/15/1/714/3, Report for 1927, p.34.

133. IOR:R/15/2/176, Copies of a petition signed by the following leading Shiᶜi notables, of the 23rd Ramaḍān 1353 A.H. (the 30th December, 1934: Manṣūr al-ᶜUrayyid; ᶜAbd ᶜAli al-Hajj ᶜAbdulla al-ᶜAlaiwāt; Muḥsin bin Aḥmad al-Tājir; ᶜAbdul Rasūl bin ᶜAbdulla bin Rajab; Ḥajji ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz bin Hijīr al-Būri; Aḥmad bin Nāṣir (from Bārbār); Ḥusain bin Mohammad al-Madḥūb al-Bilādī (from al-Khamīs); and Hajj ᶜAlī bin Abbās al-ᶜĀli (from ᶜĀlī).

134. A well known Bahrainī poet and writer from the early 1930's.

135. IOR:R/15/2/176. Confidential report, Government of Baḥrain, the 28th January 1935 by C.D. Belgrave.

136. IOR:R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 18th February, 1935, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire.

137. Loc. cit.

138. They were Mansūr al-ᶜUrayyiḍ, Abd Ali al-Ḥajj ᶜAbdulla al-ᶜAlaiwāt, Muḥsin bin Aḥmad al-Tājir and ᶜAbdul Rasul bin ᶜAbdulla bin Rajab. The other four Shīᶜī notables were from Manāma villages.

139. IOR:R/15/2/176, Translation of letter dated the 25th

Shawwāl 1353 (the 30th January 1935) from ᶜAbdul Rasūl bin Rajab to the P.A., Baḥrain.

140. R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 4th February, 1935, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire.

141. R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 18th February, 1935, from the P.A. Baḥrain, to the P.R. Bushire.

142. Loc. cit.

143. Loc. cit.

144. Loc. cit., R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 26th March, 1935, from the Political Agent, Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire; con. letter of the 18th March from the P.R. Bushire, to the Foreign Secrtary to the Government of India, New Delhi.

145. R/15/2/176, Confidential, Government of Baḥrain, the 28th January, 1935.

146. R/15/2/176, Express letter of the 8th December 1938 from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire.

147. R/15/2/176, Confidential report of the 26th October, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire; Secret letter of the 27th October, 1938 from the P.A. Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

148. R/15/2/176, Letter of the 3rd November 1938 from C.D. Belgrave to H. Weightman the P.A., Baḥrain.

149. Loc. cit.

150. Loc. cit.

151. R/15/2/176, Confidential Report written by the P.A., Baḥrain on the 26th October 1938.

152. R/15/2/176, Translation from extract from an Arabic Weekly Egyptian Newspaper al-Rābitah al-ᶜArabiyyah, dated the 14th September 1938, the article entitled "Gloomy despair in Baḥrain - an ardent call."

153. R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 19th Novembr, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire; Confidential repot by the P.A., Baḥrain on the 16th October, 1938; Report by C.D. Belgrave, of the 22nd November, 1938.

154. R/15/2/176, Secret letter of the 27th October, 1938, from the P.A. Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire.

155. R/15/2/176, Confidential report by the P.A., Baḥrain, dated the 26th October 1938.

156. Loc. cit.

157. Loc. cit.

158. Kuwait and Dubai were administratively backward by comparison with Baḥrain, a situation which the British regarded as undesirable.

159. F.O.371/21832, Confidential letter of the 18th July, 1938, from the P.R., Bushire to the India Office, London.

160. Al-Rumaihī, M., "Reform Movement of 1938 in Kuwait, Baḥrain and Dubai", Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, Vol.3, No. 4, October 1975, pp.29-67.

161. F.O. 371/21832, Confidential letter of the 18th July, 1938, from the P.R., Bushire, to the India Office, London.

162. Al-Sijil, No. 108, the 19th August, No. 117, the 21st September, No. 119, the 4th October, No. 115, the 7th September, 1938, articles regarding the reform movement of Dubai.

163. Al-Sijil, No. 116, the 14th September, No. 120, the 11th October, No. 121, the 18th October, 1938; No. 124, the 7th February, No. 130, the 17th March, 1939.

164. F.O.371/23180, Telegram of the 28th February, 1939 from the P.R. Bushire, to the India Office,London

165. F.O.371/23180/P.Z. 2110/39, Confidential letter of the 17th March, 1939, from the P.R., Bushire to the Secretary to the Government of India. External Affairs Department, New Delhi; R/15/2/176, report by C.D. Belgrave on the political situation in Baḥrain, dated the 22nd, November 1938.

166. R/15/2/176, Confidential Report by the P.A., Baḥrain, dated the 26th October 1938.

167. A suburb of Manāma.

168. Fā'iq Adham a Lebanese.

169. There was a popular demand for their dismissal on the grounds of corruption.

170. IOR:R/15/2/176, Confidential report by the P.A., Baḥrain, pp.141-143. The objective of women's restriction was that if a woman applied to the courts for protection, her case should not be taken up but she should be sent back to her relatives regardless. The Political Agent summarised the existing position

thus, presuming that only prostitutes would apply to the courts:

> If a woman chooses to lead an immoral life, the Qadhis do not pass an order of murder against her but order her to go to her relatives so that they may look after her but when such a woman falls into the hands of the policemen, they keep her in their special houses and after satisfying themselves throw her in the streets, On many occasions the relatives of such bad women were disgraced in such a manner by the policemen.

171. Loc. cit.

172. R/15/2/176, Confidential reports of the 24th and 25th October 1938, by the P.A., Baḥrain.

173. R/15/2/176, Secret letter of the 27th October 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain, to P.R. Bushire.

174. R/15/2/176, Translation of an extract from an Arabic weekly al-Rābitah al-ᶜArabiyya, dated the 14th September 1938.

175. Al-Sijil, No. 116, the 14th October 1938, pp.15-16.

176. Ibid., No. 120, the 11th November 1938, pp.10-11.

177. IOR:L&S/12/4584, Confidential letter of the 8th July 1939, from the Political Resident, Bushire, to the India Office, London; F.O.371/23180/E1582/66/91, Telegram No. T/52 of the 26th February from T.C. Fowle to India Office.

178. Loc. cit.

179. IOR:R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 24th October 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire (translation of the leaflets)

180. Al- Jabal here means the Oil Company where the oil fields were situated around the Dukhān Mountain, the only mountain in Baḥrain 450 Ft. high.

181. IOR:R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 2nd November, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire (translation of the leaflets).

182. R/15/2/176, Confidential report by the P.A., Baḥrain, dated the 24th October, 1938.

183. R/15/2/176, Secret letter of the 27th October, 1938

from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

184. R/15/2/176, Secret letter of the 5th November 1938, from the P.A. Baḥrain to the P.R. Bushire.

185. R/15/2/176, letter of the 3rd November, 1938, from Belgrave to the P.A., Baḥrain.

186. R/15/2/176, Confidential report of the 3rd November 1938 by the P.A., Baḥrain.

187. Loc. cit.

188. R/15/2/176, Secret letter of the 5th November, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

189. R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 12th November 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

190. Personal interview with Ibrāhīm Fakhrū on the 25th May 1982 in Baḥrain.

191. R/15/2/176, Confidential letter of the 12th November, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain, to the P.R., Bushire.

192. Loc. cit.

193. R/15/2/176, pp.202-206.

194. IOR:R/15/2/176, pp.250, 302-304.

195. Yūsuf Fakhrū, Sayyid Saᶜīd Sayyid Khalaf, Manṣūr al-ᶜUrayyiḍ, Muḥsin al-Tājir and Isa bin Ṣāliḥ bin Hindī.

196. R/15/2/176, pp.217-218.

197. R/15/2/176, Express letter of the 8th December, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain, to the P.R., Bushire.

198. R/15/2/176, letter of the 19th November, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

199. See appendix 6.

200. R/15/2/176, pp.265-273. The letter was signed by Manṣūr al-ᶜUrayyiḍ, Yusuf Fakhrū, Sayyid Saᶜīd Sayyid Khalaf and Muhsin al-Tājir.

201. R/15/2/176, Minutes of the meeting, dated the 9th December, 1938, Baḥrain, pp.287-293; the newspaper al-Bahrain, No. 17, the 29th June 1939.

202. R/15/2/176, Secret letter of the 19th November, 1938, from P.A., Bahrain to the P.R., Bushire.

203 R/15/2/176, Secret letter of the 5th November, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain, to the P.R., Bushire.

204. Loc. cit.

205. R/15/2/176, Translation of a petition from the people of Hed to His Highness Shaikh Sir Ḥamad, received by His Highness on the 24th Ramaḍān 1357 (November 1938); memorandum of the 8th December, 1938, from C.D. Belgrave, to the P.A., Baḥrain.

206. R/15/2/176, A leaflet signed: The Representatives of the People, pp.207-208.

207. R/15/2/176, Letter of the 9th December, 1938, from Belgrave to the P.A., Baḥrain.

208. Personal inteview with Ibrāhīm Fakhru on the 25th May 1982, in Baḥrain.

209. Al-Sijil, No. 123, the 6th January 1939, pp.16-18.

210. Ibid., No. 124, the 7th February, 1939, pp.8-10.

211. Ibid., No. 130, The 7th March, 1939, pp.5-8.

212. Shaikh Ḥamad the Ruler of Baḥrain.

213. R/15/2/176, Letter of the 19th November, 1938, from the P.A., Baḥrain to the P.R., Bushire.

Part Two

(Chapters Three and Four)

Iraqi Policy

and the Kuwaitī and Bahrainī

Nationalist Movements

1939 - 1958

Chapter Three : Kuwait

Page

Introduction

The nationalist movements in Baḥrain and Kuwait were always dependent upon the support of larger countries sustaining stronger nationalist elements during the 1930's this was Iraq and later Egypt. The period under review was the period in which Iraq lost her lead of Arab nationalism to be replaced by Egypt and Nāsserite influence. The return of al-Saᶜīd to the premiership of Iraq in 1938 was a watermark in Iraq's loss of prestige amongst Arab nationalist. Up until this time Iraq had had the leadership of the progressive intelligentsia and its claims to institute the first democracy in the Gulf region, were respected. King Ghazi's widely influential chairmanship of liberal and nationalist causes continued until his death in 1939 by which time he was in violent opposition to the Prime Minister Nurī al-Saᶜīd. Al-Hāshimī also helped to maintain Iraq's position in the forefront of nationalism as chairman and founder of the People's Party and one of founders and chairman of the National Brotherhood Party.

During the war period Iraqi nationalists maintained an active opposition to al-Saᶜīd's pro-Western stance, but they did not succeed in preventing Britain's use of Iraqi bases according to the 1930's alliance treaty. In 1941 a military revolt was led by nationalists against the British Army which the British rapidly defeated. In 1946 political parties were permitted after a suspension of five years,

and nationalists succeeded in preventing the ratification of the Portsmouth agreement with Britain, but by that time Iraq's primacy in nationalism was forgotten and Egypt was beginning to take over.

Nationalists in Egypt succeeded in seizing power in July 1952. After the rise of Nāsser, military and economic co-operation with the Eastern bloc introduced a policy of vehement independence. In August 1955, Egypt made a trade agreement with China and in September the same year, announced an arms supply agreement with Czechoslovakia.(1) These joint projects, introduced also by Syria caused consternation in the west.(2) For Arab nationalists Egypt's membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (1955) increased her stature. The resolutions of the Bandung Conference which Nāsser attended, condemning imperialism and opposing military pacts were particularly provocative to Britain and her allies.(3) Egypt's contributions to the Palestinian and Algerian causes were also inflammatory. Consequently Britain attempted to sabotage Egyptian economic projects, in the hope of bringing down a disturbingly revolutionary government. As a leading member of the International Bank, Britain succeeded in preventing the financing of Egypt's Aswān Dam project. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal on the 26th July 1956 succeeded in both increasing the national revenue and restricting British manoeuvres in the region.(4) This move was seen as presumptuous: Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt.

Nāsser's regime had won considerable sympathy in the Arab World and there was a backlash in the form of attacks on western properties especially in Syria and the Gulf Shaikhdoms. Iraq joined the demonstrations clashing with the police in Baghdād streets and other cities. When Nāsser delivered a speech there at the National Assembly of Egypt he welcomed the Iraqi people, with the words:

> The demonstrators in Baghdad, Basra and Najaf faced the bullets only out of support for their Arab brothers."(5)

President Nehru encouraged the unofficial Iraqi protests and denounced the despotic policy of the Iraqi regime in his speech at the Indian Senate on the 3rd December 1956 he said,

> "The reason for disorders in Iraq is that, the Iraqi people support Egypt, despite the attitude of Nuri al-Sa^cid, who opposes the Nasserite regime."(6)

After the Suez War, Nāsser's popularity grew in the Arab World and he became the idol of Arab Nationalism. Pan-Arabist revolutionary policy gave Egypt the leadership of the Arab people during the 1950's, and 1960's especially after the formation by Egypt and Syria on the 1st February 1958 of the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.). Iraq lost influence in the region due to the alliance with the Western bloc. The shifting balance of power and influence between Egypt and Iraq is crucial to an understanding of the impact of Iraq on the Kuwaitī and Bahrainī nationalist movements in this period.

1. Long-term disputes: The date gardens in Iraq, the borders, smuggling, water supplies and appointment of the Iraqi Consul

Any attempt to solve long-standing problems between Iraq and Kuwait was hindered by the Kuwaiti Rulers opposition to strengthening relations with iraq, by popular and government sympathy in Iraq for the nationalist reform movement of Kuwait, and by the British administration in the gulf. The long-term problems were those concerned with the property of the ruling family, the border, smuggling, the water supplies, the establishment of a new post office and the appointment of an Iraqi Consul.

The collapse of the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement coupled with the death of King Ghazi had, however, created a new political situation in both Iraq and Kuwait. The Iraqi press and the 'Ghazi Radio' were no longer so hostile. The Radio station of Qaṣr al-Zuhūr was immediately handed over to the Government after Ghazi's death on the 3rd April 1939 by which time the Kuwaitī rebellion had been suppressed.(7) This period (the 1940's according to al-Ṣānic was considered the darkest period of the present century owing to the severity of the measures taken.(8) In the same decade a restricted Anglo-Iraqi treaty of June 1930 which had given Britain a powerful hand in military affairs inside Iraq, came into force with the outbreak of the Second World War. The British bases in Ḥabbāniyyah in the north and Shucaibah in the south caused the British military presence.(9)

The loss of Alexandretta, the Palestine dispute, and the growth of ill-feeling in the Arab World against Britain and France, encouraged by the Axis Powers, led to the adoption of British counter-activities. The semi-official weekly newspaper al-Baḥrain, originated by Belgrave, was first published in March 1939, with the consent of the Baḥrain Government. It was edited by a certain ᶜAbdulla al-Zā'id,(10) under Government censorship.(11) Broadcasting stations were established in Baḥrain and Kuwait for the same purpose in the same year.(12) The British Public Relations Officer in the gulf reported on the 28th February 1942 that,

> "Bahrain, a pioneer among publicity centres, has had to rely up till now on a fragmentary 'taking-down' in longhand of the B.B.C. news bulletin for re-broadcasting."(13)

In Iraq there was general encouragement of Arab nationalist attempts to undermine al-Saᶜīd's pro-British position by military means.(14) At the same time the Iraqi Arab nationalist newspapers continued publishing violent articles criticising British and French imperialism. Their traditional allies, the tribal regimes in the Gulf region, were singled out as targets. On the 11th July 1940, the Arab nationalist newspaper al-Nās published an article entitled "Idol that should be destroyed." The writer attacked the rulers of the Gulf Shaikhdoms:

> In the Arab Gulf countries live awakened and intelligent peoples. These peoples are, however, strongly suffering on account of a strange form of government upheld by a hidden power.

> In the Gulf countries are to be found Shaikhs who have set themselves up as rulers, whereas they are born to act as slaves of foreigners and enemies of their own people. In their ignorance these shaikhs are incapable of realising the responsibilities they are called upon to shoulder in the interest of their countries. They only know how to fill their bellies and satisfy their selfish ambitions, bleeding their peoples white of their wealth and reducing thousands to misery in seeking their own personal benefit."

The writer continued:

> This painful state of affairs urged the peoples of the Gulf countries to rise in rebellion against the wrong and tyranny of these (Shaikhs) and to seek the establishment of sound national government on modern lines such as would ensure progress and advancement.(15)

Further, the Baghdādī Arab nationalist newspaper al-Istiqlāl published a leading article entitled "The Duty of France and Britain towards Syria and Palestine" on the 21st June, 1940. The British Press Attache at the Embassy in Baghdād quoted:

> ...The idea of fighting in Colonies and mandated countries is only intended as means for bargaining and nothing else. We hate to see Arab countries become objects for bargain at such most critical moment when the world is passing from an old order to a new order with far reaching effects on the life and future of small peoples...(16)

Such articles however embarrassed British Officials in the Gulf region and endangered their prestige during the Second World War. At the same time the British persisted in resisting the hostile propagandist campaign of German and Italian radio stations. They relied upon the combined Middle East intelligence centre in Cairo and the

pro-British broadcasting stations in Baḥrain and Kuwait, in addition to the newspaper al-Baḥrain.[17]

In response Mr. Edmonds, adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, according to the British Ambassador's request, met Rashīd ʿAlī al-Gailānī - the Prime Minister - in September 1940. Mr. Edmonds informed al-Gailānī during their meeting that "in his capacity of Acting Minister of the Interior he should be in control of the Press and Publicity department."[18] For the same purpose the British Press Attache at the Embassy also made direct oral representations on similar lines to the Director of the Press and Publicity Department.[19] Finally Mr. Edmonds submitted to the Premier successful proposals on the 10th September 1940 for the control of the press and broadcasting. His suggestions were intended to remedy the failure of the Committee for Propaganda and the Press (formed under Ordinance No. 56 of 1939). He concentrated on the flagrant case of al-Istiqlāl's disobedience to this ordinance. The gist of the offence was the publication of German and Italian radio broadcasts, using false attributions to cover the offence. Edmonds recommended the maximum penalty for those responsible and wished to eradicate all publication of news from enemy sources. As a result the "failure to supervise adequately the press and broadcasting" was remedied.[20] Despite the appearance of the quoted article in the Iraqi press, direct attacks on the Kuwaitī regime disappeared for the rest of the monarchical era, following King Ghazi's death.

After the death of King Ghazi on the 3rd April 1939 Iraq came under the control of Nurī al-Saᶜīd - the most influential pro-British politician not only in Iraq but in the Middle East as a whole. He remained powerful throughout the Hāshimite era except during the Rashīd ᶜAlī Cabinet of April-May 1941, when both Nurī al-Saᶜīd and ᶜAbdul-llāh the Regent fled from Iraq to Jerusalem.(21) Nūrī al-Saᶜīd devised a special policy for diplomacy with the Kuwaitī regime to solve mutual problems peacefully. His objective was to annex Kuwait to Iraq gradually, to utilise its wealth in regional projects.(22)

The principal problems in relations between the Iraqi Government and the Shaikhdom of Kuwait over this period must now be examined.

The ruler's date gardens in Iraq

In 1914 the British Government guaranteed Mubārak, the Ruler of Kuwait, that his date gardens, situated between Fao and Qurnah in Iraq, should "remain in his possession and in possession of his descendants without being subject to the payment of revenue or taxes."(23) The privilege had been given to the Ruler of Kuwait by Britain to encourage his participation in the campaign against the Ottoman Army in Mesopotamia.

This British obligation was mentioned under article 8 of the Treaty of Alliance (June 1930) between Iraq and Britain, and was upheld by the opinion given in 1934 by the Law Officers of the British, who held that any arbitration would be likely to confirm the obligation.(24) Without

doubt such assurances reflected British influence even in the independent Iraq.

In 1936 the British Government offered

"(i) To accept the decision of the Iraqi Land Courts regarding the boundaries of Shaikh's garden;

(ii) To undertake not to make any claim against the Iraqi Government in respect of any changes which the courts might make in these boundaries, provided that the Iraqis would agree that the Shaikh's non-Iraqi nationality would constitute no bar to his continued possession of the gardens."(25)

The offer was accepted by the Iraqi Government in 1938. The British obligations in respect of the Ruler's freedom from the payment of revenue or taxes, under the 1914 guarantee, were disposed of - in 1940 - by the payment of a lump sum to the Ruler. An amendment to the Land Law had excluded non-Iraqis from holding certain types of lands. In 1941, however, provision was made, and confirmed by the Iraqi Government that this amendment should not apply to the Ruler of Kuwait.[26] The British Embassy acted as the mediater between the Ruler of Kuwait and the Iraqi Government on this matter. In October 1948 Aḥmad al-Jābir Ruler of Kuwait had written relinquishing all rights on behalf of himself and all other persons having claims in the estate of the late Shaikh Mubārak, after receiving the sum of £8,400 paid by the British Government in the United Kingdom. This amount was compensation to the ruler for the loss through litigation of 180 shares of the al-Bāshiyyah garden, because of this Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir released the British Government from any liability towards

the heirs and successors of Shaikh Mubārak in respect of this loss.[27] However, the legitimacy of the settlement was disputed by members of the ruling family with shares in the properties, who had not received a share of the compensation. In 1949 a decision was given by an Iraqi Land Court depriving certain members of the Kuwaitī ruling family of gardens at Fao, owned independently of Shaikh Mubārak's estate. The extended family continued the dispute until the mid 1950's.[28] The date garden problem remained without final solution, according to British documents and confirmed by surviving members of landowning families, until the collapse of the monarchical era, when it was overtaken by other disputes. At the same time the increase in oil royalties made Kuwait the richest country in the Middle East. Therefore the ruling family of Kuwait ignored its properties in Iraq.

Attempts at settling the smuggling dispute

Iraq had made efforts in vain since 1932 to solve the problem of smuggling. Owing to the continuation of smuggling operations from Kuwait into Iraq during the 1930's Iraqi Police incursions into Kuwait during March 1939 increased. Therefore when the British Ambassador at Baghdād complained on the 11th April to Nurī al-Sa^{c}īd, the Prime Minister, about the incursions, the latter rejoindered with complaints about the effects of smuggling operations and stated that "the Shaikh had always stubbornly refused to adopt any proposals which were in the least likely to be effective."[29] In response the ruler

of Kuwait, according to the British Ambassador, argued that when the Saᶜudī trade blockade of his territory was raised he would put an end to smuggling into Iraq. Clashes between the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement and the Ruler in February and March 1939 increased mutual support between the monarchies in the Gulf Shaikhdoms, because their rulers were apprehensive of the power of the popular movement. This created the opportunity to solve problems between Kuwait and Saᶜudī Arabia. Negotiations between Kuwait and Saᶜudī Arabia began in March 1939(30) and led to the ratification of the Extradition Agreement of 1942 which had enabled both countries to stamp out smuggling along their common border.(31) These developments encouraged Britain to find a solution to the Iraqi-Kuwaitī problem. The new Kuwaitī Saᶜudī rapprochment flourished owing to a series of political disagreements over security between Iraq and Kuwait. The Saᶜudī Government moved to defend the Kuwaitī regime against its nationalist opposition. Kuwait was the natural port of Najd, therefore Iraq had expected that once the blockade was raised a considerable volume of trade between Riyadh and the Gulf would move naturally through Kuwait. From Nurī al-Saᶜīd's point of view, the opening of caravan traffic from Kuwait to Najd would lead to the extension of smuggling along the whole of the southern frontier of Iraq.(32) The discovery of oil in Kuwait in 1938 added urgency to Britain's attempts to seek a solution, especially since a number of Britons were employed by the oil company as well as in the Government and the private sector.(33) These interests were behind

Britain's desire to secure a position in Kuwait and influence in Iraq as well. Therefore Britain played a considerable role in negotiations between the ruler of Kuwait and the Iraqi Government regarding a draft extradition agreement similar to the Kuwaitī-Saᶜūdī agreement. The proposed Iraqi-Kuwaitī agreement was drafted by the British Government after initial contacts and negotiations between the Political Resident in the Gulf, the British Ambassador in Baghdād and the Foreign office in London from 1949 to 1951. The objective of this proposed agreement was the restriction of criminal activities between the two countries. C.M. Rose, British Senior Official stated on the 9th June 1950 that "in practice the restriction is more likely to affect Iraq than Kuwait."(34) While the Political Resident in the Gulf reported on the 5th July 1950, that "Thus there would be no question that the application of the agreement was intended to be co-extensive with the Shaikh's jurisdiction."(35) Britain's initiative in the proposed agreement was due to her influence in both Kuwait and Iraq, as confirmed by the exclusive agreement of 1899 with Kuwait and by the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of June 1930. The Kuwaitī-Iraqi extradition agreement was discussed in the autumn 1951. It began:

> The Government of the United kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter called the Government of the United Kingdom) acting on behalf of His Highness the Shaikh of Koweit, of the one part, and the Government of Iraq, of the other part, being desirous of concluding an

> agreement for the extradition of offenders, fugitives from justice, who escape from Koweit into Iraq or from Iraq into Koweit...(36)

When the British Government suggested the inclusion of smuggling in the proposed extradition agreement with Iraq the ruler of Kuwait opposed any reference to this crime. Therefore although the word smuggling was omitted from the text of the agreement a reference to smuggling activities was included in article 3, paragraph (2). The text of this ran as follows:

> The offences for which extradition shall be granted are highway robbery, theft, robbery, plunder, murder, wounding, raiding and violent assault, whether the offence be committed by a single person or by several persons and whether the offence is directed against a single person or against several persons or against the local authorities or any means of transport or communication. In no circumstances shall the offences mentioned in this sub-section be deemed to be political offences.(37)

This draft agreement, which was adopted by the two countries in December 1951, signified the strength of the British influence in Kuwait and Iraq. At the same time the agreement improved relations between Iraq and Kuwait.

<u>The frontier question</u>

Neither in the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of 1913, nor in any of the subsequent definitions of the Kuwait-Iraq frontier, had any attempt been made to fix in terms more precise than "immediately south of Ṣafwān" or "just south of the latitude of Ṣafwān," the point by which the line of the frontier west-wards from Ṣafwān to Batin was regulated.

The expectation of the discovery of oil made the demarcation of frontiers imperative


Owing to the Basra oil Company's operations South of Zubair and the Kuwait oil Company's announcement in spring 1951 that it intended to carry out a survey in the northern part of their concession area the following autumn, the British authorities decided to give this matter their attention. They calculated that the oil field ran continuously from Iraq to Kuwait and that when determined the area would therefore become the boundary dividing the field between the two concessionaries.(38)

Both sides (Iraq and Britain) had apparently been content to accept the notice board which was placed south of Safwān in about 1923 as the authentic indication of this point.(39)

The definition of the frontier which was accepted by the British Government and by the Iraqi Government was given in a letter, sent by the Iraqi Prime Minister on the 21st July, 1932, to the British Commissioner in Iraq. It ran as follows:

> From the intersection of the Wadi al Audja with the Batin and thence northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan: thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells. Jebel Sunam and Umm Qasr leaving them to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zubair with Khor Abdulla. The islands of Warbar (sic), Bubuyan, Maskan (or Mashjan), Failakah, Atihah, Kubbar, Qaru and Um-el-Maradim appertain to Koweit.(40)

At the same time the Foreign Office in London requested Sir John Troutbeck - the Brtish Ambassador at Baghdād on the 7th December 1951, that the following



F.O.371/91291/EA1087/3, Frontier line proposed by British in 1951

interpretation of this definition should be given to the Iraqi Government by Sir Basil Newton[41] in his letter of the 7th October, 1940:

(a) 'Along the Batin' the frontier line shall follow the thalweg, i.e. the line of the deepest depression.

(b) The 'point just south of the latitude of Safwan' shall be the point on the thalweg of the Batin due west of the point 1,000 metres due south of the Safwan Customs Post, (i.e. the building which, on the 25th June, 1940 was used as the Customs Post at Safwan)

(c) From the Batin to the neighbourhood of Safwan the frontier shall be the line along the parallel of latitude between the points described in sub-paragraph (b) above.

(d) The 'junction of the Khor Zubair with Khor Abdullah' shall mean the junction of the thalwegof the Khor Zubair with thalweg of the north-westerly arm of the Khor Abdulla known as the Khor Shetana.

(e) From the point 1,000 metres south of the building mentioned in sub-paragraph (b) above, the frontier shall follow the shortest line between that point and the point defined in sub-paragraph (d) above, but only as far as the spring tide low-water mark on the right bank of the Khor Zubair.

(f) From the point of the spring tide low-water mark on the right bank of the Khor Zubair mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) above the point on that low-water mark nearest to the point defined in sub-paragraph (d) above, the frontier shall follow the low-water mark.

(g) From the point on the low-water mark on the right bank of the Khor Zubair nearest to the point defined in sub-paragraph (d) above to that point

itself, the boundary shall be the shortest line which can be drawn.

(h) From the point defined in sub-paragraph (d) above to the open sea the boundary shall follow firstly the thalweg of the north-westerly arm of the Khor Abdullah known as the Khor Shetana, and then the thalweg of the Khor Abdulla proper."(42)

In 1935 Colonel Dickson, then Political Agent in Kuwait, reported that,

"We have always understood the frontier to run...to a point one mile south of the Safwan Wells..."(43)

In 1937 Mr. Edmonds - Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to the Foreign office in London, suggested to his Minister that the ruler of Kuwait be asked to agree that the point was "one mile south of the palms of Ṣafwān."[44] Edmond's proposal failed, rejected by the British Ambassador in Baghdād and the Foreign Office in London.[45]

The ʿUqair Conference organised by the British Government between the 27th November and the 3rd December 1922 was the first British attempt to demarcate the frontier between, Kuwait, Iraq and Saᶜūdī Arabia.[46] On the 30th April 1923 the Kuwaitī ruler was informed that the British Government recognised the frontier with Iraq which he claimed[47] - "Just south of the latitude of Ṣafwān" in accordance with the resolutions of the ʿUqair Conference: "the point by which the line of the Iraqi - Kuwaitī frontier westwards from Ṣafwān to the Batin was regulated." The Foreign Office in London reported in 1951,

"Both sides (48) have apparently been content to accept the notice board which was placed

> south of Safwan in about 1923 as the authentic indication of this point."(49)

The same report stated that in 1939 the post which had been previously fixed was removed by the Iraqi officials. Colonel Gallaway, the Political Agent of Kuwait was instructed to place another board on the same spot but it later became clear that he had not taken adequate precautions to ascertain the correct spot: the post which he erected was also removed by the Iraqi officials on the grounds that it was 250 metres inside Iraqi territory.[50]

In 1940 the British Government proposed to the Iraqi Government that the frontier should be demarcated in accordance with the definition accepted by the Iraqi Prime Minister in the summer 1932. These proposals were made to the Iraqi Government by Sir Basil Newton, the British Ambassador in Baghdād in his letter of the 7th October 1940. The Foreign Office requested the British Ambassador in Baghdād in its despatch on the 7th December 1951 to suggest also to the Iraqi Government that the Newton proposals which were similar to earlier suggestions. In detail Newton's suggestions were:

(a) A joint Technical Commission set up to:

   (i) complete where defective a network of triangulation along the frontier zone from the intersection of the Wadi al Audja with the Batin to the western extremity of the land frontier.

   (ii) erect frontier pillars which shall be visible from one another the whole length of the

land frontier and to mark buoys or other means which may be agreed upon that part of the boundary which follows the Khor Zubair, the Khor Shetana and the Khor Abdulla down to the sea.

(b) For the purpose of (i) and (ii) above, the frontier shall be deemed to be the line re-affirmed in the Prime Minister's note to the High Commissioner, No. 2944 of the 21st July, 1932, as interpreted in paragraph 4 above.

(c) The frontier pillars shall be iron (51) stakes 5" x 5" and 11' in length. On the upper extremity an iron disque 1' in diameter shall be fixed in a perpendicular position bearing in relief the number of the pillar.

(d) The pillars shall be numbered consecutively beginning with the first pillar which shall be placed at the point where the joint commission begins its work.

(e) The Joint Commission shall consist of a first representative and a second representative with the necessary technical and other assistants nominated by each Government that is to say His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government. It shall be permissible, in case of necessity, for the second representative to replace and enjoy the same privileges as the first representative. The first representative of each country shall preside alternately over the work of the Commission.

(f) In case of differences between the representatives, they shall submit the question in dispute to their Governments with a view to a solution being reached through the diplomatic channel.

(g) The proces verbaux of the Commission shall be prepared in Arabic and English and, in case of difference, the English text shall prevail.

(h) The date on which the Joint Commission shall begin work shall be fixed by

agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Iraq Government.

(i) It is confirmed that the costs of demarcation shall be shared equally between the Government of Kuwait and Iraq."(52)

Although negotiation over the placement of frontiers between the British and the Iraqi Governments continued on the basis of the 1940 formula, a final solution to the dispute was not agreed, since the definition of the formal proposals No. (a) was "less favourable to Kuwait than the Iraqi admission of 1940," according to the British report.(53) In this case the reluctance of the Kuwaitī Ruler supported by Britain was responsible for the failure of Iraq's effort.

For the following 8 years the question was raised peiodically between the two governments, whilst the development in parts of Southern Iraq and the possibility of an oil discovery on disputed ground there, made demarcation still more desirable.(54) The British Government renewed its efforts to solve the frontier dispute between Kuwait and Iraq again in 1948. Their proposals were again based on those of 1940.(55) Although these were nearly accepted by the two governments concerned, Kuwait's suspicions of Iraq's real intentions hindered British efforts to end the problem.(56)

Significantly, the Political Agent at Kuwait reported in 1950 that he had obtained the Ruler's agreement that the British Government should approach the Iraqi Government again on the basis of the "1940 Formula." The principal hindrance to the British efforts was Iraq's persistence

that Umm Qaṣr as a whole and not only its fort be relinquished to Iraqi territory to establish a port.(57)

Water Conveyance: Deliberation

Despite the fact that the first section of the sea water distillation plant came into operation in March 1953, the growth in the population of Kuwait in the 1950's aggravated the shortage of drinking water.(58) Owing to the urgency of the situation negotiations began between the Iraqi and Kuwaitī governments in 1953. In these negotiations Iraq agreed to transport by pipeline one hundred million gallons of drinking water from the Shaṭṭ al-ʿArab to the city of Kuwait. The Iraqi acceptance was conditional on obtaining the right to rent certain anchorage sites in the port of Umm Qaṣr for 99 years as a quid pro quo for the water.(59) The wealthy and vulnerable shaikhdom of Kuwait feared that Iraq had ambitions to re-absorb it in accordance with the policy of the 1930's; and it appears that this doubt broke down the negotiations of 1953.

Other efforts were made to solve the border problem involving an agreement on water supplies also, when the Government of Kuwait submitted its proposals on a draft agreement in 1955 to the Iraqi Government, through the British Authorities. To alleviate the Kuwaitī water situation Iraq was to cede a right of way for a pipeline, along with a thirty-metre strip on either side and enough ground to erect the necessary installations. The proposal was not well received in Iraq. Although the Iraqi

Government accepted the water supply project, the relinquishment of land was unacceptable.(60) It was suggested that Iraq's claim to Umm Qaṣr for economic purposes could be allowed as compensation for the Iraqi land which would be used for the project. This particular claim reflected the strategic importance of Kuwait in her commercial and trade plans.

By October 1955, when Shaikh Fahad bin Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ, the ruler's brother, visited Baghdād, Iraq had shifted her attitude towards the draft agreement. In a discussion with Shaikh Fahad, Nurī al-Saᶜīd adopted a moderate approach. He proposed that the construction be done on a 50-50 basis, and that the formality of leasing any territory be waived. The ruler's brother was favourably impressed, according to the American Ambassador in Baghdād, and al-Saᶜīd hoped for a solution on this basis. But nothing came of it; when the ruler visited Baghdād in June, 1956, he showed no inclination to discuss the projects insisting that this visit was one of courtesy only.(61) The failure of the water supply project was caused by vacillation over the conditions; it was particularly difficult for Iraq to reach an agreement without seeming to recognise Kuwait as an independent state.

Consular Representation in Kuwait

Iraq's desire to appoint a Consul in Kuwait was rejected by both Britain and the ruler of Kuwait in the 1930's.(62) By the 1940's a yet stronger reason for the

request had emerged: a large Iraqi community was resident in the contiguous territory, engaged in Kuwaitī construction projects. In 1950 the Political Agent, J. Gethim, reported that there were about 2500 Iraqis registered with the Kuwaitī authorities as being in Kuwait - and there were doubtless many unregistered. 306 Iraqis were employed with the Kuwait Oil Company. They were almost all of labourer or semi-skilled artisan class. There were few Iraqi merchants in Kuwait - most of the larger Iraqi merchant houses in Baṣra had Kuwaitī Agents in their Kuwaitī branches. In fact, Iraqi trade interests there were limited but there were a number of Iraqi shareholders in public service projects in Kuwait, particularly the Kuwait Electric Company and the Kuwait Transport Company, the latter with headquarters in Baṣra. In noting these Iraqi interests the Political Agent remarked:

> I must admit that I consider that Iraq has a far stronger case for consular representation than the Americans have. Whereas with rare exceptions we do next to nothing for Americans, we are constantly handling Iraqi affairs.(63)

These interests in Kuwait formed the basis of the Iraqi Government's request for representation. The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, submitted a _note verbale_ on the 17th May, 1949, to the British Embassy in Baghdād requesting the opening of Iraqi consulates in Kuwait and Baḥrain.(64) As a protectorate country Britain had rights to prevent the rulers of Baḥrain and Kuwait

admitting to their Shaikhdoms consular officers of any foreign power in accordance with exclusive treaties. The Iraqi case nevertheless was strengthened by the presence of the Saᶜudī Trade Agent in Kuwait and the American request to appoint a consul in Kuwait too.

The British Foreign Office reported on the 25th April, 1950 that the government had been forced in August 1949 to agree in principle to the American request for the establishment of a consulate in Kuwait. The same British source stated that Britain resisted an American request for the formation of a consulate in Kuwait mainly because it believed that this might open the door to the establishment of Iraqi and other Middle Eastern Consulates in the Gulf, "with a consequent risk of undesirable political intrigue there."(65) In September 1949 the British made a special offer to America allowing the appointment of a consul in Kuwait on certain conditions.(66) The Iraqi request faced considerable difficulties. In the first place Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ the new ruler of Kuwait had specifically objected to the idea of an Iraqi representative in Kuwait. Secondly, the British expected that - unlike in the case of an American Consul - it would be difficult to restrict the activities of an Iraqi Consul. Finally, it was possible that the appointment of an Iraqi Consul in Kuwait might cause the Governments of India and Pakistan to request that their representatives in Baḥrain be raised to consular status (which in fact was not the case).(67) The British nevertheless recognised the

necessity of an Iraqi representative in Kuwait. The British Ambassador in Baghdād explained these beliefs in a letter of the 24th March 1950 to the Foregn Office,

> "When the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spoke recently to a member of my staff on this question he remarked that it was more than a year since the Iraq Government had first broached the subject with us and getting on for a year since they had sent us an official request. They had been told nothing, despite frequent reminders, which was very unusual behaviour on the part of His Majesty's Government. He maintained that Iraqi interests in Kuweit were considerable. There was a common frontier and now that the oil company was working there, there were plenty of Iraqi subjects in the Sheikhdom."(68)

The same Ambassador - Sir Henry Mack - recorded in his letter of the 21st October his views towards the formation of an Iraqi consulate in Kuwait,

> "When it was decided last year to admit an American consul subject to certain conditions, it was recognised that, if the Americans agreed, we could not well refuse a similar request for a consul from Iraq or any other country with whom we have a consular convention. In recognising this, we tacitly admitted that neither Kuweiti interests nor our special position in the Gulf would be too seriously prejudiced by the admission of an Iraqi Consul, though I realise that earlier discussions with the Americans on Persian Gulf affairs amongst other things made it difficult to refuse their request."(69)

Matters came to a head when the case of the alleged murder of two Sa^cdūn tribesmen by a member of the al-Ṣabāḥ family trailed tediously through the 1950's without solution. The Iraqi Government made various complaints regarding the treatment of its subjects in Kuwait.(70) These developments forced Britain to accept in principle the Iraqi request for appointing a consul in

Kuwait, but the British made this acceptance conditional on the prior appointment of an American consul in Kuwait.(71) The delay in the American decision regarding the appointment of an American consul in Kuwait motivated the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office to propose, on the 25th April 1950, the appointment of an Iraqi trade agent in Kuwait, instead of a consul, with functions similar to those proposed for the Indian and Pakistani trade agents in Baḥrain.(72) The same British letter to Sir Henry Mack reported that,

> "The trade agents should have no direct access to the Shaikh, and should only handle routine matters direct with the Shaikh's authorities." (73)

This suggestion was approved by both the British Ambassador in Baghdād and the Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir R. Hay.(74) The British realised that Iraqi investments probably justified representation in Kuwait. They calculated that, if and when an American consul was appointed, they would be obliged to accede to the Iraqi request, and to persuade the ruler to agree.(75)

The British Ambassador in Baghdād told the Kuwaitī Ruler in March and April 1950 that it was difficult for them to continue their resistance to Iraqi pressure when there was already a Saᶜūdī trade agent in Kuwait.(76) The British Ambassador reported on the 24th March 1950 that Aḥmad Pasha the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had questioned the presence of a Saᶜūdī trade agent in Kuwait during a meeting with him in March the same year.(77) By contrast, the Political Agent in

Kuwait (H.G. Jakins), supported the ruler's opposition to the appointment of an Iraqi representative in Kuwait, whether trade agent or consul. On the 18th November he stated to the Political Resident in the gulf,

> "From a purely local point of view I of course do not like the idea of there being any Iraqi representative at all in Kuwait and I would deplore any decision to admit an Iraqi before an American."(78)

The British Senior Official continued,

> "Any Iraqi appointed to Kuwait would obviously have much closer contact with the local population that is possible for me or for any member of the Agency staff."(79)

The Foreign Office reported on the 29th May 1951 that the American Embassy in London had informed them that the State Department intended to appoint a consul in Kuwait by the 30th June the same year. When the Ruler of Kuwait was informed in June about the British admission of an American consul and his attitude towards a request from the Iraqi Government to make a similar appointment the ruler replied that "he was in H.M.G.'s hands in this matter" and that it was therefore for them to decide.(80) The same British report described the ruler's attitude towards the British acceptance of the appointment of foreign representatives in Kuwait,

> "He fully appreciated that if one consul came, others could not be kept out."(81)

The British Ambassador at Baghdād was instructed to notify the Iraqi Government of British consent on the day of the arrival of Mr. E.S. Duncan in Kuwait on the 28th June 1951 to take up his duties as first American Consul. The presence of the American consul in Kuwait reflected the

increase of the American interest and influence in the Gulf.[82] Finally the British Government was forced to concede a consul to Iraq. The Foreign Office asked the British Ambassador in Baghdād on the 28th June 1951 to inform the Iraqi Government that the British Government was prepared to agree to the appointment of an Iraqi consul in Kuwait.[83] The British decision to restrict the activities and reduce the privileges of an Iraqi consul prevented the appointment of the latter. Despite initial reluctance to accept foreign representation in his shaikhdom, by 1951 the Sheikh, according to the Political Resident's report was convinced of the importance, especially to his prestige of the system.[84]

2. Regional Pacts 1955-1958 : Iraq's attempts to include Kuwait

Rumours about the possible union of Baḥrain and Kuwait in the early 1930's were given credence by an article in "Ordience Modeno" of October, 1931

> "The British plan for a united Arab Government under the British flag extending from Kuwait to Aden with its capital at Bahrain."(85)

Baḥrain and Kuwait were the most progressive shaikhdoms in the Gulf region. There were cultural links between the intelligentsia of the two shaikhdoms and ancestral links between the peoples including the ruling families.

Khālid Moḥammad al-Faraj, a Kuwaiti nationalist writer and poet published an article in the Egyptian Newspaper al-Shūrā on the 26th Shawwāl 1345 A.H. (1925) regarding the essential links between Baḥrain and Kuwait.

The article was translated by the British,

> "Bahrain is Kuwait and Kuwait is Bahrain. They are twin sisters whose father is the Gulf and their mother the Arabian Peninsula. Their nationality is the same; they speak the same language and their customs are identical. Their rulers are from the same family, if they differ in political idiom they combine in everything else. They are about gathering together in the lap of the kind world educating power, and God is knowing."(86)(sic)

Al-Faraj had been deported from Baḥrain in 1927 by Captain Alban - the Political Agent at Baḥrain, for writing anti-British articles.

The rumour of Arab confederation in the Gulf region coincided with British preparations to transfer their Residency in the Gulf from Bushire to Baḥrain for strategic and practical reasons. The move was dictated by the establishment of military bases for the Navy at Jufair(87) and the Royal Air Force at Muḥarraq in the 1930's. The British regarded Baḥrain as the new centre of their influence in the Gulf, and transferred the Residency there in 1946.(88)

The Arab union project of the Shaikhdoms was revived in 1939, to be considered in the light of various political developments in the region. These were: German and Italian propaganda, Soviet influence, the nationalist reform movements, the competition between the traditional regimes, and the outbreak of the Second World War. German and Italian propagandist activities attempted to mobilise the people against Britain through their broadcasts and press. At the same time the emergence of communist parties

in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt provided an outlet for Soviet propaganda and influence in the Middle East. Moreover the development of the nationalist reform movements in the Gulf region in 1938-39 and the continuance of the Arab Nationalist Movement in Iraq after 1939 threatened the interests of the traditional allies: Britain and the old ruling families. These movements and the oil concessions revitalised competition between the local monarchies and created new frontier disputes; in particular the Sa^cudī's battled against Iraq's overtures to Kuwait.(89) The outbreak of the Second World War created a new threat to the influence of both Britain and the traditional regimes, by the increase of the propagandist campaign of the Axis Powers through their press and broadcasts since 1939. For instance, T.C. Fowle - the Political Resident in the Gulf reported on the 8th July 1939 that, the German Arabic Broadcasts had stated on the 10th May that,

> "The British were trying their colonising intrigues everywhere, 'in Kuwait as they did in Bahrain'."

The same report continued,

> "On the 24th May an attack was made on the British Adviser (90) of the Bahrain Government for having imposed a censorship on the press. It was also given out that a correspondent of the German station in Bahrain had written that the people of Bahrain had expressed their desire to join Iraq."(91)

The considerable oil revenue which the Saᶜudī King - ᶜAbdul-ᶜAzīz began to receive from the Ḥasā concession in the late 1930's strengthened the political influence of the

Sa^c^udī regime in the region. On the basis of this economic strength and King ^c^Abd al-^c^Azīz bin Sa^c^ud's political ambitions, the British reported on the 20th January 1940 that, as the most effective means of preparing the Arab States against the possibility of a Soviet attack, there should be some kind of union between them, with a common programme and a common policy. The same British report stated that they had replied to Sa^c^udī proposals with the promise to bear in mind constantly, King ^c^Abd al-^c^Azīz's advice and asserted that they would not hesitate to adopt his suggestions if necessary.[92] Ibn Sa^c^ud was anxious that the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq might lead to the annexation of the rest of the Arab Shaikhdoms. Details about the project of the Arab Federation appeared in the press during the summer of 1939: especially al-Baḥrain, al-Rābiṭah al-^c^Arabiyyah and al-Nashrah al-^c^Arabiyyah.[93] The project was discussed by the politically minded in Iraq and Egypt, in addition to Sa^c^udī Arabia and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, but nothing was achieved.[94]

In the 1950's the same project arose in the political circles in the region. The new political and economic developments persuaded Britain to discuss seriously the question of a federation of the Gulf Shaikhdoms. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was a demonstration of the new strength of educated people, in a position to react against the abuse of power. The Egyptian example was a clear incentive to the populations of the Gulf Shaikhdoms. The new Egyptian regime's resistance to British policy

encouraged the nationalist groups. The Arab emigrants strengthened the position of the Kuwaitī Nationalist Movement by participating in the cultural and sporting clubs which were centres of political discussion. Allied collusion in the formation of Israel, the Iranian revolutionary policy during Mossadegh's Government (the 20th March 1951 to the 20th August 1953)[95] and the popular uprisings of 1948 and 1952 in Iraq excited ill-feeling towards the westen bloc especially Britain. These events consolidated nationalist feeling in the Gulf region, especially in Kuwait and Baḥrain.

The British doubted the possibility of a real union of the Gulf Shaikhdoms because local jealousies, based on tribal competition and frontier disputes, could not reliably be dissipated. The British Government realised that although the possibilities of achieving any form of economic or political federation of these states under a central authority was remote, the achievement of co-ordination in social services such as education, health and postal services was not difficult.[96] The Foreign Office reported on the 30th May 1951 that in November 1950 a rumour was current throughout the Middle East that

> "a new Arab Federal State was about to be set up in South-West Arabia consisting of the various British protectd states in the Persian Gulf and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Newspapers in Iraq and Syria carried this report as also did Cairo radio. As a result inquiries were made at several of our missions in the Middle East and the Persian Embassy asked the Foreign Office that there was no truth whatever in the idea. Nothing has been heard of it since and its origin

> was never satisfactorily traced....one suggestion from Damascus was that it came from a son of the late Imamm of the Yemen who had been exiled to Aden, and that it had thereby been intepreted as having British support."(97)

The British Govenment emphasised that although the modernisation of the administration and the improvement in internal independence in the Gulf Shaikhdoms was desirable, the maintenance of British control of foreign relations, administration and preservation of law and order was paramount.[98]

Britain regarded the congress of doctors from the Gulf region held in Baḥrain in November 1948 as a good example of co-ordination between the Gulf States, and the opportunity for consultation was welcomed. It was hoped that it would continue, and possibly extend to other spheres of the social services.[99]

After the Second World War Britain attempted to replace the Alliance treaty of June 1930 with Iraq with a new treaty, the Portsmouth treaty of January 1948. Owing to the resistance of the Iraqi Nationalist Movement, the attempt failed. The ratificatin of the regional defence agreement known as the Baghdād Pact then became the aim of the new British policy in the region: It was felt that it would protect the political and economic interests of the Western bloc. Early in the 1950's the British Government believed that the defence of the Middle East was vital to the Security of the free world. Anthony Eden - the British Secretary of State - reported on the 31st October 1951 that the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Turkey would be founder members of a proposed defence command in

the Middle East. The British Minister added that the interests of the free world in the region would be secured by the proposed command through co-operation between the interested powers and the Middle East States. He hoped that the Middle East States would agree to associate with the command. Therefore Egypt was offered status similar to that of the founders. Egypt's rejection of the proposals of the defence command gave Iraq the opportunity to become the most powerful ally of the Western bloc in the Arab World,(100) whilst the Iraqi opposition movement advocated neutrality between the Eastern and Western blocs.(101) The Baghdād Pact was signed on the 24th February 1955, between Turkey and Iraq. Later, on the 5th April, Britain, Pakistan on the 23rd September and Iran on the 12th October 1955.(102) Majīd Khaddūrī explained the general objectives of this pact as follows:

> "The signatories pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of one another, but agreed to co-ordinate their efforts in matters of defence and security."(103)

By this achievement Baghdād became the headquarters of the Middle Eastern military and political activities of the Western bloc. The pact strengthened the influence of Iraq and an attempt was made on that country's behalf to include Kuwait. Between 1952 and 1958 Britain attempted to create a "federal Arab union of the Gulf Shaikhdoms" consisting of Kuwait, Baḥrain, Qaṭar and the seven Shaikhdoms of the Trucial Coast and ʿOmān, which was to be under the presidency of the Iraqi Crown Prince ʿAbdul Ilāh.

It was decided by Britain that Baḥrain would be the capital of this union. The British decision was welcomed by the Iraqi Government. Senior Iraqi and British officials made several visits to Baḥrain and Kuwait where they discussed the federal union. For instance ᶜAbdul Ilāh then Regent of Iraq later Crown Prince with Nurī al-Saᶜid, at that time Prime Minister of Iraq and other Iraqi ministers visited Baḥrain for the same purpose in 1952,(104) while Moḥammad Fāḍil al-Jamālī the Iraqi Prime Minister visited Baḥrain in 1953.(105) Moreover King Faiṣal II with the Crown Prince ᶜAbdul Ilāh and other Iraqi ministers made another visit to Baḥrain in 1954.(106) Bahrainī, Kuwaitī and Egyptian newspapers published news regarding the proposed federal union in 1955 and 1958.(107) The federation however failed to come into being owing to the Suez War in October 1956; the formation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958 and the downfall of the Hāshimite regime in Iraq on the 14th July 1958. The restitution of a nationalist consciousness, reinforced by Nāsserite and anti-imperialist propaganda, caused resistance to British domination of the region.(108) Britain was attempting to renew her interests and her prestige in the Gulf region by replacing the old protectorate treaty with contemporarily acceptable agreements, to reduce the effects of the Nāsserite propaganda campaign.(109)

After the formation of the Arab union (A U) on the 14th February 1958 between the Hāshimite regimes in Iraq and Jordan, Iraq attempted again to bring Kuwait to this

union.

On the 14th March, 1958, just eleven days after he had returned to power as Prime Minister, Nurī al-Sa^c^īd spoke to the American Ambassador in Baghdād, Mr. Waldemar J. Gallman, in some detail about Kuwait's joining the Arab union. The American reported that al-Sa^c^īd thought

> "The time had come for Britain to overhaul her traditional position in the area. She might well start with Kuwait by withdrawing from her 'protectors role' status. This would pave the way for the Kuwait's adherence to the A.U."(110)

Nurī al-Sa^c^īd had suggested this option to Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd when he passed through Baghdād some days earlier on his way to Manila. In any event, he hoped Britain would influence Kuwait to join the union. At the same time he asked the American Government to use its influence on Britain to the same purpose. The A.U. needed the financial aid of Kuwait's high oil revenues.[111] The Iraqi Government alone could not subsidise the expenditure of the A. U.[112] Therefore al-^c^Uzrī, the A. U. Finance Minister, in a meeting at the American Embassy on the 9th May 1958, stressed al-Sa^c^īd's concern over the need to bolster the A. U. financially. On the occasion of the Kuwaitī Ruler's visit to Iraq on the 10th May the same year, al-Sa^c^īd offered to accept the demarcation of the frontiers and to provide Kuwait with water from the Shaṭṭ al-^c^Arab in exchange for Kuwait's membership of the A.U. Long established mistrust caused the ruler to reject the proposal and rebuff al-Sa^c^īd with a reference to his confidence in Nasser. It was clear that the Gulf

Shaikhdoms had been influenced by Nāsserite policy, supporting the newly established UAR whilst opposing the A. U. The Iraqi regime recognised that the Ruler of Kuwait's rejection was dictated by the strength of pro-Nāsserist public sentiment in the state. The Government realised that the Shaikhdom could exercise considerable independence, inspite of the British presence.[113]

After the formation of the A.U. al-Sa^{c}īd once again suggested to the British Government that the independence of Kuwait would allow it to join and finance the A. U. When the Iraqi proposal was aired after the British Ambassador's suggestion to al-Sa^{c}īd in February 1958, the former asked the latter for Iraq to take responsibility for the annual donation of aid to Jordan, instead of Britain. In the spring 1958 al-Sa^{c}īd raised his proposal for Kuwait's membership of the A.U. with Britain, the United States and Sa^{c}ūdī Arabia. Al-Sa^{c}īd discussed his project with King Sa^{c}ud, who was in favour on the condition that Iraq respected the right of the Government to make its own decision.[114] Nurī al-Sa^{c}īd also obtained the American acceptance when he negotiated with Mr. Waldemar J. Gallman - the American Ambassador in Baghdād.[115] While the U.S. and Sa^{c}ūdī Arabia were convinced by al-Sa^{c}īd's argument regarding Kuwait's membership of the A.U., Britain was not. Britain shared the same fears as the ruling family over membership. Finally al-Sa^{c}īd wrote a violently worded memorandum in May 1958 to the British and United States Governments with the demand that Kuwait receive independence, join the A.U. and provide annual financial aid

for it. If the first proposal was not approved, the current status of the Kuwaiti frontier should be denied, and her dependence on Iraq renewed, as during the Ottoman era. If the second proposal was not accepted Iraq would reseve the right to act independently.(116)

Finally Nurī al-Saᶜīd visited London in June and met the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd. It was a stormy meeting, despite al-Saᶜīd's reliance on the British in the Middle East. He was said to have hammered on the table demanding the acceptance of his proposals.(117)

Dr. Moḥammad Fāḍil al-Jamālī describing this meeting, stated that,

> "When I returned back from the United States at the beginning of July 1958, I visited Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd at his House, No. 1 Charlton Gardens. He told me about the stormy meeting with Nuri al-Saᶜid. He said, Mr. Nuri al-Saᶜud was angry with the British owing to their hesitation in giving Kuwait her independence. There was an Iraqi demand for her independence. I suggested that the Amir of Kuwait should be King, and Kuwait should join the A.U. which now consists of Iraq and Jordan. Kuwait could then participate in the defence expenditures of Jordan on which the defence of the whole Arab East depends. But the British delayed, finally announcing Kuwait's independence three years later."(118)

Al-Jamālī, the Iraqi Foreign Minister had been told by the British Foreign Secretary that an Iraqi-British meeting should be held on the 20th July 1958 to discuss mutual problems, including the Kuwait question.(119) But the outbreak of the Revolution of the 14th July 1958 ended the Hāshimite regime in Iraq.

The ruler's opposition to joining the A.U. was

influenced by the Kuwaitī nationalist movement; the position of which had altered considerably. The first suggestions of unity with Iraq were made in 1938-39 by King Ghazi and were then supported by the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement. At that time the proposals were firmly resisted by the monarchy and the protectorate. By 1958 Britain could see the desirability of such a union; it seems possible that they were anxious that there was an alternative to the independent and revolutionary character of the UAR. By then, the Arab Nationalist faction had transferred its loyalty to the UAR, and was suspicious of British intentions. In the 1930's Iraq had been the centre of Arab nationalism, but by the 1950's it had become the hub of imperialist activities in the Middle East, while Cairo took over the leading role in Arab Nationalism, after the Egyptian Revolution of the 23rd July 1952. Even in Iraq the A.U. was opposed: forty-two politicians submitted a petition to Nurī al-Saᶜīd on the 15th March 1958 supporting the UAR and protesting against the A.U., and against the policy of suppression.(120) Both the nationalist movement in Iraq and the nationalist movement in Kuwait considered the A.U. as a challenge to Nāsserite leadership. In the 1950's the growth of Nāsserite influence in the Gulf region weakened British influence. Britain was unable to support the ambitions of the Iraqi regime in Kuwait, which would jeopardise her interests in a region where Nāsserism had considerable popularity. In Kuwait this popularity developed when the cultural and socio-economic order was overturned by regional developments.

3. The growth of the intelligentsia and its effects on the development of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement

Before the Second World War there were no educated people outside the ruling family, the notables and the merchants, because of the limited number of schools, and the cost of education, and the necessity to many families of a child's earnings. The royalties of the oil industry allowed the Kuwaitī Government to develop public and social services, which led to the emergence of a middle class and an improvement in the situation of the working class. Nine wells were drilled between 1938 and 1942, when all operations were suspended and the wells plugged with cement owing to the war. These wells were re-opened after the war and the first commercial crude oil shipments were made on the 1st June 1946. In January 1949 there were 40 wells in production with an average daily output of 220,000 barrels. In December 1950 there were 85 wells producing 476,718 barrels a day. Before the war, the ruler's income - which was based mainly on customs duties and revenue from date gardens in the south of Iraq - was measured in tens of thousands of pounds. The royalties of 220,000 barrels a day during January 1949 amounted to about £7,000 per day, equal to an income of 2½ million a year. The royalty was three rupees (about 5 English shillings at that time) per ton.(121)

The growth in state income coincided with a change in Kuwait's leadership following the death of Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ on the 29th January 1950, after a

twenty-nine year reign, and the succession of his first cousin, Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ. The succession caused a certain amount of optimism amongst the Kuwaitī intelligentsia: the new ruler was considered to be more liberal than his predecessor.

The Political Agent in Kuwait described the new ruler as follows:

> "During the first year of his rule Shaikh Abdulla has shown two praiseworthy characteristics: reiterated reliance on His Majesty's Government and a sincere and conscientious sense of his Shaikhdom. Not naturally of a forceful personality and preferring a simple life among his books and his friends, he seems to be much happier leaning on British advice than was his authoritative predecessor. He doubtless realises the advantages of letting the brunt of the family bickerings of the Sabah and the intrigues of the merchants fall on others. The Ruler shows a concern for the welfare of the poorer of his subjects."(122)

Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim was more generous in social matters, especially health and education. It was not surprising that Government expenditure reached about twenty million rupees, in 1950-1951.

During the school year 1950-51 there were 3949 boys and 1689 girls in the schools in Kuwait town and 511 children in the village schools. In the boys schools there were 78 Palestinian teachers, 7 Iraqi, 1 Saᶜudī, 1 Baḥrainī and 108 Kuwaitis, while in the girls schools 60 teachers were Palestinian, 3 Egyptian, 3 Syrian, 2 Lebanese and 15 Kuwaitī. This compared with 500 pupils of both sexes four years earlier.[123] Improvements in Government administration and the development of the oil industry in Kuwait created jobs for Kuwaitis and immigrants, and

increased their purchasing power as well.

Vastly increased socio-economic expenditure liberated large sections of society from traditional patterns.

Their general increase in prosperity and education brought about an upheaval in the social structure, with significant political effect. The working class in the oil industry had greater independence than under the Nākhudās. Owing to the inadequate supply of native labour there was an influx of immigrants from Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and the Gulf States.

The first non-native Arab employees of the Kuwaitī Government were four Palestinian teachers given employment in 1936.(124) By 1938 this number had doubled and two Palestinian school-teachers were brought in for the girls' school as well.(125)

Owing to Kuwaitī fears of an Iraqi takeover, attempts were made to develop cultural relations with Egypt. In 1939 the first group of four students was sent to al-Azhar University in Egypt. In 1942 the Department of Education employed five Egyptian teachers. The number of Egyptian teachers increased to thirty in 1948.(126) Nevertheless the Kuwaitī Government sent five students to study language and Islamic Sciences at al-Aᶜẓamiyyah College in Baghdād in 1939, with grants from the Iraqi Government. There were also a number of Kuwaitī students who joined Iraqi schools and colleges from the upper classes; sons of the Kuwaitī residents in Baṣra; others were sent from Kuwait.(127)

Owing to the increasing numbers of Kuwaiti students in Egyptian universities and institutions the Kuwaiti

Government establshed a bayt al-Kuwait (Kuwait House) in Cairo in 1945 for benefit of the students. Al-Bi^c tha, a cultural monthly, was published by the Kuwaitī students in Egypt January 1947.(128)

Cultural relations between Kuwait and Egypt grew rapidly during the 1950's. Khalīl Kannah, who was Minister of Education in the Iraqi Government in 1953, related that,

> "I remember when I received Shaikh Abdulla al-Jabir, the Kuwaiti 'Minister' of Education in 1953, when he made a second visit. I explained to him that Iraq was able to send the teachers needed in Kuwait and that I was ready to arrange this. He thanked me politely. Then he travelled to Egypt and brought Egyptian teachers to Kuwait."(129)

Before the development of the oil industry, members of the ruling family spent the summer at their date gardens in the south of Iraq. When the extent of the oil income and the danger of an Iraqi takeover in Kuwait became clear in 1938-39, members of the ruling family were encouraged to buy properties in Egypt.(130)

From 1941 to 1958 more than one hundred Kuwaitī students graduated from Egyptian, Iraqi, Baḥrainī and Lebanese universities and institutions; about 75 per cent graduated from Egypt.(131) This situation was partially responsible for Nāsserite influence during the 1950's and afterwards.

Improved cultural relations between Kuwait and Egypt, the unpopular Iraqi regime during the 1940's and 1950's, and the formation of the Kuwaitī political groups in the 1950's, all weakened Iraqi influence on the Kuwaitī nationalist movement and the Government. After the Kuwaitī

regime had attempted to suppress the nationalist groups in 1938-9, opposition leaders had fled to the neighbouring countries, especially to Baṣra where Kuwaiti leaders of the reform movement such as ʿAbdulla al-Ṣaqr, lived. After the popular uprisings in Iraq of January 1948 and November 1952 and the dissolution of Iraqi political parties in September 1954 a large number of Iraqi nationalist groups fled to Kuwait. It was reported that the eminent communist poet Badir Shākir al-Sayyāb was amongst these. During the same period, after the collapse of Dr. Mossadegh's Government in Iran on the 20th August 1953, a number of persecuted Iranian communists fled to Baḥrain and Kuwait. These groups from Iraq and Iran undoubtedly affected the political outlook of the nationalist groups.(132)

The Formation of political and ideological groups:

At the beginning of the 1950's certain politically active graduates and immigrants co-operated towards the formation of underground political parties in Kuwait. Sporting and cultural clubs were the meeting places for them.

In 1946, fifteen young men met at the house of one of the students Marzūq Fahad al-Marzūq to form a cultural club.(133) An Administrative Council was elected before official permission from the Government had been obtained. This was the first attempt to form a cultural club in Kuwait during the 1940's. Officially it never existed: the application for a licence was rejected by the ruler out of fear of the recurrence of opposition activities like

those of the Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī - K.S.W.(134) This rejection increased the determination of the intelligentsia. Owing to the ruler's refusal to licence the club, and encouraged by the success of the Cairo paper al-Biᶜtha', members of the group began to publish the first Kuwaitī monthly paper (Kāẓima) in July 1948. It became the platform of Kuwaitī writers, both literary and political. The disappearance of this paper in March 1949 was caused by financial and professional difficulties.(135)

The death of Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir on the 29th January 1950, liberated the cultural and political activities of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement after the respected and liberal ruler Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim succeeded the former. The new ruler supported the Kuwaitī intelligentsia in establishing a number of clubs. The founders of these clubs became the leaders of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement in the 1950's and 1960's. The underground political movements and trends which developed in the clubs were: the Islamic, the Kuwaitī Nationalist, the Pan-Arab Nationalist the Baᶜthist and the Communist.

These groups were to play a vital role in the political future of Kuwait: a detailed examination of the emergence of the groups will be necessary.

The Islamic group, or the Moslem Brotherhood, believed in the necessity of co-operation between Moslems on Islamic principles and opposed nationalism. The essential theories of this group developed in Kuwait after

1914 when a small uprising occurred in support of the Ottoman Sultan (the Caliph of Moslems) and in opposition to the ruler's military co-operation with Britain during her occupation of Iraq (1914-1918). This movement had been suppressed rapidly by Shaikh Mubārak in 1915.(136) The Egyptian teachers from the University of al-Azhar who began their work in the religious institutions of Kuwait in the early 1940's, and graduates from this institution and from the University of al-Azhar were the founders of the Islamic group. They began to formulate their opinions at the end of the 1940's. Links were created between the Kuwaitī Moslem Brotherhood and the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood. The activities of this group were directed by ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-ᶜAlī al-Muṭawwaᶜ. In 1951 the Moslem Brotherhood established Jamᶜiyyat al-Irshād al-Islāmiyyah (the Islamic Guidance Society) after a number of meetings at the dīwān of ᶜAbd al-ᶜAzīz Yūsuf al-Mizainī. Other prominent members of this society were ᶜAbdulla al-ᶜAlī al-Muṭawwaᶜ, ᶜAbd al-Rahmān al-ᶜAtīqī (Minister of Finance for fifteen years, now Adviser of the Amir), ᶜAlī al-Jassār, Khālid al-Jassār, Khālid bin Isa al-Ṣāliḥ al-Mutawwaᶜ former Minister of Works and Moḥammad al-ᶜAdasānī (the current President of the Kuwaitī National Assembly who had occupied prominent political posts earlier). Shaikh Yūsuf bin Isa al-Qināᶜī "the reformist"(137) - became the honorary chairman of this society; the founder was acting chairman.(138) The political activities of the society increased during the first five years. In 1982 Faiṣal al-Ṣāniᶜ remembered Jamᶜiyyat al-Irshād as a well organised political party. He

reported that although the party was underground, information was openly disseminated. During 1955 handbills were daily placed on students desks in the higher educational institutions. He cited Shuwaikh Secondary School, the religious institution and the Technical College as targets. According to al-Ṣānic the party owned transportation and was able to arrange large meetings. He named Aḥmed al-Ducāij and Yūsuf al-Niṣef as the most active members.

In 1954 the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nāsser. The Brotherhood was antagonised by the execution and imprisonment of prominent members by the Nāsser regime earlier that year. Public opinion in Egypt went against them.

The influence of the party in Kuwait weakened during 1956 owing to the growth of Nāsserite influence and the tide of Nationalism stirred by the tripartite aggression against Egypt.(139)

Despite waning influence the party continued its educational activities in Kuwait after 1955. After the independence in June 1961 it revived and reformed as <u>Jamciyyat al-Islāḥ al-Ijtimāci</u> (the Society of Social Reform) and the publication <u>Majallat al-Irshād al-Islāmiyyah</u> (the Islamic Guidance Journal) was replaced by <u>Majallat al-Mujtamac</u> which is still in existence, and continues to exert considerable political influence.(140)

In the independence era leading members of the newly reformed society came to occupy prominent posts in the

Government and were able to promote and consolidate their property.

The period of relative liberalism introduced by Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ allowed the formation of a teachers club "Nādī al-Muᶜallimīn" in 1951. A monthly Majallat al-Rā'id (the Explorer's Journal), was published by the club, in 1952. An increase in the number of qualified members led to the production of Majallat al-Raᶜid al-'Usbūᶜī (the Weekly Explorer) a political and social weekly. A split between the founders in 1952 was caused by political differences between two groups:

(i) The Kuwaiti Nationalists, represented the majority and dominated the club. On this side the most important members were Abdul Aziz Husain (the current Minister of the State of Cabinet Affairs), Abdul Muhsin Rashid, Yusuf al-Ali, Ahmad al-ᶜAdwāni, Hamad al-Rijaib and Fahad al-Duwairi.

(ii) The Pan-Arab Nationalists, were in the minority and were supported most notably by Ahmed Zain al-Saqqaf, Khalid al-Masᶜūd al-Fihaid and Abdulla Ahmad Husain al-Rumi.

Political and ideological differences over the club's programme caused the split. The second group encouraged by new graduates of similar views, established on the 4th April 1952 a new club called al-Nādī al-Thaqāfī al-Qawmī (The Pan-Arabist Cultural Club). The founders of this club were joined by ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr and Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, a Medical Doctor who had graduated from the American University of Beirut (A.U.B.) and had spent ten years (1942-1952) there under the influence of the Pan-Arabist

groups. Al-Khaṭīb was the principal founder and became a respected Pan-Arab leader in Kuwait during the 1950's. The club became the centre of Pan-Arab Nationalists - not only for Kuwaitis but for the Arab community there as a whole. In the 1950's 70 per cent of the members of this club were Palestinians, among them were Ghassān Kanafānī, a Pan-Arab, and Nājī ᶜAllūsh, a Baᶜthist who currently occupies a prominent post in the Palestine Liberation Organisation; Egyptian and Syrian members were included. The founders had graduated from Egyptian, Iraqi and Lebanese universities.[141] Their influence affected the activities of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement more than any political group until the abolition of the clubs by the Government in 1959. The important objectives of the founders were the termination of illegal Iranian immigration, and the liberation of the Gulf Shaikhdoms from British influence. Arab unity was also an ambition.[142] In January 1953 the club published their first monthly, "Majallat al-'Īmān" (The Faith). It was printed in Beirut although the Education Department of Kuwait had had an antiquated printing press since 1948, but were without qualified staff to use it. Owing to increased membership and the growth of cultural activities a weekly Mulḥaq al-'Īmān (Appendix to The Faith), printed in Kuwait, was also produced.[143] The most important subjects in the first number of Majallat al-'Īmān were: the socio-economic affairs of Kuwait, and the news of the Arab world. Essays were written not only by members of the club, but by Kuwaitī women and students of both sexes. Therefore the Majallat al-'Īmān and Mulḥaq al-'Īmān

created links between the club and society generally.(144) Significantly, although all members of the club, especially the founders, were Pan-Arab Nationalists, later they divided into three ideological groups: the Pan-Arabists, the Nāsserites, and the Ba^cthists. The Kuwaitī graduates and the Arab immigrants who joined the club were active theorists; consequently ideological frictions occurred. The Ba^cthists began to withdraw from al-Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Qawmī and established Nādī al-Ittiḥād (the Union Club). This club became the centre of Ba^cthist activities; articles written in the club's news-sheet and cultural meetings and seminars took place. The emergence of Ba^cthism in Kuwait in the 1950's was due to the presence of Syrian and Palestinian teachers and not to Iraqi Ba^cthists. Nājī ^cAllūsh was a prominent activist. The Ba^cth party was still developing in Iraq after the popular uprising on the 22nd November, 1952.(145) After the popular uprisings in Iraq in January 1948 and November 1952 the Iraqi Government introduced stringent measures to discourage opposition. Many communists fled to Kuwait then and in 1954 after the dissolution of political parties.

At the same time communists were persecuted in Iran after the collapse of the Mossadegh Government on the 20th August 1953. Many appeared in the Gulf Shaikhdoms, especially Baḥrain and Kuwait, where they found jobs in the oil companies.

Before this influx of political exiles events had occurred which were to be relevant to communist activities. The Kuwait Oil Company had begun a series of retrenchment

measures. In 1949 the labour force in the Kuwait Oil Company numbered 12,089.(146) By 1950 the main construction work had been completed, notably the jetty, and British and American construction engineers had left. In addition cuts were made in expenditure within the company. As a result a large number of Kuwaitī labourers were dismissed. The labourers took their case to the ruler through the mediation of Yūsuf bin Isa al-Qināᶜī, but without success. Eventually the labourers joined the pearling boats in the summer of 1950, when the number of boats increased from the previous year. In 1949 forty boats were employed while in 1950 as many as one hundred and twenty were observed.(147) This was a direct result of the situation in the oil company. Former employees resented the enforced return to the pearl industry, and the deprivation it entailed.

The presence of Iraqi and Iranian communists helped to give the labourers' new situation an ideological character. This led to an increase in communist activities, especially among the workers in the Kuwait Oil Company. They established a political group called al-ᶜUsbah al-Dīmuqrātiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyah in the early 1950's, and published a weekly paper called Rāyat al-Kuwait (Kuwait's Banner). It attacked Arab nationalist opinions, especially in al-'Imān the newsheet of al-Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Qawmi.(148) Significantly, Baṣra was an important base of Iraqi communist activities in the 1920's and afterwards.(149) It was reported that links existed between Iraqi communist party groups in Baṣra and the

communist cells in Kuwait, Sa^c^udi Arabia and Baḥrain. The branch of the Iraqi communist parties in Baṣra appears to have been responsible for the formation of the Kuwaitī communist group. The reduction in the labour force by the oil companies in Baḥrain, Sā^c^udī Arabia and again Kuwait in 1953 caused further anger amongst the working class.(150) This strengthened the position of communist groups in the Gulf region.

An increase in the numbers of students in the three higher educational institutions in Kuwait and the growth in the number of Kuwaitī students abroad, prepared for the establishment of the unofficial students' union.(151) The majority of the students abroad were in Egyptian universities and institutions. They published in Cairo in 1955 Majallat al-Ittiḥād (the Union paper) in place of al-Bi^c^thah (the Scholarship).(152)

The increase in the number of graduates led to the formation of a special club for them called Nādī al-Khirījīn (the Graduates' Club) in 1955. They published Majallat al-Fajr (the Dawn paper) on the 2nd February 1955.(153) The founders were Pan-Arab Nationalists. The establishment of this club not only led to the propagation of Pan-Arabism - which reinforced the position in Kuwait of al-Nādī al-Thaqāfī al-Qawmī - but also facilitated the cultural movement in Kuwait and fortified the Kuwaiti nationalist movement as a whole. Through these institutions political groups developed in Kuwait. These groups represented the ideologies of the main political trends in the Arab world: progressive, moderate and conservative.

The growth in influence of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement coincided with the formation of the Baghdād Pact in April 1955. Therefore the failure of the Iraqi Government's efforts to bring Kuwait into this Pact was due to the opposition of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement, influenced by a wider group of Arab Nationalists. The nationalist groups realised that the objective of the pact was not only the protection of the western interests and their Middle Eastern allies from Soviet influence, but also the destruction of progressive regimes such as the Egyptian and the Syrian ones. It was expected that Israel would be included in the pact.[154]

The military invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel on the 29th October 1956 provoked a common reaction from all the cultural institutions - with the exception of the Moslem Brotherhood[155] - and led to the establishment of a committee called L'ijnat al-Andiyah (the Clubs Committee) to collect financial aid for Egypt. All the club youths dressed in Scout uniform and collected contributions for the Egyptian Army.[156] The Kuwaitī Moslem Brotherhood participated in contributions despite their hostility to Nāsser's regime.[157]

Uncharacteristically, the Ruler of Kuwait issued orders to the ruling family to participate in the popular demonstrations. Handbills were printed by the Kuwait Government calling for a general strike on behalf of the Egyptian people. Jābir al-Aḥmad (the current Amir of Kuwait) and his brother Ṣabāḥ al-Aḥmad (the current Minister of Foreign Affairs) went to the prison and

released prisoners to distribute the handbills. Al-Mubārakiyyah School became the headquarters of the clubs committee which was responsible for collecting contributions. At the same time, the teachers' club took on the registration of volunteers for the Egyptian Army. Contact had been made with the Egyptian Ambassador at Damascus regarding the training and transfer of volunteers to the battle fields in Egypt.[158]

Without doubt these activities reflect the extent of Nāsserist influence in Kuwait, both within the Government and in the nationalist movement. After the tripartite aggression Nāsser became the revolutionary leader par excellence in the Arab world.

The invasion of Egypt strengthened the position of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement and the Pan-Arab Nationalists. After the collapse of the Baḥrain Popular uprising 1954-56 some Baḥrainī Arab Nationalist leaders arrived in Kuwait and were welcomed by the leaders of the Kuwaiti nationalist movement, although the Baḥrainis had been deported by their Government. Among the Baḥraini deportees were: ʿAlī Sayyār,[159] who worked in the department of Social Affairs; and Ḥasan al-Jishshī, Ḥamad al-Ṣabāḥ and Rāshid al-Qūtī, all of whom worked in the department of Education. Bin Hindī, Moḥammad Abū Zaid and ʿAbdulla al-Ṭāʾī[160] were also amongst them.[161] Al-Jishshī became the chairman of the first National Assembly of Baḥrain in December 1973 after independence. Without doubt the welcome of the Baḥrainī Arab Nationalists in Kuwait reflected the solidarity of the two movements.

The formation of the unofficial Kuwaitī Students Union (K.S.U.) in 1957 also confirmed the position of the Kuwaitī Nationalist Movement. They were influenced by the afore-mentioned political groups, whether in Kuwait or abroad. They were active in the organisation of Seminars and in the publication of Majallat al-Yaqẓah (The Englightenment Journal).[162]

The development of the Iraqi nationalist movement in the late 1950's indirectly affected the Kuwaiti Nationalist Movement, although official relations between the two countries were limited. At that period there were only about twenty Kuwaiti students at the Iraqi University and institutions. The small number of Kuwaiti students in the Iraqi university was the result of the Kuwaiti policy of limiting relations with Iraq and in so doing limiting the activities of political groups in Kuwait.[163] The growth of the Iraqi nationalist movement was consolidated by the establishment of the Supreme Committee of the Free Officers in December 1956 under the leadership of Brigadier ʿAbdul Karīm Qāsim. It consisted of fourteen officers - Colonel ʿAbdul Wahāb al-Shawwāf, Colonel ʿAbdul Salām ʿĀref and his brother Colonel ʿAbdul Raḥmān ʿĀref were amongst them. All were Pan-Arab Nationalists.[164] The formation of the underground National Union Front in 1957 unified the Iraqi political parties and strengthened the position of the Iraqi nationalist revolutionary movement. The principal political parties of that time were: the Baʿth Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, the National Democratic Party and the Independence Party. These parties supported the

revolutionary policy of the Nāsserite regime, especially the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. In sympathy with Egypt, they called the Iraqi people to a general strike on the 16th August 1956.[165] The parties opposed the Iraqi regime for several reasons:

Firstly Iraq had a poor record in social and economic affairs, combined with an undemocratic approach towards the participation of political groups. Secondly the regime's attitude towards the invadors of Egypt was unpopular with the Iraqi Nationalist Movement. Finally Iraq's membership of the Baghdād Pact revealed imperialist tendencies and alienated the rest of the Arab world.[166] Therefore co-operation between the political and the military groups developed and led to the breakdown of the regime on the 14th July 1958, which ended the monarchical era and established the republic.[167]

The establishment of the United Arab Republic on the 2st February 1958 gave a boost to nationalist movements in the Arab World. The majority of the Arab people supported the new republic, considering this state to be the first practical step towards the unity of the Arab Nation.

The Arab Union was established by the Hāshimite regimes on the 14th February in reaction to the formation of the U.A.R., but Nāsser's popularity in the Arab world doomed it to failure.

It was not surprising that the Iraqi Government's efforts to bring Kuwait into the A.U. were unsuccessful. The influence of the Pan-Arab Nationalists (the most

powerful political group in Kuwait) was responsible. Belief in Pan-Arabism had prompted the Kuwaitī Nationalist Movement in 1938-39 to co-operate with Iraq. The attempts were suppressed by the autocratic ruler and Britain, in the belief that a united Arab world would undermine their power. In 1958 Iraq was amongst those countries which were hostile to the Egyptian centre of Arab nationalism. This and Iraq's involvement in the Baghdād Pact was sufficient to alienate the Kuwaitī Nationalist Movement. The situation altered drastically, however, on the collapse of the Iraqi monarchy.

Footnotes: Chapter 3

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133. Al-Marzūq was a student at the American University of Beirut -AUB., at that time.

134. Personal interview with Aḥmad al-Saqqāf on the 16th March 1982 in Kuwait. Al-Saqqāf said that he was one of the people who were elected to the Administrative Council.

135. Loc. cit. The administrative council consisted of prominent nationalist writers: ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniᶜ the first political prisoner in Kuwait in the 1930's he had written a number of anti-British articles in the Iraqi newspapers such as al-Nās. Al-Ṣāniᶜ was the owner of the paper, ᶜAbd al-Ṣamad Turky al-Jaᶜfarī - Administrative Director and Aḥmed Zain al-Saqqaf - the editor. For details see Abdulla, M.H., al-Harakah al-Adabiyyah Wal Fikriyyah fil-Kuwait, Rābitat' al-'Udabā' bil-Kuwait, Kuwait 1973, pp.198-203.

136. IOR:R/15/1/712/1, Report for 1915, p.52.

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138. Personal interview with Faiṣal ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniᶜ in Kuwait, on the 7th March 1982 and with Khālid al-Rūmi and Aḥmad Diyain in March 1982 also in Kuwait.

139. Personal interview with Faiṣal ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniᶜ in Kuwait, on the 7th March 1982.

140. Personal interview with Aḥmad ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Mizainī on the 10th June 1983 in Exeter, U.K.

141. Personal interviews with: Aḥmad al-Saqqāf, Faiṣal ᶜAbdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniᶜ, Dr. Aḥmed al-Khatīb and ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr in March 1982 in Kuwait.

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156. Personal interview with Faiṣal ʿAbdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniʿ on the 7th March 1982.

157. Personal interview with Aḥmad ʿAbdul ʿAzīz al-Mizainī on the 10th June 1983 in Exeter, U.K.

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160. Al-Ṭā'ī was an ʿOmānī teacher who worked in Baḥrain for several years and was involved in the opposition movement there. In the late sixties he occupied a senior post in Education Department in Abū Dhabi and later in the Ministry of information. In the early seventies he was appointed Minister of Work and Social Affairs in ʿOmān.

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162. Pesonal interview with Faiṣal al-Ṣāni[c] on the 7th March 1982 in Kuwait.

163. Ibid, the interview was on the 10th March 1982.

164. For more detail about the Supreme Committee of the Free Officers see Batatu, H., op.cit., pp.777-782.

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Chapter Four : Baḥrain

1. Relations between Baḥrain and Iraq, 1939-1958.

During the 1940's relations between Baḥrain and Iraq were normal. By the 1950's it was reported that relations were cordial.

Iraqi workers joined BAPCO in the 1930's and continued to work for the company in the 1940's and 1950's. By 1950 there were 224 Iraqis in Baḥrain including those who were employed by BAPCO. Most of these Iraqis were small traders, retailers and money changers. Jews who were of Iraqi nationality, though permanently resident in Baḥrain, were included in this figure.(1)

It was reported also that in 1954 some Iraqis acquired Bahrainī nationality.(2) Iraqi religious speakers continued to participate in Muḥarram celebrations in Baḥrain during the period under review. In the 1950's their number increased to serve a large educated audience in a greater number of ma'ātim.(3) In the 1950's a special programme was established at Kulliat al-Fiqh(4) a religious college at Najaf, to train Iraqi religious speakers; the result was a high level of sophistication and persuasiveness in their arguments.. People from both Shīʿī and Sunnī sects were attracted to their lectures in the ma'ātim. They began to speak in the clubs as well. Sayyid Jābir, the popular religious speaker was one of the most dynamic.(5)

At the same time, the number of Shīʿī pilgrims who visited the Holy Cities of Iraq increased, in 1953 the recorded number was 3,500 Shiʿi pilgrims, an increase of

about 500 over the number of the previous year.[6] In 1954 the number was over 4,000,[7] and in 1955, about 4,500.[8] It was thought that the increase was an indication of prosperity among the working class.[9] The duration of their stay in the Iraqi Holy Cities - between one to three months - allowed them to develop relationships with Iraqis, especially in the intelligentsia.

Moreover, a number of Bahraīni students were staying in the Iraqi schools and institutions, especially the religious ones, during this period.[10] For instance Dr. Ḥusain Moḥammad al-Baḥārnah, the current Minister of State for Legal Affairs obtained his first degree, a B.Sc., from the University of Baghdād in 1950.[11] These links consolidated the relationship between the two countries over this period.

When the Military revolt broke out in Iraq on the 2nd May 1941 the official pro-British newspaper, al-Baḥrain, violently attacked the leaders of the Military revolt, Rashīd ᶜAlī al-Gailānī - the Prime Minister - and his comrades. Nevertheless hostility was directed at the powerful pro-British leaders Nūrī al-Saᶜīd and the Regent ᶜAbdul Ilāh, and not the monarchy.[12] The attacks indicated the sympathy of the Baḥraīni Government with King Faiṣal II and without doubt al-Saᶜīd's administration retained a favourable impression of the Baḥraīni attitude when it was re-established on the 31st May 1941.[13]

In the 1950's exchange visits between Baḥrain and Iraq were made by senior government officials. These visits consolidated relations between the two countries.

The improvement was mainly caused by the proposal of a federation between the Gulf Shaikhdoms under the presidency of Prince ʿAbdul Ilāh, with Baḥrain as capital.(14) The official attitude of the Bahrain Government as revealed by the British documents and the Baḥrainī annual reports of the 1950's towards the proposed union, was not clear. The visits of high-ranking Iraqi delegations to Baḥrain at the beginning of the 1950's reflected the possibility of the formation of this federation. In February 1951 Nūrī al-Saʿīd the Iraqi Prime Minister, accompanied by Dr. Ḍiyāʾ Jaʿfar Minister of Communications, made an official visit to Bahrain.(15) On the 2nd April 1952 Prince ʿAbdul Ilāh, Regent of Iraq, with Nūrī al-Saʿīd, other Ministers and court officials visited Baḥrain. There was a public reception at the Quḍabiyyah Palace followed by a luncheon party, and a large dinner was given by the ruler at the Rafāʿ Palace, to which representatives of all communities were invited. The Iraqi delegation visited schools, hospitals and historical sites in the vicinity of Manāma. ʿAbdul Ilāh conferred on the ruler the order of the Rāfidayn, first class, and the same order, on the ruler's uncle Shaikh ʿAbdulla bin Isa al-Khalifa and his brother Shaikh Moḥammd, second class and on the ruler's sons,(16) and on Belgrave, third class. After the visit ʿAbdul Ilāh left Baḥrain for London, while others of the party returned by sea to Baṣra. This was the first occasion on which the royal family of Iraq had visited Baḥrain.(17) The visit emphasised the hope that a federation of the Gulf Shaikhdoms under the Hāshimite

Crown, would be established to reinforce relations between the two countries. In 1953, a Baḥrainī deputation headed by Shaikh Isa bin Salmān (eldest son of the ruler, now Amir of Baḥrain), represented Baḥrain at the coronation of King Faiṣal II in Baghdād.(18) King Faiṣal II himself visited Baḥrain in 1954.(19) Without doubt, the exchange visits between Iraq and Baḥrain during the 1950's reflected the progress of relations and regional efforts to establish the Federation of the Arab Shaikhdoms. The plan was backed by Britain because she wanted to modernise the protective agreements with the shaikhdoms. The growth of the intelligentsia in the Gulf region (especially in Iraq, Baḥrain and Kuwait), the success of the Egyptian Revolution of the 23rd July 1952, and the nationalisation of the oil industry by the Mossadegh Government gave Britain reason to fear for her continued control of the region. Mossadegh's nationalisation policy had compelled the western oil companies to amend their old agreements with Iraqi, Sauᶜudī, Kuwaitī and Baḥrainī Governments in the first half of the 1950's.(20) The formation of the Baghdād Pact in April 1955 was a further development of the new British policy in the region.

On the 5th April, 1955, the document of British membership of the Turko-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Co-operation were deposited with the Iraqi Foreign Office, thus formally terminating the 1930 treaty and bringing into being the Baghdād Pact.(21) The Gulf Shaikhdoms were invited to join this defence association. A delegation consisting of Jalāl Bayar, the President of Turkey, ᶜAdnān Mandris, the Turkish

Prime Minister, and the Pakistani Ambassador in Turkey visited Baḥrain on the 14th February 1955 for this purpose.[22] The delegation could not reach any agreement over the proposals. The growth of Pan-Arab consciousness and the effects of the anti-imperialist policy of the Nāsserite regime were responsible. Egypt began to guide the Arab liberation movements after the Revolution of the 23rd July 1952; her leadership of the Arab world began when the Arab League countries' opposition to the Baghdād Pact was influenced by the initial Egyptian decision. The Arab League countries endeavoured to persuade Iraq not to sign the Baghdād Pact Agreement. There were considerable differences between Egypt's and Iraq's interpretation of the Baghdād Pact. Egypt regarded it as a potential stronghold of imperialism and a threat to the liberation movements in the Middle East. Dr. al-Jamālī, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, regarded it as a defence against communist influence.[23] Tension consequently arose betwen the two countries.

After the signing of the pact, a new voice in Cairo took to the air with daily programmes in "Radio Free Iraq", which matched Cairo radio in vituperation and called on the people of Iraq to revolt against Nūrī and the monarchial regime. When "Radio Free Iraq" was closed down, Cairo radio's Ṣawt al-ʿArab kept up its attacks with varying degrees of force. Tension between the two countries grew when on the 20th October 1955, Egypt and Syria entered into a mutual defence agreement. Saʿūdī Arabia became party to a similar arrangement with Egypt on the 27th October of

that year.[24] The creation of this bloc threatened Iraqi influence and ambitions in the region. In 1954 relations between Iraqi and Sa^c^udī Arabia were strained, more than they had been for 15 years. The distrust between the Hāshimite and Sa^c^udī dynasties began in 1926 when the Sa^c^udis, supported by the British, ousted the Hāshimite King Ḥusain bin ^c^Ali from Ḥijāz. At the same time the Hāshimite regimes in Jordan and Iraq had had ambitions in Syria since the expulsion of Faiṣal I by the French in July 1920. After the death of ^c^Abdulla, Amir of Jordan, in 1951 ^c^Abdul Ilāh then the Crown Prince of Iraq in 1953 became the most powerful Hāshimite leader. He attempted to unite Syria with Iraq, spending vast sums on subsidising Syrian politicians and military offices to engineer a coup d'etat, which failed to produce the desired union.[25]
Owing to the Iraqi policy towards Syria Nurī al-Sa^c^īd reacted immediately toward the Defence Agreement between Egypt, Syria and Sa^c^udī Arabia. He explained,

> "I want to break up the Egyptian - Syrian - Sa^c^udi joint command."(26)

Iraq's involvement in the Baghdād Pact indicated that the regime aspired to play an important role in the region, similar to that of the Ottomans. The federation of the Shaikhdoms in the 1950's was proposed when conditions were not conducive to its success, since Iraq had invited the hostility of nationalists by her rapprochment to the west.

The growth of Nāsserite influence in the Arab World, frustrated Hāshimite aspirations not only in Syria but in

the entire Gulf region. ᶜAbdul Raḥmān al-Bākir, one of the leaders of the Baḥraini nationalist movement (1954-56) described the situation thus:

> Britain had a plan which was to have been executed after the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. It was the unification of the Arab Emirates in the Gulf (Bahrain, Qatar and the Emirates of the Trucial Coast) under a federal union after the annexation of Kuwait to the Hashimite Crown. Abdul Ilah would have been the President of this federation, Bahrain the capital. The failure of this project was caused by the outbreak of the revolution of the 14th July 1958.(27)

The project of the Federation of the Shaikhdoms was discussed in the Egyptian daily newspaper Akhbār al-Yawm on the 12th November 1955. The paper reported that ᶜAbdul Ilāh the Iraqi Crown Prince was to have been the King of this union.[28]

From the death of King Ghazi until the breakdown of the monarchy in Iraq on the 14th July 1958, Iraq's power to inspire nationalist sentiments declined as the despotism of the monarchical regime became evident. The Iraqi military revolt of May 1941 was the first sign of the effects of this policy. This thirty-day revolt was encouraged by the Axis powers and was defeated because of the difference in the military capabilities of the British and Iraqi armies. The revolt reflected the discontent of the Iraqis over their government. The growing influence of the pro-British group in Iraq deepened the Iraqis' hostility towards the regime, and its policy. The opposition of the Iraqi people to this policy was again manifested in the uprisings of January 1948 and November 1952. In response a large number

of politicians were then imprisoned or executed.[29] The pro-British policy reached its zenith in September 1954, when the Iraqi Government dissolved all political parties on the 22nd September 1954.[30] This was a step towards the ratification of the Baghdād Pact, the success of this agreement could be guaranteed, in the absence of opposition parties. The dissolution of the political parties led to the disbanding of all political newspapers. The situation was a complete reversal of Iraq's earlier liberalism. Nevertheless the parties continued underground.[31] By contrast the suppression of the Iraqi nationalist movement during the last five years of the monarchy coincided with the growth of the nationalist movements in Kuwait and Baḥrain. In the 1930's the Iraqi press supported the nationalist reform movements in the Gulf region. While in the 1950's the situation changed owing to the policy in Iraq dictated by al-Saᶜīd. Suprisingly, Baḥrainī newspapers took up the attack on the Iraqi policy and the defence of the Iraqi nationalists. Majallat al-Qāfila, the Baḥrainī bi-monthly, published an article under the title: "Mādhā fil-ᶜIrāq?" (What is happening in Iraq?) on the 5th December 1952 by Nāṣer Abū Ḥijr. This article described the persecution of politicians and students by the Iraqi regime and how a large number of Iraqi nationalists, according to the author, had been imprisoned or executed. It was also claimed that some had fled to the neighbouring countries such as Kuwait and Baḥrain.[32]

Furthermore on the 1st June 1956 Majallat al-Waṭan, the Baḥrainī bi-monthly, published an article by one of the

Iraqi prisoners under the title: "Qal^c at Glub Bāshā fil-^c Irāq" (Glub Pasha's Fort in Iraq). The prisoner stated that he was kept at Nuqrat al-Salmān Fortress and he described the inhuman treatment of the prisoners by the police.(33)

The appearance of this sort of article in the Baḥrainī press was an indication of the extent to which the press had adopted the nationalist line. The increased independence of the press was largely due to the activities of the intelligentsia. The Baḥrainī press not only criticised the autocratic policy of the local regimes of the Gulf region during the first half of the 1950's but also spread the ideas of the Baḥrainī nationalist movement during the uprising of 1954-56, although Baḥrain was still under British protection.

2. The Uprising of 1954-56

The uprising of 1954-56 was the result of the changes in the socio-economic structure, the growth of the intelligentsia and the British domination of the administration.

When pearling was the dominant industry the traditional socio-economic structure was upheld by the wealthy community: the members of the ruling family and the pearl merchants - the richest people in Baḥrain. The pearl divers represented the majority of the working class, whilst peasants, boat-builders and construction labourers made up the remainder. The oil industry boom created a class of nouveau riche merchants such as the shipping

agents and contractors. The pearl merchants and members of the ruling family were all Baḥrainīs, but at that time the new members of the wealthy community included not only Baḥrainīs but also Britons, Saᶜudīs, Iranians, and Indians, most of whom had come to Baḥrain for the sole purpose of making money, to be sent out of the country, without providing for its future. The middle class also emerged from the Government and private sectors. The working class consisted of labourers at BAPCO and other companies, peasants and a minority of pearl divers. The uprising of the 1950's marked a climax in nationalist feelings. To a certain extent it was the inevitable consequence of social, cultural, economic and political developments in Baḥrain and abroad. The press support of the nationalist movement was fundamental to the uprising. Its criticism of autocracy in the region gave confidence and credibility to the opposition. Independent economic and social factors, however, also contributed. An analysis of these follows.

Ordinarily oil royalties and customs duties reinforced the Baḥrainī economy but the Second World War caused a decrease in revenue. Customs receipts and oil royalties fell. The difficulty in obtaining transport for oil was one of the causes of reduced oil output. Appendix nine provides a breakdown.

The BAPCO slump which coincided with a bad diving season 1941 spread unemployment in Baḥrain, and hardship for the poorer people. The cost of living increased considerably despite Governmental measures to prevent profiteering by controlling the prices of essential

commodities.[34] The combination of circumstances sent labourers at BAPCO on strike for several days at the end of 1943, demanding higher wages and improved working conditions. The outcome was an increase in pay which had been approved but not brought into effect before the strike occurred.[35] This strike was one of several engineered by the intelligentsia from the cultural clubs, the labour force was in fact used as a political instrument in the 1950's by the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie to achieve nationalist aspirations.

After the Second World War the higher customs and oil revenues enabled the Government to provide free medical treatment and free education for every Baḥrainī. The expenditure on education in 1956 was estimated at about Rs.830,519; and expenditure on public health at Rs.6,572,421.[36] In 1942 expenditure on education had amounted to Rs.240,000 and on public health to Rs. 264,000.[37] Owing to the increase in the Government's expenditure the number of schools and students expanded. At the beginning of the 1954-5 school year there were 24 schools for boys, and a Technical School containing 6,544 boys; together staffed by 282 teachers of whom 93 were foreigners; in addition there were 2,313 school girls in Baḥrain.

Ten years earlier there had been 9 schools and a Technical school, then staffed by 76 teachers and containing 1,519 boys. At the end of 1954 the staff of the boys school consisted of the following:

Egyptian (most of them in the Secondary School)	15
Indians	2
Syrians	4
Lebanese	26
Palestinians	45
Others	1
Baḥrainis	289
Total	382 (38)

It was reported that the Egyptian teachers were the most highly qualified and experienced.(39) Arab teachers spread the concepts of nationalism in schools, cultural clubs and in the Baḥrainī press. The role of these local institutions, especially the cultural and sports clubs and the ma'ātim, in the social and political activities of the uprising of the mid-fifties, was prominent.

The principal clubs established during the period under review were: the ᶜUrūba, Ahlī and Firdawsi in Manāma, the Baḥrain and Iṣlāḥ in Muḥarraq and the Nahḍa in Ḥidd. All these cultural and sport clubs were formally approved; there was, however, one which was established secretly by the Baḥrainī workers at the oil refinery. ᶜAbdul Raḥmān al-Bākir, one of the founders of the latter club related that the labours' participation in the uprising of 1938 had been organised by this club.(40)

The Baḥrain Club of Muḥarraq was established in 1936 by a number of Arab Nationalists. Amongst them were ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz Saᶜad al-Shamlān, ᶜAbdul Raḥmān al-Bākir and Maḥmūd al-Mardī. In 1939 the ᶜUrūba club was established in

Manāma. The founders were also Arab Nationalists. Ḥasan al-Jishshi and ᶜAli al-Tājīr were amongst them. In the same year and in the same area the Ahlī Club was established. In 1942 the Iṣlāḥ club was founded by members of the ruling family and their allies in Muḥarraq in response to the formation of Arab Nationalist clubs. The founders had training in civil and Islamic law in Egypt. The Iṣlāḥ became the centre of the Muslim Brotherhood, a society which followed the same line as al-Muntadā al-Islāmī, and attracted religiously oriented people, whilst the al-Baḥrain club attracted more liberal members. The Nahḍa Club was established in 1946 in Ḥidd. The founders were Pan-Arabist and Nationalist groups. In the same year a number of Iranian Shīᶜis established the Firdawsī cultural and sports club. Members of all these clubs were recruited from the new, emerging social groups; teachers, students, salaried labourers and civil servants. The majority of the founders were merchants and civil servants. Basic educational programmes were carried out. Night schools were arranged for the illiterate, in which club members taught Arabic and arithmetic voluntarily. In the absence of organised political parties and labour unions these clubs became centres for underground political parties, where the members established links with colleagues abroad.

The most active clubs politically were al-ᶜUrūba, al-Baḥrain and al-Nahḍa. These became centres for various Arab Nationalist groups: Pan-Arabists, Nāsserites, Baᶜthists and Baḥrainī Nationalists. It was reported that when the groups of the underground Baᶜth party in Iraq

became known by the Iraqi police in June 1955, Baḥrainī undergraduates studying in Baghdād University were found amongst its members.[41] The clubs were licensed for purely literary and social purposes and for sport in some cases. Religious celebrations like the birth of the Prophet Moḥammad, however, were used for political meetings - whilst the anniversary of the partition of Palestine was marked with political lectures. The speakers usually attacked imperialist policy in general, criticising indirectly the British dominance of Baḥrainī affairs. The number of these clubs increased rapidly during the 1950's owing to the increase in the number of educated people.[42] The increasing contact of Baḥrainis with the outside world by travel, radio and the press had eradicated unthinking acceptance. The cultural activities of the clubs had further raised the public awareness of international affairs, as also did the five new public cinemas. Between the 2nd and 4th December 1947 the intelligentsia organised demonstrations through the clubs protesting against the resolution of the United Nations regarding the partition of Palestine. Students of both sexes participated. In 1948 a committee consisting of representatives from all the Arab clubs obtained an agreement from all cinemas that 1 anna (1/16 Rupee) on every ticket sold should be in aid donated for Arab refugees from Palestine.[43]

The same committee collected money and clothes for Palestinians.[44] The clubs were also involved in the problems of the working class, as many of their members

were employed by BAPCO. The collapse of the uprising in 1938 had ended hopes for an improvement in the conditions of Baḥrainī workers not only in BAPCO but also in other sectors in Baḥrain. The formation of a labour committee was one of the major demands of the rebellion, on the grounds that without such a committee, the conditions of the labour force would never change.

During the summer of 1947 there was a certain amount of unrest amongst the working classes which was fomented by political agitators. The rapid growth of the oil industry in Kuwait,Sa^c^udī Arabia and Qaṭar had produced a demand for almost unlimited numbers of skilled and unskilled labourers. The shortage of manpower in oil companies led contractors, both for companies and for the government, to pay very high wages to their employees. All neighbouring states and shaikhdoms demanded workers and were willing to attract them with higher wages. Many Baḥrainī workers were tempted to leave their country to earn higher pay abroad.

BAPCO therefore employed more and more foreigners, mainly Indians, Pakistanis, Iranian and non-Gulf Arabs. The influx of foreign labour, whilst educated and semi-educated Baḥrainis were [illegible] seeking work abroad, was a fact deplored by all Baḥrainis. In Sa^c^udī Arabia many office employees, skilled company workmen, contractors and Sa^c^udi Government employees were from Baḥrain. It was reported that their increasing numbers caused similar resentment amongst the local Sa^c^udī inhabitants. According to the reports of the second census held in Baḥrain in spring 1950, it was found that the number of foreigners was

18,471 of whom 6,934 were Iranians; 3,043 were Indians and Pakistanis, and 2,208 were British, American and European. In the meantime the number of Baḥrainis living or working abroad, mainly in Saᶜudī Arabia, was 5,000.(45) In the early 1950's there was extensive immigration to Baḥrain from ᶜOmān and the Trucial coast, which provided sufficient unskilled workers for local requirements.(46) Moreover, positions in BAPCO were divided as follows: Westerners in management positions, Indians and Pakistanis in intermediate positions and Baḥrainis in lower clerical and manual jobs. These statistics indicate the trap of inferior status which faced the Baḥrain labour force.

Clubs became the outlet for complaint and for discussions with colleagues. The creation of a trade union to ensure the rights of the workers was seen as a paramount necessity. The conditions facing the Baḥrainī labour force became the central issue of the nationalist movement in the late forties and early fifties. A large number of the intelligentsia sympathised with the labour force and opposed British influence and autocratic rule. Dedicated nationalists realised that the failure of the uprising of 1938 was caused by the absence of an experienced, loyal leadership, with a popular base. After the Second World War the Arab League was established, many Arab countries became independent and Israel was founded as a state in Palestine. Undoubtedly these events affected political and social thought in Baḥrain. A number of educated people, representing the core of the intelligentsia, and believing in Arab Nationalism and unity had guided cultural and

political movements since 1949. Sawt al-Bahrain (the voice of Bahrain), a monthly newspaper, was the first production of this movement and became its mouthpiece from 1949 to 1952. The editors called it affectionately "dear child" as the off-spring of their political efforts. The editorial board of Sawt al-Bahrain included Ibrāhīm Hasan Kamāl, Mahmūd al-Mardī, Hasan al-Jishshī, ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz Saᶜad al Shamlān, ᶜAli al-Tājir and ᶜAbdul Rahmān al-Bākir. All believed in the administration of Government institutions on a democratic basis. The principal objects of the paper were: the propagation of an Arab Nationalist consciousness not only in Bahrain but in the whole of the Gulf region; the reform of the Government administration; equality amongst the people in rights and duties and the formation of a trade union.(47) This paper was banned for political reasons, but was replaced by a weekly paper al-Qāfila (the Caravan) published between 1952 and 1955 which followed the same political lines as Sawt al-Bahrain. It was also closed down for the same reasons by the Government. Efforts continued and it was succeeded by the bi-monthly al-Watan (the Nation) in 1955-56. These three papers were organised by the group who had led the uprising of 1954-56 and whose relatively progressive ideas were expressed in these papers.(48) The press activities of the leaders of the Bahrainī nationalist reform movement prepared the political atmosphere for the uprising of the mid-fifties. Other papers were published in Bahrain during the same period, such as al-Khamīla, first published on the 29th

October 1952 by Karanīk George, an Iraqi artist, al-Mīzān then started in January 1955 and al-Shuᶜla. was published once only in 1956 by the editor Maḥmūd al-Mardī.(49) The proliferation of journals of high intellectual standards in Baḥrain during the first six years of the 1950's reflected the achievements of the intelligentsia and importance of press in the success of the popular uprising of the mid-fifties.(50) The growth of the press activities in Baḥrain coincided with various internal and regional developments and helped to build a strong nationalist opposition and thus contributed to the outbreak of the uprising of 1954-56.

As far as regional developments are concerned in the early fifties the activities of the opposition parties in Iraq actually increased. The official parties were the Independence party, the National Democratic party and the United Popular Front, but there were also in existence underground bodies such as the Communist and Baᶜth parties. These opposed the initiatives of Britain to connect Iraq and other Arab countries with the Western bloc, through a mutual defence pact. It was claimed that the alignment of Arab countries to the western bloc had in the past led to the loss of Arabistan (Khurrumshahr), Alexandretta and Palestine. Iraqi political parties based their opposition to the proposals for a Middle East Defence association on these losses.(51) The British Embassy in Baghdād described the attitude of the anti-British political parties as follows:

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> "In the days following Mr. Truman's declaration of the end of November about the use of the atomic bomb in Korea, articles appeared in the left-wing and nationalist press urging solidarity among the Eastern domination. Abdul Razzaq Dhahir (an ex Minister of Economics), writing on 10th December said: 'The common purpose behind the present bitter struggle in Asia is to get rid of Western influence, with its attendant humiliation, poverty and exploitation from which the East has suffered for the past three centuries.' He expressed the hope that the present bloody reckoning between East and West would result in the liberation of the Arabs from European-American-Zionist imperialism, in the same way as India, Pakistan and Indonesia had been liberated."(52)

Iraqi nationalist politicians realised that the western dominance of the Asian peoples should persuade the liberation movements in these countries to unify their efforts to create an Asiatic Third Force which would follow the line of non-alignment.

On the 11th January 1951 Ṣawt al-Ahālī the mouthpiece of the National Democratic party supported the idea of an Asiatic Third Force, which would attempt to achieve the interests of peace between East and West. It called on all Eastern nations free from foreign dominance to join this force. The same article stressed that the Arab countries could join if their foreign policies were genuinely based on the principles of neutrality, if foreign troops left Arab soil and if "opressive treaties" were abolished.(53) Another leading article appeared in the left-wing paper al-ᶜĀlam al-ᶜArabī on the 20th January 1951 which denounced Western dominance as follows:

> "The call of the west finds no echo in our hearts. We do not understand them because

> we do not feel ourselves to be part of the so-called "free world" which they say they are defending. We are part of the oppressed world which is struggling against them to achieve its freedom and throw off their yoke."(54)

When Nuri al-Sa^c^īd went to Cairo to discuss the proposed project of defence with the members of the Arab League to obtain their support,(55) al-Istiqlāl (the newspaper of the Indepedence party) asked on the 23rd January:

> "how can Nuri al-Sa'id proclaim a policy abroad which he is unable to sell at home?"

The writer went on to say that,

> "the only policy which represents the will of the Iraqi people is that of neutrality."(56)

At the same time the leaders of the Independence and National Democratic parties sent telegrams to the Secretary General of the Arab Leage. They reiterated in their telegrams, the desire of the Iraqi people to follow a policy of neutrality to spare the Arab nation the horrors of war.(57)

The opposition parties continued their resistance to the Government policy when the United Popular Front and the National Democratic Parties published a joint manifesto in which they severely criticised al-Sa^c^īd's Government. They demanded that,

> "a). Iraq should not become a base for aggression against Iran or any other country;
>
> b). Iraq should avoid entanglement with international groupings;
>
> c). Constitutional freedoms should be safeguarded, elections should be free

and concentration camps should be abolished; and

d). Food and clothing should be provided at reasonable prices, monopolies curbed and the rights of workers and peasants safeguarded."(58)

As a result al-Saᶜīd issued a declaration on the 3rd July 1951, (the day after the issue of the manifesto) in which he defended the policy of his government.(59) The manifesto of the opposition parties reflected their emphasis on popular demands for the fundamentals of life, despite the fact that the parties were composed of the upper classes. The conditions of the working class and peasants were such as to win the sympathy of these parties.

The opposition parties in Iraq supported the Egyptian Government in the rejection of the four power proposals for a Middle East command. Therefore when news arrived in Iraq from Egypt to the effect that the 14th November 1951 would be celebrated as "National Struggle day." The Iraqi nationalist movement replied in sympathy immediately. The British Embassy in Baghdād described the Iraqi oppositin movement's reaction as follows:

"First the lawyers' union which is under the thumb of the National Democratic party, then the Doctors' Association, which is a more nationalist body announced that their members would strike on the morning of 14th November. The United Popular Front and the National Democratic party then invited the whole nation to strike, call which was taken up the following day by the Istiqlal Party."(60)

The co-operation of Egypt with the Iraqi opposition parties strengthened the resistance of the Iraqi nationalist movement. Links between the two grew after the

Egyptian Revolution of the 23rd July 1952.

Without doubt the efforts of the Iraqi political parties indirectly affected the nationalist movements of Kuwait and Baḥrain. At the same time Egypt's rejection of the proposal of a regional defence pact encouraged the nationalist movements in the region to support Egyptian policy on other matters later.

The Iraqi opposition parties were not opposed only to the western defence plans for the Middle East but also to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of June 1930. For instance the deputy leader of the independence party, Fā'iq al-Sāmarrā'ī had spoken of Anglo-Iraqi relations in an interview with the "Iraq-Times" published on the 30th May 1949. He advocated the strengthening of Anglo-Iraqi relations by a new treaty based on the recognition of the full sovereignty of Iraq. The new treaty would omit the provisions about British Advisers and provide for the transfer to the Iraqi Army of the two Royal Air Force bases at Ḥabbāniyya' and Shu^{c}aiba' in Iraq; all foreign troops would then evacuate the country.(61)

The efforts of the Iraqi opposition parties coincided with British attempts to appoint British Advisor in Kuwait and the requirement of the ruler of Baḥrain for a general assurance of protection from Britain. The Political Resident was aware of "general agitation for the liberation of the Arab World from western influence," and described the Iraqi uprising of January 1948 as a manifestation of this.(62) The ruler of Kuwait was also conscious of

agitation and was reported as being concerned to ensure prior to any appointment, that it would not aggravate the nationalists.

Britain had been pressing the ruler to make an appointment since 1946, but he was not receptive to the idea. The proposal was for the appointment of a financial advisor to put the economy on a proper footing, (especially after the increase in oil royalties after the Second World War). By Novembr 1947 however the ruler of Kuwait had not only changed his mind but had decided to request further help. He informed Sir R. Hay, the Political Resident in the Gulf, that he was thinking of asking for British Advisers for finance, customs and police. He said he would be glad to receive lists of possible candidates for his consideration. When the ruler met the Political Resident in Kuwait in March 1948 he said he wanted to appoint a British Financial Adviser and that he was carefully preparing the way for the appointment, but asked the British not to hurry him. He was apprehensive of the press reaction especially after the uprising of January 1948, a fact which the British hoped to turn to their advantage:

> "Perhaps you may be able to shame the Sheikh out of his present attitude that he cannot appoint one because of Iraqi press criticism."(63)

Later the British realised that Shaikh Aḥmad was opposed by Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim, who was recognised as the former's probable successor. Sir R. Hay, commented on this point,

> "Shaikh Ahmad naturally wishes to make sure that he can either reconcile Shaikh Abdulla or eliminate his influence before he asks us to find him an adviser."(64) (sic)

Accordingly, however, to the Political Agent's annual report for 1950 ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim had changed his mind "without further prompting" over the appointment of British Financial and Customs experts.(65) In contrast, nationalist leaders of the time, recalled in 1982 that British pressures had caused al-Sālim's acceptance.(66) Either way, Britain benefited in that her political influence in the Shaikhdom was strengthened. In the similar case of Baḥrain, the long-standing dispute with Iran was aggravated at the end of the 1940's and the early 1950's by renewed claims from Iran. The instability that ensued caused a reinforcement of the British role. In the 1940's the Iranian Government adopted a new approach to attract attention in the international sphere to the claim to Baḥrain. In September 1950 Iran announced that it would withdraw its delegation to the World Health Conference in Istanbul, if Baḥrain was represented, although there seemed to be no intention of attendance by Baḥrain. The Iranian delegation at the International Food Organisation Conference of 1949 threatened to walk out if the Baḥrainī delegation attended: predictably there was no Bahrainī delegate but a Baḥrain flag printed among others on the corner of the agenda was hastily erased. The Iranian Ambassador in Cairo protested to ᶜAzzām Pasha, the Secretary General of the Arab League, against the attendance of the Baḥrain Director of Education, Aḥmad al-ᶜUmrān, at a conference in Alexandria 1950, and was snubbed for his pains.(67)

Furthermore, in 1948, it was reported that Russian

broadcasts in Arabic were being heard three times a day in Baḥrain. They violently attacked the British role in Baḥrain, and incited the people to rebel against the British administrtion. It was also related that "Al-ᶜArab" a violently anti-British newspaper published by Yūnis Baḥrī in Paris, was obtaining a certain amount of circulatin through a local book-seller.[68]

These developments threatened the credibility of both Britain and the Baḥraini regime. Therefore Shaikh Salmān bin Ḥamad al-Khalīfa the ruler of Baḥrain asked the British Government - in 1949 and in 1951 - for a written assurance that the British did not recognise the Iranian claim to Baḥrain. He asked also for a British promise to safeguard the interests of his subjects in foreign countries.[69] The British Government was surprised since Baḥrain was already connected to Britain through a number of Treaties and Agreements which assured the protection of Baḥrain. The British reported that the 1861 Treaty between the two countries asserted the British support to the ruler of Baḥrain in the "maintenance of the security of its possessions against aggressions directed against them by the chiefs and tribes of the Gulf." Moreover Baḥrain was a British protected state and therefore had the same right to protection as a Colony or any other British territory.[70] The British protection was justified by the Exclusive Agreements of the 22nd December 1880 and the 13th March, 1892 which were ratified by the Governments of the two countries.[71]

Finally the Political Resident in the Gulf sent a

letter to the ruler of Baḥrain on the 9th July 1951, which included the British assurances for renewal of protection as follows:

> "I have been authorised to inform your Highness that on the basis of the existing treaties and engagements His Majesty's Government regard your state as being under their protection which means that they accept responsibility to protect your state against any external aggression in the same manner as any British Territory. They also regard your subjects as British Protected Persons and will protect their interests in foreign countries to the same extent as they do those of their own nationals."(72)

The ruler of Baḥrain sent a letter in reply to the Political Resident assuring the British Government of the continuing loyalty of himself and his successors.(73)

Ironically, whilst the Iraqi opposition parties called for the elimination of British influence in Iraq, the Baḥrainī and Kuwaitī rulers encouraged the increase of British influence in their Shaikhdoms. Consequently the political activities of the Iraqi opposition parties were vital to the welfare of the Kuwaiti and Baḥraini nationalist movements during the early 1950's. Despite the Iraqi regime's suppression of its own oposition parties by measures in November 1952 and September 1953, the groups continued underground. In the 1950's the elimination of British influence was the principal demand of the nationalist movements in the three neighbouring countries - Iraq, Kuwait and Baḥrain.

From the mid-forties until 1971 Baḥrain was the main centre of British military and political influence in the Gulf region. During the 1930's the Royal Air Force was

established in Muḥarraq and a Navy Port was established at Jufair, one of the Manāma suburbs. In 1946 the British Residency was transferred from Bushire to Baḥrain. In this situation the internal and external affairs of Baḥrain were effectively controlled by Britain. The British Offices in control were the Political Residency at Jufair base, the Political Agency and Advisor's office at Ras Rummān, one of the Manāma suburbs.

Belgrave's dominance over the Government administration was an irritant contributing to the uprising of 1938. He started his work in April 1936 as Financial Advisor of the state of Baḥrain and continued until the end of 1956.(74) The British reported that Shaikh Ḥamad - Deputy Ruler of Baḥrain from 1923 and sole ruler from 1932 until 1942 - left practically all government affairs to Belgrave, after his appointment.(75) Shaikh Salmān, the heir apparent, took an active and effective interest in the affairs of state but Belgrave's influence was never reduced and his position in the eyes of the public was questionable. The intelligentsia in Baḥrain were maintaining a level of agitation against him in particular, which was based partly on the desire for change and partly on his financial and political conservatism. The Baḥrainī nationalists were convinced that he was the greatest hindrance to the nationalist reform movement in 1938 and responsible for the deportation from Baḥrain to Bombay of the leaders of the uprising of the same year.

In 1948 the Political Resident in the Gulf reported on Belgrave's role in the Government administration and the

reaction of the people towards his measures as follows:

> "Mr. Belgrave possesses a charming personality and an artistic temperament he has maintained almost complete security of life and property and has brought Bahrain to a stage of material development far exceding that in any of the other Gulf States. He does not however move with the times and is inclined to be dilatory and unbusinesslike in his management of state affairs. Though still robust physically his many years in a trying climate have probably sapped his mental energy. He is obsessed with the idea - and this obsession is even stronger with the Shaikh - that as the life of Bahrain oil-field is limited (it is estimated at being likely to last only from twenty to fifty years longer) he must save and invest as much money as possible. The more enlightened of the public on the other hand realise that with the opening of new ports in the Gulf especially on the Saudi Arabian Coast and the Qatar peninsula the importance of Bahrain will rapidly dwindle unless strenuous efforts are made to develop its facilites and amenities. His failure to encourage the political growth of the state is not perhaps so serious, as owing to the heterogeneous nature of its population there is little real national feeling, but more might be done to associate the people in its government."(76)

The British realised in fact that Belgrave was the main obstacle to any adminsitrative improvement in Baḥrain. He had centralised the control of the state administration in his own hands, and had abstained as far as possible from delegating responsibility for decisions, financial or otherwise, to the various heads of departments.[77] Ill-feeling against him had developed amongst certin classes (the merchants and intelligentsia) nevertheless he was persona grata with the new ruler.[78] He appreciated Belgrave's efforts to improve

the Government administration and to control the budget of the country during the decrease in national income caused by the war.[79] When the Political Resident asked the ruler in Autumn 1946 how long he thought Belgrave ought to continue in his present office, the latter predictably defended the advisor. The Political Resident described the Shaikh's reaction as follows:

> "The Shaikh referred to the services Belgrave had rendered to his father and himself, talked in glowing terms of his ability, efficiency and energy and remarked that he was doing the work of four men. This gave me an opening to suggest that he required an assistant. The suggestion was not favourably received the Shaikh remarking that he did not consider an assistant was necessary."(80)

The Political Resident reported that he had an idea that Belgrave hoped that his son James (who was 16 years in September 1946 and had entered a college in Beirut) would in due course return to Baḥrain as his assistant and subsequently succeed him and that the Shaikh was privy to this plan.[81]

The Political Resident was convinced that Belgrave should be provided with an assistant either directly or through the Political Agent as the opportunity arose. He thought it unlikely that the Shaikh would be changed from his present attitude until Belgrave showed obvious signs of collapse or until some serious disturbance or breakdown of the administration gave proof of his inability to carry on single-handed.(82)

The pessimism of the Political Resident regarding the danger of Belgrave continuing in his office were asserted

by a petition dated on the 21st July 1947, signed by "Baḥrain Island Population" and sent to the Minister of Colonies in London. Without doubt this petition reflected popular discontent against Belgrave's control of the general administration of the Government of Baḥrain. The petition accused Belgrave of responsibility for BAPCO's unjust policy against national labourers (the limitation of their wages in comparison with the wages of foreigners, whether skilled or unskilled). They accused him also of preventing Baḥrainis from leaving for the Gulf Shaikhdoms where pay was higher in order to give BAPCO as much advantage as possible. He therefore nullified all visas previously issued. The petition explained that his objective was only to force the Baḥrainī labourers to work with this American Company, to show his authority and his absolute power. The petition explained his influence in the Government administration as follows;

> "This man has utilised the weakness of our present ruler and had his own way. Below we enumerate the posts at present occupied by either British or Indian officials in Bahrain, but only in name as they cannot do a single thing in their own jobs, whatever their experience. It might not be believed when we state that he even interferes in Hospital directorship etc. causing one of the best British Doctors we ever had - Dr. John - to resign:
>
> Finance (his own no doubt).
> Director of Customs & Post Office.
> Education Director.
> Commandant State Police.
> State Medical Officer.
> General Chairman of Municipalities
> (Muharraq & Manama)
> The head Judge of the Law Courts.
> The head Judge of Criminal Courts.
> State Engineer; Passport Officer.
> Superintendent Public Works."(83)

The petition stated a number of examples of the mismanagement of Belgrave and his control of the state administration which had caused such discontent:

> "Mr. J.F. Wakelin was appointed by the British Council as Education Director, Bahrain. This certainly was a nice blow to Mr. Belgrave's influence. Mr. Wakelin adopted new education methods on the most modern system and brought Egyptian teachers and conditions improved nicely, but in the long run the Adviser started putting obstacles in Mr. Wakelin's way, sometimes creating financial excuses, other limiting Mr. Wakelin's lectures and speeches in the schools until he was so annoyed and was compelled to resign."(84)

The petition also criticised Belgrave regarding the lack of justice in the courts because he had appointed as assistant judges certain junior numbers of the ruling family, who were not only lacking in education but also had not the slightest idea of the law. The petition ended by requesting immediately, the following:

> "(i) The release of the present adviser and the appointment of another, limited to his own sphere.
>
> (ii) The appointment of a capable Education Director, free to fulfil his own responsibilities.
>
> (iii) That the present State Engineer should be given fuller authority to handle his own job without interference from others.
>
> (iv) The formation of a Legislative Committee to complete a law for Bahrain and to remain in power to supervise the interior affairs and organisation.
>
> (v) The formation of a Labour Committee to safeguard the interests of the labourers on the islands."(85)

Copies of this petition had been sent to the Political Resident in the Gulf and the Political Agent at Baḥrain. The Political Resident ordered the Political Agent to discover the identity of the writer of the afore-mentioned petition but all endeavours failed.[86] The Political Resident reported that when he asked Belgrave about the possibility of his retiring, he replied in a vague manner "possibly in about two years time." The Political Resident believed that the principal motive which attracted Belgrave to stay on as long as possible was that the Baḥrainī Government were subscribing to a Provident Fund for him.[87]

Meanwhile, in December 1947 Baḥrain became the only shaikhdom in the Gulf in which there was concerted opposition to western dominance although it was the military and political centre of British influence in the region. Owing to the decision of the United Nations assembly regarding the partition of Palestine, a three day strike, a procession and demonstration took place from the 2nd to 4th December. About one hundred arrests were made.[88] The British officials in Baḥrain accused the following persons of organising the demonstrations: Yūsuf ᶜObaidlī, ᶜAbdul Azīz Saᶜad al-Shamlān (both educated in Beirut - the latter was the son of one of the leading members of the uprising of 1938), ᶜAlī ᶜAbdulla al-Wazzān, Moḥammad Jāsim al-Shirāwī an ex-school teacher, Moḥammad Ṣādiq an Indian Moslem Tailor, Ṣāliḥ Khālid ᶜUjān (an Iraqi), Aḥmad Shaikh ᶜAlī bin Khalīfa and Moḥammad Shaikh

Rāshid bin ᶜAbdulla bin Isa (school boys and members of the Ruling family).(89)

Plans were being made for the evacuation of all Americans from Baḥrain to Dhahrān in December 1947 because defence forces were inadequate to protect the refinery and ᶜAwālī, where the headquarters of BAPCO and the residencies of the senior persons of the company were located. An attack was expected by the agitators on the installations of BAPCO.(90) The British position was disturbed by these incidents.

At the same time according to the Political Resident's telegram No. 55 of the 14th January 1948, to the Commonwealth Relations Office, a leaflet which appeared demanding the dismissal of Belgrave, stressed the news of the existence of a National Party at Baḥrain.(91) Belgrave's influence not only annoyed the people and motivated the opposition movement but also elicited criticism from the British. British Political Officers in Baḥrain blamed him for miserliness over administrative affairs.(92)

It was obvious that the removal of Belgrave was one of the major problems which faced British policy in Baḥrain. Britain realised that the continuance of Belgrave's employment would increase anti-British feeling amongst the people, but this was the desire of the ruler. The ruler rejected the appointment of an assistant to Belgrave because he realised that it would lead to the experienced advisor's removal. The ruler's opposition

indicated that the demise of Belgrave could challenge his own influence. Thus the omnipotence of Belgrave became the prime grievance of the Baḥrainī nationalists in the mid-fifties and a source of danger to the British and the ruler's influence.[93]

The continuation of sectarianism in Baḥrain was another major motive of the uprising of the mid-fifties, despite a limited improvement in the situation in terms of the achievement of equality of employment in the private and Government sectors. Some aspects of sectarianism still existed during the period in question most specifically the absence of equal representation on the Manāma Municipal Committee. In May 1950 the first election to be held for the Manāma Municipal Committee took place. Of the 12 elected members, the Shīʿī only obtained two seats, but received three places as members nominated by the Ruler: the Shīʿis obtained only five seats out of the total twenty-four. Originally the members represented the various sects living in Manāma: Sunnī Arabs, Shīʿī Arabs, Sunni Iranians, Shīʿī Iranians, Indian Hindus, Oriental Jews and other nationalities.

It was reported that, immediately after the election there were suggestions that the elections had not been properly conducted, and that the municipal officials who were mostly Sunnī had used their influence to help the Sunni candidates and that voting cards were not properly distributed, but no complaint was made to the Government.[94] After a few meetings the Shīʿī members realised that their representation in the Manāma Municipal

Committee was inadequate, therefore they resigned.[95]

Personal efforts by the Ruler and Belgrave had failed to persuade the five Shīᶜī representatives to withdraw their resignation. They refused to do so and at the many meetings held subsequently they produced various complaints implying that Shīᶜī Arabs were oppressed and ignored. They demanded immediate fresh elections.

Dissolution of the Committee would have provoked strong opposition on the part of the remaining members and in the opinion of the Government it would have been an undesirable policy to follow.[96] The Bahrainī Government refused to agree to new elections being held until they became due in 1952, but promised in the meanwhile to revise the boundaries of the constituencies so that the Shīᶜīs would get their fair share of representation.[97] Another source of discontent among the Shīᶜī was the high rents on meat, vegetables and fish stalls in the market which belonged to the ruler and his brother Shaik Duᶜaij. The majority of the shopkeepers in these markets were Shīᶜis. At the same time the ruler had increased rents on his own large number of small shops in Manāma after reconstruction. These shops were mostly occupied by poor Shīᶜis who were unable to pay the increased charges.[98]

Belgrave's influence on the Government administration, sectarianism and the bad conditions of the labourers were the principal issues which attracted the attention of the Baḥrāinī nationalist movement during the period under review.

The success of the Egyptian Revolution of the 23rd

July 1952, reinforced the resistance of the Iraqi people to oppressive policy in November 1952 and the liberation movements in Asia and Africa. The Baḥrainī nationalist movement was encouraged to demand general reforms.

3. The role of the intelligentsia in the emergence of nationalist unity in Bahrain and the participation of Iraqi religious speakers.

The cornerstone of the uprising of 1954-56 was the co-operation of people from both of the major religious sects. The achievement of communications between the Baḥrainī people was based on a common desire to pursue the national interest, a concern fostered by the Baḥrainī press from the early 1950's, especially Ṣawt al-Baḥrain, al-Qāfila and al-Waṭan.

The articles of these papers concentrated on the desirability of a national consensus; the rights of the working classes and reform of the Government and administration. The concepts of democracy, freedom and Arab unity were also discussed.(99) The high intellectual standards of the Baḥrainī press at that time attracted a number of prominent intellectuals from the Middle East. Nāzik al-Malā'ika and Moḥammad Mahdī al-Jawāhirī, respected Iraqi poets were the most significant contributors.(100) In Jumāda al-Thānī 1371 A.H. (1952) Ṣawt al-Baḥrain published an article under the title: "Sectarianism is a weapon in the Colonialists's hand." It was written by the Najaf mujtahid(101) Ayatullāh Moḥammad

Ḥusain Kāshif al-Ghiṭā'.[102] He was the most senior Imam of Najaf and his religious title and position gave him considerable spiritual influence over Shīᶜīs all over the world. He was involved in the uprisings of the tribal leaders of the Middle Euphrates in 1935-36.[103] His articles advertised the fact that links existed between the Baḥrainī intelligentsia and their colleagues in Iraq. They also explained the tactics of the Baḥrainī opposition leaders. The editorial board of Ṣawt al-Baḥrain believed that disinterested collaboration was the fundamental base of any popular movement, and played an important role in the achievement of this aim. Contact was made with the Iraqi religious leaders to spread this message. The Iraqi Shīᶜī leaders were as influential in Baḥrain as at home. Despite the prominent role of the Baḥrainī press and the cultural activities of the clubs and ma'ātim a number of sectarian incidents occurred in 1953 and 1954. These incidents upset the stability of Baḥrain.

The Shīᶜīs considered themselves ill-treated and resigned en masse from the municipal councils in 1951 and 1953. Their leaders such as ᶜAbd ᶜAlī al-ᶜAlaiwāt made various complaints to the Government about conditions in the markets, the representation of Shīᶜīs on public bodies and the absence of Shiᶜi judges in the courts (except the Shara Court) in which all the magistrates were Sunni members of the Ruling family. These matters were under consideration when violent sectarian riots in September 1953 disrupted the sessions.[104]

During the first ten days of Muḥarram the Shīᶜīs

assembled in towns and villages day and night in their ma'ātim(105) to hear sermons and lectures delivered by religious speakers from Baḥrain and from Iraq. On the evenings of the 8th and 9th, and on the 10th of Muḥarram during the day, crowds of men from the ma'ātim poured out into the narrow streets of the Shīᶜī districts in Manāma, and Muḥarraq and from Shīᶜī villages to form processions. Some Iraqis were involved in organising the processions in Manāma. Before the month of Muḥarram 1373 A.H. (1953), Belgrave reported that there were suggestions from the Sunnī that the Government should no longer allow the ᶜāshūr(106) processions to take place. It was argued that the processions were not approved by the Shīᶜī religious leaders. But the Government had at no time any intention of restricting the ᶜāshūr observances.(107)

During the Shīᶜī religious procession on the 10th Muḥarram, 1373 A.H. (1953) the 20th September 1953, disorder broke out and there was a fight in Manāma between Sunnī spectators and Shīᶜi participants in the procession, about sixty people were injured from both Sunnīs and Shīᶜis. Most of the injuries were from stones, bottles and from the Police lathis or rifle butts.(108) Each side accused the other of instigating the disturbance but an official enquiry revealed no grounds for either accusation. On the following day the Shīᶜī village of ᶜArad was attacked by a mob of Sunnīs from Muḥarraq and Ḥidd. There was no particular reason for the attack on this village, whose people were on good terms with the Sunnis living in the neighbourhood. Although the village was an isolated

place, out of sight and without a telephone, the assailants disappeared when two magistrates arrived on the scene at the same time as the police.(109) The sectarian conflicts were not ended by the <u>ᶜāshūr</u> incidents. A renewal of sectarian conflict during the spring of 1954 prompted a group of Baḥrainī Pan-Arab nationalists to urge political reform through the reconciliation of Sunnī and Shīᶜī sects. The initial plan was to dissolve ill-feeling between the two sects in order to establish a "nationalist brotherhood" as the basis of a popular political movement.(110) The group consisted of five men: Ḥasan al-Jishshī, ᶜAlī al-Tājir, Maḥmūd al-Mardī, ᶜAbdul ᶜAziz al-Shamlān and ᶜAbdul Raḥman al-Bākir, all of whom were on the editorial board of <u>Ṣawt al-Baḥrain.</u> The first two were Shīᶜī school teachers from the <u>ᶜUrūba</u> club, and the last three were Sunnī from the <u>Baḥrain Club</u>. ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Shamlān, now Baḥrainī Ambassador in Tunis, had worked for the Royal Air Force, and was, during the crisis the Chief Clerk in the British Bank of the Middle East. Mardi had worked in the Imperial Bank of Iran and had then become a professional journalist. Al-Bākir was working as a contractor in Qaṭar but had worked earlier at the oil refinery in the 1930's and traded between the coasts of the Arab Peninsula and East Africa.(111)

This group initially contacted the traditionally influential persons - notables and merchants of both sects - such as Manṣūr al-Urayyiḍ and Khalīl al-Muaʾyyad who had played a considerable role in the nationalist reform movement of 1938. These notables supported the efforts of

the political group towards reconcilliation. Preparatory meetings had been held by leading Sunnis at the Baḥrain Club, at the Ahlī Club and in Shamlān's house. The absence of enthusiasim among the Sunni notables and merchants led the political group of five to establish a Sunni Youth Committee to approach Shiᶜi leaders to act for reconciliation. The Sunni Committee included ᶜAbdul Raḥmān al-Bākir, ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Shamlān, ᶜAbdulla al-Zain, ᶜAli al-Wazzān, ᶜAbdul Raḥmān ᶜAbdul Ghaffār, none of whom were from the traditionally powerful families, but from the new middle class. A Shiᶜi Committee was established after this owing to the efforts of the same group. It consisted of Sayyid ᶜAli bin Sayyid Ibrāhīm who was an eminent religious leader, Muḥsin al-Tājir, ᶜAbd ᶜAlī al-ᶜAlaiwāt, ᶜAbdulla Abu Dīb, ᶜAbdulla Abu Hindī and Ḥasan al-ᶜArādī. Al-Tājir and al-ᶜAlaiwāt were notables and participants in the 1930's movements. The last three were merchants. The committees held two secret meetings at al-ᶜArādī's house in Rās Rummān. They decided there in the second meeting to hold a comprehensive meeting at the Jumuᶜa Mosque in Muḥarraq on the 15th Ramaḍān 1372 A.H. (1952). They agreed to make preparatory contacts within their own sects in towns and villages, which would allow them to form a committee to study the general situation in the country.(112) On the second day each committee contacted its supporters, but their efforts were sabotaged by the ruler. The Government issued a curfew and an order forbidding meetings. In the Spring the Government appointed a committee consisting of four leading persons, two Shīᶜis and two Sunnis, to

dissipate the sectarian tensions which threatened the stability of Baḥrain.(113) The aim was to eliminate the political group before it could achieve popularity. Both sects efforts towards reconciliation failed, because of the ruler's anger at the secret meetings held by the opposition leaders and owing to the deportation of al-Bākir - the most active member of initial political group - (he was sent to Lebanon on the 28th June 1954). The renewal of sectarian conflict in the summer of 1954 confirmed the failure.(114) The political activities of the Baḥrainī nationalist movement during the spring of 1954 coincided with the appearance of anonymous letters, leaflets and newspaper articles attacking the autocratic rule, Belgrave personally and Belgrave's clique. Al-Bākir reported that the leaflets were signed with fictitious names, sometimes by the "National Front," or the "Black Palm." The leaflets were in fact his own work, as he later confessed. The typing and distribution was executed by a certain Ibrāhīm bin ʿAlī Kānoo (Secretary in the Secondary School and the Director of Broadcasting from 1955), who received Rs.20 for each operation from Al-Bākir.(115)

On the 15th June 1954 there were sectarian clashes between the workers at the Refinery gates. Shīʿis and Sunnīs from neighbouring villages were injured, one Sunnī Arab being killed. The people involved in the fight were tried on the 30th June and a number of them from both sects were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment. Ḥasan al-Māganah, a Shīʿī notable of Sitra was amongst them. The next day, the 1st July, after the case had been heard,

there was a mass meeting of Shīᶜis in a mosque opposite the fort, in which they were held. Violent speeches were delivered by religious leaders and others and the crowd advanced on the fort with the intention of liberating the Shīᶜī prisoners. Belgrave reported that shots were fired and four Shīᶜīs were killed in the crowd and several others wounded, as the crowd refused to disperse.(116) Al-Bākir stated that nine men were killed, and not the official four.(117)

There was a further demonstration later in the day led by Shīᶜī leaders carrying the bodies of the dead men into the Political Agency before taking them to the Cemetery for burial. They covered the coffins in British flags and called for British protection, in the face of persecution by the regime. Although the majority of the Shīᶜī notables and educated people were alarmed by the killing, they violently criticised the behaviour of the Shiᶜi.(118)

On the following day, the 2nd July, a general island-wide nine-day strike of protest by Shīᶜī workers was announced by their leaders. A large proportion of the Shīᶜis working in BAPCO took part and commercial transactions were crippled by the strike.(119)

After the deportation of al-Bākir 'the five' recruited Moḥammad al-Shīrāwī a journalist, and Ibrāhīm Fakhrū, a merchant, to take part in their secret activities. During the summer of 1954, the original political group held many secret meetings in private

houses, trying to organise a framework for their political activities. Each member of this group was asked to submit a list of candidates sympathetic to their aims. They agreed on a hundred and twenty names but decided not to divulge them to the public for fear of government reprisals. The proposed persons were intended to link the original political group to the masses.(120)

The secret political activities of this group coincided with al-Bākir's endeavours to discuss the political dilemmas abroad and with the strike of bus and taxi drivers on the 25th September, the same year. This strike was in oppositin to the Government's introduction of compulsory third-party insurance. Belgrave reported that it was organised by the 'five'.

The Government permitted the formation of a local insurance company after the mediation of two notables Manṣūr al-ᶜUrayyiḍ and Khalīl al-Muʾayad. In fact the national insurance company called Ṣundūq al-Taᶜwīḍāt al Taᶜāwunī (the Co-operative Compensation Bureau) was run by the political opposition. The administrative committee which was composed of leading merchants and taxi drives included al-Bākir, who returned to Baḥrain a few days before the strike, and al-Shamlān.(121) Although the conditions of the new law were not altered and third-party insurance remained compulsory, the formation of the national insurance company Ṣundūq al-Taᶜwīḍāt al-Taᶜāwunī was the first achievement of the nationalist reform movement. As a national company it attracted the bus and

taxi drivers of both sects and was a successful competitor to the foreign insurance companies. It was on this account the first fruit of nationalist unity.(122)

The success of the opposition group irritated Belgrave who considered the dominance of the opposition in the national insurance company as a threat to the government's power. Therefore Belgrave decided to withdraw al-Bākir's passport, granted earlier in 1948, without consulting the ruler, although Belgrave had mentioned to al-Bākir in a letter that the ruler had ordered him to withdraw his passport. The ruler denied knowledge of this when al-Bākir's sympathisers intervened.(123)

The underground opposition group arranged for a public meeting at the al-Khamīs mosque on the 6th october 1954. The hundred persons were instructed by the original political group to call the meeting which was attended by people from both sects. Five decisions were announced to the public there:

> "the refusal to accept the withdrawal of al-Bakir's passport, the mobilisation of the people to come together in a solid line, the plan to hold a general meeting a week later in Sanabis to form a united front, the election of representatives to pursue the implementation of the front's demands, the establishment of an oath of loyalty to the united front to be invoked at the opening of every private meeting."(124)

It is worth noting that the political activities of the uprising of the mid-fifties in Baḥrain followed the same techniques as the uprising of the 1920's in Iraq.(125) There was a particular link in the form of the Iraqi religious speakers, lecturing in Baḥrain for the

period of ᶜāshūr. Whereas normally their lectures were confined to the ma'ātim, during the mid-fifties they spoke also in clubs and mosques, where the political meetings took place. Meetings, under the pretexts of religious occasions, were organised and led by popular representatives. It became clear that the purpose of the meeting at al-Khamīs Mosque was only outwardly to protest at the withdrawal of al-Bākir's passport. In fact it was meant to announce publicly the establishment of a political organisation. Therefore this meeting was a preparation for subsequent meetings in which the Baḥrainī nationalist movement came face to face with the Government.

On the 13th October 1954, a public meeting was held at Sanābis village, attended by a large number of people representing both sects. It was a crucial meeting which nominated and organised the leadership of the nationalist movement for the popular uprising of the mid-fifties. In this meeting the following decisions wer taken:

> "120 names were deputed to constitute the 'general assembly'(126), which in turn nominated eight representatives,
> The representatives were known as the High Executive Committee (HEC),
> The HEC was elected by the general assembly at the same meeting."(127)

It included three of the original underground political group ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Shamlān, Ibrāhīm Fakhru, ᶜAbdul Raḥmān al-Bākir and five additional members Ibrāhīm bin Musa, Sayyid ᶜAlī bin Sayyid Ibrāhīm, Muḥsin al-Tājir, ᶜAbdulla Abu Dīb and Abd ᶜAlī al-ᶜAlaiwāt. The HEC was drawn from all sects according to the policy of nationalist brotherhood. Al -Bākir was elected as Secretary General

for the HEC. At the same time a shadow committee of eight, parallel to the HEC was nominated. The four members of the underground political group who were left aside - Ḥasan al-Jishshī, Maḥmūd al-Mardī, ʿAlī al-Tājir and Moḥammad al-Shīrāwī - were amongst them. Additionally it was decided that, the general assembly should be summoned monthly, as well as for urgent matters. It was agreed also that the HEC would represent the people before the authorities, and the secretary general would be responsible for the execution of its resolutions, the collection of the contributions and signatures confirming the legitimacy of the HEC's representation. In the same meeting the general assembly nominated the HEC to present the most urgent reform requirements:

a) The formation of a Legislative Council,

b). The enactment of a civil and a criminal code,

c). The establishment of a trade union for indigenous labour force,

d). The formation of an appeals court staffed with qualified judges.(128)

The HEC declared itself publicly on the same day of the meeting at Sanābis.(129) This announcement was later considered to instigate the uprising of the mid-fifties or <u>Ḥarakat al-Hay'a</u>.(130)

At the end of October Abu Dīb and bin Musa who represented the HEC submitted a petition to the ruler which included the afore-mentioned requirements. Some copies were sent to the British Foreign Office, the Political Resident, the Political Agent and Belgrave. Although the

members of the HEC described themselves as reformist representatives of the people, the ruler refused to recognise them as his people. He retained their petition, and neither then nor subsequently acknowledged that they had any official status.[131] The ruler was convinced of the necessity of the reforms demanded but at the same time he regarded the movement as an attempt to reduce his power. These demands were similar to those of the nationalist reform movement of 1938; in fact the nationalists of the mid-fifties can be seen as an extension or revival of the earlier reform movement. In 1974 a former member of the HEC, now Baḥrainī ambassador to Tunis, maintained that the new movement wished to strengthen the position of the ruler i.e. to diminish Belgrave's role, and to reinforce his relationship with his people.[132] In 1982 another former HEC member confirmed this interpretation of policy.[133] In their view misunderstanding between the two sides - the ruler and the HEC was complicated by Belgrave's interference.

On the next day, the beginning of December 1954, the ruler issued a proclamation announcing that his Government was about to take, and had already taken certain measures to resolve matters contained in the petition. Whilst the ruler was aware of the inevitability of reform he was not prepared to be manipulated by the reform movement. Al-Bākir reported that the ruler's denial of the demands of the HEC was influenced by British officials, especially Belgrave.[134]

The HEC then began to mobilise its popular support in order to convince the government of its legitimacy - two public gatherings were organised by the HEC during religious celebrations. The first was held at the Mu'min Mosque on the 20th Ṣafar on the occasion of the fortieth day of mourning for Imām Ḥusain's martyrdom and the second was held on the 12th Rabī^{c} al-Awwal 1374 A.H, the birthday of the Prophet Muḥammad. The second gathering was attended by twenty thousand people from various towns and villages, including women in large numbers. Speakers from both sects criticised directly the government's administration and called for liberty and justice in their speeches and poetry.(135)

During the same period al-Bākir formed a Consultative Committee and began to contact British Agency officials, without prior consultaton with the HEC, to investigate the attitude of the British Government towards the popular movement. He concluded that the British officials were generally in favour of the reforms with the exception of the proposed legislative council and labour union. The British, he thought, were doubtful on account of the lack of democratic experience in Baḥrain, but he also appreciated that the British must have been reluctant to allow a Legislative Council to destabilise the present balance of power, or a labour union to improve conditions for the indigenous labour force at the expense of foreign companies' profit margins: both were inimical to British and allied interests.(136) He discovered British respect for

the reform movement as a well organised entity, and was made aware that its suppression would therefore reflect badly on the British Labour Government.

Al-Bākir had unveiled the British ambiguity towards the situation. On the one hand, they were aware of the extent to which the rise of democratic produce could displace their own interests; on the other they knew that only the implementation of the reforms would ease tension, and that the suppression of the movement would inflame the situation, possibly to the advantage of the Nationalist Reform Movement. Unsurprisingly, the Baḥraini Government was advised to counter the movement with the most delicate diplomacy.(137)

Al-Bākir's popular Committee (HEC) responded to the findings with moves to gain international support. The HEC sent letters to a number of Kings, presidents and international organisations. This move successfully proved that the movement was prepared to work intelligently and peacefully for reform. King Saᶜud bin ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz and the Iraqi mujtahids were contacted.(138) The movement had high hopes of the involvement of the latter. The HEC counted on support from them in view of their earlier involvement in the Iraqi uprisings of the 1920's and 1930's, and their advocation of national unity in publications (especially in Sawt al-Bahrain) during the early 1950's. It was generally considered that their intervention would clinch the matter, creating a consensus of opinion which the ruler would be unable to resist. However, al-Bākir stated that the only reply received was from King Saᶜud, who advised them to

deal 'politely' with the ruler to achieve popular demands.(139)

Continuing mediation between the ruler and the HEC; two leading notables (Manṣūr al-ᶜUrayyiḍ and Aḥmad Fakhru) contacted the ruler in order to find a compromise, but failed.(140) The failure of these efforts led the HEC to exert more direct pressure on the government. A general strike took place for a week on the 4th December 1954.(141) It was a peaceful one: the popular leaders simply wanted to show the government their influence amongst the people, to achieve official recognition of their representation and the approval of the demands.

The strike was immediately effective: the ruler appointed a committee of both sects to examine popular views on Education, Public Health and the Law Courts. The committee recommended the establishment of two permanent committees for eduction and public health. It was reported that the HEC unsuccessfully attempted to boycott the task of this survey by preventing people from appearing before it.(142) Tension between the government and its opposition increased. The ruler regarded the emergence of a popular council as a challenge to his legitimate authority, and denied negotiations with its members. The HEC regarded the appointment of the afore-mentioned committees by the ruler as a challenge to its existence. The general strike of December 1954 demonstrated the popular support behind the HEC, and indicated that solidarity was based on national and not on tribal, sectarian or racial interests.

Ibrāhīm Fakhrū remembered that during the general strike of December 1954, Shaikh Du^c^aij the youngest brother of the ruler contacted the HEC by proxy. He agreed to join their opposition movement if they would promise to support him as a ruler, in place of his brother. The members of the HEC rejected the offer because their reform movement was not hostile to the ruler personally but against autocratic rule in general and Belgrave's dominance of the Government administration, in particular.(143) Al-Bākir's memoirs confirm this analysis.(144)

The Nationalist Reform Movement was composed of notables, merchants, teachers, government officials, students and the indigenous labour force, the major strength behind this movement. Members of the HEC realised the importance of the working classes to the success of a popular uprising, and wanted to convince them that their leadership would continue to pay attention to the needs of the working classes.

To obtain the confidence of the Working Class they established "Ittiḥād al-^c^Amāl al-Baḥrānī" (the Baḥrainī Labour Federation), headed by Moḥammad al-Shīrāwī, a member of the shadow committee. The Federation included a further eleven representatives and a fund to finance its projects and expenditure. The decision had been made, with others, on the 8th February 1955 by the HEC. Other decisions included the sending of a memorandum to the ruler to remind him of the previous petition and of the persistence of the people in their demands.(145) Al-Shīrāwī the current editor of the Baḥrainī weekly newspaper al-Aḍwā' published

in the mid 1960's a number of articles in the Baḥrainī papers for two reasons: Firstly, to promote political consciousness amongst the labourers, secondly, to prompt the Government and the Companies to improve the conditions of labourers.(146) The Baḥrainī Labour Federation was the first achievement of the uprising of 1954-56, and attracted a large number of labourers and civil servants. It was reported that the number of labourers in this Federation amounted during the summer of 1955 to about fourteen thousand.(147)

The success of the Baḥrainī nationalist reform movement threatened the Government and the foreign companies' influence. The major foreign companies were BAPCO, Gray McKenzie (G.M.) - shipping and transportation company - and BOAC. The main complaints of the Baḥrainī labour force were:

a). The dismissal of native labourers to be replaced by foreigners without the payment of adequate compensation.

b). Discrimination against native labour, despite equal ability, in wages and increments.

The most important requirements of the labourers were:

a). The elimination of social instability through the creation of reasonable labour relations.

b). Improvement in conditions, including increased wages, life insurance and adequate compensation in case of accident.

c) Jobs for all native labourers and the occupation of senior posts by Bahrainis.

d). The protection of the future of the indigenous labour force, through the organisation of foreign immigration according to proper plans, accommodated to the needs of the society.(148)

The Government was embarrased by the formation of the Baḥrainī Labour Federation, under the HEC. The latter deliberately maintained the level of tension, sending a memorandum to the ruler and holding frequent public meetings. The HEC, employing every possible means to their end, also sent a Memorandum to the British Government through the Political Agent, dated the 21st February 1955. In this document, the HEC took a moderate and conciliatory stance, describing the political and the administrative problems which faced Baḥrain but admitting that progress towards western educational and social standards had been made.These diplomatic overtures were successful and the Political Agent on the 17th March 1955 advised them to co-operate with the government. The British Government mediated between the HEC and the ruler during 1955 and early in 1956. By this time the position of the HEC and the British had so altered that the HEC were confident that their former opposition would influence the ruler in their favour.(149)

In the meantime the pressure was maintained by the HEC. It began to hold public meetings in mosques, ostensibly for religious occasions, to provide a political

platform. Pamphlets and notices were issued attacking both individuals and the backward administration of the Government, and ordering members of public bodies to abstain from attending meetings. Whilst the HEC were peacefully campaigning - more extreme groups were increasing the pressure in other ways. Anonymous threatening letters and telephone calls occurred which became more violent as time passed, and the Government ignored the signs of unrest. It was reported also that the same pro-regime merchants were threatened with the burning of their property.(150)

Religious speakers especially Iraqis such as Sayyid Jābir, Sayyid Moḥammad al-Shikhiṣ and Sayyid Mahdī al-Suwaichī played a prominent role in the nationalist reform movement. On the occasion of ᶜāshūr in 1955 and 1956 they delivered political lectures at ma'ātim, mosques and clubs, reminding their audience that according to the Islamic tradition, the use of force was permissible as a last resort. The religious speakers attempted to sustain unity between the people through their lectures. The battle of Karbala - an Islamic revolt, opposing the oppressin of Umayyad rule during the reign of Yazīd - was represented as an heroic analogy. The innovatory content of their speeches attracted both sects to attend the lectures, and especially young people.

The role of the Iraqi religious speakers was perhaps more significant than that of the national press, it could even be said that national unity was their achievement.

Whereas the effects of the latter were confined to educated people, the impact of the former reached the illiterate majority.

Other members of the Iraqi intelligentsia participated in the propagation of cultural and nationalist consciousness during the early 1950's, by means of articles and lectures in the Baḥraini clubs. ᶜAlī al-Khāqānī, a highly cultured man and well-known author delivered for example in Jumāda al-Thānī 1371 A.H.(1951) two lectures in the clubs. First was at al-ᶜUrūba Club, entitled "Naẓrat al-Islām fi al-Mustaqbal" (Islamic views in the Future) and the second was at Ahli Club entitled "al-Shiᶜr al-Siyāsī fil-ᶜIrāq" (Political poetry in Iraq).

It is clear that the uprising of the mid fifties was built on intellectual activities in the clubs, ma'ātim and mosques.(151)

The development of the uprising in 1955 coincided with the emergence of an underground political party Jabhat al-Taḥrīr al-Waṭanī al-Baḥrāniyya (The National Liberation Front of Baḥrain), early in 1955. This was the first communist group in Baḥrain believing in the efficacy of violence. The group published an underground newspaper called Ṭalīᶜat al-Niḍāl (The front guard of the battle).(152) Al-Bākir reported that the peaceful efforts of the national reform movement were hindered by the extremism of this recently established communist group, by the royal entourage, the sectarianism of the Moslem Brotherhood and by opportunists from various factions. Proclamation No.15 issued by the HEC on the 8th February 1955 criticised all these counter-productive activities and

called on people to ignore the radical and irresponsible in order to protect the reform movement from a Government clampdown.(153)

The national reform movement was strengthened by support from abroad especially from Egypt.
In April 1955 Nasser stopped at Bahrain Airport for a few hours on his way to attend the Bandung Conference, to be greeted by a hugh crowd. Al-Bākir, the popular leader, met Nāsser on the plane, but the authorities attempted to hide the news of Nāsser's passage through Baḥrain, in order to avoid diturbances. In June 1955 a Baḥraini delegation representing the nationalist reform movement attended the Islamic Conference held in Port Sa'īd. This delegation included al-Shamlān, al-Jishshī, ᶜAli Sayyār the editor of al-Watan, Aḥmad Qasim al-Sunni, Rāshid al-Qūti, Muṣtafa Jaᶜfar, Yaᶜqūb Yūsuf Maḥmūd, Ḥassan al-Khayyāṭ and Moḥammad Qāsim al-Shakar.(154) Al-Shamlān and the well-known journalist Sayyār(155) were amongst the speakers. The uprising and the general instability of Baḥrain were on the agenda of the Conference.(156)

In Autumn of 1955 a large number of Baḥrainī people, including the ruling family gave financial aid to Egypt for rearmament. In November 1955 a portrait of Nāsser was sold for Rs.3,000 during a football match to raise funds.(157)

When Sādāt, the President of the Egyptian Parliament, visited Qaṭar at the end of February 1956, he also was greeted by a hugh crowd. The enthusiasm reflected the influence of the Nāsserite regime in Baḥrain - it was seen as proof of the potential strength of the national reform

movement, and caused a greater degree of recognition for the movement from the Baḥrain authorities. This became evident when the Islamic Conference and the Egyptian Government granted twenty scholarships for higher education at Cairo universities and Institutions. The offer was taken up by the HEC.(158) In sympathy with the Baḥrainī movement the Egyptian propaganda machine criticised the policy of the Baḥrainī Government and attacked British influence there. Both the Egyptian and the pro-Nāsser press in Lebanon, supported the reform uprising of the mid-fifties.

The increase of the HEC's influence in Baḥrain and abroad through the national press, the Baḥrainī Labour Federation and Ṣundūq al-aᶜWīḍāt al-Taᶜāwunī led the Government to issue certain codes to restrict the activities of its opposition.

In June 1955 the ruler appointed a committee of four government officials as censors of the local press.(159) The effects of their code appeared clearly on the pages of al-Waṭan and al-Mīzān papers. The leaders of the opposition movement were deeply resentful of this code and inevitably called for its abolition.(160) The Government maintained that censorship had become necessary because of the prevalence of irresponsible and mischievous articles.

The local newspapers al-Mīzān and al-Waṭan, on more than one occasion, provoked protests from the rulers of neighbouring states and tended also to stir up ill-feeling between the Government and the people of Baḥrain.(161) At

the same time the Government issued a criminal code; but the influence of the leadership of the popular uprising led to the abolition of both the press censorship and the Criminal Code in 1956. The members of the HEC maintained that the aim of both codes was the elimination of the reform movement.(162)

The influence of the HEC increased at home and its support from abroad especially from Egypt grew: Britain was driven to persuading the ruler to negotiate with members of the HEC. Al-Shamlān and Sayyid ᶜAlī represented the new power at a meeting with the ruler at Rifāᶜ Palace on the 11th Rabīᶜ al-Awwal 1375 A.H. (1955). Both sides agreed to the appointment of specialised judges in courts, the formation of separate boards for education and health, with half the members elected by a popular vote and the introduction of a criminal code.(163) On the second day the ruler announced the formation of the Education and Public Health boards but when the elections for the Education board were held only three persons were found to be willing to stand as candidates against the HEC and none of the three were elected. The proceedings were held up by objections to the ruler's nominees raised in declarations and mass gatherings by the HEC. When the time arrived for the election to the Public Health board only the HEC candidates were in the field.(164) These events confirmed the influence of the HEC to the region. Therefore the Government did not succeed in establishing the two boards until after the collapse of the uprising, then eight

members were nominated by the ruler on each board in November 1956.[165]

To reduce or to sidestep this influence the Government appointed a number of foreign experts to improve government administration. Dr. ᶜAbdul Razzāq Sanhūrī, a well-known Egyptian jurist was appointed as legal expert in 1955. In the same year a number of Baḥrainis belonging to the upper classes were appointed to senior posts. Amongst them were Musāᶜid al-Zayyānī who was appointed secretary to the Muḥarraq Municipal Council, and Ṣādiq al-Baḥārnah a merchant, who was appointed President of the Shīᶜī Waqf Committee in place of Muḥsin al-Tājir.[166]

The formation of Ittiḥad al-ᶜAmal al-Baḥrānī (the Baḥrainī Labour Federation) by the HEC early in 1955 forced the government to establish a Labour Legislation Committee to draft a labour law for the first time in Baḥrain. The Government then announced in April 1955 that elections would be held to select three labour representatives to sit on the tripartite committee. The Government was represented on the nine-man committee by two members of the ruling family - one of whom was chairman; and a British employee of the Baḥrainī Government. The employers sent a BAPCO manager and an important merchant and contractor and the workers were represented by three elected Baḥrainī labour force representatives - one each from the Government sector, BAPCO and the independent commercial establishment. All three labour representatives had been endorsed by the HEC.[167] The committee was helped by a labour expert lent

by the British Ministry of Labour.(168)

This Committee held fifty-eight meetings between the 30th April 1955 and October 1956. Upon completing its work on the draft labour law, it was asked to frame an industrial compensation law. The Committee then submitted its proposed drafts to the Ruler for approval.

While the Committee was holding its meetings in 1956, the constituent committee of the Ittiḥād al-ᶜAmal al-Baḥrāni met on the 22nd February 1956 to establish the trade union as a recognised force and to arrange for elections. Several resolutions were made and submitted to the Government and the Labour Law Advisory Committee. It was resolved that:

I. A single Labour Organisation should have the right to represent the labour force state wide.

II. The labour law should incorporate a clause providing, (a) a cost of living escalator for general wage adjustment, (b) labour representatives for any joint consultative committee.

III. The Labour Law Committee should be prompted to agree its statutes as quickly as possible.

IV. An application for official recognition should be made to Ittihād al-ᶜAmal al-Bahrāini.(169)

The year 1956 was a crucial one for both the Government and the opposition. At this time competition for power reached a climax and the nationalist reform movement lost ground. The leading members were arrested under laws brought in by a "state of emergency" declared in November 1956. Demonstrations against the aggression on Egypt were organised by the HEC, renamed the Committee of National Unity Party - CNU, from March 1956 and approved by

the Government. Riots, however, resulted under the agitation of extremist groups; some the direct result of British interference. The British presence was evident in several instances. After the declaration of the state of emergency the British Army was called in to reinforce the Baḥrainī police force. The presence of reinforcement made the destruction of the CNU possible; popular resistance was expected and catered for. Finally, internal disputes reduced popular support and assured the Government's triumph.

After the disturbances it was revealed that four men, amongst them Sa^{c}oor Al-Isa, were bribed by a Sa^{c}udī, Fahad Ẓā^{c}in, to "create disturbances....." in order to mar the reputation of the reform movement. Police officers stated that "fires were made by foreigners and not by Bahrainī demonstrators." They added that "orders were given by the Police Commander not to arrest anyone who set fire to property, or threw stones, or set fire to cars.[170]

Violent disturbances caused by the newly influential nationalist reform movement after 1954 gave the Government an excuse to strengthen the police force. In 1956 the police were provided with a large number of motor vehicles and new equipment and a CID branch was established. When the Government decided to enlist police officers from Iraq owing to the difficulty of obtaining suitable recruits in Baḥrain, the HEC publicly opposed the decision. The committee had been alerted by a news leak, denied by the Government. Nevertheless, the appointment of only two Iraqi officers, and a few British officers was seen as an

act of appeasement.[171]

In March 1956 a number of incidents occurred in Baḥrain creating tension between the Government and the popular leadership. On the 2nd March British Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd made a short stop in Baḥrain on his way by air, to the East. The British Minister was received by the ruler, a member of his family and a number of Government officials. There had been a football match at Muḥarraq and the streets were crowded. By coincidence, the long procession of slow moving vehicles collided with the crowds at a narrow corner of Muḥarraq. There was a hostile demonstration; slogans were shouted against the British and Belgrave especially; cars, including the rulers car were kicked and stones were thrown at them. The riots undoubtedly damaged the reputation of the popular leadership, a fact which the British seized upon, accusing the HEC of organising disturbances, on behalf of Egypt. Nevertheless members of the HEC denounced the perpetrators whom they considered irresponsible.[172]

It was obvious that this incident increased the antagonism between Britain (together with the ruler) and the HEC. Plans were laid to sabotage the reform movement. The British realised that the success of the movement would weaken their influence in the Gulf, as had been the case in Kuwait.

On the 11th March another serious incident occurred caused by a quarrel between a Shīᶜī peddler and market inspector. The trader occupied a place in the fruit and vegetable markets at Manāma without authorisation. The

official called on a policeman who arrested the peddler and drove him to the municipal building near the market place. Other village peddlers objected and immediately besieged the municipal building. To rescue the policeman and seven municipal officials two parties of police were sent from the port, one party reached the building, but the other was delayed by an angry crowd some distance away. Inside the building policemen opened fire to disperse the crowd, and five persons were killed. The HEC was against the riots per se but at the same time the killing was unjustifiable and increased ill-feeling towards the government. Belgrave, the Police Commander, became the prime target of the crowds according to al-Bākir.(173)

The HEC announced a general strike in protest against the brutality of the policemen, which led to the deaths of five citizens. The HEC called on the Government to fulfil a number of demands. Amongst these were: the dismissal of Belgrave from his post; recognition of the HEC by the Government and an enquiry into the shooting incident which would ensure compensation for the families.(174)

During the strike bitter conflict broke out: private cars were attacked at night, streets were littered with nails to puncture tyres - some roads were blocked.

To reduce the influence of the HEC amongst the people the ruler took advantage of these disturbances, and appointed a court of enquiry to investigate the shooting incident. Belgrave was amongst the members of the court. At the same time the ruler announced the formation of the Administrative Council, on the lines of the Council in

Kuwait. It included members of the ruling family and upper classes, notables and merchants holding prominent posts in the Government, under the Chairmanship of Shaikh ᶜAbdulla bin Isa - the ruler's uncle. It was intended to be a body to which other organisations such as the HEC and members of the public, could refer. The members of the HEC realised the pre-emptive motive of its formation and therefore called on the people to boycott it. The HEC opposed the procedure of the formation which was based on appointments and not on democratic elections.(175) As a challenge to the Government, the trade union Ittiḥād al-ᶜAmal al-Baḥrānī, the off-spring of the HEC announced its proposals for a procedure for the election of members to the Administrative Council.

Popular opinion demanded the ruler's consent to a meeting with his preferred representatives of the HEC. Through British mediation he met al-Shamlān and Sayyid ᶜAlī to lay the foundation for further negotiations. He made the proviso that it should change its name, that its Secretary General should step down and that other political factions should have equal freedom of expression. The intention behind this last condition was to divide loyalties and create competition to the HEC. Al-Bākir was requested to leave Baḥrain for five months under threat of legal exile. Unlike the other seven members of the HEC, he did not have an assured position in the traditional heirarchy and was considered by the Shaikh to be dangerously extremist:

The HEC was then retitled the Committee of National Union (CNU) with al-Shamlān as Secretary General. Al-Bākir then left for the Lebanon, Egypt and Syria to obtain support for the national reform movement. He reported that, to obtain official recognition the demand for an elected Legislative Council had been omitted, the British, however, had given an oral promise that Belgrave would be released by the end of 1956.(176) The recognition of the CNU by the Government on the 18th March 1956 was considered a great victory for the popular uprising. Baḥrain then became the unique possessor in the Gulf region of a modern, legally recognised political party. Its membership was drawn from the educated and semi-educated. The achievement was impressive not only in Baḥrain but in the entire Gulf region. The CNU received congratulatory telegrams from the al-Nādī al-Thaqāfī al-Qawmī and the Nādī al-Muᶜullimīn (the teachers club) in Kuwait.(177) The CNU was closely tied to Egypt from which source it received active support and encouragement. The deportation of al-Bākir from Baḥrain on the 19th March, the second day after recognition of the CNU, gained him support not only from the Nāsserite regime but also from Syria and the pro-Nāsser groups in Lebanon. Al-Bākir held a number of press conferences in Beirut, Cairo and Damascus between March and September 1956. His violent speeches against the autocratic policy of the Baḥrainī Government and against the British were broadcast on the Cairo radio. It was

reported that during his propagandist efforts abroad, he realised the success and the continuation of the popular movement in Baḥrain could not be achieved without co-operatin with other regional movements. Therefore he and representatives from Kuwait, Qaṭar, ʿOmān and the two Yemens, North and South, had decided to open an office in Damascus named al-Khalīj Wal-Janūb al-ʿArabī (The Gulf and Arabian South). The representatives signed a charter to support the popular uprisings and revolts which opposed the reactionary regimes in the region. The failure of this project was caused by the collapse of the popular uprising in Baḥrain after the arrest of members of the CNU during the Suez War.(178)

It was obvious that although official recognition of the CNU was considered a great achievement for the nationalist reform movement, the Government's Strategy was not in vain. The recognition of the CNU gave the Government an excuse to recognise other political committees, in order to weaken the CNU's united popular front. Ḥasan ʿAbdul Rasūl bin Rajab, a Shīʿī notable, and certain members of the general assembly of the popular movement organised the Nationalist Pact. Bin Rajab was followed by influential persons who were considered traitors by the CNU and widely amongst the populace. At the same time Muḥsin al-Tājir a Shīʿī notable and member of the CNU withdrew from the Committee and retired from politics. "We will leave him to the judgement of God" - said al-Bākir.(179) The CNU then consisted of the regional seven members: four Sunnī and three Shīʿī.(180) During

March and April the CNU had exchanged a number of letters with the ruler outlining their political forum. The proposed boards of education and health; the unsatisfactory administrative council; press censorship and the police department were the principal reforms proposed.(181) Additionally a number of meetings had been held between representatives of the CNU, headed by al-Shamlān, and the Government, under the ruler, between May and June at Rifāᶜ Palace the ruler's residence.

A mutual absence of confidence led to the failure of these negotiations. In June the court of inquiry (established on the 16th March 1956 to investigate the murder of five Shīᶜī men) suddenly published its findings: although no one was charged, the police were evidently guilty of manslaughter. The sequence of events is not absolutely clear. It seems that the investigation into the shootings was largely a placatory measure. Once the government had apparently exculpated itself on that account, it did not feel inclined to continue the compromise of negotiations with the CNU. The majority of CNU members lacked political experience, a weakness which the government was prepared to use. The Government's attempts to divide the CNU were successful and the Hundred Committee lost members from the upper classes. Al-Shamlān telegrammed al-Bākir to request his immediate return to regain lost loyalties.

When al-Bākir returned home on the 27th September 1956 he was greeted by a large number of people at the airport. Despite his criticism of the Government's policy

and his violent attacks on the Belgrave dictatorship, he resumed his post as Secretary General of the CNU; the Government ignored his propagandist activities abroad.

Al-Bakir made two discoveries when he returned to Baḥrain. Firstly, the British, it seemed, planned to destroy the popular movement. Secondly, the personal ambition of certain members of the CNU had alienated the rank and file.(182)

After Nāsser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, al-Bākir in Damascus, held a press conference at the Semiramis Hotel. He declared that if Britain decided to invade Egypt, the Arab people in the Gulf would attack her properties there.(183) Therefore when the Suez War erupted on the 29th October 1956, violent disturbances took place in Baḥrain which allowed the government to take action against the nationalist reform movement. The CNU had been permitted by the government to organise peaceful strikes and mass meetings under police protection, and it did organise a mass meeting in Manāma on the 2nd November, and political speeches were made. After the speeches a huge crowd marched in a peaceful procession escorted by a number of police. The peaceful demonstration deteriorated into a violent riot, ignoring all agreements the leaders having lost control the offices of the British firm of Gray Mackenzie were set on fire, the windows of Government and British commercial houses were smashed, the European flats in Muḥarraq were burned and looted, and attempts were made to set a petrol station alight in the middle of the bazaar. The angry crowds continued their attacks on British

properties the following day, incited by Cairo broadcasts. Boats and machinery on a slipway owned by a British firm were destroyed. The premises (which belonged to the ruler) of the British owned newspaper were looted and burned. The Public Works office was set on fire and a vain attempt was made to burn down the Catholic Church. Many empty houses in Manāma were looted and burned after being evacuated the day before by the European occupants.(184) The government was given a propitious opportunity to arrest the popular leaders accusing them of organising these riots. The police reinforced by the British troops in Manāma and Muḥarraq, arrested Ibrāhīm Fakhru on the 2nd November. On the 5th November four leading members of the CNU, al-Shamlān, al-Bākir, al-ᶜAlaiwāt and Ibrāhīm bin Musa, were arrested. Some members of the general assembly were arrested, others fled to the neighbouring countries: Saᶜudī Arabia, Qaṭar, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon or Egypt. These politicians stayed abroad for different periods, between two months and fifteen years.

On the 22nd and 23rd of December the trial of the five members of the CNU was held at Budayyaᶜ village about seven miles outside Manama, remote enough to avoid violent repercussions. The tribunal consisted of ᶜAbdulla bin Isa the Senior Appeal Judge, Dᶜaij bin Ḥamad and ᶜAlī bin Aḥmad, all al-Khalīfah members. During the trial members of the CNU faced a number of accusations. Amongst the evidence were letters to a Minister of the Egyptian Government, written reports of conversations between members of the CNU and persons in Cairo. A document of doubtful authenticity

stating that steps were about to be taken, such as the killing of the ruler, certain members of his family and Belgrave, was included. Therefore the influential members of the CNU al-Shamlān, al-ᶜAlaiwāt and al-Bākir were sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment, Fakhru and bin Mūsa to ten years, despite their denial of the charges.(185) The other three members of the CNU: al-Tājir (who withdrew earlier in 1956), Sayyid ᶜAli and Abu Dīb were not arrested for reasons which in al-Bākir's opinion were vague.(186) The first three influential leaders were exiled to a prison on Saint Helena Island on the 28th December where they stayed until their release on the 13th June 1961. Their release was caused by the intervention of the U.A.R., of President Nkrumal of Guinea, of the Kuwaitī opposition groups and the pressures of the British Parliament and press. The British Government paid each of them an indemnity of 15,000.(187) Al-Bākir lived in Beirut and died in 1971, al-ᶜAlaiwāt in Iraq until his death in 1969, and al-Shamlān in Damascus. He returned to Baḥrain in the early seventies after independence and was elected Vice-Chairman of the Constituent Assembly of 1972. In 1974 he was appointed Ambassador to Egypt and later to Tunis. Ibrāhīm Fakhru and Ibrāhīm bin Musa received the worst treatment amongst the leaders of the CNU, spending nine years in prison at Jida Island.(188) The strike and demonstrations which occurred in Bahrain during November 1956 signalled the sympathy of the Arab people with Egypt, which was under threat from the tripartite aggression. Severe riots accompanied the demonstrations which were

incited by foreign agitators and threatened the Bahraini regime and the British interests. The British realised that Baḥrain, which was the cornerstone of their political and military influence, was threatened by the spread of support for Nāsserism. The Suez War led to the exploration of theories of nationalism which resulted in a growth in Nāsser's influence in the Arab world. To defend their influence and to protect the regime from popular resistance British forces occupied the key points in Baḥrain. At the same time a state of emergency was announced by the Government in early November, which gave the ruler the right to arrest, detain, or interrogate anyone suspected of threatening the security of Baḥrain. Therefore the nationalist papers such as al-Waṭan were suspended. Moreover prominent Iraqi religious speakers were banned from Baḥrain after 1956 for a decade. Sayyid Jabir who encouraged the solidarity of the Baḥraini people through his lectures during ᶜāshūr from 1952-1956 was a notable example. In the Independence era he was allowed to enter Baḥrain after 1971.

The popular demands of both uprisings of 1938 and 1954-56 were nearly the same. The continuation of Belgrave's power was the principal hindrance to the success of both movements. Although Mr. Smith was appointed by the ruler as Assistant Financial Adviser, Belgrave was forced to retire from his post in 1957 only after the deportation of the popular leaders and the collapse of the nationalist reform movement.

The continuation of tribal tendencies, disloyalty

amongst certain leaders and frequent unplanned strikes were factors in its disintegration. Fakhru, al-Shamlān, and Ali Sayyār believed that the principal mistakes of the movement were: the lack of a clear programme, the dictatorial tendencies of certain leaders, and their lack of political experience.(189)

The most considerable achievement of the popular movement of 1954-56 was the creation of national unity which the uprising of 1938 could not have achieved. After 1956 sectarian disputes disappeared. More than twenty students were sent to Egypt and other countries for higher studies, including Ibrāhīm al-Muʾayyad, Khalīfah al-bin ʿAlī and Moḥammad Ṣāliḥ.(190) The formation of Ittiḥad al-ʿAmal al-Baḥrānī was another remarkable achievement of the movement but the breakdown of the uprising damaged the status of this federation. It was dissolved after the collapse of the movement. Therefore the ruler postponed his approval of the draft labour law which was submitted to him in October 1956 by the Labour Law Advisory Committee. On the 10th October 1957 the Ruler approved the industrial compensation law and after making several major changes in the draft labour law, he approved it on the 12th November. The extent of the legislation had been severely limited in the absence of the CNU. Both laws were in effect at the beginning of 1958 when the Labour Department was established. The Labour Law remained in effect until 1976 when a new and more comprehensive code was approved by the ruler. The Labour Department became merely a facade, called by its supposed subjects: "dā'irat ʿama al-ʿUmmāl"

(The Department of Labourers' Blindness). As a result the labour force, which comprised two thirds of the population, continued to dominate the nationalist movement afterwards.

The movement also violently opposed the Iranian claim to Baḥrain in the local press and with political activities abroad. The relationship between the leadership of the movement and other politicians in the Middle East consolidated the power of the nationalist reform movement in the resistance to Iranian claims. Al-Bākir's memoirs provide the most extensive details of relations between the Baḥrainī movement and the Pan-Arabist groups in the Middle East. The account of his trial, in November-December 1956, relates that he had had very cordial relations since the early 1950's with Moḥammad Ṣiddīq Shanshal, one of the leaders of the underground *Istiqlāl* party in Iraq and Michal ^{c}Aflaq one of the founders of the Ba^{c}th party in Syria.[191] During his exile (the 21st March-23rd September 1956) al-Bākir visited Beirut, Cairo and Damascus. In Cairo he met a number of senior politicians such as Anwar al-Sādāt and ^{c}Abdul Qādir Ḥātim. He met also important figures from the media: Jamīl ^{c}Āref - the editor of *Majallat Ākhir Sā^{c}a*, Sāmī Hakīm the editor of the newspaper *al-Ahram* and Ahmad Sa^{c}id the director of *Ṣawt al-^{c}Arab* Radio. The Baḥrainī leader met, perhaps most significantly Abdul Khāliq Ḥassūna - the Secretary General of the Arab League, who promised him during a private meeting that he would try to persuade the members of the League to discuss the Baḥrainī question. In Damascus al-Bākir met the Syrian Foreign Minister, Akram al-Ḥorānī,

Michal ᶜAflaq, Khālid Bakdāsh - the Secretary of the Syrian Communist party, Moḥammad Ṣiddīq Shanshal, Sulaimān al-Nābulsī and Ḥamīd Franjiah. Al-Bākir attended the Conference of the Arab people held in Damascus in summer 1956. As the secretary of the CNU his position allowed him to give his view of the general situation of the Baḥrainī nationalist movement and to discuss its concerns with representatives of political groups in the Arab World who attended the same conference.(192) Without doubt al-Bākir's presence confirmed the status of the Baḥrainī popular movement abroad. After the collapse of the uprising of 1954-56 politically-minded Baḥrainī students, in exile in Arab countries such as Kuwait, Iraq and Syria, received a welcome from the opposition parties there. The employment offered in Kuwait was supplemented by Iraq, Syria and Egypt's grants to students in their respective countries. In the 1960's these graduates disseminated the political messages from abroad, the vast majority of them consolidating the appeal of the popular movements. Mutual agreement and aid continued when the Iranian claims to Baḥrain arose in the early 1950's; the Iraqi press denounced these claims unhesitatingly.(193) It was reported that their renewal caused the suggestion of the shaikhdom federation at that time.

The transcendence of sectarian disputes in the mid-fifties was demonstrated - and its value proved - by the eventual defeat of Iranian claims. Despite the attraction of Iran as the traditional homeland of the Shīᶜī, the new solidarity frustrated Iranian hopes. The

U.N. Security Council settled the dispute in 1970, endorsing the mission report which effectively recognised the aims of the nationalist movement:

> The majority of the people of Bahrain wish to gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent and sovereign state free to decide for itself its relations with other states.(194)

To ease popular discontent towards the government, the advisory office was abolished completely when Belgrave retired and was replaced by the office of the secretary to the Government. Mr. Smith the Assistant Adviser was appointed to the new post as Secretary to the Government until the end of 1969 when the State Council was established under Shaikh Khalīfa's (the ruler's brother) Presidency. The same Council became the Cabinet after independence on the 14th August 1971.

In simple terms the popular uprising was made possible by a commonness of purpose - the nationalist consciousness - spurred by the evidence of unequal treatment in industry and given form by the example of regional popular revolutions. The ruler accepted the necessity of reform but not the pressures of his inferiors, to him to co-operate was tantamount to a diminution of authority. The leaders of the movement meanwhile considered the continuation of autocratic rule as an insult to the intelligence of the people. Eventually, a limited improvement to the public services was made, especially in the health and education sectors. The uprising of the mid-fifties shook other shaikhdoms and the tribal regimes. It encouraged the people to demand the improvement of their

situation and prompted the rulers to consolidate their relations with Britain on the one hand and to improve the public services on the other - in order to protect their influence.

Footnotes : Chapter 4

1. F.O.371/8216/EA1905/4 Confidential letter of the 15th April 1950, from the British Residency, Baḥrain to the Foreign Office, London.

2. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1954, p.3

3. Loc. cit.

4. A famous religious college at Najaf where the majority of the prominent Shī^{c}i ^{c}ulamā' of Baḥrain graduated. Shaikh Moḥammad Zain al-Dīn is now a lecturer there.

5. He was known in Baḥrain as the "reformist speaker".

6. Baḥrain Annual Report of October 1952 - September 1953, P.37.

7. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1954, p.46.

8. Ibid, Report of 1955, p.43.

9. Baḥrain Annual Report of October 1952 - September 1953, p.37.

10. Al-Baḥrain, No. 92, the 5th December 1940; Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953, p.26 and 1954, p.34.

11. Ṣawt al-Baḥrain, No. 10, Second year 1371 A.H. (1951)

12. Al-Baḥrain, No. 110, 111, 114, 116, 123, 1941.

13. For details about the Military Revolt of May 1941, See Mushtāq, T., Awrāq Ayyāmī, vol.1 Dār al-Talī^{c}ah, Beirut, 1968; al-Rawi, I., Min al-Thawrah al-^{c}Arabiyyah al-Kubra ila al-^{c}Irāq al-Hadīth, Dār al-Kutub, Beirut, 1969; al-^{c}Umarī, K., Yūnis al-Sab^{c}āwī: Sīrat Siyasī ^{c}Usāmī, Wazarat al-Thaqāfah wal-I^{c}lām, Baghdād, 1980.

14. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.8

15. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1951, p.79.

16. Shaikh Isa the current Amir, Shaikh Khalīfa the current Prime Minister and Shaikh Moḥammad a prominent businessman.

17. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1952, pp.38, 77.

18. Ibid., Report of 1953, p.3.

19. Ibid., Report of 1954, p.3.

20. For details about Mossadegh's Government, see Donelan M.D. and Grieve M.J., op.cit., pp.88-93.

21. Gallman, W.J., op.cit., p.60.

22. Al-Dawoud, M.A., Ahādith ᶜan al-Khalīj al-ᶜArabi, Manshurāt Wazārat al-ᶜIlām, al-Tabᶜah al-Thaniyah. Baghdād, 1962, p.51.

23. Al-Jamālī, M.F., al-ᶜIrāq al-Hadīth, date and publisher unknown., pp.101-115.

24. Gallman, W.J., op.cit., pp.56-57.

25. Simon, R.S. "The Hāshimite Conspiracy: Hashimite Unity attempts, 1921-1958," International Journal of Middle East, 5 (1974), pp.314-327; see also Alford, C. "The Syrian Coups d'Etat of 1949," The Middle East Journal, vol.4, No. 1, January 1950, pp.1-11; the Lebanese weekly Journal Mir'at al-Sharq al-Awsat, vol.3, the 20th January 1957, pp.10-11.

26. Gallman, W.J., op.cit., p.158.

27. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.8.

28. Al-Watan: half monthly Baḥrainī newspaper, No. 13, the 18th November 1955 published an essay entitled "The Crown Prince who will be a King."

29. Batatu, H., op.cit., pp.551; 666-670.

30. For details see al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., pp.94-98; also ᶜAmin, A. M. and others, Tarikh al-Iraq al-Muᶜāṣir, Wazārat al-Taᶜlīm, al-ᶜĀlī wal-Baḥth al-ᶜIlmī, Baghdād University, 1980, pp.155-6.

31. Marlowe, J., Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism, the Cresset Press, London, 1961, p.179.

32. Al-Qāfilah: a half monthly Bahrainī newspaper No. 3, the 5th December 1952.

33. Al-Waṭan, No. 24, the 1st June 1956, pp.9, 10.

34. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1940, p.1 and 1941, p.5.

35. Ibid., Report of 1943, p.6.

36. Ibid., Report of 1956, p.32.

37. Baḥrain Annual Report of February 1942 - January 1943.

38. Bahrain Administration Review Report of 1954, pp.33, 34, 36.

39. Private information.

40. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.38.

41. Personal interview with Dr. Ja^{c}fār Hummādi, Lecturer at the Education College, Baghdād University, in May 1982.

42. Khuri, F.I., for details about clubs and ma'ātim in Bahrain see Khuri, F.I., Tribe and State in Bahrain, the University of Chicago Press/Chicago and London, 1980, pp.154-193.

43. Bahrain Administration Review Report of November 1947 - November 1948, pp. 68, 69 and the Report of 1956, p.50.

44. Belgrave, J.H.B.D., "Oil and Bahrain," The World Today, the 7th February, pp.76-83, the page in question is 82.

45. Bahrain Administrtion Review Report of October 1949 - October 1950, p.3 and Report of 1947 p.5.

46. Ibid. Report of October 1951-September 1952, p.3.

47. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.40-45.

48. Ibid., p.45.

49. Al-Khamīlah, No. 1 and 2, October 1952.

50. For more detail about the Bahraini press and its role see al-Shāyjī, H., al-Sahāfah fi al-Kuwait wa al-Bahrain Wa Atharuhā fi al-Haraka al-Adabiyya, from its emergence until the independence. PH.d. thesis submitted to the Faculty of Arabic, University of al-Azhar, 1980.

51. F.O. 371/91633/EQ1017/3, letter of the 16th May, 1951 from J.M. Troutbeck to Foreign Office.

52. F.O. 371/91636/EQ1023/1, letter of the 24th January 1951, from H.B. Mack to Foreign Office, London.

53. Loc. cit.

54. Loc. cit.

55. F.O. 371/91633/EQ1017/9, letter of the 30th October, 1951, from Anthony Eden to Mr. Beely.

the 29th June 1951.

71. Aitchison, C.U., A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and neighbouring countries (Delhi, 1933) vol.xi, No. xxii, p.237 and No. xiii, p.238.

72. F.O. 371/91281, letter of the 9th July 1951, from the Political Resident, Baḥrain to His Highness Shaikh Sir Salmān bin Ḥamad al-Khalīfa, Ruler of Baḥrain.

73. F.O. 371/91281, letter from His Highness Shaikh Sir Salmān bin Ḥamad al-Khalīfa to the Political Resident, Baḥrain.

74. IOR: R/15/2/111, letter of the 12th April 1926, from Shaikh Ḥamad bin Isa al-Khalīfa the Deputy Ruler of Baḥrain to the Political Agent, Baḥrain, see also R/15/1/714/2, report for 1926, p.33.

75. F.O. 371/68319, Confidential report of the 17th April, 1948 from the Political Resident to the Foreign Office, London, on the subject of British Advisers for the three more important Persian Gulf States.

76. Loc. cit.

77. F.O. 371/68331, Confidential letter of the 5th April, 1946, from the Political Resident (P.R.) Baḥrain to the Secretary to the Government of India in External Affairs Department, New Delhi; F.O. 371/68331, confidential letter of the 14th August, 1947, from the Political Agent (P.A.) Baḥrain to the P.R. Baḥrain.

78. F.O. 371/68331, Personal and confidential letter of the 10th May 1946 from the P.R. Baḥrain to the India Office, London.

79. F.O. 371/68331, Note on discussion with Mr. Belgrave at Baḥrain on the 16th March 1946.

80. F.O. 371/68331, Personal and confidential letter of the 3rd September, 1946, from the P.R. in the Persian Gulf to the India Office, London.

81. Loc. cit.

82. Loc. cit.

83. F.O. 371/68331, petition of the 21st July 1947 sent to the Minister of Colonies, London, signed by the "Baḥrain Island Population".

84. Ibid., p.2.

85. Ibid., p.3.

86. F.O. 371/68331, Confidential letter of the 5th September 1947, from the P.R. in the Persian Gulf, Baḥrain to the Commonwealth Relations Office, London; F.O. 371/68331, Confidential letter of the 14th August, 1947, from the P.A. Baḥrain to the P.R. Baḥrain.

87. F.O. 371/68331, Personal letter of the 3rd December 1947, from the P.R., Baḥrain to the Commonwealth Relations Office, London.

88. There were 51 Baḥrainis and 49 of other nationalities: 25 Iranians, 8 ᶜOmānis, 2 Iraqis, 10 Saᶜudis, 2 Baluchis, 1 Indian Moslem, 1 Qaṭari.

89. F.O. 371/68330. Secret Note on the Anti-Palestinian Partition Disturbances; F.O. 371/68330, letter of the 20th January, 1948, from E.P. Donaldson to Board of Deputies of British Jews.

90. F.O. 371/68330, Secret letter of the 27th December 1947, from the P.R. Baḥrain to the Commonwealth Relations, London.

91. F.O. 371/68331, Confidential letter of the 28th February, 1948, from the Commonwealth Relations Office to Foreign Office, London.

92. F.O. 371/91264/EA1019/1, Confidential despatch of the 20th April, 1951, from the P.R. Baḥrain to Foreign Office, London.

93. F.O. 371/74943/E7061/10115/91 G, Top Secret letter of 22nd June, 1949, from Foreign Office to the P.R., Baḥrain.

94. F.O. 371/91264/EA1019/2, Confidential despatch of the 2nd June, 1951, from the P.R. Baḥrain to the Foreign Office, London; F.O. 371/91264/EA1019/4, Confidential letter of the 16th June, 1951, from the P.R. Bahrain, to the Eastern Office Department, Foreign Office, London.

95. Loc. cit.

96. F.O. 371/91264, Report by Belgrave regarding the reaction of the Shiᶜis towards the Manama Municipal Council, p.4.

97. F.O. 371/91264/EA1019/4, Confidential letter of the 16th June 1951, from the P.R. Baḥrain to the Eastern Office Department, Foreign Office, London.

98. F.O. 371/91264, Confidential despatch of the 2nd

June, 1951 from the P.R., Baḥrain to the Foreign Office, London.

99. Al-Qāfila , No. 8, the 13th February 1953.

100. Sawt al-Baḥrain, No. 5, Third year 1371 (1952) pp.10-12, 27.

101. The mujtahid is a legislator capable of giving a fatwa or binding opinion.

102. Sawt al-Baḥrain, No. 6, second year, Jumāda al-Thānī, 1371 A.H. (1951), p.5.

103. For details of the Middle Euphrates' Uprising see, Macdonald, A.D., Captain, "The Political Developments in Iraq leading up to the Rising in the spring of 1935," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, January, 1936.

104. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953-4, p.46 and Report of 1956 p.4.

105. The original name was husainiyyāt in the plural and husainiyya in the singular. Ma'ātim indicates the plural and ma'tam the singular.

106. Muḥarram. The specific meaning is the first ten days of Muḥarram.

107. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953-4, p.47.

108. Loc. cit.

109. Loc. cit.

110. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.64.

111. F.O. 371/68330, Secret Note on the Anti-Palestinian partition disturbances; Khuri, F.I., op.cit., p.199; al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.31-40.

112. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.59-66.

113. Ibid., pp.66-67; Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953-4, p. 48 and Report of 1956, p.4.

114. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.66-68.

115. Ibid., pp.45-46; Bāhrain Administration Review Report of 1953-4, p.48.

116. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953-4, pp.48-49 and Report of 1956, p.4.

117. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.68.

118. Ibid., p.69

119. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953-4, p.49.

120. Personal interview with Ibrāhīm Fakhru on the 25th May 1982 in Baḥrain.

121. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953-4, p.49; and the Report of 1956, p.4.

122. Ibid., pp.72-3.

123. Ibid., p.73.

124. Ibid., p.74.

125. Munᶜim, H.H., Muhammad Mahdī al-Basīr Shāᶜiran, Ministry of Information, Baghdād, 1980, pp.39-40.

126. The general assembly represented all the towns and villages of Baḥrain. It was called the hundred committee.

127. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.76-80; personal interview with Ibrāhīm Fakhru on the 25th May 1982 in Baḥrain.

128. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.77.

129. Ibid., pp.142-144.

130. The local name of the movement.

131. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.82-84; Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953-54, p.50.

132. Personal interview with ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Shamlān - the Baḥraini Ambassador in Cairo in Autumn 1974.

133. Personal interview with Ibrāhīm Fakhru in Baḥrain on the 25th May 1982.

134. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.84-5.

135. Al-Qāfila, Nos. 44 and 45, pp.1 and 2.

136. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.87-90; personal interview with ᶜAbdul ᶜAziz al-Shamlān in Autumn 1974 in Cairo.

137. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.87.

138. Ibid., pp.91, 93-4, 133.

139. Ibid., pp.91.

140. Ibid., pp.92-3.

141. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1953-4 p.5 and the report of 1956, p.4.

142. Loc. cit.

143. Personal interview with Ibrāḥim Fakhru on the 25th May 1982 in Baḥrain.

144. Al-Bākir, A., op. cit., p.96.

145. Ibid., pp.103-4, 155; for more details of the labour movement in Baḥrain see; Beling, W.A., "Recent developments in labour relations in Baḥrain," The Middle East Journal vol. 13, 1959, pp.156-69; Nakhleh, E.A., "Labour Markets and Citizenship in Baḥrain and Qatar", The Middle East Journal, Spring 1977, pp.143-156; Qubain, F.I., "Social Classes and Tensions in Baḥrain", The Middle East Journal, vol.9, Summer 1955, pp.269-280.

146. Al-Waṭan, No. 1, 2, 4 (2nd, 17th June; and the 15th July 1955).

147. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.487.

148. Ibid., pp.217-220.

149. Ibid., pp.104-123, 136.

150. Baḥrain Administration review Report of 1955, p.3.

151. Ṣawt al-Baḥrain, No. 6, Second year, Jumadā al-Thānī 1371 A.H. (1951), p.45.

152. ᶜAlī, S. Qadāyā al-Taharrur wa al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya fil-Baḥrain wa al-Khalij, Dār al-Farābī, Beirut, 1980, p.8; al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.264; al-Fajr, No. 35 the 15th July 1958, p.6.

153. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.154-7.

154. Al-Waṭan, No. 3, the first year, the 1st July 1955.

155. The current proprietor of the weekly "Majallat Ṣadā al- Usbūᶜ."

156. Al-Waṭan, No. 5, the first year, the 29th July 1955.

157. Ibid., No. 13, the 18th November, 1955.

158. Ibid., No. 1, the first year, the 2nd June 1955; Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, p.5.

159. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1955, p.80.

160. Sayyār, A.., "Muʾāmarah Likhanq al-Ṣaḥāfah", al-Waṭan,

No. 13, the 18th November 1955.

161. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1955, p.80.

162. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.162-165, 214.

163. Ibid., pp.100-101.

164. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, p.5; Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.101-2, 195-6.

165. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, p.3.

166. Ibid., Report of 1955, p.80.

167. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp. 487-488.

168. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1955, p.46.

169. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.217-220.

170. Eye witnesses report to the tribunal during the trial of the five members of the CNU on the 22nd and 23rd December 1956 quoted from al-Bākir; p.141.

171. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, pp.5, 52-3; al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.197.

172. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, p.5, al-Bākir A. op. cit., p.125.

173. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.198.

174. Ibid., pp.126-7.

175. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, p.6.

176. Loc. cit.; al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.130-132.

177. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.190-192.

178. Ibid., PP.133-137, 184-189; Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, p.6.

179. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.235.

180. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, p.6.

181. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.194-204.

182. Ibid., pp.138-9.

183. Ibid., p.136.

184. Baḥrain Administration Review Report of 1956, p.8.

185. Loc. cit.; al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.274-296.

186. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., p.235.

187. Ibid., pp.357-374, 387-410, 430-474.

188. A Baḥraini Island for long-term prisoners.

189. Personal interview with ᶜAli Sayyār and Ibrāhīm Fakhru in May 1982 in Bahrain, and with ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Shamlān in Autum 1974 in Cairo.

190. Personal interview with Ibrāhīm Fakhru: on the 25th May 1982 in Baḥrain.

191. Al-Bākir, A., op.cit., pp.245-247, 365.

192. Ibid., pp.238-247, 260.

193. Ṣawt al-Bahrain, No. 11, Dhul-Qaᶜdah 1371 A.H. (1951), p.44.

194. The Report of the Personal Representative of the Secretary General in charge of the Good Offices Mission, Baḥrain. UN. Doc.S/9772

Part Three

(Chapters Five and Six)

Nationalist Movements in Kuwait and Bahrain: The Impact of Iraqi Policy 1958 - 1961

Chapter Five : Kuwait

Page

1. <u>The Iraqi Revolution of the 14th July 1958</u>

The outbreak of the Iraqi Revolution paradoxically rescued both the Kuwaitī regime and the nationalist movement from extinction. Ghazī al-Daghistānī, Chief of General Staff, reported during his trial after the revolution that plan had been organised by al-Sa^{c}īd's Government - "Operation al-Mighwār" - to occupy Kuwait during the summer 1958.[(1)] The military plan had been organised despite the continuation of diplomatic contacts between Iraq, Britain and Kuwait. Al-Sa^{c}īd was anticipating the possibility of failure on the diplomatic front and wished to secure Kuwait's membership of the A.U., at all costs.

During the 1950's and 1960's oil royalties allowed the Kuwaitī Government to establish a large number of schools, hospitals and sophisticated modern cities. It had effected a rise in the annual per capita income from $50 in 1946 to $3,550 in 1968, the world's second highest. It had enabled the country to establish the world's most generous welfare state.[(2)]

The Government's ambitious plans to urbanise the shaikhdom were frustrated by the lack of skilled and unskilled native labour. The encouragement of immigration became necessary.

The following table details the development of labour immigration between 1957 -1961:-[(3)]

Years	Percentage			Population		
	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male
1957 Kuwaitis	55,0	26,3	28,7	113,622	54,468	59,154
Non-K	45,0	9,7	36,3	92,851	19,947	72,904
Total	100,0	36,0	64,0	206,473	74,415	132,058
1961 Kuwaitis	50,4	50,4	26,3	161,909	77,448	84,461
Non-K	49,6	49,6	36,1	159,712	43,466	116,246
Total	100,0	100,0	62,4	321,621	120,914	200,707

The Government gave preference to Arab labourers, despite the presence of other communities - the Indian, Pakistani, Iranian etc. The Arab communities were from the Gulf Shaikhdoms, Palestine, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Palestinians and Iraqis were in the majority. The number of Palestinians was estimated in 1982 at about 350,000, while there were estimated to be about 40,000 Iraqis in 1961, before the Kuwaitī-Iraqi dispute. The majority of them were in an area called "ʿUshairij", living in Ṣarīfās (huts) similar to those in Iraqi rural districts. A large number of Ṣarīfas were built in Baghdād itself when peasants began to migrate to the cities especially to Baghdād during the 1930's.[4] During Qāsim's rule Ṣarīfas were replaced by the Madīnat al-Thawra to improve the condition of the working class. The influx of Iraqi labourers was the result of difficult political conditions in Iraq. Iraq still functioned under a feudal

system in which the lower classes were effectually disregarded. In the upper echelons, however, there was considerable jockeying for power which resulted in a tense and unstable atmosphere. Faiṣal Jirī al-Sāmir, an Iraqi Socialist and doctor of Islamic History from Cairo University, was amongst the immigrants. He had lectured in the faculty of arts, Baghdād University, but during his residence in Kuwait in the 1950's he taught history at the Thānawiyyat al-Shuwaikh. His exile was caused by Iraqi government harrassment of opposition groups, especially the Communist Party. In Kuwait he published a number of articles in the newspaper al-Sha^{c}b, criticising the despotic rule of al-Sa^{c}īd's government. He was investigated by the police on the 12th July 1958 when he returned to Iraq after his resignation at the end of the school year 1957-58. The police decided to continue their investigation on the 15th July but the revolution of the 14th July rescued him from imprisonment.(5)

The Kuwaiti newspaper al-Sha^{c}b invited Mohammad Ṣiddīq Shanshal, the Iraqi pan-Arab and Secretary of Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl (Independence party), to deliver two lectures in the spring of 1958. In these lectures Shanshal savagely denounced the dictatorship of al-Sa'īd in Iraq. The Iraqi authorities planned to arrest him but the attempt was anticipated and sabotaged by appeals from the editor of al-Sha^{c}b to Nāsser.(6)

Kuwaiti Arab Nationalism became a formidable popular force alongside the wider pan-Arab movement during the 1950's and 1960's, due to the presence of Iraqi and other

Arab immigrants. Kuwait became the centre of pan-Arabism after the formation of al-Nādī al-Thaqāfī al-Qawmī (The Pan-Arabist Cultural Club). A great deal of support was gained from Kuwaitī students who had studied in Lebanese and Egyptian universities and institutions where pan-Arabist groups were active.

The Kuwaiti opposition became the most influential movement in the Gulf region for a number of reasons. ʿAbdulla al-Sālim's reign in Kuwait, from January 1950-1965 had provided for the development of an opposition. Both al-Sālim's liberalism and external political pressures accommodated the opposition movement. Kuwait became a sanctuary for politicians escaping from Iraq and other Gulf Shaikhdoms. A number of Baḥrainī politicians fled to Kuwait after the collapse of the popular uprising of the mid-fifties.

Dr. Aḥmad al-Khatīb, a respected Kuwaitī politician and the founder of the Pan-Arabist group reported in 1982 that,

> "The majority of the Iraqi politicians who fled from Iraq to Kuwait during the monarchical and republican eras were treated kindly by the Kuwaiti opposition groups. This sort of treatment and help was given to these people whether they stayed for a period or were in transit."(7)

The Kuwaitī nationalist movement was strengthened before the Iraqi Revolution by the formation of the Lajnat Ittiḥād al-Andiya (The Clubs Union Committee) or C.U.C. The C.U.C. represented all Kuwaitī Clubs. Regarding the role of this committee, Faiṣal al-Ṣāniʿ reported as

follows:

> "The CUC played a vital role in the growth of Pan-Arabism. It attempted to unite the nationalist and the pan-Arabist activities. But at the same time its intellectual, political and propagandist activities were considered to challenge the government. Therefore the government eliminated the opposition movement early in 1959 as soon as the opportunity appeared."(8)

The increasing number of educated people led to the formation of the Rābiṭat al-Kuwait al-Adabiyya in the spring of 1958. The sense of national identity produced clubs and schools, and the press was further encouraged by the opposition movement. An Executive Council was elected for the Rābiṭat al-Kuwait al-Adabiyya. The committee consisted of: ʿAbdul ʿAzīz Ḥusain, ʿAbdulla Ḥusain, Faḍil Khalaf, Aḥmad al-ʿAdwānī, ʿAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr, Aḥmad Abu Bakr and ʿAlī ʿAqīl.[9] The full support of the CUC to the Rābiṭat al-Kuwait al-Adabiyya was the main reason for its growth.[10] These two achievements consolidated the political activities of the opposition groups and gave Kuwaitis the experience of forming trade unions and intellectual societies after independence in 1961.

2. Popular and Governmental attitudes towards the Iraqi Revolution.

During the first half of 1958 the Kuwaitī nationalist movement reached a climax: the solidarity between the clubs and the growth of intellectual activities caused the creation of Rābiṭat al-Kuwait al-Adabiyya. The formation of the UAR on the 1st February 1958 gave credibility to Nāsser's theories which reflected well on the Kuwaitī

opposition movement and embarrassed the Government.

Therefore when the popular Iraqi Revolution of the 14th July 1958 broke out, both the Kuwaitī opposition and the regime supported it immediately.

The leaders of the opposition groups sent a number of congratulatory telegrams to the leaders of the Iraqi republican regime. Although these telegrams were retained by the Post and Telegraph Office, their release was ordered later by the ruler.(11) Demonstrations were organised by the opposition on behalf of the new regime.

Moreover, a delegation representing various opposition groups visited Baghdād to meet Iraqi leaders such as Brigadier ʿAbdul Karīm Qāsim;(12) Colonel ʿAbdul Salām Moḥammad ʿĀref(13) and Major Rifʿat al-Ḥājj Sirrī.(14) Dr. Aḥmed al-Khatīb, Jāsim Moḥammad al-Qatāmī,(15) ʿAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr;(16) Sulaimān al-Muṭawwaʿ, Moḥammad al-Saddāh, ʿAbdulla Ḥusain, Khālid al-Masʿūd were in the Kuwaitī popular delegation. These were supporters of Arab Nationalism and were in favour of an immediate Iraqi Union with the U.A.R. They believed that Iraqi membership of the U.A.R. would allow them to press the Kuwaiti regime to join also. Therefore when the Kuwaitī delegation met Qāsim at the Ministry of Defence, al-Qatāmī asked him,

> "What is your opinion of a Union with the U.A.R.?"

He replied,

> "I will not give my opinions, but my

> principle is based on surprise and secrecy."(17)

The delegation also demanded the supply of water to Kuwait from the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab (a long-standing project), but Qāsim did not make any comment on this point. From al-Khaṭīb's point of view the delegation was frustrated by Qāsim's attitude, which dampened enthusiasm for the Iraqi revolution.(18) Nevertheless, before the arrival of the Kuwaitī delegation and during its presence in Iraq, Qāsim encouraged the pan-Arabist newspapers to publish articles supporting Arab Union and concentrated on the necessity of a union between Kuwait and Iraq. The article which was published by Muᶜādh ᶜAbdul Raḥīm in the newspaper <u>al-Jumhūriyya</u> on the 29th August, entitled <u>al-ᶜIrāq wal-Kuwait Qutrun Wāḥid</u> (Iraq and Kuwait are one country) was an example. On the 28th August the newspaper <u>al-Jumhūriyya</u> published the views of Dr. al-Khaṭīb, the head of the Kuwaitī delegation, as follows:

> "The delegation is representing all the Kuwaiti people who retain a great love for Iraq and for the comprehensive Arab union."

Al Baṣīr, a member of the delegation, intimated to the same paper that,

> "The delegation came to congratulate Iraq as any Arab delegation coming to Baghdad from Mosul, Basra or ᶜAmāraʾ."

Regarding the regime's attitude to the revolution, the Kuwaiti ruler ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim sent a congratulatory telegram, published in the newspaper <u>al-Bilād</u> on the 9th August 1958. Another congratulatory letter was sent by the ruler to Qāsim on the 12th August 1958 which demanded

Qāsim's help to encourage the exportation of Iraqi food to Kuwait (meat, vegetables and fruits). Qāsim sent a reply and mentioned that he had already issued his orders regarding free transfer and transportation between the two countries and the exportation of food to Kuwait.(19) The traditional regimes in the Gulf region were shocked by the Iraqi revolution which threatened their existence, especially Kuwait's. The anxiety of the Kuwaitī regime was justified by both the growth of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement and the impact of the Iraqi revolution.

To discover the attitude of the republican regime in Iraq towards Kuwait, the ruler visited Baghdād, where he spent five days in October 1958. He was welcomed at the airport on the 25th October by Qāsim and five of his Cabinet Ministers. Although the press headlined his arrival, there followed a news black-out. The Iraqi press gave more attention to the Kuwaitī popular delegation than to that of the ruler. No communique was issued on his departure. When he left Baghdād, Qāsim did not accompany him to the airport, although representatives from the Sovereignty Council and Cabinet Ministers were there. Mr.Gallman, the American Ambassador at Baghdād at that time, clarified the reasons behind this treatment as follows:

> "There is a plausible explanation for his having been given this silent treatment. His visit coincided with the announcement in Cairo by the secretariat of the Arab League that henceforth Kuwait would be considered a member of the League. Such status for Kuwait, as we now know, could hardly have been welcomed by Qasim."(20)

At the time of the departure the ruler sent a telegram to Najīb al-Rubaiᶜī, the President of the Sovereignty Council, and not to Qāsim.(21)

Qāsim's attitude towards Kuwait became clear when he informed the cabinet ministers that he believed Kuwait to be a part of Iraq and that he would await an opportunity to annex it. The Iraqi press publicised this attitude during the visit of the Kuwaitī popular delegation at the end of August, when al-Jumhūriyya published an article on the 29th August 1958 by Muᶜādh ᶜAbdul Rahīm entitled al-ᶜIrāq Wal-Kuwait Qutrun Wāḥid (Iraq and Kuwait are one Country).

Despite the existence of diplomatic contact between the two countries after the dispute, mistrust was still rife. Therefore when the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote a letter to the ruler of Kuwait on the 19th December 1958, requesting his acceptance of the creation of consular representation between Kuwait and Iraq, the ruler rejected it. The refusal of the Iraqi request was based on the continuation of British responsibility for Kuwaitī foreign affairs, in accordance with the Exclusive Agreement of 1899.(22) But at the same time the Kuwaitī Government attempted to follow a conciliatory policy towards the republican regime.

In the Autumn of 1958 Iraq had attended the conference of Dubbāṭ al-Ittiṣāl Lil-Makātib al-Iqlīmiyya Lil-Muqāṭaᶜa al-ᶜArabiyya Li-Israel.(23) (Liaison Officers for the Arab boycott of Israel). It participated also in Mu'tamar al-'Udabā' al-Arab (The Conference of Arab

Writers) which had been held in Kuwait at the same period.(24) Kuwait meanwhile attended the OPEC Conference held in Baghdād in September 1960. The delegations of Kuwait and Iraq joined forces at the same table. This situation caused anxiety over the future political status of Kuwait.(25)

Iraq's position became clearer when the possibility of Kuwait's joining the British Commonwealth was discussed in Spring of 1961. When Qāsim delivered a speech on Baghdād Radio on the 30th April the same year, he opposed Kuwait's membership of the Commonwealth. He warned the Kuwaitī Government to beware of imperialist plans, and to consolidate internal unity. He promised to support Kuwait.(26) The Kuwaitī Government reacted immediately to Qāsim's speech in issuing a proclamation to the effect that Kuwait would not join the Commonwealth.(27) Rapprochement between the two countries reached its highest point when a Kuwaitī economic delegation visited Iraq at the beginning of June, 1961. This visit coincided with a press conference held in Kuwait on the 29th May by the information department announcing Kuwait's plans for independence, joining the Arab League and the United Nations. This announcement was the result of a visit by ʿAbdul Khāliq Ḥassūna, the Secretary General of the Arab League.(28)

The principal consequences of this visit were: an agreement on the increase of Iraqi exports to Kuwait, inducements for the investment of Kuwaitī private capital in Iraq, and joint participation in the repair of the

highway between the two countries. The most important item was the approval of the elimination of visa requirements and the agreement to use identity cards instead of passports.(29)

The pro-regime newspaper al-Fajr al-Jadīd commented on this visit as follows:

> "The Kuwaiti-Iraqi relationship is not just based on trade and economic links. The boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait are elusive, although still in existence as imperialist heritage. Imperialism attempted to weaken the Arab people by creating artificial boundaries."(30)

The political conflict in Iraq (i.e. after the Autumn of 1958) had prompted the Kuwaitī government's suppression of its own Nationalist Movement. The contact between Kuwait and Iraq took place after the Nationalist Movements propagandist activities had abated, therefore when the Kuwaitī regime was in a position of strength.

3. Competition for power in Iraq and its impact on the Kuwaitī Nationalist Movement.

The Iraqi nationalist movement which prepared for the revolution of the 14th July 1958 consisted of two underground wings: the military, led by the supreme committee of the Free Officers established in December 1956, and the political, led by the National Union Front, established in 1957. The political contained Communist, National Democratic, Independence and Baᶜth elements. Co-operation between the two wings was responsible for the successful seizure of power.(31) Contact and co-operation was made possible by the engagement of the free officers in

politics since the early 1950's. In Autumn 1952 political cells were established in the army after the success of the Egyptian revolution of the 23rd July the same year.(32)

Despite a pre-revolutionary agreement for the military to transfer power to the civilian politicians after a transitional period, the military wing continued to monopolise power after the period when post revolutionary reprisals could reasonably have been expected.(33)

The whereabouts of the triumvirate (King Faiṣal II, Nurī al-Saᶜīd and the Crown Prince ᶜAbdul Ilāh) was vital to the timing of the revolution. Their joint absence from Baghdād had been responsible for the postponment of zero hour several times. The delays tempted Qāsim, ᶜĀref and ᶜAbdul Laṭīf al-Darrāji to make decisions without consultation. They decided secretly at Manṣūr(34) Camp on the timing of the military coup, agreeing to exclude their colleagues from any leading role in the operations of the revolution or in the role to which it gave rise.(35) When ᶜĀref was tried, after his split with Qāsim, he interpreted the situation as follows:

> "al-Zaᶜīm (36) said to me, let us be courteous to them as brothers...but the decisive action is between me and you."(37)

After this secret meeting, the three Free Officers attempted to postpone the gathering of the Supreme Committee. On the 4th July 1958, the committee assembled at Qāsim's house in ᶜAlawīyya. The committee approved a military plan called "Operation Ṣaqr" to occupy Baghdād on the 14th July.(38) There were other items on the agenda of

the same meeting. Members of the revolutionary cabinet, the Revolutionary Council and Sovereignty Council were to be chosen but this was not achieved. Ḥanna Batātu, Professor of Sociology at Harvard and author of "The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq" explained the situation during this meeting:

> "A knock came at the door of the house. An unknown person entered, closeted himself briefly with Qasim, and left. Qasim then announced that the Military Intelligence had got knowledge of the gathering and would effect arrests at any moment. His associates hurriedly dispersed. It was only after the revolution that they realised that he played a game with them."(39)

The Committee never assembled again but its members waited the next days in vain for a sign from Qāsim, the chairman of the committee.

At the end of June 1958 the Supreme Committee of Free Officers knew that the Chief of Staff had issued an order to the Twentieth Infantry Brigade to move on the 3rd July towards Jordan. This move would be from Jalawlā', a military camp on the Dujayla river north-east of Baghdād. This move was later postponed to the seventh and then to the night of the 13th July to proceed to Jordan on the 14th July under the general command of Brigadier Aḥmad Ḥaqqī, to reinforce the Jordanian Army against alleged threats from Israel. Two of the three battalians of the brigade were led by Free Officers and the brigade had to pass through Baghdād over the Khirr bridge, which lies close to the royal palace. The committee at once realised that zero hour was at hand, because the leaders of the regime: (the King, the Crown Prince and al-Saʿīd) would be in Baghdād at

the same time.[40] Qāsim attempted to hide the knowledge of zero hour from his colleagues except al-Darrāji and ᶜĀref. Therefore when ᶜAbdul Laṭīf al-Darrāji met staff Colonel Muḥsin Ḥusain al-Ḥabīb (member of the Committee) and Engineer Lieutenant Colonel Rajab ᶜAbdul Majīd (the secretary of the Committee) at the Officers Club by accident on Friday evening of the 11th July, al-Darrājī conveyed the impression to them that the date of the revolution had been postponed and that the Twentieth infantry Brigade would not strike on its approach from Jalawlā'. It would first pass through Baghdād and move to al-Fallūjah and then, on a day to be fixed, carry out the revolution.[41]

Ḥanna Batātu gave a useful description of the condition of the members of the supreme committee on the eve of the revolution as follows:

> "The members of the committee were not so easily taken in this time. They now moved, however, in painful uncertainty, and on the night of 13th July remained without sleep, inwardly in turmoil, and sick with impatience for daybreak."(42)

It came as a surprise to many Free Officers when the army entered Baghdād early on the 14th July and the news of the Revolution was broadcast, although they had long been expecting it.[43]

Brigadier Qasim was Commander of the Nineteen Brigade, Colonel ᶜAbdul Laṭīf al-Darrāji, Commander of the First Battalion and Colonel ᶜAbdul Salām Moḥammad ᶜĀref Commander of the Third Battalion. Both of the latter officers were in the Twentieth Brigade which took

responsibility for the operations.

Qāsim and ʿĀref had become very active soon after they received the order of the Chief of Staff to move the force under their command to Jordan. Both prepared communiqués for the people, the names of the Cabinet Ministers and the officers who were to occupy high military posts. Without consultation with the committee, Qāsim and ʿĀref replaced the former plan (which had been organised and approved by the Supreme Committee) regarding the machinery of the new regime with a new one during the fortnight before the revolution. This dictatorial tendency before and after the revolution was responsible for the clash between the various groups especially the members of the Supreme Committee. They felt that they had been misled by Qāsim and ʿĀref.(44)

Qāsim and ʿĀref themselves had ensured a smooth take-over. The Iraqi forces in Jordan had been informed of the zero hour of the revolution, to alert them to the possibility of a loyalist counter-revolution. On the 13th July the Free Officers in this force had been ordered to be beside their radios to listen for news of the revolution in order to take control of the force to protect it.(45)

It is essential to mention here that the majority of the Free Officers belonged to middle or lower middle income families.(46) All the members of the Supreme Committee came originally from relatively poor families and belonged, after entering military service, to the salaried class, except Nājī Ṭālib, whose father was a great landowner who had long sat in parliament.(47) They had graduated at

government schools, whether in Baghdād or other cities, and had entered the Military College in Baghdād after completing their high school education, graduating as second lieutenants. Some of them had attended military courses in Europe, the United States and West Germany. Their social origins connected them with various groups, especially the peasantry and working classes.(48) The Free Officers were dissatisfied with the conditions of soldiers, whose monthly salary was two Iraqi Dīnārs.(49) The soldiers, as a rule, belonged to the peasant and working classes, most of them had been recruited through national conscription. The majority were illiterate, but many of them while in the service obtained an elementary education.(50)

When Qāsim became the chairman of the Supreme Committee he had used his close friends, Rashīd Muṭlak and Lieutenant Colonel Waṣfī Ṭāhir, as intermediaries between the Supreme Committee and the underground opposition parties.(51) Co-operation between the two wings achieved concrete unity in the nationalist movement and protected the plan of the revolution. Qāsim, ᶜĀref and al-Darrāji would not risk failing to inform the leaders of the political parties (the Communist Party, the Baᶜth Party, the Independence Party and the National Democratic Party) of the zero hour.(52) Thus, civilian leaders were aware of the zero hour, whilst members of the Supreme Committee were kept in ignorance.

The unification of the military and political groups was consolidated by other efforts to obtain support from

abroad. The initial efforts were made by Qāsim during the tripartite aggression on Egypt when he met army officers in Jordan and Syria.(53) For the same purpose the Supreme Committee sent a delegation to Nāsser in July 1957 headed by Moḥammed Ṣiddīq Shanshal. The Iraqi delegation received definite assurances of support from Nāsser.(54) Nāsser reasserted his support to Shanshal when the latter met him in Cairo on the 12th February 1958.(55)

Moreover the Soviet Ambassador in Damascus promised the support of the Soviet Union to protect the Iraqi regime after the revolution, during a meeting with two Iraqi officers at his office before the revolution.(56) Qāsim, ʿĀref and al-Darrājī were the self-appointed masterminds. Their strategic power was unchallenged: the Twentieth Brigade through ʿĀref and al-Darrāji occupied Baghdād under the protection of the Nineteenth Brigade, commanded by Qāsim. Al-Darrājī occupied the Ministry of Defence and ʿĀref the Baghdād Radio Station. At 6.30 a.m. ʿĀref broadcast the first proclamation of the revolution. When Qāsim heard this he went to the Radio Station and congratulated ʿĀref, then established his headquarters at the Ministry of Defence. Although Qāsim had entered Baghdad as the hero of the Revolution, differences between him and his close friend ʿĀref broke out immediately, most notably over the question of unity with the U.A.R.(57)

The first problem facing the Supreme Committee was the fate of the overthrown triumvirate. Shortly before the Revolution Qāsim and ʿĀref had decided that all three should

be put to death in order to avoid possible foreign intervention that might prompt insurrection on behalf of the monarchy.(58)

The almost accidental rise of dictatorship through popular revolution in Iraq disappointed its supporters elsewhere in the Gulf.

4. The Revolution and the Gulf and Internal Challenges:

a). The Gulf:

The revolution met with considerable support within the Arab World, but western interests in the Middle East were clearly threatened. Iraq was surrounded by hostile regimes, except Syria, which was considered the northern province of the U.A.R., the Gulf Shaikhdoms under British protection, Saᶜūdi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey were all connected with western countries by alliance agreements. The former regime had, moreover, made a union agreement with Jordan. It is possible to compare the effects of the Iraqi revolution, which toppled the Hāshimite regime, with the most recent Iranian revolution which brought down the monarchy and threatened western interests.

Egypt was the principle supporter of the Iraqi revolution. Three hours after the outbreak of the revolution, the Iraqi Revolutionary Council sent a telegram to President Nāsser, announcing Iraqi recognition of the U.A.R. Three hours after receiving the telegram the Egyptian Government recognised the Republican Regime in Iraq. The U.A.R.

was the first country in the world to recognise the revolutionary regime.[59] Nāsser's support protected the revolution from intervention by the western bloc. When the revolution broke out, Nāsser was on a diplomatic visit to Yugoslavia, and received the news by Radio. He also received news of the landing of the American Force in Lebanon, and of the British parachute troops in Jordan on the 17th July. His commitment to the Iraqi leaders, coupled with the western military threat, led him to cut off his visit to Yugoslavia to make an impromptu secret visit to the U.S.S.R. He met Soviet leaders to discuss their attitude towards the Iraqi revolution in view of the landing of British and American Forces in the region.[60] As a result the Soviet Union issued press releases on the 16th and 17th July 1958, interpreting the movements of the United States and Britain in the region. The Soviet Union warned all western countries and Israel against intervention in the Arab countries.[61]

The western countries, especially Britain, nevertheless attempted to hinder the progress of the Iraqi revolution despite its unlimited support from both the U.A.R. and the Soviet Union. The United States and Britain wanted to protect the Gulf region - their principal source of oil - from radical political changes resulting from the Iraqi revolution. Kuwait was the first country expected to be affected, because of the recent agitation of the

nationalist movement on the one hand and Iraq's old ambitions in Kuwait on the other. The clashes which occurred in the wake of the revolution between various groups weakened the influence of the revolution inside and outside Iraq.

b). The Internal Challenges

As soon as the army overthrew the monarchical regime, differences began to develop between the military and political leaders. The principal areas of dispute were: the undisclosed zero hour, the unwanted execution of King Faiṣal II, the possibility of unity with the U.A.R., and the exclusion from power of the Communists.

Although the revolution succeeded on the 14th July, seven failures had preceded it, between November 1956 and June 1958. This precariousness gave Qāsim and ʿĀref an excuse to conceal the zero hour even from their colleagues on the Supreme Committee. Their behaviour upset the confidence of Qāsim's colleagues, hence the clashes.(62) The ruling family including King Faiṣal II and the Crown Prince ʿAbdul Ilāh were killed on the 14th, and Nūrī al-Saʿīd on the 15th July, however this had not been the decision of the Supreme Committee. Before the revolution opinion as to the King's fate had been divided.(63)

Before the revolution the Supreme Committee had not decided whether to join the U.A.R.: the matter was left to be decided by a National Assembly which

would be established after the revolution. This decision had been taken because Iraqi society consisted and still consists of various racial and religious groups. The largest ethnic-religious group is the Shīᶜī Arab, followed respectively by the Sunni Arab and Kurd. There were also communities of Turkomans and Iranians. All these groups are Moslem and represent about 95 per cent of Iraq's population. In addition there are groups of Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians and Sabians.(64) The Iraqi society is possibly the most diverse in the Middle East.

Qāsim opposed unity with the U.A.R. for reasons of personal supremacy and social considerations; he was supported by certain free officers and leading members of the parties in this view. The latter were members of the Communist, National Democratic and Kurdish Democratic parties, whilst ᶜAbdul Salām ᶜĀref and certain Free Officers supported by the Independence and Baᶜth parties advocated unity. The difference over unity was the principal cause of dissent. Moreover the exclusion of the Communists from the portfolio of the first Cabinet despite their perseverance since the 1930's and their vital role in the revolution was responsible for violent disturbances in 1959.(65)

5. <u>The conflict over unity and its effects on the Kuwaitī nationalist movement</u>.

Arab unity was the utopian aim of the Arab nations

from the time of the formation of Arab Societies in Turkey, Paris, Cairo, Damascus and Iraq between 1908 and 1914 in reaction against the Turkification policy advocated by the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.).[66] The formation of the U.A.R. was the first real achievement towards this end. Therefore Iraqi pan-Arabist insistence on joining the U.A.R. strengthened this historical achievement, especially as it was considered that the success of the Iraqi revolution was due to the unlimited support of Nāsser. A number of nationalist aspirations were achieved by the republican regime but by and large the benefits were overruled by the Qāsim dictatorship.

The provisional constitution was issued on the 27th July 1958. Its fourteenth item asserted the necessity of Agrarian reform to transform the socio-political structure and improve the conditions of the peasant classes. The working and peasant classes were the cornerstone of the republican regime as the tribal shaikhs and land-owners had been the backbone of the monarchy or "al-ᶜAhd al-Bā'id".[67] The issuing of the Agrarian Reform Law on the 30th September 1958 was aimed at eliminating the influence of the upper classes, the real enemies of the new regime. The aim of this law was to deepen the links between the new regime, also the popular base.[68] The distribution of lands to the working and peasant classes and the establishment of the Thawra' and Shuᶜla' cities for the same classes during Qāsim's era (the 14th July 1958 - the 9th February 1963), served the same purpose. To relieve the Iraqi economy of foreign dominance, Law No. 80

of 1961 was announced on the 11th December 1961 after long negotiations between the Government and the Iraqi Petroleum Company. These negotiations had taken place between the beginning of August 1958 and December 1961. The enforcement of this law led to the liberation of the oil industry from control by western oil companies. The government seized over 99.5 per cent of the Iraq Petroleum Company's unused concession areas.(69) This policy encouraged the neighbouring countries to amend oil concessions and to aim for national dominance of this source.

According to the liberation policy of Iraq's economy the republican government broke the link between the Iraqi dinar and the pound sterling. Iraq's Government decreed withdrawal from the sterling zone, to secure its currency, the Iraqi Dīnār, from the fluctuation of the British currency, and Britain's inflation. Iraq achieved this, after successful negotiations with Britain on the 31st March 1959. On the 15th June Iraq announced her withdrawal from the sterling zone.(70) Moreover on the 24th March 1959 Iraq withdrew from the Baghdād Pact. Undoubtedly these achievements, although they consolidated the influence of the revolutionary regime also jeopardised the interests of the oil companies in the region, especially in Iraq. The Kurdish rebellion of September 1961 provided resistance welcome to the Western bloc; the Kurds' debilitating insurrection was financed and equipped through Iran. Qāsim believed that it had been engineered by the

western countries where the oil companies had suffered through the successful negotiations with the Iraqi Government.(71)

The political, social and economic achievements in Iraq impressed people in the Gulf Shaikhdoms who supported the revolution, but competition for power between the political groups disrupted the status quo and hindered revolutionary progress there. Therefore the Iraqi revolution began to lose support not only in the Gulf region but also in the Arab World as a whole. This instability contributed to the abilities of the ruler of Kuwait to suppress the Kuwaitī nationalist movement in February 1959. National power in Iraq was conferred upon a Sovereignty Council and Cabinet Ministers. The council consisted of two military officers and one civilian politician. They were: Staff Major General Najīb al-Rubaiᶜī, a widely respected officer; Colonel Khālid al-Naqshabandī, a Kurdish Officer sympathetic to the Free Officers' movement; and Moḥammad Mahdī Kubba', the Chairman of the Istiqlāl party.(72)

Qāsim became the most influential leader in the republican regime, and the Commander-in-Chief, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence; whilst ᶜAbdul Salām ᶜĀref became the Second in Command, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Deputy Premier and Minister of the Interior. In addition to Qāsim and ᶜĀref the cabinet ministers comprised eleven persons. Moḥammad Ḥadīd (Minister of Finance) and Hudaib al-Ḥājj Ḥammūd (Minister of Agriculture) represented the National Democratic Party,

Moḥammad Ṣiddīq Shanshal (Minister of Guidance) represented the Istiqlāl party, and Fu'ād al-Rikābī, (Minister of Development) an Engineer represented the Ba^cth Party. However the Sovereignty Council performed the real power remained in Qāsim's hands.(73)

Competition for power between the most powerful leaders, Qāsim and ᶜĀref, occurred and deepened the differences between the Free Officers. The most important source of friction between them was the question of the U.A.R. ᶜĀref supported unity, whilst Qāsim preferred a federal union, owing to the variety of ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.(74) The continuation of ᶜĀref's vocal support for unity with the U.A.R. caused his release from all posts on the 30th September 1958 (the same day as the announcement of the Agrarian Reform Law). The coincidence of a popular reform with an unpopular dismissal was considered deliberate. He was appointed Ambassador to the German Federal Republic.(75)

Although ᶜĀref refused to accept the new post, the mediation of friends led to his acceptance on the grounds of Qāsim's promise that he would recall him within three weeks. On the 14th Octobr 1958 Qāsim and several members of his cabinet went to the airport to say good-bye. Aref was accompanied by ᶜAlī Ḥaydar Sulaimān, the former Iraqi Ambassador to the German Federal Republic. Although ᶜĀref left Baghdād for Bonn, he went to Vienna. He returned home after three weeks - according to Qāsim's promise - without notice.(76) As a result he was imprisoned for three years after trial by a special military court.(77) Qāsim's

reasons for this measure against his close friend were:

a). When an Iraqi delegation headed by ʿĀref visited Damascus on the 19th July, 1958, ʿĀref had urged unity during his meeting with Nāsser without permission from the Government. ʿĀref believed in Arab unity and considered Nāsser the Supreme leader of the Arab Nation. To Qāsim, ʿĀref suddenly appeared to believe in ideas repugnant to himself. Qāsim preferred a federal union, which would occur after Iraq had achieved some progress in the socio-economic field.[78]

b). It was reported that a telegram was sent by ʿĀref to the Egyptian Embassy in Baghdād, mentioning that he would travel to Cairo with a number of pan-Arabist Officers to announce the unity, even if he were compelled to overthrow Qāsim.[79]

c). Qāsim had encouraged ʿĀref after the revolution to strengthen links between the revolutionary regime and the public. During his tour of the country ʿĀref gave enthusiastic speeches, and he assured the people of the necessity of unity with the U.A.R.[80] He called also for the setting up of a revolutionary council.[81]

According to ʿĀref, Qāsim and his supporters utilised the opportunity of ʿĀref's absence on his tour and replaced ʿĀref's supporters in key positions of the army by those loyal to himself. When ʿĀref returned from his tour he

could do nothing to reverse the orders.[82] The split between Qāsim and ᶜĀref frustrated the pan-Arabist groups, especially the Baᶜthists and Nāsserites who attempted to work together against Qāsim's rule. Therefore Qāsim gave the communists - who supported him against ᶜĀref - a powerful role in the country.[83] His aim was not only to undermine the influence of the pan-Arabist groups but to weaken political parties as a whole, in order that he himself and his army could remain supremely in power.

After ᶜĀref's dismissal on the 30th September, and his arrest on the 5th November 1958, Qāsim delivered a number of speeches. Thousands demonstrated in Baghdād on behalf of Qāsim.[84] Seven thousand girls who had applied for training in the Popular Resistance Force, supported the regime's militia.[85] Three days later after ᶜĀref's arrest, the Iraqi Times reported on the 9th November that demonstrations continued in Baghdād, and that delegations arrived from the provinces to lend their support to the Qāsim regime. The demonstrations included workers, students, intellectuals and housewives. It is worth noting that the demonstrations were widespread in Iraqi cities such as Baṣra, Mosul, Ḥillah, ᶜAmārah, Hindīyyah, Najaf, Karbalā, Arbīl, Sulaymāniyyah and Kut.[86] On the eve of ᶜĀref's arrest there was a demonstration against him during which the slogan "Khamsah Bi-al-Shahar mātat al-Qawmiyyah." (On the fifth of the month nationalism died) was shouted.[87] ᶜĀref's imprisonment caused an explosion of conflict between the various political groups, especially the pan-Arabists and the communists. The pan-Arabist

groups were suppressed by Qāsim who was supported by the communists. This caused the resignation of six pan-Arabist ministers on the 7th February 1959, two days after protesting against Qāsim's policy.(88) The Mosul revolt of the 8th March 1959 under the leadership of Colonel Abdul Waḥḥāb al-Shawwāf was an example of the opposition of pan-Arab groups.(89) The execution of thirteen army officers on the 20th September 1959 was considered the climax of the suppression of pan-Arabism. Rifᶜat al-Ḥājj Sirri, a founder of the secret cells of the Free Officers, and Nāẓim al-Ṭabaqchalī, a prominent free officer, were amongst them. In protest the pan-Arabist groups organised demonstrations and shouted slogans against the Qasim dictatorship.(90) A number of them were arrested.(91) This policy provoked the pan-Arabist groups under the leadership of the Baᶜthists to attempt to assasinate Qāsim on the 7th October 1959, but the plan failed.(92)

The suppression of the pan-Arabist groups by Qāsim's regime frustrated the nationalist movement in Kuwait which was dependent on the same groups. In 1958 the influence of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement had reached a zenith. The formation of the U.A.R. and the collapse of the Hāshimite regime in Iraq were responsible. When Nāsser participated in the opening of the new building of Bayt al-Kuwait in Cairo in September 1958, he was greeted by 1,800 Kuwaitis. On this occasion Nāsser said,

> "Our gathering here is an expression of Arab Nationalism."(93)

The presence of a large number of Kuwaitis reflected the Nāsserite influence in Kuwait.

The anti-pan-Arabist policy in Iraq coincided with an active period of pan-Arabism in Kuwait. On the anniversary of the tripartite aggression on Egypt (29th October 1956) and of the Algerian revolution (31st October 1958 the Kuwaitī clubs held a cultural meeting at the Teachers Club. Amongst the speakers were: Muḥammad al-Saddāḥ, Secretary of al-Nādī al-Thaqafī al-Qawmī, Ḥamad al-Shaikh Yūsuf, Aḥmad Abu Bakr Ibrāhīm, Ghassān Kanafānī and Nājī ᶜAllūsh. A number of Algerian speakers were also there. Qāsim's regime became the target of their criticism, because of his opposition to unity.(94) Imperialist countries became a common target: The Arab people were prompted to revolt against oppressive rule.(95)

When ᶜĀref was arrested, al-Nādī al-Thaqāfī al-Qawmī held a seminar in mid-November 1958. Dr. Aḥmed al-Khaṭīb was the speaker. He discussed the political situation in Iraq, criticising the anti-pan-Arabist policy of Qāsim's regime.(96) The Kuwaitī press began to attack the feudal and despotic rule in Kuwait. It called for independence and the creation of constitutional and parliamentary rule. The autocratic rule in Baḥrain became a target also for the Kuwaitī press. It criticised the administrative system in Baḥrain and called the press and the political groups in the Arab World to act for the release of Baḥrainis imprisoned after the collapse of the popular uprising.(97) Baḥrain's absence from the Arab Writer's

Conference held in Kuwait during the Autumn of 1958 caused a press attack on the despotic rule which attempted to isolate the Baḥraini people from the rest of the Arab world.(98)

The suppression of the pan-Arabist groups in Iraq led to conflict between the political groups there, especially between the pan-Arabist and the Communists supported by Qāsim. Kuwait was in a similar situation. The dominant pan-Arabist groups in Kuwait sympathised with ʿAbdul-Salām ʿĀref and his followers. Therefore the Kuwaiti press violently attacked the communists in Iraq who opposed unity with the U.A.R.(99) The resignation of the six pan-Arab Ministers from Qāsim's Cabinet on the 7th February 1959 caused a deadlock between Qāsim and the pan-Arabist groups. The pan-Arabist groups became the target of communist press criticism in Iraq.(100)

The Iraqi people celebrated the anniversary celebrations of the establishment of the U.A.R. in February 1959, despite the regime's violent measures against the pan-Arabs. The Communists attacked the crowds and shouted against Egypt, "Manreed Waḥdatkum Shīlu Safāratkum" (we don't want your unity, remove your Embassy).(101)

The Communists did not confine their criticism to the pan-Arabs, but also attacked Islamic ideology in a number of articles, which were published in their newspapers. Ṣawt al-Aḥrar was one of the papers which published anti-Islamic articles on the 1st and 18th February 1959,(102) which deepened communist disagreement with the religious groups, in a country where religious leaders held

popular power. The communist interference in the Islamic ideology led to a widening of enmities in Iraq and caused their defeat.

The conflict and competition for power between the political parties in Iraq gave the Kuwaitī Government an excuse to cripple the activities of the nationalist movement. The government may possibly have acted in this way, even if there had been a stronger regime in Iraq, but leaders of the Kuwaitī nationalists maintained that their government was always apprehensive of Iraq's power to incite the populace. The occurrance of two internal incidents allowed the government to achieve its object. The Kuwaitī Government was disturbed by the press campaign against its policy and against other regimes in the region, such as Iraq and Baḥrain. At the same time the Kuwait Government was threatened by the influence of the pan-Arabist groups on the one hand and by the influence of the communist groups in Iraq who had links with the communist group in Kuwait. In January 1959 a delegation of the Kuwaitī Democratic Youth (the underground Communist Party) attended the conference of the Iraqi Communist Party.[103] The second threat appeared during the celebrations on the occasion of the formation of the U.A.R. The Kuwait Clubs Union arranged for two gatherings at the beginning of February 1959. The first was held at al-Nādī al-Thaqāfī al-Qawmī, and the second at the Shuwaikh secondary school. Thousands of both sexes attended the gatherings, in which a number of speakers delivered passionate addresses. Amongst these speakers were Jāsim

Mohammad al-Qatamī, ʿAbdulla Ḥusain and Khālid al-Masʿūd. Al-Qaṭāmi, a pro-Nāsser graduate from the Police College in Cairo, who had attended military post-graduate courses in Britain. He was dismissed from the Police Directorate in November 1956 on the grounds of his refusal to shoot demonstrators. Al-Qaṭāmi called in his violent speech for the deposition of the monarchy. The Shuwaikh gathering was followed by a demonstration. The inflammatory atmosphere shocked the Kuwaiti regime and led to immediate action by the Government.The reaction of the Government sabotaged the nationalist movement as a whole. Al-Qaṭāmī was dismissed from his job as director of the cinema company in Kuwait and his passport was temporarily withdrawn. ʿAbdulla Ḥusain and Khālid al-Masʿūd were also dismissed. About 500 Arabs were deported from Kuwait. Although the Government considered them communists, the Kuwaitī pan-Arabists reported that the deportees were representative of the pan-Arabist's progressive trends. The clubs were closed and the newspapers were suspended. The achievements of the intellectual movement were due to the support of Shaikh ʿAbdulla al-Sālim, but their success exceeded his expectations and the suppression of the nationalist movement was the result of his order. The measures were executed by ʿAbdulla al-Mubārak the Chief of Police and of the Security Directorate and his assistant ʿAbdulla al-Aḥmad al-Ṣabāḥ, the brother of the current ruler.(104)

The absence of the clubs and the press (the cornerstone of the activities of the nationalist movement) undermined the opposition movement. The competition and

conflict between the parties in Iraq was an important factor in the breakdown of the nationalist movement in Kuwait.This situation continued in Kuwait until the Kuwaitī-Iraqi dispute, after the announcement of independence.The ideological conflict in Iraq not only discredited the Kuwaitī nationalist movement but also hindered the nationalist and Arabist role of the revolution.

6. <u>Independence: Renewed Iraqi Claims to Kuwait</u>

The suppression of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement was evidence of the Government's fears of Iraqi influence. It was an act out of character for the usually liberal new ruler. It is possible that ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim was influenced by Saᶜudī or British pressure or the anticipation of it. Although the ruling family had seized power on the basis of only limited government participation (by notables and the mercantile classes); the socio-economic policy was populist, attempting to create a closer relationship between the state and citizen. This policy eased the effects of suppressive measures against the nationalist movement.

To improve the social condition of the subjects, the public services were improved - especially education, health and housing. The present state of social support is the result of these beginnings; currently there is one physician per 700 people, a government donation of unemployment benefit of up to 75 per month; and when the government cannot provide employment, it offers capital of $500-600 for private enterprise.(105) For those with

limited incomes (less than 420 per month), the government has embarked on an ambitious home-financing project which enables ownership on a twenty-five year loan.[106] The Government had spent its huge income on land, purchased at inflated values, for the purpose of road, construction, office-building, and income redistribution. Some $1.5 billion had already been spent by the end of the 1970's to buy land, benefiting about 20,000 families. The public money spent on such projects between 1957 and 1962 was approximately $840,000,000.[107] On the negative side this policy has enriched some wealthy merchants and speculators in real estate. About 83,000 houses were built on government purchased land.

During ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim's reign, the whole country was linked by a network of good quality roads which connected with roads in neighbouring countries, Iraq and Saᶜudī Arabia. Ports, commercial and petroleum terminals, as well as a highly developed transport system contributed to good international connections. Drinking water however remained a problem in Kuwait, as Iraq realised, but the income from oil royalties allowed the Kuwaitī Government to resolve it, without recourse to Iraq. The domestic supply of water was a considerable achievement by the public services. The first section of its sea-water distillation plant came into operation in March 1953.[108] The plant was one of the biggest in the world. The first section serviced the town with two million gallons a day, while the second section when finished was capable of

producing[109] 5 million gallons daily.[110]

The ambitious policy of socio-economic development caused an increase in the foreign labour force in Kuwait. The Govenment foresaw this and took certain precautionary meansures for the indigenous community. These measures gave greater security to the subjects. The naturalisation decree of 1959, restricted Kuwaitī citizenship to those who lived in Kuwait continuously from 1920 and their descendants in the male line and to foreign women upon marriage to Kuwaitis. The amendment of the same law in 1960 enabled Arabs to be naturalised after ten years of residence from the date of promulgation, and for non-Arabs after fifteen years. To insure against wholesale naturalisation, the law stipulated that only fifty persons were to receive citizenship in any one year. Exceptions to this general rule were that Arabs in residence before 1945, and foreigners before 1930, as well as other Arab nationals who had performed outstanding services to the State, could be granted citizenship without delay.[111]

Further, legislative protection for subjects was assured by the Legislation Electoral Law of 1962 which excluded from voting rights subjects who had obtained their naturalisation less than ten years prior to the legislation.[112]

Furthermore, in the field of business and industry, the Government safeguarded the future of Kuwaitī citizens. The Imports Law of 1964 restricted the right of importation to Kuwaitī subjects, to partnerships providing all members were citizens, and to Stock Companies in which Kuwaitī

capital stood at not less than 51 per cent.[113] Moreover, in the Civil Service, Kuwaitī graduates were exempted from entry examinations, administered by the Civil Service Commission for all other applicants. They were also exempted from certain degree requirements and had priority in administrative posts.[114] Pension privileges, social security benefits, free building sites, and mortgage loans at very low interest were reserved for the citizen as his birthright.[115]

The forward-looking policy of the Kuwaitī Government involved contributing a proportion of its wealth to the Trucial Shaikhdoms to improve social services. From 1953-4 Kuwait gave grants to start construction of the first modern schools in Dubai, Shārjah, Umm al-Qaiwīn, ᶜAjmān, Rās al-Khaimah and Fujairah. These schools were staffed and provided with text books by the Kuwaitī government. The Gulf Permanent Assistance Committee (GUPAC) was formed to recommend and administer economic aid. Health services were included from 1961. In the field of education Kuwait had established 33 schools from 1953-1971 in these six shaikhdoms, whilst in the field of health services, four hospitals and five medical centres were established in the same shaikhdoms by 1972. In 1966 GUPAC was replaced by al-Hay'a al-ᶜĀmma Lil-Janūb Wal-Khalīj al-ᶜArabī (The General Committee of the South and the Arab Gulf). The name was changed when the two states of Yemen were included in the aid programme. Kuwait continued to support the education and the health services in these shaikhdoms until 1972, when the Government of the United Arab Emirates

(U.A.E.) took responsibility there.[116]

The socio-economic development in Kuwait and the aid to subsidise the social services in the Trucial Coast indicated the liberal-mindedness of Shaikh ʿAbdulla al-Sālim. Nevetheless the ruling family had originally risen to power through a tribal system, which only the reform movements of 1921 and 1938-39 and the huge wealth of oil were responsible for moderating. Before the oil era the notable and mercantile classes were considered the most influential: they owned the fleets, provided the ruling family with a meagre income in the shape of customs duties, and provided employment for the working class. Additionally, they subsidised education and other social and cultural institutions. The reform movements attempted to reduce the influence of the ruling family and to allow the influential classes to share power. The movements aimed to change the political structure from a tribal to a modern democratic system. The oil era allowed the ruling family to release itself from financial dependence upon the notable and mercantile classes within the new economic structure, and members of the ruling family took up senior posts in the administration and its councils. The Supreme Council was established as a consultative council for the ruler; its eight members were from the ruling family. On the 19th July, 1954, the number of Government directorates was increased from ten to twenty-four,[117] whilst on the 7th February 1959 it was decreased to ten.[118] In 1958 a consultative committee was established; it consisted of ten members appointed by the ruler. Seven members were from

the notable and mercantile classes and three from the ruling family.(119) In conclusion the Government administration was controlled by the ruling family in the 1950's, whilst the notable and mercantile classes were allowed to share a limited proportion of power.

The institutionalisation of Government administration coincided with the progress of the revolutionary movements in the Arab World, which were the prime influence on nationalist movements in the Gulf region. The Kuwaitī nationalist movement thrived on its newly-recognised power and the inspiration of the revolutionary movements in the region, both brought with the tide of pan-Arabist reaction against a history of imperialist domination. The number of nationalist clubs continued to increase, as did the membership of the nationalist movement. The prosperity of the opposition brought about its downfall. In February 1959 ʿAbdulla al-Sālim suppressed it for the sake of his own and the protectorate's peace of mind.

In the 1950's Kuwait became the principal source of oil for Britain. Therefore after the outbreak of the Iraqi revolution, Paul Johnson - a senior British official - advised his Government to encourage the ruler of Kuwait to undertake democratic reforms; to issue a constitution; and to replace the exclusive agreement of 1899 with Britain by one of friendship.(120)

Before independence and in order to facilitate it, Britain encouraged the Kuwaitī Government to join international organisations. It was considered a suitable

preparatory step for Kuwait to administer her foreign affairs. Kuwait therefore joined seven international organisations.[121] Surprisingly, Iraq voted for Kuwait's membership, possibly in deference to Britain, on whose advise Kuwait had applied.[122] This support lent weight to Kuwait's resistance to the Iraqi claim to Kuwait after her independence on the 19th June 1961.

Britain was aware of the effects of the suppressive measures on the opposition movement. She believed that the continuance of these measures under the existing agreement might lead to a revolutionary movement, and therefore decided that it was possible to announce Kuwaitī independence, without losing the loyalty of the monarchy.

It was felt that the Nāsserite regime would be unlikely to interfere on behalf of the opposition movement if the country were independent; the same was thought to be true of the possibility of an attempt by Qasim to occupy Kuwait.

Qāsim's suppression of the pan-Arabist groups in Iraq had been followed by the same action in Kuwait; Qāsim was therefore resented by pan-Arabists generally, especially for his resistance to unity with the U.A.R. and Nāsserite leadership. Britain could therefore be certain that Kuwait would not be part of a general move to join the U.A.R., which might, but for Qāsim, have been led by Iraq. It was also unlikely to give way to pressure to join Iraq.

In the British view, independence would defuse popular resentment over the suppression of the nationalist movement and provide an anti-republican example for the

rest of the Gulf.

Independence was a practical attempt to sabotage the effects of republicanism and Iraqi ambitions in the region as a whole.

It was widely rumoured that Yūsuf Aḥmad al-Ghānim was one of the prominent influential notables selected by Britain to carry the letter to the ruler which included the proposal of independence. According to this interpretation of events the British object was to remind the ruling family that if al-Ṣabāḥ opposed the proposal the British would have a substitute family to rule Kuwait with British support.(123) This theory acknowledges the influence of the notable and mercantile classes in Kuwait, and if true, betrays a widely suspected British regard to self-interest. The agreement that was made protected both the British interests in Kuwait and the ruling family that would assure their dominance.

On the 19th June 1961 the exclusive agreement of 1899 was replaced by a treaty of friendship which included a British obligation to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter so requested. Shaikh ʿAbdulla al-Sālim al-Ṣabāḥ signed the memorandum of the new agreement on behalf of the Kuwaiti Government and Sir William Luce the Political Resident in the Gulf on behalf of the British Government. As soon as this agreement had been signed the Iraqi Government announced its claims to Kuwait publicly.

The Iraqi claim to Kuwait was based on Ottoman dominance dating from before the formation of the modern

shaikhdom of Kuwait. When the al-Ṣabāḥ ruling family seized power in 1752 tribute continued to be paid, although irregularly, to the Sultan of Turkey until 1871. After that date, the Shaikh accepted the title of "prefect" - Qā'im Maqām - and his dependence was displayed in the regular payment of tribute until 1914. During this period Kuwait was an independent entity within the Ottoman Empire, and flew its flag.(124) It was not an integral part of modern Iraq, but had numerous links with it; primarily strong trading links, familial inter-relationships and common pilgrimages.

The title of Qā'im Maqām, which clearly denoted subsidiary status, was conferred by the Turkish Governor of Baghdād on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, on the then ruling al-Ṣabāḥ for military aid in an Ottoman expedition (al-Ḥasā 1871); it assured Ottoman protection for Kuwait, but at the same time it was conferred by an Iraqi ruler. It provided evidence for Qāsim's case against Kuwait.

The rise of British influence in Kuwait was the result of Shaikh Mubārak's desire to assure his personal sovereignty, which was in doubt owing to his criminal and murderous route to ascendancy.(125) Mubārak was supposed, by Turkish authorities, to have been encouraged by the British Political Resident in the Gulf.(126)

In 1897, one year after his accession, Mubārak accepted the Wālī of Baghdād's title in order to placate the Ottoman authorities, who were in effect sheltering his rivals in Baṣra. Although the Ottoman authorities must have been prepared to accept his legitimacy, the Wālī of Baṣra, a governor of lower rank than the Wālī of Baghdād,

aided an expedition to dethrone Mubārak, organised on behalf of his nephews. The attempt was frustrated by the presence of British patrol ships.[127]

Mubārak then turned to the British for protection but was urged to remain under Ottoman sovereignty,[128] until the arrival of German and Russian contractors persuaded the British to reassert their influence in Kuwait.[129] Mubārak concluded the Exclusive Agreement without consultation with the Ottoman authorities and it was therefore considered by Qāsim "a fictitious document."[130]

Between 1899 and 1913 Mubārak steered a treacherous course between the rival dominant powers. He retained both the title 'Qā'im Maqām' and his obligations to Britain. The Ottoman authorities were less content than the British, and attempted to depose him. Mubārak's response was non-committal:

> "The son should not stop obeying his father because the father treats him harshly."(131)

He continued to donate financial aid to Ottoman projects.[132]

Britain meanwhile consolidated her position in Kuwait, restricting the shaikh and his heirs through a number of agreements between 1900-1913.[133] When a British political agent was appointed, in 1904, Ottoman authorities protested but ineffectually.[134]

In 1914 the reported threat of a Turkish invasion of Kuwait prompted an assurance from the British Government that the shaikhdom would be recognised as independent under

British protection, provided that her troops assisted in the capture of Baṣra. Mubārak accepted the condition,(135) and at the outset of the operations in Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab, an incident occurred which led to the discarding of the Ottoman flag, and to the adoption of a Kuwaitī flag, from the 17th December 1914.(136)

Two major factors led to the lapse of Iraqi rights over Kuwait. Turkey formally relinquished "all rights and titles over the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised", in accordance with Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne of the (24th July 1923) between the Allied Powers and Turkey.(137) The British dominance over Kuwait and Iraq confirmed the separation and the status of Kuwait.

7. <u>The claim to Kuwait : Effects on the Kuwaitī Nationalist Movement and on Iraq's reputation in the region</u>

Kuwait's independence coincided with a number of important incidents in Iraq: the opposition movement led by the Baᶜthists was gaining strength, the Government was in the midst of negotiating with the Iraq Petroleum Company - I.P.C., and the Kurds were in rebellion despite the republican Government's initial generosity to them.

Qāsim wished to appear to be heading a broadly-based semi-democratic constitution. To maintain it he permitted five political parties (the Communist Party, the National Democratic Party, the National Progressive Party, the Kurdish

Democratic Party and the Iraqi Islamic Party).[138] The system, however, ran into difficulties as Qāsim was not prepared to alter his anti-Pan-Arab policy in accordance with the majority desire. Qāsim supported, but did not share power with, the Communist Party and the al-Barazānī faction of the Kurds, both of which concurred with his anti-Pan-Arabism. He hoped that those elements would counterbalance the widespread support for union with the U.A.R. In the event, his balancing act backfired in the form of the Mosul revolt,[139] the tragic Kirkuk incidents,[140] the Kurdish rebellion, and a fatwa outlawing communism from Islam.[141] The execution of 13 pan-Arabists officers, two of them Free Officers, inflamed their supporters inside and outside Iraq and lost Qāsim the goodwill of nationalists all over the Middle East.[142]

Britain realised the impact of the internal problems in Iraq. The announcement of Kuwaitī independence on the 19th June 1961 coincided with an increase in the number of opposition groups, the oil negotiations between the Government and I.P.C. and the Kurdish dispute.

The absence of the nationalist movement in Kuwait after its suppression in February 1959 and the entanglement of the new regime in Iraq in various internal problems encouraged Britain to support the independence of Kuwait. Britain believed that the disappearance of the opposition in Kuwait diminished the possibility of an attempted unity with the U.A.R., especially considering the opposition of Qāsim's regime. At the same time the Kuwaiti opposition, before its supression, rejected the anti-pan-Arab policy of Qāsim's regime. Dr. al-Khatīb in March 1982 related that,

> "although the cancellation of the agreement of 1899 or the agreement of 'Slavery' was a step towards independence, the agreement of the 19th June which replaced the former was an indication that Kuwait's independence was not entire."(145)

Qāsim was surprised by Kuwait's independence. The friendship agreement of the 19th June 1961 elicited an immediate Iraqi reaction. The Iraqi Government considered Kuwait's independence a plot against Iraq. Iraq's attitude towards Kuwait became clear during a three hour long press conference held by Qāsim in the Ministry of Defence at Baghdād on the 25th June, five days after independence. In this conference he announced publicly the Iraqi historical rights to Kuwait, considering Kuwait as integral to Basra. In accordance with his argument he called for the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq.

Qāsim nevertheless looked back on the historical links more in terms of voluntary brotherhood then joint subservience to the Ottoman Empire, although he did recall the title of Qā'im Maqām to mark ʿAbdulla al-Sālim's dependency:

> "A presidential decree will shortly be issued appointing the present, honourable Shaikh of Kuwait as the Qaᶜim Maqam (Prefect) of the Kuwait district of the Basra (Province)."

The main line of argument was traditional brotherhood and common resources,

> "he will be a traitor who defies the consensus of the Arab people and the solidarity of his brothers in Iraq."

Coupled with heroic rhetoric on the subject of individual freedom,

> "The part of Iraq has now been liberated, but there remains the Kuwaiti people who still suffer under the imperialists, under a clique which juggles with their destiny and fortunes, and a pack of feudalists and shaikhs which has even denied them water supplies from the land of their brothers in Iraq."

and vilification of the "oppressors":

> "The age of the anachronistic Shaikhdoms is over and done with."

Qāsim's claim as revealed in his speech during Press Conference at Baghdād on the 25th June 1961, despite his revolutionary goal, was historically detailed and firmly argued, particularly on the grounds of Mubārak's attempts to retain the goodwill of the Ottoman authorities after the 1899 treaty, mentioning Mubārak's declared allegiance in 1901:

> "...in Basra where he publicly declared that as Qa^{c}im Maqam of Kuwait he was attached to the vilayet of Basra, and reaffirmed his allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan."

He also relied on the unratified Anglo-Ottoman Draft Convention on the Gulf Area of the 29th July 1913. Qāsim was satisfied that the appearance of the Anglo-Kuwaiti Exclusive Agreement of the 23rd January 1899 was the main hindrance to Iraq's rights to Kuwait. Its abolition gave Iraq the right to restore "al-Liwā' al-Khāmis ^{c}Ashar al-Salīb" (the Stolen Fifteenth Province -Kuwait-).(146) Qāsim explained that by re-establishing their position in Kuwait, the imperialists were preparing for the creation of an eastern Arab Federation, which they intended to surround Iraq to prevent it from leading other states towards Republicanism. The existing South Arabian

Federation in the South Yemen in the 1960's was to be the pattern for this federation. The model however was seen to threaten the independence of its neighbour state, the North Yemen, especially in collaboration with Sa^cūdī Arabia on its Northern side. Qāsim felt that the imperialists were leading a vendetta against the Arab World in general and Iraq in particular. He continued:

> "The Arab States know nothing about the new agreement which is being hailed by the imperialist circles, or about the way in which the imperialists are plotting against the Arabs and the independent states. The state particularly affected by the continued presence of imperialist spheres of influence in the area is the Republic of Iraq."(147)

When Qāsim was asked whether he had discussed the frontier question with the Kuwaitis, he replied that Iraq had repeatedly explained that she recognised no frontiers between herself and Kuwait. He added that the border would shortly be opened up. Finally he stated that the first projects to be undertaken in Kuwait by the republic would be the opening of new schools and hospitals and the provision of fresh water supplies.(148)

Qāsim's claims to Kuwait during this press conference not only shocked the ruling family in Kuwait but also threatened all traditional regimes and their peoples. Qāsim's regime opposed unity with the U.A.R. and suppressed the pan-Arabist groups in Iraq. This policy incited the pan-Arabist groups in the Gulf especially in Kuwait against Qāsim. Qasim did not call Kuwaitis to unity but depended on threats. There is some doubt as to whether Qāsim had

laid military plans for an occupation; it was certainly feared in Kuwait that he had. However, traffic passing across the borders of the two countries reported that there was no evidence of military activity. A British correspondent visiting Baṣra immediately after the press conference, questioned his compatriots in Baṣra about the possibility of an Iraqi operation against Kuwait, and was informed that it was not likely. It was suspected by Kuwaitī nationalists that the British exaggerated the danger of military action, in an effort to demonstrate their indispensability as allies.(149) The anti-pan-Arab policy and the declaration of the Iraqi claims to Kuwait and Qasim's threats to use the army caused the isolation of Iraq from the Gulf region and the entire Arab world.

On the 26th June the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Iraq issued a declaration to various countries regarding Iraq's legal rights in Kuwait.(150)

The Iraqi claims to Kuwait deepened differences between senior members of the regime, the pan-Arabist groups and communists. When the Kuwaitī question was discussed by the Cabinet, ministers were divided regarding the technique of execution. Nevertheless all of them were convinced of the historical rights of Iraq to Kuwait, but Free Officers in the Cabinet supported military operations, while civilians called for diplomatic solutions. Hāshim Jawād, Minister of Foreign Affairs was at the head of the latter.(151)

Before the independence of Kuwait, when the British Ambassador in Baghdād asked Hāshim Jawād about the Iraqi

attitude towards the announcement of Kuwait's independence, the latter replied that he would welcome it.(152)

Regarding the attitude of political groups, the national command of the Ba^cth party maintained its hostility to local tribal regimes, but denounced Qāsim's plans to annex Kuwait by force. In the same declaration it advocated Arab unity.(153) The pan-Arabist Movement joined the attack on Qāsim's threats to Kuwait, describing the intervention as an imperialist manoeuvre which would strengthen British credibility in the region.(154) The Iraqi Communist Party opposed Iraq's claims in accordance with its principle of self determination. These views appeared in its declaration issued on the 28th June 1961, emphasising the necessity of Kuwait's liberation from colonialism and the despotism of the tribal regime.(155)

At the same time there were a number of pan-Arabists such as Fā'iq al-Samarrā'ī and Salmān al-Ṣafwānī from the Istiqlāl party; Maḥmūd al-Durrah, an independent,(156) who supported the official claims, sending a memorandum to the Secretary General of the Arab League containing the request that Arab countries should not recognise Kuwait's independence.(157) Moreover Muzāḥim al-Bachahchī, a former prime minister during the monarchical era, also sent a memorandum to the Arab League requiring the refusal of Kuwait's membership and emphasising Iraqi rights in Kuwait.(158) The National Democratic Party and the National Progressive Party supported Qāsim's policy in the Gulf.(159)

The appearance of the Iraqi claims to Kuwait after independence was not a surprise, but reflected the long-standing ambitions of Iraq since the formation of the modern state in 1921. The principal motives of Iraq, after the declaration of claims, were to do with nationalism and security, internal and geo-politics and economics.

Iraq possessed a strong nationalist element coupled with a sense of insecurity, being the only republican regime in the Gulf. The state was surrounded by monarchies dominated by British and western influence through the oil companies. Amongst these were the shaikhdoms which lay on the western coast of the Gulf, from Kuwait in the North to ʿOmān in the south. Kuwait, Baḥrain, Qaṭar, Abū-Dhabi and Dubai were the only shaikhdoms besides Saʿudī Arabia producing oil. The ruling families were controlling the economy and obtained about 30% of these royalties. The limited population in the shaikhdoms and increasing oil royalties encouraged Iran to announce claims to Baḥrain and certain islands in the Gulf. An increase in Iranian immigration to these shaikhdoms threatened to overtake the indigenous communities. The republican regime in Iraq might attempt to annex Kuwait and later the rest of the shaikhdoms to counteract Iranian ambitions in the Gulf. Moreover Iraq intended a genuine liberation of the shaikhdoms from the dominance of both the traditional regimes and the British. The Iraqi regime still believed that the opposition movement of 1938-39, which supported unity with Iraq, would help in the achievement of unity

especially after the support of the same people to the Iraqi revolution.

Politically Qāsim stood to gain national support from the claims to Kuwait. He had weakened the powerful political groups, both pan-Arabist and Communists, from the outbreak of the revolution until the Iraqi-Kuwaitī dispute. His policy caused dissent within the government, which was increased by the Kurdish rebellion. The Iraqi claims to Kuwait were considered necessary to maintain national pride, and provided the government with a means to unite factions behind it, after bitter conflict between the political and ethnic groups.[160] The majority supported the claim, as a nationalist cause. In addition Qasim saw Kuwait as an alternative source of income.

Geographically speaking, Iraq was too nearly land-bound for secure trade and communications. The north coast of the Gulf is divided between Iraq, Iran and Kuwait, but there is approximately 60 km of Iraqi Coast in comparison with 76 km belonging to Abu Dhabi.[161] Iraq has the smallest coastal strip despite its historic and economic importance and the size of its population. Currently Iraq is estimated to have about 14 million inhabitants, i.e., the equivalent of the entire population of the Arab Peninsula states including North and South Yemen. During the monarchical era Iraq had been compelled to negotiate with the Kuwaitī Government to obtain the lease of Umm Qaṣr; earlier Iraq had proposed to extend her railway system to the coast in Kuwait Bay and to form an Iraqi port on Khor ʿAbdulla. All Iraqi attempts from the

1930's until the revolution were frustrated by the British.(162) After the development of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute Qāsim asserted in his speeches that Kuwait was the natural port of Iraq.(163)

Undoubtedly, the growth of oil production in Kuwait increased its importance to Iraq. In 1960 the oil exports of Kuwait were estimated at about 80,573,627 tons with royalties of $465 million,(164) while Iraqi exports amounted to 35 million tons in 1958 and 46 million tons in 1960. Equal production continued until 1963, because the progress of Iraq's revolutionary econmomic policy was hindered by the oil companies.(165) It was suggested that the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq would help the revolutionary regime to subsidise ambitious economic projects, especially in the public services, and indeed Iraq's own oil revenue was not sufficient to finance such schemes. Protracted negotiations (August 1958-11th December 1961) between the Iraqi Government and the Iraq Petroleum Companies limited the increase in oil production. The new regime was attempting to relieve the Iraqi economy of foreign influence,(166) but the success of the negotiations was largely dependent on the outcome of the claims to Kuwait. The majority of shares in the Iraq Petroleum Companies were British-owned as were the majority in the Kuwait Oil Company, and the threat to Kuwait was a powerful bargaining weapon. The negotiations dictated the timing of the claim; the pending agreement was the more pressing question:

> "give us Kuwait to stop our claims from the companies."(167)

Qāsim was quoted to have said. Further the newspaper al-Thawra (the Revolution) announced on the 1st August 1961,

> "We cannot negotiate with the oil companies from a firm standpoint, while the British are occupying the South of Iraq."(Kuwait)(168)

The Iraqi leaders denied that Iraq coveted the oil royalties of Kuwait. Qāsim stated:

> "we do not have ambitions to invest the oil of Kuwait, thanks be to God we have a wealthy country. No one of us can eat more than his need, and no one can wear two suits at one time. Our intention is to relieve our country from this imperialist base which threatens our independence, and freedom and hinders the liberation of other Colonial districts in the Arab world."(169)

The Government stance was consolidated when Hāshim Jawād, the Minister of Foreign affairs, asserted that the real object was to relieve Iraq of the imperialist British base. He denied the existence of any ambitions to the Kuwaiti oil income as follows:

> "I want you to be sure that we are not greedy for the oil of Kuwait or its wealth. Thanks be to God. Our country is very wealthy and we have enough for all our needs..."(170)

The position of both Qāsim and Jawād justified the declaration of Iraqi historical claims to Kuwait (announced on the 25th June 1961 by Qāsim) with motives of security. They believed that the annexation of Kuwaiti territories to Iraq would secure the independence of Iraq.

It was reported that Qāsim contacted certain influential people in Kuwait, notably in the ruling family. ʿAbdulla al-Mubārak the royal acting commander of the

military force was one of the parties. He was dependent upon the Iraqi community in Kuwait, then estimated at about 42 thousand.(171) The majority of Iraqis supported their country's claims. Iraqi labourers in Kuwait's poverty-stricken ᶜUshairij region demonstrated the day after Qāsim's announcement. Many of them were communist supporters of Qāsim's revolution, which had made an ally of the Soviet Union. They chanted:

> "ᶜUshairij Qitᶜah min al-Soviet, Itqaddam yal-Mahdawi (172) Itqaddam." (ᶜUshairij is a part of the Soviet Union come forward Mahdawi come forward) (173)

Iraqi labourers in Kuwait considered the claims to Kuwait a nationalist demand, but the Kuwaitī Government actively pursued and in some cases deported those who demonstrated. The Iraqi community decreased after the dispute from 42 to 30 thousand.(174) Nonetheless the Kuwaitī Government denied Iraqi accusations of persecution in the local press.(175)

Some sources reported that military operations had been planned to occupy Kuwait as soon as Qāsim had finished the press conference on the 25th June 1961. Colonel Sayyid Ḥamīd Sayyid Ḥusain, the commander of the Iraqi Army in Baṣra was supposed to have been ordered to occupy the Kuwait qaḍā' (District). The failure of the Iraqi takeover was due to his refusal to obey orders.(176) It was rumoured that he had been bribed by the Kuwaitī Government before or after Qāsim's announcement. The arrival of British forces in Kuwait caused further difficulties; Iraqi

military advisors effectively shelved the invasion because Qāsim appreciated the inferiority of his forces and preferred a peaceful solution.(177)

8. Kuwaitī reaction towards the Iraqi Claims

Iraqi claims to Kuwait revitalised the Kuwaitī nationalist movement. Iraq could have achieved a peaceful union with Kuwait, but for the rejection of unification with the U.A.R. The Iraqi Government made the new regime the enemy of both the Kuwaitī regime and the Nāsserite nationalist movement. The Iraqi threats to Kuwait compelled the Kuwaitī regime to co-operate with the opposition groups to protect the country's autonomy. This situation unified Kuwait; both the regime and the people reacted against the potential disgrace of annexation. To restore his people's confidence, ʿAbdulla al-Sālim, the ruler of Kuwait, permitted the clubs and their newspapers (after suspension on the 3rd February 1959) to renew the Kuwaitī propagandist campaign against Iraq.(178)

Government support manifested itself in various ways. Demonstrations were held, the militants volunteered to fight and sympathetic telegrams were sent to the ruler.

Despite the Government's efforts to protect the country from Iraqi threats, many among the upper classes sent their capital and families abroad for a period.(179) Regarding the Government reaction, a number of declarations were issued by the Supreme Council and the Kuwaitī Government Secretariat. These declarations emphasised the independence and sovereignity of Kuwait and

denounced and denied the Iraqi claims. They argued that the Iraqi support of Kuwaiti membership of the international organisations before independence indicated Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's independence.(180) The declaration of the Supreme Council specified the Government's diplomatic efforts to protect the country. Foremost amongst these was the requirement of military aid from Britain in accordance with the friendship agreement of the 19th June 1961. A number of telegrams had been sent to the Arab countries informing their Governments of the danger of Iraqi threats to Kuwait's independence.(181) Moreover, both Kuwait and Iraq required the assembly of the Security Council. Kuwait required discussion of the Iraqi threats resulting from the British troops' arrival in Kuwait on the 1st July 1961.(182) Above all, Saᶜudī Arabia sent troops to Kuwait, supporting the monarchy. The arrival of Saᶜudī troops in Kuwait was representative of the attitude of all traditional regimes in other shaikhdoms.(183) Iraq's threats to Kuwait were dangerous to all other monarchies in the Gulf region. The Saᶜudī opposition to Iraqi ambitions towards the Gulf Shaikhdoms began in 1938, when the nationalist movements in the Gulf region were developed and supported by Iraq.

Four major factors protected the independence of Kuwait; co-operation between the regime and the opposition groups; the Kuwaitī membership (before independence) of international organisations; the support gained through Kuwaitī aid to the Arab Shaikhdoms and states; and the flexibility of ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim. These were the bases on

which the first semi-democratic state in the Gulf was formed.

British troops were later replaced by Arab security forces which protected Kuwait from the Iraqi threat until the claim was overthrown by regional opinion.

Britain expected this threat from Iraq. The friendship agreement which was reached between Britain and Kuwait on independence day was the result of these expectations; protection of both the monarchical regime and British interests being the principal objects of the treaty. Britain realised that the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq would damage the British economy. The Kuwaiti investments in Britain and the British oil income from Kuwait would disappear if Iraq succeeded. The London Financial Times detailed the effects of the Kuwaiti wealth on the British economy. Yearly British interest was estimated at about $420 million, the exports related to oil machineries amounted to $200 million, the yearly deposits of the ruler of Kuwait were estimated at about $170 million. The same British paper estimated the total British interest in Kuwaiti wealth at about $700 - 840 million, and the total of the ruler's investments in Britain at 840 million. Undoubtedly the loss of these interests would weaken the international commercial position of Britain.[184] Field Marshal Charles Elworth the Commander of the British Forces in Kuwait was well aware of the economic responsibility:

> "This operation is not a picnic, it is a dangerous matter, this trip is for oil."(185)

The rapid reaction of Britain was a measure of the risk. The first British troops[186] were landed in Kuwait on the 1st July 1961.[187] This force was consolidatd on the 3rd and 4th July by troops from Baḥrain, Aden, Kenya and Cyprus. The total number was estimated at about 5000 - 7000 soldiers and officers, under the command of Field Marshal Charles Elworth and his assistant Brigadier Horsford.[188]

After the British Commandos had landed in Kuwait, the British Prime Minister Mr. Macmillan announced in London on the 1st July the task of the British Forces in Kuwait as follows:

> "in accordance with Her Majesty's Government's obligations to the Ruler of Kuwait, and at his urgent and formal request, a British force was today moved into the State of Kuwait and placed at the Ruler's disposal. It is to afford him such assistance as he may consider necessary for the preservation of the independence of Kuwait in the face of recent developments in Iraq.
>
> The Secretary-General of the United Nation is being informed.
>
> Her Majesty's Government earnestly hopes that the necessity to make use of this force will not arise. It is intended that it should be withdrawn as soon as the Ruler considers that the threat to the independence of Kuwait is over."(189)

Sir Patrick Dean, the British Permanent Representative at the United Nations, read the Prime Minister's statement to the Security Council on the 2nd July 1961.[190]

The U.A.R. and Saᶜūdī Arabia were the Arab countries most concerned with the Iraqi-Kuwaitī dispute. Nāsser had widespread influence amongst the people in the Gulf, while

Sa^c^udī Arabia considered herself the most powerful monarchy. Iraqi claims to Kuwait threatened the influence of both Nāsserism and the monarchies, especially that of the Sa^c^udīs.

The Sa^c^udi involvement showed itself in the rapid arrival of Sa^c^udi forces, while the U.A.R. was the first Arab country to recognise the independence of Kuwait. Moreover, two days after Qāsim's announcement of the claim the U.A.R. Minister of State in charge of propaganda and publicity affairs, Colonel ^c^Abdul Qāder Ḥātem, issued a statement setting out Nāsser's opinion. The U.A.R. did not accept the concept of annexation, but supported every trend towards unity, whether partial or comprehensive. The U.A.R. believed that there were factors of unity between the Iraqi and Kuwaitī peoples profounder and stronger than the documents of the Ottoman Empire. The U.A.R. did not expect to see the day when one Arab soldier would face another. Later, before the arrival of the British troops, Ḥātem said that there were indications that Iraqi forces had been ordered to move towards the Kuwaiti borders. A third statement from Ḥātem came on the 3rd July, expressing alarm at the large-scale military operations carried out by the British. He stated that the Iraqi Government had abandoned the concept of annexation by force, and therefore the U.A.R. delegation at the United Nations would be instructed by the Government to demand the immediate evacuation of the British troops. At the same time the propaganda of the U.A.R. played a vital role in supporting Kuwait's independence.(191)

The extent of the U.A.R.'s support of Kuwaiti independence was further indicated over the question of membership of the Arab League. When the Political Committee met on the 12th and 13th July, Morocco was to have proposed Kuwait's membership. In the event membership was postponed for a week at the wish of the Tunisian delegate for consultation. In Cairo the Tunisian move was considered a deliberate manoeuvre by President Bourgība to keep British troops on Kuwait soil. The Cairo press and radio protested bitterly.(192)

The unlimited support of Sa^cudī Arabia and the U.A.R., the most powerful members of the Arab League, was responsible for the unreserved acceptance of Kuwait by the Arab League's Political Committee, on the 20th July 1961. Kuwait's membership of the Arab League was considered the first defeat for the Iraqi claims to Kuwait, because it confirmed Kuwait's independence and sovereignty.(193)

The landing of British troops embarrassed the revolutionary regimes in the Arab world, especially the U.A.R., and led to the formation of an Arab security force to replace the British forces in Kuwait, organised by the Arab League. The intent was to achieve a balance of monarchical and republican forces amounting to between 3000 to 4000 soldiers and officers. The new force arrived in Kuwait on the 10th September to replace the British who had been asked by the ruler to withdraw on the 14th September. The British finally left on the 20th September landing in al-Hamala'i in

Bahrain.[194] Despite the persistence of Iraqi threats to Kuwait and the diminution of the Arab security force, due to political developments in the Arab World (e.g. the Yemenī Civil War in 1962, the collapse of the unity of the U.A.R. in September 1961) Kuwait was adequately protected. The last group of the Arab security force was withdrawn at the end of January 1963. It consisted of 112 Sudānese soldiers.[195] The Kuwaitī-Iraqi dispute was the main battlefield in the competition for leadership between Cairo and Baghdād. Iraqi ambitions in Kuwait were defeated by the Nāsserite influence on Kuwait both in the monarchical and the republican periods. The possibility of a recurrence of the claims was squashed by Kuwait's recent acceptance by the United Nations (the 4th May 1963) and by Iraq's recognition of independence (the 4th October 1963) during the first Baᶜthist regime (the 9th February - the 18th November 1963).

The Iraqi-Kuwaitī crisis contributed to the isolation of Iraq, damaged her trade relations and eliminated her share of the Kuwait aid funds. At the same time the pressure on ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim effected a reconciliation with the nationalist movement and led to the formation of parliamentary and constitutional rule in Kuwait.

9. The gamble of Qāsim's announcement

Iraq took a number of measures to disprove Kuwait's independence. After the failure to obstruct Kuwait's membership of the Arab League, Iraq persisted in pursuing

her claims in other ways.(196) The threat of severing diplomatic relations was freely used. The presence of the British troops was considered a challenge to the new regime. Three months after the evacuation of the British troops, Hāshim Jawād the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced:

> "The Iraqi Government will revise her view of diplomatic relations with any country which recognises Kuwait's independence. Formation of any kind of relations will be considered an uncordial act and will amount to the denial of Iraq's rights..."(197)

This statement was made six months after the official claim to Kuwaiti territories. The threat of diplomatic severance was carried out in a number of instances: The London Times reported on the 12th May 1962 that Hāshim Jawād, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, had met on the 11th May Dr. Saʿīd al-Asʿad the Lebanese Ambassador, and conveyed to him the Iraq Government's decision to recall its envoy from Lebanon, insisting that his guest leave Iraq also because of the Lebanese Government's decision to exchange diplomatic representation with Kuwait. This threat had by then been carried out against Jordan, Japan and Iran.

As an increasing number of countries recognised the Kuwaitī State, Iraq was put in a position of increasing isolation.(198) At the same time Kuwait was consolidating her international standing. Kuwait's wealth played a decisive role in obtaining support especially after the formation of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) in December 1961. Within two years KFAED had submitted $200 million to six Arab countries as loans.

These loans had been distributed as follows: K.D. 20 million to Algeria to establish petroleum pipelines; K.D. 20 million to Tunis for electric and irrigation projects; and K.D. 7 million each to Sudān to establish a railway project and sugar factory to Jordan for the Yermuk project and for tourism. Moreover Egypt, Lebanon and North Yemen had been given loans for development.(199) It was reported that the persistance of Iraq's claims to Kuwait caused the loss of a yearly contribution of K.D. 40 million in aid - an offer of this amount was made during the negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait to solve the dispute.(200) A number of meetings between representatives of the two countries had taken place between May 1962 and the breakdown of the Qāsim regime on the 9th February 1963.(201) Mūsa ᶜAllāwi, an Iraqi lawyer who was working as a merchant, and Qāsim Ḥasan, the Iraqi Ambassador to Czechoslovakia were the Iraqi representatives, while Sayyid Aḥmad Sayyid ᶜUmar, the Kuwaiti representative at OPEC, was the Kuwaitī envoy. The first meeting had been held on the 8th May 1962 at Zurich. Athens and Beirut were amongst the locations of these meetings. Iraq persisted in the attempt at annexation, denying Kuwaitī independence, and repudiating Kuwait's suggestion of a union.(202) Major-General Qāsim saw Kuwait and the Kurds as victims of imperialist manipulation. In a speech reported by the London Times on the 12th May 1962, Qāsim described Kuwait "as a strong base dependent on the sea and the Imperialists Warships now in Baḥrain." He continued to state that,

> "British imperialism after creating the Kuwait base, had instigated some 'highwaymen' in northern Iraq, who do not represent the Kurds."

He saw Iraq as a heroic force preparing to bring the Arab Gulf under a liberated command. Under these circumstances no agreement could be reached.(203)

Before the republican era Iraq and Iran were the most powerful countries in the Gulf region. Iraq's pre-occupation with the claim to Kuwait allowed Iran to become the super-power in the Gulf, while Iraq became a minor power. The western bloc was encouraged to develop the armed forces of Iran, Saᶜūdī Arabia, and Kuwait, while Iraq was weakened by the Kurdish rebellion and frequent coups, organised by various political groups during their competition for power in the 1960's. Iraq's revolutionary role in the region was weakened, whilst the traditional regimes flourished - especially after the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971.

After Kuwait's independence an Iranian delegation visited Kuwait on the 8th July 1961 to consolidate relations between the two states. The appointment of the first Iranian Ambassador to Kuwait indicated the success of this visit. The Iranian Ambassador arrived at Kuwait on the 5th May 1962. The Iraqi Ambassador to Tehran had been called back on the 18th March in protest against the Iranian Government, while the Kuwaitī Embassy in Tehran had been opened in June 1962.(204) Iran's support for Kuwaitī independence consolidated Iranian relations with Kuwait and

Sa^c^udī Arabia and protected the traditional regimes in the region. Iranian influence on the western coast of the Gulf increased through the growth in Iranian emigration in the 1960's, whilst the Iraqi community decreased in Kuwait and other Gulf Shaikhdoms; hence the weakness of Iraqi influence.

After the Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute Qāsim began to call Kuwait "the Southern District of the immortal Iraqi Republic."[205] The supposed Iraqi sovereignty of Kuwait, posed problems in the formulation of passport regulations. The phrase "valid for all countries except Kuwait" was printed on all passports. According to Dr. Hāshim Baraḳāt, an Iraqi government official[206] this was intended, paradoxically, to prevent the recognition of Kuwaitī independence.

Other measures were taken by the Iraqi Government to justify her claims to Kuwait. The contravention of laws of emigration by Kuwaitis was overlooked in order to instil the notion of Kuwaitis as Iraqi citizens, whilst the Ministry of Education issued material showing Kuwait as a province of Iraq.[207] School curricula included such information. Moreover, Iraq forbad the acceptance of visas issued by Kuwait to enter Iraq. Above all the political map of Iraq was amended.[208]

Iraq's exports to Kuwait decreased after the dispute. The total amounted to I.D. (Iraqi Dīnār) 10,396 in 1962[209] while in 1959, it had been estimated at about, I.D. 1,125,329.[210]

Iraq did not succeed in diminishing Kuwait's status which was only hindered by the failure of the Egyptian efforts to obtain membership of the United Nations for her. This, however, was largely due to the Soviet veto.(211) It was reported that the real achievement of Iraqi claims to Kuwait was the defeat of the western oil companies in Iraq (I.P.C.), which preferred to lose Iraqi concessions rather than risk the loss of both Iraqi and Kuwaitī assets. The announcement of Law No. 80 of 1961 on the 11th December was a real victory for the republican regime. This law allowed the new Government to seize over 99.5 per cent of I.P.C.'s concession areas, which were still not in use.(212) It was a significant step towards the liberation of Iraq's economy and the formation of the National Oil Company was a direct result.(213) ᶜAbdulla al-Ṭarīqī, a well-known Arab Oil expert, commented on the Iraqi Law:

> "I consider law No. 80 as a great nationalist act."(214)

10. The Impact of Iraq's claims on the Kuwaitī Nationalist Movement

Iraq's attacks on the Kuwaitī regime indirectly benefitted the Kuwaitī nationalist movement. Pressures on the regime compelled the ruler to establish parliamentary and constitutional rule in order to secure internal unity.

Despite the presence of the British forces and later the Arab security forces, the threat to Kuwait continued. Jābir al-Aḥmad al-Ṣabāḥ (the current ruler), stated in summer 1961 whilst touring the Arab World to spread recognition of independence,

> "Qasim said that surprise was one of his principles, therefore it is not improbable for him to invade Kuwait."(215)

Qāsim's speeches had shocked and embarrassed the Kuwaiti ruling family and other ruling families in the Gulf, in violently attacking the Shaikhs of Kuwait. Qāsim enquired;

> "Is it fair to leave Arab wealth to be bait for the British banks? Is it fair to freeze $1500 million in British banks? Is it fair to leave Arab Capital to be invested in imperialist aims against Arabs...?"

He questioned with bitterness,

> What are Kuwait's Shaikhs doing with this money? Did they spend one piastre on Palestine..? I challenge all the world to reply."(216)

The views of the republican leaders of Iraq were supported by a bitter propagandist campaign: the press, radio and television joined forces for this purpose. The pressure accumulated to intimidate the ruler to issue the decree of election of the Constituent Assembly in November 1961.(217) The decree was issued by ʿAdulla al-Sālim on the 26th August, 1961, whilst the British forces were on Kuwaitī territory.

The fundamental objectives of the Constituent Assembly were to draft a permanent constitution and to administer a provisional legislative council.(218)

The Electoral Law of the Constituent Assembly had been drafted by the joint council (the Supreme Council and the new eleven person committee chosen by the ruler from his own circles) with the help of Arab Constitutional experts. It consisted of forty-eight articles, and was

approved by the ruler on the 7th October1961.[219]

The constituent assembly of twenty members had been elected on the 30th December, 1961. No member of the ruling family was amongst the seventy-four candidates contesting the seats; the Sabāḥīs, however, dominated the cabinet which consisted of 14 ministers, all of them Ṣabāḥīs. Their posts in the cabinet disallowed their nomination in the constituent assembly.[220]

On the 17th January 1962 the ruler issued decree No. 3 of 1962 regarding the formation of the first cabinet in the independence era, consisting of fourteen ministers.[221] A number of middle class pan-Arabists who had played a considerable role in the nationalist movement during the 1950's, were appointed under-secretaries. Jāsim Moḥammad al-Qaṭāmī, a prominent Nāsserite, was amongst them. He was appointed Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The appointment of a number of pan-Arabists was significant in that the independent influence of the nationalist movement could safely be diminished whilst the liberal nationalist element endowed the Government with a distinguished moderate record from the beginning of independence. It was a measure of the success of the balance that an agreement to hold diplomatic relations was made between Kuwait and the Soviet Union in 1964.

The threat of an Iraqi boycott helped to develop an extrovert foreign policy in Kuwait, the moderation of which was partly due to the necessity of maintaining good

relations on all sides in order to preserve the Kuwaitī regime and its independence. However, Kuwait could not have achieved esteem, especially from the third world, without the liberal pan-Arabist and nationalist content of her policies. Kuwait managed to maintain a balance in diplomacy between Western and Eastern influence.

The moderate independent State of Kuwait was established on a firm base with the formation of the National Assembly and trade unions, the improvement in public and social services, the establishment of an army and of productive financial institutions. These bases prepared for economic and political stability. Kuwait's policy after independence became a model to the Arab people not only in the Gulf region but in the Arab World in general, both in monarchical and republican countries.

The Constituent Assembly drafted Kuwait's first constitution which was adopted by the ruler on the 11th November 1962 and promulgated in the same day.(222) Kuwait was declared an hereditary Emirate, held in succession by the descendants of the late Mubārak al-Ṣabāḥ.(223) The Amir was empowered to nominate his successor, subject to a majority vote in the National Assembly. Legislative power was vested in the Amir and the National Assembly. The Amir was to appoint and dismiss the Cabinet.(224) The constitution imposed restraints on the Amir's legislative authorities by giving the National Assembly power to override the Amir's veto by a two-thirds vote.(225) It also limited the time he had to confirm or refuse

legislation to thirty days.[226] The constitution gave the deputies the right to intercept any minister and demand full explanation of any policy matter and to request a debate.[227] The National Assembly could return a vote of no confidence in any of the ministers, but not in the Cabinet as a whole or in the Prime Minister. Ministers could vote in the Assembly's debate, as ex-officio members, except when one of their colleagues was subject to a vote of no confidence.[228] In the case of the Prime Minister, the National Assembly could declare its inability to co-operate with him giving the Amir a choice between releasing the Prime Minister and appointing a new cabinet or dissolving the National Assembly to call for a new election.[229] The National Assembly had also the power to control financial affairs. Amongst these powers were the approval of the annual budget and the imposition of a general tax.[230] In foreign affairs, the Assembly had the power to ratify treaties pertaining to peace, alliances, concessions to exploit Kuwait's natural resources, and financial commitments.[231]

Regarding the public righs of the subjects, the constitution recognised the basic freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion and protection from illegal searches and seizures.[232] It recognised the principle of the equal protection of the law.[233] Education and employment rights were also included.[234]

Briefly, the constitution was a great achievement for a newly independent state, allowing a greater degree of

democratic involvement than might have been expected.

After the promulgation of the constitution, an electoral law was adopted, giving conditions for the qualifications of both electorates and candidates for the National Assembly.[235] Eligible voters were males over twenty-one years of age, and Kuwaitī by origin or by naturalisation, i.e., those who had lived a minimum of twenty years in Kuwait.[236] These last rules were intended to ensure loyalty to the State. The electoral law prohibited the police and armed forces personnel from participating in elections.[237] Eligible candidates for the National Assembly were Kuwaitī by origin, not under thirty years of age on election day, and literate in Arabic.[238]

After the adoption of an electoral law, elections for the newly created National Assembly were held on the 23rd January 1963. Some 205 candidates competed for the fifty seats, and about 17,000 participated in the voting. The National Assembly and Cabinet gathered on the 29th January 1963, when the ruler delivered the fist speech. The constitution was responsible for the changes in socio-political structure. The new Cabinet comprised ten ministers of the ruling family and five selected ministers mostly merchants and notables.[239] The Prime Ministership was assigned to the Crown Prince. The National Assembly was mainly composed of merchants and notables. ʿAbdul ʿAzīz Ḥamad al-Ṣaqr, one of the leading notables had been elected for the presidency of the New Assembly.[240] His father had been the president of the first consultative council

means of creating a federal Arab State in the spring of 1963.[243] The petitioners wanted Kuwait to be the fourth member in the proposed union, despite the ideological and structural differences between their country and the three socialist Arab States. They asserted the inevitability of a united Arab State to fulfil Arab aspirations for unity, democracy, socialism and the restoration of Arab rights in Palestine. The tripartite negotiations in Cairo failed on the 16th April 1963 owing to mistrust between Nāsser and the Ba^c^thists which sabotaged the ambitions of the nationalist movement and rescued the Kuwaitī monarchy.[244] Nevertheless the government promised to reconsider their demands.[245]

The formation of the constitutional and parliamentary state in Kuwait was intended to create a closer relation between the regime and the subjects. It was a new technique to modernise the tribal regimes in the gulf. All other Gulf states followed the Kuwaiti line after independence in 1971, except Saudi Arabia and ᶜOmān.

The formation of the constitutional and parliamentary rule in Kuwait caused competition for power. To strengthen its influence the Kuwaiti nationalist movement established associations and trade unions to compensate for the absence of political parties, which were not expressly forbidden by the constitution but were known to be unwelcome.[246] Al-Ittiḥad al-ᶜĀm Li-ᶜUmmāl al-Kuwait (the General Union of Kuwait's Labourers); Rābiṭat al-'Udabā' (the League of Writers); Jamᶜiyyat al-Muḥāmīn (Association of

Lawyers); Jam^c^iyyat al-Sahafiyyn (Association of Journalists); Nādi al-Istiqlāl (Independence Club); Jam^c^iyyat al-Mu^c^allimīn al-Kuwaitiyya (The Kuwaiti teachers Association); al-Ittihad al-Watanī li-Talabat al-Kuwait (the Nationalist Union of Kuwaiti Students); Jam^c^iyyat al-Islāh al-Ijtimā^c^i (The Social Reform Association) - this was a continuation of the Jam^c^iyyat al-Irshād al-Islāmiyya (The Islamic Guidance Association). Al-Jam^c^iyya al-Thaqāfiyya al-Ijtimā^c^iyya al-Nisā'iyya (The Feminist Cultural and Social Association) and Jam^c^iyyat al-Nahdah al-^c^Arabiyya al-Nisa'iyya (the Enlightenment Arab Feminist Association) were amongst the popular Associations established after independence in the 1960's.(247)

The freedom of press guaranteed to Kuwaitis in the constitution led to the advancement of press activity. A number of newpapers were established such as al-Siyāsa, al-Talī^c^a, al-Watan.(248) In the 1960's and the mid-seventies the Kuwaitī press took precedence in the Gulf, becoming an influential voice for the opposition groups. Moreover freedom of speech made way for progress in Kuwaiti drama.(249)

Press, drama, cultural associations and trade unions strengthened the influence of the nationalist movement and consolidated the power of the people's representatives in the National Assembly. These institutions became channels of communication between the electorate and their representatives in parliament. It helped delegates to

lobby the Government to achieve nationalist demands. The existence of democratic procedures gave authority to the nationalist movement and credibility to the monarchy.

The Government also played a considerable role in strengthening the social welfare; confirming its continued support by improving standards of living. Education, health and housing were the most important sectors under consideration. The welfare benefits of the Kuwaitī subject became a model in the Arab World.[250] The progress of public and social services decreased ambition for political changes, their conditions comparing favourably with the republican regimes such as Iraq. Constitutional and parliamentary rule supported by a progressive social policy created a positive basis for the monarchical regime in Kuwait.

The flexible and prudent internal policy of the Kuwaitī regime was consolidated by the formation of a modern army and financial establishments to subsidise development projects in the Arab world and in third world countries. The Iraqi claims to Kuwait prompted the establishment of the Kuwaitī Army. The first stage took place between September 1961 and September 1963; after the announcement of the Iraqi claims the Kuwaitī Government requested to buy British jets to the cost of K.D. 500,000.[251] In the Spring of 1963 Kuwait became the second state in the Middle East to own the anti-tank missiles known as "Vickers Vigilant."[252]

Despite Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's independence in 1963 after Qāsim's era, mistrust continued between the

two neighbouring States, Iraq refused to demarcate boundaries, and the Kuwaiti Army increased. In 1968 Kuwaitī Military Expenditure amounted to about $76 million, whilst in 1976 it amounted to about $2,060 million.(253) Extensive military expenditure created a modern army in Kuwait, consisting of three forces. The following table enumerates the equipment of the forces, according to the estimates of 1977.(254)

Country	Army	Navy	Air Force
Kuwait	8,500	500	1,000
Personal	112 Tanks	12 Patrol Boats	49 combat Planes
Equipment	240 Armoured vehicles	16 Patrol Launches 3 Landing Craft	48 helicopters 7 Transport Planes 6 Trainers 50 missiles

The high investment and the property of financial establishments produced a firm economic base for Kuwait's independence, and established her influence in the world, which was assured by a dynamic foreign policy. Financial security allowed Kuwait to play an important role in Arab and third world economic development.

The Gulf Permanent Assistance Committee (GUPAC) was the first Kuwaitī institution to attempt to finance health and educational projects in the Gulf Shaikhdoms during the mid 1950's. From 1963 to 1969 Kuwaitī aid for public services reached North and South Yemen consecutively. The expansion of Kuwaitī aid to South Arabia led to the replacement of GUPAC by the al-Hay'a al-ᶜĀmma Lil-Janūb

Wal-Khalij al-ᶜArabī (the General League of the South and Arab Gulf in 1966.[255]

The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) was the second aid distributing institution and the first investment agency. It was established in December 1961 to provide Arab Countries with long-term, low interest loans (2.5-3.5% for 15-25 years) for development programmes.[256] Banks and other investment establishments were formed in Kuwait for the same purpose.[257] Kuwaitī loans to the Arab Countries led to the recognition of Kuwait's independence by those Arab Countries which had hitherto refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the monarchy: Libya, Syria, Iraq were examples.[258]

The collapse of the Qāsim regime on the 9th February 1963 allowed the two neighbouring countries to renew friendly relations. Congratulatory telegrams were sent to ᶜĀreḟ the President of the Republic by Shaikh ᶜAbdulla al-Sālim the ruler, and by ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz Ḥamad al-Ṣaqr - the Chairman of the National Assembly, whilst Ṣabāḥ al-Aḥmad Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a congratulatory telegram to Ṭālib al-Shabīb the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs. The telegrams were sent on the 9th February 1963. At the same time Kuwaitis organised demonstrations supporting the new Iraqi regime.[259]

The Baᶜthist's successful coup against Qāsim's regime on the 8th February 1963 was responsible for normalising relations between Kuwait and Iraq; and economic and trade relations were resumed. On the 2nd October 1963 a Kuwaitī delegation headed by the Crown Prince Ṣabāḥ al-Sālim (the

ruler's brother) visited Iraq. On the 4th October, 1963 the head of the Kuwaiti delegation and Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr the Iraqi Prime Minister signed an agreement which announced that Iraq formally extended recognition to Kuwait, while the Kuwait Government announced that it "would terminate the agreement with Britain at the appropriate time." The two Governments agreed also to form diplomatic relations.(260) On the 10th October the same year the Iraqi delegation headed by Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr visited Kuwait. During this visit the two Governments signed an agreement regarding Kuwait's obligation to submit a 30 million interest-free loan to Iraq for development projects; in exchange Iraq finally agreed to the fresh water project from Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab to Kuwait.(261)

Although the ruler approved the agreement on the 12th October 1963 and the loan was submitted to Iraq, the fresh water arrangement was never achieved.(262) After negotiations the two countries signed a preliminary agreement on this subject but negotiations broke down over the issue of land-ownership and control.(263)

Despite failure to agree on the water project, Kuwaiti loans to Iraq and other Arab Countries consolidated her independence and assured her influence in the Arab World. Regarding Kuwaiti loans to Iraq; KFAED submitted loans to a paper mill in Baṣra, and for the Samarra Barrage project which were completed in October 1966 and October 1967 respectively.(264)

Kuwait's membership in the four international financial organisations in September 1962 was consistent

with her efforts to protect her independence and create influence abroad. These organisations were: The International Capital Fund, International Development Organisation, International Bank and the International Financial Union.[265]

The presence of liberal and nationalist Kuwaitis in power from 1962, reduced the influence of the oil companies. The Kuwaitī Government convinced the Kuwaitī Oil Company to amend its concessions. The formation of the National Oil company of Kuwait was one of a number of Kuwaitī efforts to deliver her economy from foreign dominance. The radical Iraqi oil policy became a pattern for the nationalist elements in Kuwait.[266]

The influence of the nationalist movement in the National Assembly and the regime's need to secure its approval produced a distinguished policy in Kuwait compared with the neighbouring countries. During the 6 day war with Israel in June 1967 in accordance with Article 1 of the constitution of Kuwait, (which emphasised that Kuwait is "a part of the Arab Nation"), Kuwaitī troops participated. Kuwait was also the first country to respect an Arab decision to stop oil production. According to the decisions of the Khartoum Summit Conference she contributed the largest proportion of the $365 million annual Arab subsidy to Egypt and Jordan.[267] Moreover Kuwait extended military and financial aid to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) sheltering about 350,000 Palestinian refugees. Liberal support to the Arab cause made Kuwait a respected power in the Arab World.

To emphasise this policy after independence she became a member of the co-ordinating committee of the non-aligned countries and a proponent of the formation of a special solidarity fund for the non-aligned, with headquarters in Kuwait.(268)

The growth of Kuwait's foreign relations with the international blocks reflected the success of her prudently calculated liberalism. For example, the Government agreed to finance a third of the $500 million pipeline running from the Yugoslavian coast through Hungary to Czechoslovakia. The State had also began strengthening her relations with China, which was becoming an increasingly important trading partner.(269)

Despite the continuation of competition for power in the National Assembly between the traditional and opposition groups, the constitutional and parliamentary rule achieved regional and international influence for Kuwait.

Influence and the successful foreign policy allowed Kuwait to play the mediator's role in the dispute between the United Arab Republic (Egypt) and Sa^cudī Arabia over Yemen in 1966. Further, Kuwait restored harmony to Sa^cudī-Iranian relations after the differences over Iranian-Baḥrainī questions early in 1968. Moreover, the Country played a remarkable role in the solving in April 1970 of the Iranian-Baḥrainī dispute, and the formation of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) on the 2nd December 1971.

Kuwait's prestige after independence was achieved through a successful combination of specialist skills, the

pragmatism and conscientiousness of the national element and the broad-mindedness of ʿAbdulla al-Sālim.

The Kuwaitī nationalist movement considered the constitutional and parliamentary rule as a great achievement, while the Kuwaitī regime regarded it as an instrument to protect itself from violent action by the opposition groups. The separation of the U.A.R. in September 1961, the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six Days War, and the death of Nāsser on the 28th September 1970 weakened the Arab Liberation Movements. These three major events were responsible for conflict and division in the opposition groups in Kuwait, hence the waning of their influence. The ideological conflicts in the Arab World on the grounds of the frequent defeats had debilitated the Kuwaitī opposition. For example, conflict between Baᶜthists and Nāsserites occurred in Kuwait and other Arab countries. Each group accused the other of responsibility for the separation. The same case occurred in 1969. As a result the pan-Arabist groups which influenced the Kuwaitī nationalist movement in the 1950's and 1960's divided into two parts:

The Nāsserite group headed by Jāsim Moḥammad al-Qaṭāmī called themselves: al-Jabhah al-Waṭaniyyah al-Dīmuqrāṭiyyah (The Democratic and Nationalist Front). The second was the Marxist group headed by Dr. Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb, which established Ḥarakat al-Taqaddumiyyīn al-Dīmuqraṭiyyīn al-Kuwaitiyyīn (The Movement of Kuwaitī Progressive Democrats) in 1971. The newspaper al-Ṭalīᶜah was published

by them. Internal division in the pan-Arabist group weakened the role of the nationalist movement and allowed the traditional groups to restore some of their former influence.[270]

Footnotes : Chapter 5

1. Al-Sha[c]b No.43, the 4th September 1958. For the details see, Muhakamat al-Mahkama' al-[c]Askariyya' al-[c]Ulya al-Khāṣṣa', al-Mahādhir Lil-Jalasāt allati [c]Aqadatha al-Mahkama', Wizārat al-Difā[c], Maṭba[c]at al-Ḥukūma', Baghdad 22 vols.

2. United Nations, Studies on selected Development Problems in various countries in the Middle East (New York, 1967), p.3; see also Shehāb, F., "Kuwait: A Super Affluent Society", Foreign Affairs, vol.42 (April 1964), pp.461-474.

3. Annual Statistical Abstract, Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Planning, State of Kuwait 1981, p.31

4. A Ṣarīfa is a type of mud-hut. For details about the conditions of peasants and working classes see Batātu, H., The Shaikh and the Peasant in Iraq, 1917-1958, unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, April 1960.

5. Al-Sha[c]b, No.43 the 4th September 1958.

6. Loc.cit.

7. A personal interview with Dr. Aḥmad al-Khaṭīb on the 6th March 1982 at Kuwait.

8. Personal interview with Faiṣal [c]Abdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāni[c] on the 10th March 1982 at Kuwait

9. Al-Sha[c]b, the 22nd May 1958

10. Al-Sha[c]b, No.42, the 28th August 1958

11. Al-Fajr, No.37 the 29th July 1958.

12. The Commander-in-Chief, Premier, and Minister of Defence

13. Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Deputy Premier, and Minister of the Interior.

14. The Chief of Military Intelligence, and one of the founders of the Free Officers Movement in Iraq from September 1952.

15. His father was nationalist and was killed on the 10th March 1939 during the disturbances.

16. A Pan-Arabist who participated in the Kuwaitī nationalist reform movement of 1938-39.

17. Personal interview with Dr. al-Khatib, on the 6th March 1982 at Kuwait.

18. Loc.cit; see also al-Hadaf, No.203, the 24th February 1965.

19. The official paper al-Kuwait al-Yawm, No.333, the seventh year, the 2nd July 1961, p.3; see also al-Sha^cb, No.42, the 28th August 1958.

20. Gallman. W.J., Iraq under General Nuri, Washington, D.C., 1965, p.151.

21. For details about this visit see the Iraqi newspaper al-Bilad, No.5336, the 1st November 1958.

22. Al-Kuwait al-Yawm, No.333, the 2nd July 1961, p.3; "Haqā'iq al-Azmah Bayn al-ʿIrāq Wal-Kuwait", Hukumat al-Kuwait, Dā'irat al-Matbuʿat Wal-Nashr, August 1961, p.28.

23. Al-Bilād, No.5340, the 5th November 1958.

24. Ibid. No, 5386, the 21st December 1958.

25. Sulaimān, Q.A., al-Siyāsah al-Khārijiyyah al-ʿIrāqiyyah (the Iraqi foreign policy 1958-63) M.A. thesis, submitted to Baghdad University, June 1978, p.223.

26. The Times (London), the 5th May 1961.

27. Kanafānī, M., Bayn al-ʿIrāq wal-Kuwait, Manshūrāt Dār al-Hayāt, Dimashq Lil-Sahāfah wal-Nashr, unknown date of publishing.

28. The Times (London), the 21st, 26th July 1960; Dukas, M., Azmat al-Kuwait: al-ʿAlāqat al-Kuwaitiyya al-ʿIrāqiyya 1961-1963, Dār al-Nahār Lil-Nashr, Beirut, 1973, p.20; Arab World, June 1961.

29. Ibid., the 15th June 1961.

30. The Times (London), the 3rd April 1961.

31. Al-Zubaidī, L.A., Thawrat 'Arbaʿtaʿash Tammūz 1958 fil-ʿIrāq, Dār al-Rashīd Lil Nashr, 1979, pp.101-109, 135-7: Khadduri, M., Republican Iraq, The Middle East Institute, Washington D.C. 1978, p.17; Batātu, H., The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement of Iraq, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1978, pp.775-7, 782.

32. Interviews with ʿAli Sālih al-Saʿdī, the Secretary of the regional Command of the Baʿth party in Iraq; ʿAbdul Qādir Ismāʿil, member of the Central Committee

of the Iraqi Communist Party (I.C.P.), quoted from al-Zubaidī, L.A., op.cit., pp.163-4

33. Khaddurī, M., op.cit, p.28

34. A suburb of Baghdād.

35. Khaddurī, M., op.cit., p.38; al-Zubaidī, L.A., op.cit., p.195; Batātu,Ḥ., op.cit., p.799

36. The leader Qāsim was called "al-Zaᶜīm" by his colleagues and the Iraqi people. He was the only Iraqi leader called by this title.

37. Mohākamāt, vol.5, 1959, Wizārat al-Difāᶜ, Baghdād; Batatu, Ḥ., op.cit., p.800 (personal interview with Free officers.)

38. Khaddurī, M., op.cit., p.39.

39. Batātu, Ḥ., op.cit., p.799

40. Ibid., p.797; Khaddurī, M., op.cit., p.38, al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., p.195

41. Ibid., p.199, Batātu, Ḥ., op.cit., p.799

42. Batātu, Ḥ., op.cit., p.799

43. Khadduri, M., op.cit, p.39.

44. Ibid., pp.39-40; al-Zubaidī, L.A., op.cit., pp.200-201

45. Al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., p.201

46. Batātu, Ḥ., op.cit., p.1125; Khaddurī, M., op.cit., p.16; al-Zubaidi, L.A. op.cit., pp.172-3

47. Khaddurī, M., op.cit., p.18, al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit p.173

48. Khaddurī, M., op.cit., p.19; al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., p.173

49. The Iraqi Dīnār equalled nearly one sterling pound at that time

50. Khaddurī, M., op.cit., p.16, al-Zubaidī, L.A., op.cit p.176.

51. Khaddurī, M., op.cit, p.23, Batātu, Ḥ., op.cit, p.793; al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit, pp.165-6.

52. Al-Zubaidī, L.A., op.cit pp.168-9.

53. Qāsim's speeches, 1959, part 1, pp.30-31, pt.2,

pp.89-90; Khadduri, M, op.cit., p.24; Abdul Karim, A., Adwā' ʿAla Tajribat al-Wihdah, Damascus, 1962, pp.153, 158.

54. Batātu, H., op.cit, p.795; al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit, p.166-167, 170-171.

55. Interview with, Engineer Colonel Rajab ʿAbdul Majīd and Mohammad Siddiq Shanshal, quoted from al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., p.171.

56. Ibid. p.172.

57. Batatu, H., op.cit., pp.800-802; al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., pp.201-219; Khadduri, M., op.cit p.43.

58. Khadduri, M., op. cit. p.27.

59. Al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., p.234.

60. Ibid., pp.234-5., Khadduri, M., op.cit p.59.

61. Ibid., pp.235, 238-9; Khadduri, M., op.cit, p.59.

62. Al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit pp.180-190; Khadduri, M., op.cit, pp.34-35.

63. Al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., pp.191-2.

64. For details about the Iraqi population see: Lawless, R.I., Iraq: Changing Population Patterns, edited by Clarke, J.I., Populations of the M.E. and North Africa, University of London Press Limited, 1962, pp.97-129; Adams, D.G., "Current Population Trends in Iraq", The Middle East Journal, vol.10, Spring 1956, pp.151-165.

65. Khadduri, M., op.cit., p.69, Batātu, H., op.cit., pp.808-815; al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit, p.263; Tejirian, E.H., Iraq 1932-1963, unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to Columbia University 1972, pp.194-5.

66. Khadduri, M., "ʿAzīz ʿAlī Misrī and the Arab Nationalist Movement", Middle Eastern Affairs, No.4 1965, pp.140-163.

67. The popular name of the monarchial era in Iraq.

68. al-wqā'iʿ al-ʿIrāqiyyah, No.44, the 30th September 1958; al-Dhāhir, A., al-Islāh al-Zirāʿi wal-Siyāsi, Matbaʿat Shafiq, Baghdad 1959, p.15, Hasan, M.S., Dirasāt fil-Iqtisād al-Iraqi, Dār al-Taliʿa, Beirut 1966, p.47.

69. The text of the Law No.80,1961 in al-Waqā'iʿ al-Irāqiyya. No.616, the 21st December 1961, pp.1-3;

The Official Gazette, No.616, the 12th December 1961.

70. Al-Samarrā'i, S.A., Iraq and Sterling Zone, Baghdād, 1961, Arabic Text, pp.19-21.

71. Press conference held by Qasim in the Ministry of Defence on the 23rd September 1961.

72. Khadduri, M., Republican Iraq, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978, p.69.

73. Batātu, H., op.cit, pp.808-815; al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit, p.263; Tejirian, E.H., op.cit, pp.194-5.

74. Khadduri, M., op.cit., pp.91-2; Aref's statement published in al-Jumhuriyyah, No.3 the 20th July, 1958.

75. Al-Zubaidi, L.A., op.cit., pp.416-419: Tejirian, E.H., op.cit., p.202; Khadduri, M., op.cit, pp.92-94.

76. Khadduri, M., op. cit., pp.96-7.

77. Ibid., pp.97-98; al-Zubaidi, L.A., pp.420-424; al-Sha[c]b, No.53, the 13th November 1958, p.2

78. Khadduri, M., op. cit, pp.91-2.

79. Al-Zubaidi, L.A., op. cit, p.415.

80. Khadduri, M., op. cit, p.92; Tejirian, E.H., op.cit p.202, Kannah, K., al-[c]Irāq Amsihi wa Ghadihi, Dār al-Rayhānī Lil-Tibā[c]ah wal-Nashr, Beirut, 1966, pp.340-341.

81. Khaddurī, M., op. cit., p.94.

82. Ibid., pp.92-3, al-Zubaidi, L.A., op. cit., p.419.

83. Kannah, K., op. cit., pp.339-340.

84. Iraq Times, the 7th November 1958; al-Bilād, the 6th and 12th November 1958.

85. Iraq Times, the 7th November, 1958.

86. Ibid., the 10th November, 1958.

87. Al-Rawī, A., Min al-Qāhirah Ila Mu[c]taqal Qāsim, Arabic text, Manshūrāt Dār al-Adāb, Beirut, 1963, p.36.

88. Khaddurī, M., op. cit., pp.99-100; al-Zubaidī, L.A., op. cit., pp.427-430.

89. Khadduri., M., op. cit., pp.108-110; Iraq Times, the 13th March, 1959; Tejirian, E.H., pp.209-217; The Times(London), the 10th March 1959.

90. Batātu, H., op. cit., pp.771-2; al-Rāwī, A., op. cit., pp.212-214.

91. Khaddurī, M., op. cit., p.129.

92. Ibid., pp.129-130; al-Rikābi, F., al-Hal al-Awhad, Arabic text, al-Sharikah al-cArabiyya Lil Tibaca Wal-Nashr, Cairo, 1963, pp.53-55, 81-3.

93. Al-Fajr, No. 44, the 16th September 1958.

94. Ibid., No. 51, the 4th November, 1958.

95. Ibid., No. 52, the 11th November, 1958.

96. Al-Shacb, No. 53, the 13th November 1958.

97. Al-Fajr, No. 54, the 25th November 1958.

98. Ibid., No. 53, the 18th November and No. 54, the 25th November 1958.

99. Loc. cit.

100. al-Zubaidi, L.A., op. cit., pp.493-494.

101. Al-Rāwi, A., op. cit., pp.70-74.

102. Iraq Times, the 1st February, 1959.

103. Personal interview with Aḥmad Diyain in March 1982.

104. Personal interview with Aḥmad al-Saqqāf on the 16th March, Faiṣal al-Ṣānic on the 10th March and with Aḥmad Diyain on the 7th March 1982 at Kuwait. See also al-Kuwait al-Yawm, No. 211, the 8th February, No. 212 the 15th Februry 1959.

105. Kuwait Ministry of Guidance and Information, Kuwait Today: a Welfare State (Nairobi, Kenya, n.d.), p.18.

106. Annual Statistical Abstract 1981, op. cit., p.92.

107. The annual Statistical Abstract of 1968, op. cit., p.112 and of 1981, p. 284; (Public Property.)

108. "Water for Kuwait", The Economist, the 4th April 1953, pp.28-29.

109. Now, three million gallon storage tanks have been completed beside it. It has a pump house to forward drinking water to the distribution towers around the

town. Water towers rise 80 to 100 feet above street.

110. F.O. 371/91258/EA1011/2, letter of the 14th February, 1951, from Mr. Jakins to Sir R. Hay, the P.R., at Baḥrain; Kuwait Annual Report for 1950.

111. Text of Naturalisation Law in al-Nafīsi, A., al-Kuwait al-Ra'y al-'Ākhar, London, 1978, pp.144-155.

112. Text of Electoral Law in al-Marayati, A., Middle Eastern Constitutions and Electoral Laws, New York, 1968, pp.230-242.

113. Mackie, A., "Kuwaiti Special Report", Middle East Economic Digest, August 1977, pp.1-44, reference on p.38.

114. Kuwait Today: a Welfare State, pp.158f.

115. Ibid., pp.18-24.

116. al-Hay'a al-ᶜĀmma Lil-Janūb Wal-Khalīj al-ᶜArabī, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1981, pp.1-2; see also, al-Mallākh, R., "Kuwait Aids to its Gulf Neighbours", Emergent Nations, vol.1, No. 1, August, 1965, pp.54-5.

117. Ḥusain, A., "Lectures in the Kuwaiti Society", delivered at the institution of the high Arab studies in Cairo, Arab League, 1960, pp. 102-103; see also, Nawfal, S., al-Siyasa bi- Imārāt al-Khalīj al-Arabi Wa-Janub al-Jazīrah, Arabic text, Dār al-Maᶜarif, Cairo, 1961, P.191; Baḥry, Le., Kuwait, etudes sociaux, economiques et politiques, thesis Montpellier, 1962, p.210.

118. Al-Isa, H., al-Kuwait Wal-Mustaqbal, Dār al-Talīᶜa, Beirut, September 1961, pp.72, 77.

119. Ibid., p.70; al-Ṣāliḥ, O.A., Le System politique Koweitien (Formation historique: études; juridiques, économiques, socio-politiques). Thesis for state doctorate in Law, Universite de Paris, 1-Panthen, Sorbonne, 1973, p.92.

120. Paul, J., "High Moon in Kuwait", New Statesman, 26th July 1958.

121. On the 24th July 1959 Kuwait joined the International Union for Telegraph and Wireless Communications; The International Post Union on the 16th February 1960; The International Civil Aviation Organisation on the 25th April, 1960; The International Health Organisation on the 9th May 1960; Agriculture and Food organisation on the 29th June 1960; The UNESCO

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(the 10th October 1922) in Hurewitz, J., The Middle East and Africa in World Politics, Vol. 2, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1979, pp.325-337.

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140. Khutab al-Za[c]īm, vol. 2, 1959, pp.42-47; see also Batatu, H., op. cit., p. 919; al-Zubaidi, L.A., op. cit., p.488.

141. al-Iraq, the 22nd March, 1960, Baghdad, the text of the Fatwa; al-Huriyya, the 9th May 1960 (a letter issued by the Chief Marji[c] (Mujtahid) Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim denouncing communist activities).

142. Wizārat al-Difā[c], Muhākamāt al-Mahkama al-[c]Askariyya al-[c]ulyā al-Khassa, al-Mahadir Lil Jalasāt allati [c]Aqadathā al-Mahkama, Matba[c]at al-Hukūmah, Baghdād, twenty-two vols., the reference in vols., 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 regarding the trial of participants in the Mosul revolt; al-Rāwi, A., op. cit., pp.127-128, 212-215; Batatu, H., op. cit., pp.771-772.

143. Personal interview with Dr. al-Khaṭīb on the 6th March 1982.

144. Arab World, the 21st, 23rd June 1961.

145. The Times (London), the 23rd June, 1961.

146. As it is called in Iraq.

147. The text is a summary of the Prime Minister's statement during a press conference held in the Ministry of Defence at Baghdād on the 25th June 1961, Middle East Economic Survey, the 30th June, 1961.

148. Loc. cit.

149. Personal interviews with al-Ṣāni[c], al-Khatīb, al-Saqqāf and al-Basīr in March 1982.

150. Al-Bilād, No. 6131, the 26th June 1961, Baghdād.

151. Sulaimān, Q.A., op. cit. p.232.

152. Ibid., p.226.

153. Nidāl al-Ba^c^th al-Arabi al-Ishtirāki ^c^Abr Bayānāt Qiyadātihi al-Qawmiyya', 1955-1962, Dar al-Tali^c^a, Beirut, 1971, pp.160-161.

154. Fawzi, A., Petrol Wa Dukhān, Dār al-Sharq al-Jadīd, Cairo, 1961, p.215.

155, Sulaimān, Q.A., op. cit., pp.239-240.

156. They were exiled in Cairo and members in the Hay'at al-Tajammu^c^ al-Qawmi.

157. Al-Zubaidi, L.A., op. cit., p.515.

158. Sulaimān, Q.A., op. cit., p.240.

159. Ibid., p. 239

160. Dokas, M., Azmat al-Kuwait: al-^c^Alāqāt al-Kuwatiyya' al-^c^Irāqiyya', 1961-1963, Dar al-Nahar Lil-Nashr, Beirut, 1973, p.71.

161. The Gazette of Iraq Republic 1960, p.56; al-Fil, M.R., Dr., "Mushkilāt al-Hudūd Bayn Emārāt al-Khalij al-Arabi", Journal of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies, vol. 2. No. 8, October 1976, pp.25-64, reference on p.31.

162. See chapters one and three.

163. Al-Akhbār, the 11th December 1962.

164. Isa, N., Namūdhaj al-Tanmiyah fil-Kuwait Wal-Takāmul al-Iqtisādī al-^c^Arabi, Ma^c^had al-Inmā' al-^c^Arabi, Tripoli, Beirut, 1976, p.29.

165. ^c^Allāwī, I. al-Pitrol al-^c^Irāqi Wal-Taharrur al-Watanī, Dār al-Tali^c^a, unknown date, Beirut, pp.81-82.

166. Fawzī, A., Qāsim Wa al-Naft, Matābi^c^ Dār al-Kātib al-^c^Arabi, Cairo, 1963, pp.109-112.

167. Sulaimān, Q.A., op. cit., pp.279-280.

168. See also the Times (London), and the New York Times, the 25th July 1961.

169. Interview with Qāsim made by Amīn al-Doghān, al-Doghān, A., al-Haqā'iq Kama Ra'ytuhā fil-^c^Irāq, Manshūrāt Dār al-Sha^c^b, Beirut, 1962, p.114.

170. Ibid., p.56.

171. Sulaimān, Q. A., op. cit., p.246.

172. Colonel Fādil ^c^Abbās al-Mahdāwī was a Free Officer and

was appointed chairman of the al-Makhkama al-ᶜAskariyya al-ᶜUlya al-Khassa (the Special High Military Court). It was established in August 1958 after the revolution to try senior members of the former regime, and leaders of the counter revolution.

173. Personal interview with Aḥmad Diyain on the 8th March 1982 (see Appendix 1).

174. Loc. cit., Moḥammad, M.J., op.cit., p.150.

175. Al-Kuwait al-Yawm, No. 334, The Seventh Year, the 9th July 1961, p.4; No. 335, the 16th July 1961, p.1.

176. Al-Hadaf, No. 26, p. 2

177. Sulaimān, Q.A., op. cit., p.246, 257-8; al-Nafīsī, A., op. cit., pp.43-4.

178. Personal interviews with al-Saqqāf, al-Wiqayyān al-Ṣāniᶜ in March 1982.

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181. Al-Kuwait al-Yawm, No. 33, The Seventh Year, the 2nd July 1961, pp.1, 2, 3, 5; No. 335, the 16th July 1961; Ḥumāt al-Waṭan, the 5th July 1961, p.2.

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185. Fawzī, A., Petrol Wa Dukhān, Dār al-Sharq al-Jadīd, Cairo, 1961, p.149.

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188. Ibid, pp.43-4.

189. S.C.O.R., Sixteenth Year, 957th meeting, 2nd July 1961, paras. 17-38.

190. Loc. cit.

191. Humāt al-watan, the 5th July, 1961, pp.11-14; "Notes of the Month: Arab reactions to Kuwait", The World Today, Vol. 17, No. 8, August 1961, pp.323-4; Fawzi, A., op. cit., pp.93-95.

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202. Loc. cit.

203. Loc. cit.

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205. Al-Hadaf (Mulḥaq 4), the 2nd July 1961, pp.2-3.

206. Al-Hadaf, No. 100, the 20th February, 1963, p.7. Dr. Barakāt pan-Arabist former Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Social Affairs, related to the correspondent of the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Hadaf. He left Iraq for Kuwait in July 1959 after the persecution of the pan-Arabist groups, staying there until the collapse of Qāsim's regime in February 1963.

207. Sulaimān, Q.,op.cit., p.250.

208. Qāsim, J.Z., op.cit., p.92.

209. Wizārat al-Takhṭīṭ, al-Iḥṣā'iyyah al-Sanawiyyah, 1963, Baghdād, p.269.

210. Wizārat al-Takhṭīṭ, al-Iḥṣā'iyyah al-Sanawiyyah, 1960, Baghdād, p.195.

211. Dunn, U., op.cit., p.251.

212. Al-Waqā'iᶜ al-Iraqiyyah, No. 616, the 21st December, 1961, pp.1-3, the text of the Law No. 80, 1961; ᶜAllāwi, I. al-Pitrol al-ᶜIrāqī Wal al-Taharrur al-ᶜArabi, Dar al-Talīᶜah, Beirut, 1967, p.210; Moḥammad, M.J., op.cit., p.152.

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230. Article 141.

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237. Article 3 of the Electoral Law; see al-Ṣāliḥ, U., op.cit., p.268.

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Chapter Six : Baḥrain

Page

1. Relations between Bahrain and Iraq on the eve of the Popular revolution of the 14th July 1958.

Relations between Baḥrain and Iraq had been cordial before the Iraqi revolution, and surprisingly continued to be so, as a result of Iraq's important religious and educational role and the widespread popular support for republicanism. Trading and cultural exchange were important to both countries.

Baḥrainī pilgrims continued to visit the Holy Cities and the Iraqi religious speakers continued to visit Baḥrain to participate in the ᶜāshūr celebrations as before. The following table indicates that Baḥrainī pilgrims contributed about 40% of the Departures to Iraq.(1)

Year	Baḥrainis		Iraqis	
	Departures	Arrivals	Departures	Arrivals
1958	32,750	32,592	286	245
1959	32,788	34,403	131	102
1960	33,952	35,312	219	124
1961	31,512	30,975	211	166

Amongst the Iraqi visitors to Baḥain were businessmen and relatives with Baḥrainī origins.

2. The Baḥrainī Nationalist Movement during the period in question:

Although the nationalist movement had been suppressed

in November 1956, underground political activities continued after the suspension of papers like al-Watan and al-Mīzān under the "state of emergency."

Jarīdat al-Khalīj al-ᶜArabī (The Arab Gulf Newspaper) and the Gulf Daily Times were the only papers published before April 1961. The first was an Arabic, the second an English paper, both belonging to the British Gulf Company Ltd. They were issued only during 1956 and disappeared after the burning of their offices during the violent riots in November 1956. Both were re-issued after the restoration of the offices but floundered rapidly, boycotted by the nationalist majority.(2)

Between 1920 and November 1956 the nationalist movement fought for social, cultural, economic and political reforms. It did not oppose British protection or the monarchy. After the largely unsuccessful uprising of the mid-fifties, the Baḥrainī nationalist movement took a more militant approach, in line with the other parties. The principal reasons for the change from nationalism to nationalist Reform were increasing resistance to the despotism of the monarchy, and to the continuation of British dominance of the Government's administration. The expansion of the British and American Military bases in Baḥrain contributed to the conviction of abuse by foreign powers. The longstanding unrest of native labourers was evidence of the economic repression of a large part of Baḥrainī society. The nationalist reform movement itself was suffering brutal suppression after the uprising in November 1956, and the formation of rival underground

political groups: the Communist, Ba^c^thist, Nāsserite and pan-Arabist groups endangered the Nationalist Party's monopoly of popular support. The last four of these were nationalist oriented, but their priorities lay elsewhere. The formation of the U.A.R. and the Iraqi revolution provided models of success and practical aid.

The Nationalist reform movement had made the emergence of Communist and Ba^c^thist groups possible; although unofficial they could affiliate to the nationalist reform movement. An increase in the number of Baḥrainī students in universities in Baghdād, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon strengthened the underground groups in Baḥrain. The principal activities were the production of pamphlets and leaflets in Baḥrain and the organisation by students of political meetings abroad. These meetings aimed to discuss the internal situation and means of reform; criticised government policy and were intended to maintain communication between the leadership of the opposition groups and the popular base. Al-Kifāḥ (the Struggle), al-Yaqẓah (the Awakening) and al-Niḍāl (the Strife) were examples of the leaflets.(3) Students also attended academic conferences in Baghdad and Cairo on the subject of third world liberation.

The clubs and ma'ātim continued their role as headquarters for the underground political groups. Religious celebrations, especially during Muḥarram, became the principal occasions for public criticism of the internal political situation, through lectures and marches. Religious anniversaries provided the only opportunity for

free speech, between the uprising and the formation of the National Assembly (in December 1973 after independence). The religious occasions provided a captive audience in secure circumstances. A government infringement of political rights could be brought into the open, as when it deprived Dr. ᶜAbdul Hādi Khalaf, a Baḥraini Communist, of his membership of the National Assembly under the excuse that he was under the legal age. The announcement of this ruling coincided with ᶜāshūr, and participants in the processions shouted in sympathy with Dr. Khalaf:

> "Māl Mīzān al-ᶜAdālah Wafāz bil Kursi badīl (the balance of Justice shifted, another won the chair). Min baᶜad Sahb al-Thiqah Asbah al-Kursi Hazīl." (When we withdrew our confidence the place became vacant).

The nationalist movement depended upon Baḥraini politicians in exile, and students in Arab universities, for its vitality.

Before the suppression of the Kuwaiti nationalist movement on the 3rd February 1959, its papers like al-Shaᶜb (the People), and al-Fajr (the Dawn) sympathised with the Baḥraini nationalist movement and criticised violently the despotic rule in Baḥrain. For example the newspaper al-Fajr published on the 28th October a translation of an article from the British Daily Express regarding the imprisonment of the leading figures of the Baḥraini opposition movement of the mid-fifties.(4) On the 13th November 1958 the newspaper al-Shaᶜb published an article entitled al-Dhikra al-Thāniya Liᶜtiqāl Qādat al-Baḥrain (the second anniversary of the arrest of Baḥraini leaders). The article had been written by al-Shabāb al-ᶜArabī

fil-Khalij (the Arab Youth in the Gulf). The writer discussed briefly the suppression of the uprising and the arrest of its leaders. He also called on the Arab League and the Arab press to demand the release of political prisoners.(5) Moreover the state of emergency prevented Baḥrain's representatives from attending the conference of Arab writers held in Kuwait. Their absence provoked criticism of the autocratic policy of the Baḥrainī Government by al-Fajr on the 25th November 1958.(6)

The Baḥrainī nationalist movement suffered from the absence of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement; it was practically disadvantaged and its morale weakened. The new hard-line approach was a defensive tactic.

3. The Iraqi Revolution: reaction from the Baḥrainī regime and from the people.

There were demonstrations amongst nationalists in Baḥrain welcoming the Iraqi revolution. Portraits of Qāsim and ᶜĀref were displayed in homes and in shops in towns and villages. The Iraqi Ministry of Guidance (i.e. propaganda) sent tens of thousands of pamphlets and posters of the leaders, including transcripts of "Khutab al-Zaᶜīm" (the speeches of Qāsim) to Baḥraini sympathisers; an action which the Baḥrain government chose to ignore.

Nationalist aspects of the new policy were the negotiations to regain I.P.C.'s concessions, and the repudiation of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement.

Negotiations to recover oil concessions began in August 1958.[7]

Baḥrain was beseiged with major upheavals in the powerful neighbouring states of Iran and Iraq. Whilst Iran was laying claim to Baḥrain, Iraq was attacking the anachronism of monarchy. During the uprising of the 1950's in Baḥrain, public feeling in Iran was strong enough to compel the government to make formal claims to Baḥrain.[8]

In November 1957, the Iranian Parliament passed a Bill declaring Baḥrain to be the 14th province of Iran. In 1958, the Shah re-asserted Iranian claims at a press conference, declaring,

> "We consider Bahrain an integral part of Iran and will gladly accept the allegiance of Shaikh Sulman bin Ahmad all Khalifa (sic) (9) the present ruler, in the capacity of the first Iranian Governor-General of Bahrain."(10)

Although British and monarchical interests were threatened by the new republic, both parties were in agreement that the Iranian claims to Baḥrain were inadmissable. However, the strong Iraqi reaction was a threat in itself, indicating the intention to take an active role in regional affairs.

The Iraqi Ministry of Foreign affairs issued a proclamation on the 26th November 1958 denying the right of Iranians to govern a predominantly Arab nation, and announcing opposition to the Iranian demands for Baḥrain. During a press declaration the Iraqi Foreign Minister said:

> "Bahrain was an Arab country in bygone years and is so now, it is a part of the Arab Nation, and Iraq entirely supports the Arabist identity of Bahraini people, their

Sovereignty and their independence."(11)

"This declaration was welcomed by the Baḥraini Government. As a result Shaikh Salmān bin Ḥamad sent a telegram to the Iraqi Foreign Minister, thanking him for support to Baḥrain."(12)

After Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdād Pact in March 1959, it was reported that Iran might use this pact to impose her dominance on the Gulf region, especially after the end of the protection.(13)

Iraq's opposition to the Iranian ambitions encouraged the Baḥraini Government to co-operate and develop mutual confidence, despite the contrast in political ideals.

4. Effects of the Political infighting in Iraq on the Baḥraini Nationalist Movement

The success of the Iraqi revolution gave the underground political groups of Baḥrain confidence that the revolution would, in the long run, be a source of support. Conflict between political groups in Iraq and the competition for power between the leading Free Officers disappointed the Baḥraini natonalist movement. The political crisis in Iraq weakened the underground opposition movement. The major political groups which dominated the Baḥraini nationalist movement were: the Nāsserites, the Ba^{c}thists, and the Communists. In January 1959, the leading figures of the Baḥraini nationalist movement sent a letter to Qāsim calling for material and moral support to the movement to consolidate its position and to continue its activities against

colonialism.(14) Qāsim responded with promises and thanks, but did not step-up the aid, mostly in the form of scholarships, already being given.

Conflict between unionists and anti-unionists caused division and open conflict between Baḥraini political groups at home and abroad. Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdād and Beirut, where Baḥraini students studied, were centres of a conflict erupting throughout the region. The separation of the U.A.R. in September 1961 deepened the ideological differences and the violence was aggravated. Nāsserites, Baᶜthists and Communists were the principal groups involved. These clashes were the main hindrance to progress in the Baḥraini nationalist movement during the period in question and afterwards.(15)

In 1962 the communist groups Jabhat al-Taḥrir al-Waṭani al-Baḥraniyyah (The Baḥraini Nationalist and Liberation Front) issued the first programme, containing fifteen items, defining the aims of the Front. These aims were not merely limited to reform but required fundamental change to create a new social, political and economic structure.(16) The termination of the protectorate agreements and the formation of an independent, democratic state with full sovereignty; and sexual equality - politically, socially and economically - were objectives.(17)

An increase in the number of Baᶜthists in Baḥrain led to the formation of an underground branch of the Baᶜth party. Ideological and intellectual growth within the Baḥraini nationalist movement strengthened its position at

home and abroad despite savage suppression. Sympathy and support were gained from Iraq, Syria and Egypt.

After the collapse of Qāsim's regime on the 9th February 1963, the underground Ba^cth party in Baḥrain sent a congratulatory telegram to the National Revolutionary Command Council. The League of Baḥrainī students in Cairo issued a proclamation on this occasion, asserting the importance of Thawrat 'Arba^cta^cshar Ramaḍān 1963 for the liberation movement in the Gulf region.(18) After the first Ba^cth regime had seized power in Iraq in February 1963, Iraq's support to the Baḥrainī nationalist movement, allowing it to dispense scholarships and give salaries to its party workers, increased. Baghdād radio and the Iraqi press supported the Baḥrainī opposition movement overtly. Iraq's nationalist policy clearly encouraged the Baḥrainī rebellion in March 1965.(19) The newspaper al-Thawra al-ᶜArabiyya (the Arab Revolution) published two articles: Infijār Sha^cbī fil-Khalīj ("Popular explosion in the Gulf") and al-Sha^cb Aqwā ("The people is stronger"),(20) during this rebellion and a daily radio programme - The Holy March - was devoted to the Baḥrainī cause.

The highly influential propaganda of Iraq strengthened the position of the Baḥrainī rebellion. It was led by Jabhat al-Quwā al-Taqaddumiyya (The Front of the Progressive Forces), established before this rebellion, containing the major parties.(21) The same leadership sent a grateful telegram to al-Ittiḥād al-Ishtirākī (The Socialist Union) in Baghdad and Cairo describing the attitude of the Iraqi people as deeply moving.

> "The people of Bahrain will remember the significant role of Iraq in successfully promoting the rebellion. This attitude had a vital impact amongst the revolutionary people in Bahrain."(22)

Support to the Nationalist Movement in Baḥrain was an indication of Iraq's attention to the Arab people in the Gulf region. The ideological differences between various political groups weakened the position of the republican regime at home and abroad. At the same time the western presence in the Gulf, especially the British, further decelerated Iraq's progress in the region.

5. <u>Baḥrain: reactions to the Iraqi claim to Kuwait</u>

The formation of a republic in Iraq caused anxiety for Britain and the monarchies in the Gulf region. The political, economic and social policies of the republic confirmed the fears of the Governmental circles in the region. The loss of the Hāshimite regime in Iraq was considered a great loss by the Western bloc, the very existence of the new regime was a major aggravation. The oil concessions in Iran, Kuwait, Baḥrain, Saᶜūdi Arabia and Qaṭar belonging to western companies were suddenly vulnerable. The landing of American forces in Beirut and Iran, and the British paratroops' arrival in Jordan after the Iraqi revolution was a measure of western uneasiness over the new régime in Iraq.(23) The unlimited support of the U.A.R. to Iraq and the prompt warnings of the Soviet Union against western intervention pr-empted allied aggression and rescued the Iraqi revolution.

The Iraqi regime was the sole republic in the Gulf until the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran in February 1979 (when the Islamic Iranian republic was established) and regional nationalist movements had hopes that it would introduce a larger measure of democracy in the region. However Iraqi parties became embroiled in internal competition; the Ba^{c}thists and the Communists were particularly occupied with supremacy. External pressure, visible in the allied military presence, prevented Iraq from patronising the nationalist movements in the Gulf.

Iraq's claim to Kuwait exacerbated the fears of the western countries (especially Britain) and the shaikhdoms.

The gift of independence to Kuwait was a British sleight-of-hand. Iraq clearly had more right to Kuwait than Britain, but independence could theoretically eliminate both claims, whilst Britain could protect the present regime and thus ensure her interests. At the same time, the nationalist movement's discontent could be solved. The Shaikhs could be relied upon to respect British wishes in order to protect their own status.(24)

The landing of British forces in Kuwait between the 1st July and the 20th September confirmed British obligations to protect the traditional regimes. The British troops were replaced by Arab Security forces, consisting of troops from monarchical and republican countries. Although the Arab security force was intended to protect Kuwaitī independence, it effectively safeguarded the traditional Kuwaitī regime and the western interests.

The withdrawing troops were transferred to a new base

at al-Hamala' in Baḥrain, where they were immediately available to resist the Iraqi claim, but did not interfere with Kuwait's independence. The move brought great financial benefits to Baḥrain; in exchange for communications services, water and electricity supplies the Government received an annual payment of £250,000, on a 15 year contract. The presence of the British forces in al-Hamala' added another base to the first two British stations in Muḥarraq and Jufair.

The declaration of Iraqi claims to Kuwait and the rapid arrival of the British forces in Kuwait gave the traditional regimes the impression that Britain was the sole power capable of securing their regimes. At the same time they believed Iraq to be the principal disruptive power in the region.

The Kuwaitī nationalist movement benefited from Iraqi threats by the formation of parliamentary and constitutional rule, while the strength of the British influence resulted in the suppression of the Baḥrainī nationalist movement. In response to persecution, the Baḥrainī nationalist movement followed a radical line in criticising violently British colonialism and the traditional regimes, through student meetings abroad and pamphleteering at home. Al-Intifāḍa' al-Sha^c^biyya' (The Popular Uprising) on the 5th March 1965 was a manifestation of the new radicalism.

The presence of the three British military bases gave Britain and the Baḥrainī Government confidence of the impossibility of a popular rebellion. However, the

progress of the underground opposition groups and the deterioration in the conditions of the native labourers made the rebellion possible.

It was true that the formation of a constitutional and parliamentary rule in Kuwait allowed the leaders of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement to support the Baḥrainī opposition movement. For example, after the outbreak of the Bahrainī rebellion in March 1965, in response to a telegram the Kuwaitī National Assembly requested intervention to end suppressive measures against the people of Baḥrain.[25]

The presence of three military bases in Baḥrain before independence in August 1971, not only protected the regime from internal popular resistance, but also secured the shaikhdoms from annexation by Sa^c^ūdī Arabia and Iran, as well as intervention by Nāsserite groups.[26] The outbreak of civil war in North Yemen after the collapse of the Monarchy in 1962 confirmed British predictions and justified the presence of her troops in Baḥrain and Shārjāh. .

Undoubtedly, the number of British troops in Baḥrain contributed to the local revenue and consolidated the position of the Baḥrain Government. The Baḥrainī economy was otherwise unaffected by the Kuwait-Iraq crisis: trade between Baḥrain and Iraq continued unaltered. Nevertheless, it encouraged the propagandist campaign and was considered a nuisance in the region.[27] The new British bases stimulated the nationalist movement to follow a revolutionary line.

The Iraqi republic unlike the shaikhdom of Kuwait, had the support of the Baḥrainī working class, except those active in the nationalist movement. The majority of Qāsim's supporters in Baḥrain, as in Iraq, were peasants looking to the benefits their equals in Iraq had gained through the new social policy. The Agrarian Reform Law (the 30th September 1958) distributed landowners' fields to their former labourers, and new cities, al-Thawrah and al-Shu^{c}lah provided homes for former tenants. Baḥrainī peasants and labourers called Qāsim "the defender of the poor people."(28) A number of Baḥrainis, the majority from working class families were educated during Qāsim's era at the Iraqi Government's expense. The grants were administered in secret by leaders of the Baḥrainī nationalist movement, aid donated mainly to active members of that movement. Grants covered tuition and living expenses for Iraqi universities.(29)

There was therefore tangible impressive evidence in Baḥrain of Iraq's efforts to restore social equality. Qāsim became in Iraq a semi-mythical figure, and his reputation spread into Baḥrain. Stories current at the time, of his face appearing in the moon, are still remembered in both countries.

Footnotes : Chapter Six

1. Annual report of the immigration movement from 1958-1961, Baḥrain State Police, Immigration Department, Baḥrain.

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3. Al-Bākir, A., Min al-Baḥrain Ila al-Manfa, Manshūrāt Dār Maktabat al-Hayāt, Beirut, 1965, p.264.

4. Al-Fajr, No. 50, the 28th October, 1958.

5. Al-Sha[c]b, No. 53, the 13th November, 1958.

6. Al-Fajr, No. 54, the 25th November, 1958.

7. Khaddurī, M., Independent Iraq, (1932 - 1958), Oxford University Press, London, 1960, pp.348-355.

8. Qāsim, J.Z., , al-Khalīj al-[c]Arabi (1914-1945), Cairo, 1973, p.267; Moghtade, H., "The settlement of the Baḥrain question", Pakistan Horizon, 1973, 2nd quarter, pp.16-29, reference on p.20.

9. Shaikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa.

10. Keesing's Contemporary Archives 1970, Bristol, p.23998.

11. Al-Bilad, the 27th November 1958.

12. Al-Bilad, the 28th November 1958.

13. Al-[c]Aqqad, S., al-Tayyarat al-Siyasiyya fil-Khalij al-[c]Arabi, Cairo, 1965, p.232; Sada al-Usbu', No. 179, the 19th June, 1973, p.10.

14. Al-Bilad, the 23rd January 1959.

15. Ali, S., Qadāyā al-Taharrur Wal-Dīmuqrātiyyah Fil-Waṭan al-[c]Arabi, Dār al-Fārābi, Beirut, 1980, p.67.

16. [c]Ali, S., op.cit., pp.22-24.

17. Ibid., p. 22, 23.

18. Al-Jamāhīr, Baghdād, the 19th February 1963.

19. Newspapers of al-Thawra; al-Jumhūriyya; al-Thawra al-[c]Arabiyya: March, April, May 1963; al-[c]Ubaidi, I.K., al-Haraka al-Waṭaniyya fil-Bahrain 1914-1971, Maṭba[c]at al-Andalus, Baghdād, 1976 pp.239f.

20. *Al-Thawra al-ʿArabiyya*, No. 206, the 18th March 1963.

21. Al-ʿUbaidī, I.K., op.cit., pp.239f.

22. *Al-Thawra al-ʿArabiyya*, No. 217, the 30th March, 1963, Texts of telegrams from the *Jabhat al-Quwa al-Taqaddumiyya* in Baḥrain to Iraq, Cairo, The Arab League.

23. See chapter five; *al-Fajr*, No. 53, the 18th November 1958; No. 37, the 29th July 1958.

24. ʿAbdulla, M.M., *The United Arab Emirates*, U.S.A., 1978, p.75.

25. *Al-Hadaf*, No. 207, the 24th March 1965.

26. New Statesman, the 25th February, 1966, p.243.

27. Watt, D.C., "The Decision to Withdraw from the Gulf", *Political Quarterly*, 1968, vol. 39, pp.310-321, reference on p.320.

28. Stories were related to the researcher in Baghdād and Baḥrain during personal interviews in May 1982.

29. Private information.

Conclusion

Iraq, Kuwait and Baḥrain came under British domination in the same period, and popular resentment to foreign interference was strong in each case. The availability of Iraqi newspapers, close relations as a result of trade, a common religious heritage and familial ties enabled the political developments in Iraq to be followed by Kuwait and Baḥrain.

The intelligentsia in Kuwait and Baḥrain believed that Iraqi resistance to the British take-over resulted from a clash between the Islamic and Western cultures. With the military defeat of Iraq in the uprising of the twenties, the formation of a new political system was a considerable achievement. In spite of the restrictions imposed on Iraqi sovereignty, the new constitution was admired in the region, especially in Kuwait and Baḥrain, the most progressive shaikhdoms. During the 1920's, and until the demise of the monarchy, Iraq opposed British domination and provided a model of resistance for the Gulf region.

The intelligentsia of the three countries led the nationalist movement in the formation of opinion and in propagandist activities from the uprising of the twenties to the Iraqi revolution of the 14th July 1958.

The formation of the parliamentary and constitutional rule did not change the traditional political structure in Iraq and there was no real democracy, but this rule gave

the Iraqi people the basic freedoms of speech, press and religion. Despite the prevalent influence of the feudal and tribal systems, the opposition groups continued resistance through party activities: producing papers, organising assemblies and also contributing to parliamentary debate.

In both Baḥrain and Kuwait the political developments in Iraq were admired. In accordance with the pan-Arabist policy of Iraq during the era of King Ghazi, it was claimed that Iraq could lead the Arab countries to unity in the same way as Prussia had led the German principalities. The support of both shaikhdoms for Palestinian rebels in 1936 was due to the Iraqi stance.

The Iraqi pan-Arabist policy during the era of King Ghazi, the autocratic rule in Kuwait and the growth of Iranian influence there provoked the formation of the movement known as Harakat al-Majlis in Kuwait in 1938-1939. The same Iraqi pan-Arabist attitude had different effects in Baḥrain. Indeed, autocratic rule and the bad conditions of the working classes were responsible for the Baḥrainī uprising of 1938.

The despotic rule in Kuwait not only humiliated its people but also prejudiced Iraqi interests. Shaikh Aḥmad al-Jābir al-Ṣabāḥ, the ruler of Kuwait rejected co-operation with Iraq in response to British advice.

Both the Iraqi regime and the Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī (K.S.W.), which led the Kuwaiti nationalist movement in the 1930's, had a common aim. It was anticipated that Iraqi support for the K.S.W. would produce

a political group of sufficient influence to frustrate the Shaikh; the K.S.W. accordingly prospered with Iraq as an ally. The new status of the K.S.W. would, it was hoped, allow them to solve Iraqi-Kuwaitī disputes, such as the smuggling, the demarcation of the border, the railway extension and the Shaṭṭ al-ᶜArab problem. The ruler of Kuwait believed that the solution to these problems would prepare for an Iraqi take-over. The K.S.W. nevertheless benefitted from the Iraqi propaganda campaign and compelled the ruler to accept their nationalist demands beginning with the formation of the Legislative Council, which was the first successful step towards democratic rule in a Gulf Shaikhdom. However, this council was active for only six months.

The dissolution of the council was the result of a marked lack of political experience amongst members of the legislative council, dissent amongst the Shīᶜī incited by members of the Royal entourage and the Shaikh's decision to rely on British protection rather than popular support.

The setback for Kuwaitī nationalists was countered by a regeneration of activity in Iraq in support of Jamᶜiyyat Anṣār ᶜArab al-Khalīj. This society was set up with pan-Arabist members from the Gulf Shaikhdoms in order to maintain opposition to Iranian expansionism. Jamᶜiyyat Anṣār ᶜArab al-Khalīj and Maktab al-Diᶜāya wal-Nashr fil-Khalīj al-ᶜArabī (established in February 1939) were both centred in Baṣra, the most accessible of Iraqi cities for the people of the shaikhdoms. The renewed claims of Iran to Kuwait and Baḥrain stimulated more pan-Arab

activities. The growth of the Iranian community in Kuwait in both numbers and in power, supported by the Shaikh of Kuwait, required a response.

After suppressive measures, the majority of the K.S.W. fled to Baṣra and Baghdād. The presence of the nationalist groups in Iraq after the suppression of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement reflected Iraq's patronage of these movements. Iraq was a refuge for Kuwaitis and other pan-Arabist and nationalist groups in the 1930's and in the 1940's.

During the Second World War there was popular resistance to al-Saᶜīd's plans to allow land to be used by British troops precipitating a military revolt in May 1941 and rebellions in January 1948 and November 1952. The leaders of the military revolt were regarded as heroes in Iraq and in Kuwait. Iraqi resistance inspired the reorganisation of Kuwaitī nationalist movement activities in the 1950's.

The spread of Iraqi idealism to Kuwait and Baḥrain was the work of Kuwaitī and Baḥrainī graduates from Iraqi schools in Baṣra, Baghdād, Najaf and Karbalā'. Iraqi support of the nationalist movements in the Gulf and the growth of pan-Arabist concepts in Iraq were responsible for the British decision to transfer Kuwaiti students on Government grants from Iraqi schools to the Victoria College in Alexandria or to the American University of Beirut. Nevertheless, Kuwaitī schools were using the Iraqi curriculum until 1942, when it was replaced by the Egyptian.

The British decision reflected mistrust of Iraqi

teachings and fear of their effects in the region. However, the long-standing connections of Iraq, Kuwait, Baḥrain and other shaikhdoms were stronger than the British restrictions. Pilgrims from Kuwait and Baḥrain continued their visits to the Holy Cities, and students from the two Shaikhdoms also attended Iraqi schools, albeit in decreasing numbers.

In the 1950's, visits by Iraqi intellectuals promoted cultural and intellectual activities in Baḥrain and Kuwait, although the Iraqi nationalist movement was itself suppressed.

The revolution of the 14th July 1958 was expected to consolidate the postion of the nationalist movements in the Gulf region. Ideological differences and competition for power between various groups hindered the efforts of progressive groups and gave the traditional regimes in the region, with British support, an opportunity to suppress the nationalist movements in Baḥrain and Kuwait.

The political infighting in Iraq gave Qāsim's military regime a free hand to suppress the Iraqi opposition movement and destroyed hopes of a balanced democracy.

The Iraqi government's rejection of unity with the U.A.R. was responsible for Kuwaitī opposition to Iraq's claims on Kuwait. Kuwaitis had wished to join Iraq in the 1930's in accordance with pan-Arabist ideals. However, this policy was changed during Qāsim's regime and the same people who had welcomed the Iraqi revolution now demonstrated against Iraqi claims to Kuwait and denounced

their threats. It might have been possible for Kuwaitis to call for unity with Iraq if Qāsim had supported unity with the U.A.R.: enthusiasim for Arab Nationalism and unity in Kuwait and Baḥrain was widespread.

The support which the U.A.R. gave to Kuwait embarrassed Nāsser, whose position became similar to that of the Sa^cudī regime in its protection of the Kuwaitī regime. The experience of protecting traditional regimes allowed Britain to keep her control in the background.

The leading members of the Kuwaitī nationalist movement believed that during the republican era the weakness of the Iraqi regime would reflect adversely on the Kuwaitī nationalist movement, while the strength of the same regime would promote its position. The same members, fearing the vulnerability of the Kuwaiti regime after Iraqi threats, pressed strongly for the formation of parliamentary and consititutional rule in order to command popular loyalty.

The pearl industry had maintained a strict social and political hierarchy which was reflected in the shipping industry. The decline of the former, in the face of competition from Japanese cultured pearls, and the collapse of traditional industries after the advent of oil, enabled a socio-economic transformation to take place. The form of the new system was largely determined by a combination of pressure from the nationalist movement within and from Britain and Iraq outside. The early period of prosperity was complicated by the Second World War, although Kuwait

continued to receive her royalties. In 1938, the nationalist movement demanded the adoption of more democratic procedures and achieved a Governmental role temporarily with the formation of the Legislative Council. This council resurfaced after suppression in 1939 to continue to influence public opinion in favour of democratisation.

Britain had advised the formation of the Legislative Council, but the council had begun to undermine both Britain's power in the shaikhdom and the traditional domination of the ruler. The dissolution of the council allowed the British to resume their dominant advisory role.

Britain encouraged and supervised social welfare projects and the development of education. The revolution in Iraq and the subsequent threat of Iraqi intervention persuaded the British to advise Kuwait to join international organisations.

Independence was a safeguard for Kuwait against annexation by Iraq, and it was also a measure to placate the nationalist movement, which was in rebellion after its suppression. After independence, the nationalist movement had an official role in Government and continued to urge democratisation. Hence, the Iraqi claim to Kuwait had, ironically, hastened the formation of parliamentary rule, unifying both the nationalist and traditional elements in common resistance to annexation.

Appendix 1

Those listed below are important witnesses whose accounts and opinions have been quoted or paraphrased, and academics who have undertaken extensive research in the field. Some valuable material was provided by Baḥrainī, Kuwaitī and Iraqi nationalists active in the movement in the 1950's and 1960's, who prefer to remain anonymous for political reasons. The views of many other interviewees have been taken into account, but not directly referred to. The interviews took place between February and May 1982.

Appendix 1(a): Baḥrain

- ᶜAbdul ᶜAzīz al-Shamlān: currently Baḥrainī Ambassador to Tunis; member of the C.N.U. in 1956. He returned from 14 years exile after independence in 1971. He became the Vice-Chairman of the Constituent Assembly (December 1972 - July 1973), and was appointed Ambassador to Cairo in 1974, staying there until the Arab boycott of Egypt, during which he was appointed Ambassador to Tunis.

- ᶜAli Sayyār: respected journalist, businessman and editor and owner of the weekly Majallat Ṣadā al-'Usbūᶜ. He was the editor of the most popular newspapers, al-Qāfila and afterwards al-Waṭan from 1952-56.

- Ibrāhīm Fakhru: well-known Baḥrainī nationalist and merchant. He was active in the nationalist movement in 1938 and 1954-56. He received a ten year prison sentence for sedition, and was held on Jeda Island.

Appendix 1(b): Kuwait

- ᶜAbdul Razzāq al-Baṣīr: well-known Kuwaitī liberal and nationalist writer. He was an active figure in the Kuwaitī nationalist movement from the 1930's, and founder member of Nādi Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭanī in 1938 and al-Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Qawmī in 1952. Joined the Arab traditional school (al-Kuttāb) after private tuition with a Kuwaitī religious shaikh with Iraqi roots (ᶜAlī Musa al-Ḥā'iri). Studied theology under Yusuf bin Isa al-Qināᶜī until the age of 15 years, then in the Karbalā under Shaikh Muḥammad al-Khaṭīb. Al-Baṣīr became a religious speaker and began to deliver lectures in Kuwait's ma'ātim. He is a member of Rābiṭat al-'Udabā' bil Kuwait.

- ᶜAbdul Ṣamad al-Turky: a Kuwaiti writer and former press attache at the Kuwaiti Embassy in Baghdād.

- Aḥmad al-Khatīb: Kuwaiti medical doctor graduate of the American University of Beirut (1952) and founder of al-Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Qawmi. Al-Khatīb was an active progressive member of the Kuwaiti nationalist movement from the 1950's until the present day.

- Aḥmad Zain al-Saqqāf: respected Kuwaiti Arab nationalist writer, Chairman of Rabiṭat al-'Udaba bil Kuwait (the League of Kuwaiti Writers), and Chairman of al-Hay'a al-ᶜĀmma lil Janūb wa al-Khalīj al-ᶜArabi (the General Committee of the South and Arab Gulf), a founder member of al-Nādi al-Thaqāfi al-Qawmī,

- Ahmad Diyain: director of Shuᶜbat al-Dawriyyāt (the Periodical Section).

- Fahad al-Duwairī: Kuwaitī writer, born in 1921, graduate of the al-Mubārakiyya School in 1935, studied at the al-Raḥbāniyya School in Baṣra for five years. He returned to Kuwait in 1940.

- Faiṣal Abdul Ḥamīd al-Ṣāniᶜ: businessman, active Baᶜthist, the Chairman of Rabitat al-Ijtimaᶜīyyin (the Sociologist League). Studied at Cairo University 1960-62. In 1963 he transferred to Baghdād University, where he was influenced by the Baᶜthist ideology. He graduated from the Sociology Department in 1965, and became an active member of the underground Baᶜth Party in Kuwait during the 1960's and 1970's.

- Jāsim Ḥamad al-Ṣaqr: well-known Kuwaitī merchant and notable, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National assembly. He graduated from the College of Law in Baghdād in 1942-43.

- Khālid Moḥammad al-Rūmī: unskilled labourer in the Kuwait Oil Company, who was dismissed in 1949 with other Kuwaitī labourers. He described the active political role of Iraqi labourers in the Oil Company, in encouraging Kuwaitī labourers to claim their rights.

- Khalīfa al-Wiqayyān: Assistant General Secretary of al-Majlis al-Waṭani lil-Thaqāfa wa al-Funūn wa al-'Ādāb (the National Council of Culture and Arts). B.A. and M.A. University of Kuwait, Ph.D., Cairo University. The topic of the dissertation for his second degree was al-Qaḍiyya al-ᶜArabiyya fi-al-Shiᶜr al-Kuwaitī (The Arab Question in Kuwaitī Poetry) published in Kuwait in 1977. He is an Arab nationalist and member of Rābiṭat al- udabā' bil Kuwait.

- Najāt ᶜAbdul Qādir al-Jāsim: doctor of Modern and Contemporary History, ᶜĀin Shams University, and chairman of the History Section of Kuwait University.

Appendix 1(c) Baghdād University

ᶜAbdul Amir Moḥammad Amīn: doctor of Modern and Contemporary History, and lecturer in the Education College.

Jaᶜfar Ḥumaidī: doctor of Modern and Contemporary History, and lecturer in the Education College.

Appendix 2 *

Newspaper Translations

Al Zamān (Pro Govt.)
3.4.1938.
A New Movement in Kuwait

The people of Kuwait have started demanding reforms in their country from their Shaikh, and they have already approached him on the following demands:-

1. The expedience of spreading education in their widest measures so that the people of Kuwait would be given the same opportunities for education as their co-racials in other Arab countries.

2. Establishment of a Hospital at Government expense and providing same with all the means necessary in order to save the public from diseases and spare them the need to attend Mission Hospitals which are there for well-known objects.

3. Organisation of the country's economic position and expenditure of its revenues on the improvement of its conditions in every respect.

4. Closing the doors of Kuwait in the face of foreign refugees who have no ties with the natives of the country.

5 Full permission must be given to the Arab nationalists to visit Kuwait and no Arab should be prevented from entering Kuwait under any conditions, and see that steps are taken to remove the misunderstanding that Kuwait is not prepared to accept Arab visitors.

* F.O. 371/21832

6. The Amir should get in touch with all classes of the people and hear their complaints and conduct the affairs on a basis satisfactory to the majority.

7. The Kuwait people wish that this country should cooperate with Iraq for realising reformatory projects and for its improvement on the basis of educational and cultural, trade and geographical considerations.

Translation of an article appearing in an Iraqi Newspaper "al-Zamān" dated, Baghdād 11th April 1938.

KUWAIT AND THE DEMANDS FOR THE

IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR COUNTRY

We, in a previous issue, published the demands of the Kuwaitis, which they submitted to His Highness the Amir of Kuwait for the improvement of their country from the economical, civilized, and educational point of view.

The "al-Nās" newspaper of Baṣra added some other demands made by Kuwaitis of His Highness the Emir, and which we publish below:-

1. The establishment of two Courts, one Legal and the other an Appeal Court, in which the Laws and Rules are to be complete, and restraint put upon those who punish the nationals and execute judgements as they wish upon them. The election of two other members in each Court, and proper Registers should be kept, to which a reference could be made when necessary.

Judgements, before execution, should be subjected to examination in such a way that no injustice is being done.

2. The establishment of a "Security Department" like the Police stations in Iraq, and its members to be distinguished by special badges, and responsible for general supervision and town security work.

3. The proper administration of the Customs revenues. A committee should be appointed to supervise the work of

the sub-offices. The present "loose" administration should be stopped. The appointment of a Minister or Director General of Finance to supervise all transactions.

4. The establishment of a Committee of Counsellors (Majlis Shūra), to which all the affairs of the country should be referred, as also the International affairs which directly affect the interests of the country, and an office to be established for the exclusive work of the Committee.

5. The establishment of a Passport and Residence Office which is to be in close touch with the "Security Department", and the authority for issuing the visas by the British Consul at Baṣra should be removed. The refusal by the British Consulate of Baṣra for issuing visas to the Arabs men (Notable Arabs)(sic) brings a bad fame upon Kuwait, while Kuwait does not acknowledge any foreign interference in her internal or external affairs.

6. The assistance in financial and educational matters, is to be sought from the Iraq Government, and to follow the steps in parallel line with the Arabs' "Rise" in respect of the customs and laws.

7. Negotiations are to be taken up with the neighbouring Arab Governments for conclusion of Treaties of Alliance - Offensive - defensive, which would possibly reveal any foreign Government's intentions who want the troubles to befall Kuwait.

8. The confinement of work and employments to the Kuwaitis, who when not capable, and Iraqi Arabs to be preferred to the Indians, Armenians and other foreigners.

9. The allotment of a sum in the Budget for despatching the missions abroad to study the mechanic and other courses to be prepared for work in the Oil Department.

10. The Kuwaitis to be acquainted with all the big projects.

Appendix 3 *

Translation of the Law Governing the powers of the Kuwait Administrative Council as granted by H.M. the Ruler of Kuwait on the 9th July 1938.

We, the Ruler of Kuwait, in accordance with the resolution passed by the State's Administrative Council, do confirm and sign this law about the powers of the Council, and we have ordered that it may be put into effect.

Article 1. The people are the source of power, as represented by the Council of their elected representatives.

Article 2. The Administrative Council has to establish the following Laws:-

(a) The Law of the Budget, viz, the proper control of all the State's income and expenditure and its diversion in a just manner, with the exception of the personal properties of the Al-Ṣubāḥ, with which the Council has no right to interfere.

(b) The Law of Justice, the purpose of which is to establish the religious and common Law in such manner as to insure the proper administration of Justice between the People.

(c) The Law of Public Security, the purpose of which is to insure security within and out the town (of Kuwait) upto the furthest points of the frontier.

(d) The Law of Education, the purpose of which is to establish Laws for education, that it may proceed in line with that in progressive countries.

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* F.O. 371/21832

(e) The Law of Public Health, the purpose of which is to establish Laws of Health which will protect the State and its inhabitants from the dangers of ill-health and diseases of all kinds.

(f) The Law of Improvements, which includes the construction of roads out of the town, the building of jails, the boring of wells, and whatever general improvements are necessary within and out of the town.

(g) The Law of Emergency, the purpose of which is to establish laws which will empower the authorities to take whatever measure is necessary to insure public security in the State, in the event of an emergency.

(h) Whatever law it is found necessary to establish in the interests of the public, it is the right of the Council to establish it.

Article 3. The Administrative Council is the place of refrence for all Treaties, Concessions, Monopolies and Agrements, both internal and foreign. If any of these (i.e.existing) has to be renewed, it shall not be considered to have become legal unless seen and approved by the Council.

Article 4. As the State hasno Court of Appeal, the powers of such a Court will rest temporarily with the Administrative Council until such time as a special court is established for the purpose.

Article 5. The President of the Administrative Council represents the Executing Authority in the State.

Signed, Aḥmed Al-Jābir Al-Ṣubāḥ

Appendix 4 *

The Charter of Kutlat al-Shabāb al-Waṭani

ميثاق كتلة الشباب الوطني الكويتي

المادة الاولى : الايمان بأن الامه العربيه امة واحده وأن الوطن العربي وطن واحد وان حق الامه بممارسة سيادتها التامه واستقلالها الحنيف حق مطلق لها وان حقها و مصلحتها فوق كل شيء .

المادة الثانيه : اعتبار الكويت بلد عربي وانه جزء لا يتجزء من الوطن العربي الأكبر .

المادة الثالثه : توثيق الروابط والصلات بين جميع الأقطار العربيه وتشجيع المصنوعات العربيه وتقوية الروح الرياضيه والسعي الى كل ما يفيد العرب وينهض بهم اجتماعيا واقتصاديا .

المادة الرابعه : احياء الروح القوميه في نفوس الافراد .

المادة الخامسه : السعي لنشر روح الثقافه العربيه في المجتمعات الكويتيه .

المادة السادسه : لم شعث الشباب الكويتي .

المادة السابعه : السعي بكل القوى لمؤازرة الاحرار المخلصين .

المادة الثامنه : يقسم كل عضو من اعضاء الكتله اليمين على تحقيق اهداف وميثاق الكتله والاخلاص للانظمه والقرارات التي تبنتها الهيئه الاداريه .

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* Al-Sijil, No. 107, the 12th August 1938

Appendix 5 *

Improvements introduced by the Kuwait Council since its formation.

1. Cancelled all export duties. (previously these were not charged on a fixed scale but at the discretion of the Customs Officials, and some times up to 20%)

2. Cancelled duty of 10% paid by Kuwait villagers on provisins and all other necessities which they purchase from town.

3. Cancelled import duty on fruit and vegetables.

4. Allowed all members of the public to build shops. (in recent years the building of new shops in Kuwait was a monopoly of the ruling family)

5. Made an improved scale of salaries to all members of the ruling family.

6. Forbidden the taking of any tribute, usually in kind, by some members of the ruling family, from butchers, fishermen etc.

7. Forbidden the forced selling, by butchers and others, of skins etc., at very low rates to certain members of the ruling family.

8. Dismissed corrupt customs officials.

9. Dismissed corrupt Qādhi.

10. Employed better educated persons, according to qualifications, in Government Departments.

11. Dispensed with the corrupt Police or Petty Court, and dismissed its officials.

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* F.O. 371/21833

12. Formed a disciplined Police Force.

13. Appointed a second magistrate to sit with the previous one with a view to preventing corruption in the civil court.

14. Took over the duties of a temporary appeal court pending the opening of one.

15. Opened three Government schools, including one for girls, in addition to the two in existance, and brought additional teachers from Palestine.

16. Built a new land customs house.

17. Laid the foundation of a new building to house the Courts, Police, and other Government Departments.

18. Cancelled the aerated-water monopoly and returned the sum paid by the monopolist, and granted permission to others to manufacture aerated-waters without monopoly.

19. Cancelled the pearl fishing tax, (which was three shares from each boat to the Shaikh)

20. Cancelled the intestines monopoly, and returned the sum paid for it, making trade free to all, consequently the value of intestines rose from Rs.40/- to Rs.300/- per 1000.

21. Dissolved the corrupt board of Municipality and formed another by free public elections.

22. Intensified town improvements, the widening of roads etc. etc.

23. Reduced the heavy rents and cancelled taxes charged to bakers and encouraged more bakeries to open at all convenient places (previously this was an absolute monopoly of the Shiekhly family)

24. Forbidden the adulteration of butter which was

practiced on a large scale, and unchecked.

25. Forbidden the butchering of young lambs, with a view to protecting the breed from extermination.

26. Built a new building for the Port Police, near the Sea Customs.

27. Made extensive repairs of the old sea customs building

28. Permitted the playing of Radios in public places.

29. Reduced the rents and cancelled the taxes in the meat and fish markets. (previously this was an absolute monopoly of the Shaikh)

30. Forbidden the "Sukhra" (the forced use of free labour by the Shaikhly family).

31. Introduced some reformatory laws in the Courts, the Municipality and other departments.

Appendix 6 *

Translation of a letter addressed to the Adviser dated 29th Ramadhan 1357 from the leaders.

Salaams and suitable greetings.

With reference to your letter 1624/9A dated 20th Ramadhan 1357 ?? that the Political agent would like to know the duties of the Labour Committee and the causes of the complaints and grievances and in obedience to your order and demands to our country, we have studied the whole matter and collected all information from those concerned such as the labourers and others and you will find herewith the complaints and grievances as we have received them, and with it the duties of the labour committee. It is hoped that this will meet with the approval of the Political Agent and the Government and will be pleased to agree to them causing satisfaction and that the nationals will thank God first and bestow their sincere thanks afterwards to the Government.

This if the government approves of these (duties) and finds them reasonable: As you know the governments of all countries desire to give all jobs and work and benefits to their own nationals.

This is our opinion and we forward it to you with the impression that we are in any case in need of your advice and admit that your opinion is better. The right of amy orders rests with you. 29th Ramadhan.

Manṣūr ʿArayyaḍ
Yusuf Fakhroo
Syed Saeed
Syed Moḥsin Tājir

* IOR: R/15/2/176

Duties of the Labour Committee

The committee should be granted absolute powers to give a reasonable footing to the national workman in according to what he deserves and to obtain such rights in full and to defend such rights by way of negotiations and good understanding with the heads of the Company and to put them forward to the Government if necessary. And to pay attention to the work and workman, to see the rosters of the workmen, make remarks thereon and give suggestions to rectify errors and bring them according to the following conditions and any advice given by the Government and the conditions recognised in other countries.

1. The national workman to be given prior right in national departments as far as is possible, whether in the company or government departments.

2. Baḥrain nationals should at least enjoy similar conditions to those of Indians and Iraqis, similar rights, wages, habitations, transport, supply of water, fuel and lighting. Consideration of nationality of all employees and increase of national labour.

3. Equality and justice in assigning wages and division of labour in the three grades to be according to merit and work and the amount of danger incurred as is done in case of foreigners without any discrimination of nationality.

4. If a national dies while on duty or is disabled for a long time preventing him from doing any work the

company to pay his family suitable compensation as is given to the foreigner, and to the man if he continues to live. As for other injuries which do not prevent him from work he should be paid suitable compensation as is given to the foreigner.

5. Review the wage of the national and give him a living wage which is now very low.

6. The rights of the old national workman to be protected; he should not be changed or replaced without lawful reasons: to give him yearly increments according to circumstances.

7. National should not be dismissed except for lawful reasons and unless his fault is proved, the committee to defend him and the government to afford all assistance by getting grievances redressed.

8. Wage to be on monthly basis with the deduction of wage for Fridays and religious holidays and to give 20 days leave per workman per year with pay for sake of health.

9. Company to train continuously and by degrees the national and afford him facilities to learn technical work of all sorts which Indians and Iraqis now do and pay national same wage as foreigner.

10. Prevent the heads of workmen from abusing and beating Baḥrain subjects and to obtain the right of the oppressed workman.

11. The treatment of the national to be the same without any difference as given to the foreigner, without favouritism as this is the cause of the contempt shown

towards the national.

12. Company to enlist labour through the committee and to select from those proposed who fulfil the needs of the work and not enlist foreigners unless Baḥrain subjects are not available for the job.

13. After ten years work if a Bahrain subject falls ill he should receive 18 months pay in full and 18 months half pay if he continues to be ill.

14. The company to open night schools to teach Baḥrain workers English, Arabic and arithmetic and other subjects.

15. Company to send young men yearly, Sunnīs and Shiʿas, abroad for education to colleges at the expense of the company to learn mechanics.

16. A provident fund system should be introduced the worker paying one anna and the company paying half anna and such fund should not be attachable through Court.

Two mosques should be built within company area one for Sunnīs and one for Shiʿas.

Appendix 6-(b)

These are the grievances of the nationals:-

1. We refer to the quarters provided for the nationals and those provided for the foreigners. The foreigners are in stone built quarters and the nationals in nests causing severe cold and exposed to winter storms.

2. We refer to the water provided for drinking. The water used by the national is contaminated and brings microbes and the foreigner used distilled and cold water.

3. The 'Sherika' has places where nationals and foreigners work together: the foreigner earns as much as Rs 4/- a day and the national earns Rs 1/- per day and both the national and the foreigner do the same work. But the national does the work better than the foreigner. This is something which the 'Sherika' know very well, especially certain of the officials.

4. If an accident occurs as a result of which a labourer cannot work, for example damage to a limb or a burn - the foreigner receives half the wages during the time he is in the hospital but the national is not paid anything under similar circumstances.

5. Partiality towards the foreigner. If some misunderstanding arises between a national and the foreigner, the foreigner can go and get the national dismissed without reason or without letting him state

his grievances.

6. Transport of labour. The foreigner gets transport from the 'Sherika' taking him from his house to the work and vice versa. As for the poor national, he has to walk on foot from the work to the place where he lives. Sometimes it takes two hours for him to reach his house.

And you can also ask our brothers the Shias who are working in the 'Sherika'.

1. We find that the 'Sherika' recruits labour locally. There are nationals and foreigners. The national workman gets Rs-/10/- per day. The foreigner gets at least Rs. 2/- a day. Why this difference? The national who gets Rs.-/10/- a day does the same work which the foreigner does, the foreigner who gets Rs.2/-. This small wage is deducted for Fridays: that is four days in a month: he therefore gets wages for 26 days, which is Rs.16/4. Is this small amount sufficient for supporting his family? This indicates that the national is prevented from enjoying the benefits (khairat) of his country and the foreigner enjoys them at the expense of the national without any right. Perhaps the 'Sherika' says that the workmen of the Saoudiya 'Sherika' receive the same wage as the Baḥrain workmen. But we say - Has the 'Sherika' noticed that all the men who are working there are subjects of Saoudi Arabia? But here, the workmen who

are nationals are very small in proportion to the foreigners consisting of Persians, Baluchis, Indians, ᶜOmānis, Ḥassāwis, Nejdis and others. Let the 'Sherika' know about this army of foreigners as compared with the few nationals, the sons of the soil, without work, and if they are going to pay here the same wage as in Arabia, let them at least take only nationals. But if a national and a foreigner apply for work the foreigner is given preference and this is not justice.

2. Secondly the ability of the national is more than that of the foreigner. The national and foreigner are doing the same work and after some time the foreigner is given increased wage while the work is same and even while the national works better. Unfortunately the foreigner always scores in pay over the sons of the soil who have a right to such benefits. What is this but cruelty of the 'Sherika' on the son of the soil? And there is no one to help the national and prevent such bad treatment. They do not have anyone to report their grievances to. Such instances of partiality are many. We give two examples.

(i) The gaugers. There are two divisions, one division in the new camp and one in refinery. The national and foreigner do the same work. But the national works under the foreigner even if the foreigner is not in any way abler: in almost all cases the national is abler in his work. The

'Sherika' always refused the right of the national, it prefers the foreigner to the national even if the national is abler.

(ii) The proof that the 'Sherika' gives the foreigner better wages than the national. There is a place in the refinery called "place of distillation". Before the people in charge of the work there were Indians. But three months ago the 'Sherika' replaced them with Arabs, but on reduced wages. The Indian was receiving Rs.5/- a day and the national new gets Rs.2/- a day at the most. Let it be known that this work used to be formerly done by Indians and is now done by nationals.

3. Facilities given by the 'Sherika' to the foreigners and are denied to the nationals.

(i) Pay. We have already dealt with this point.

(ii) In cases of sickness or an accident while on duty. The foreigner gets pay during sickness and also is given compensation for any accident. The son of the soil does not get pay if sick and is not given any compensation in case of accident except one week after the accident when the 'Sherika' gives half wage and after recovery the 'Sherika' takes him on only if it finds quite fit for work: if he is not quite fit it refuses to take him back to work and is refused any compensation. The foreigner is thus given enough money in such instances.

(iii) Living quarters and other facilities.

The foreigner is given stone built houses with electricity, the national is given huts which are full of dust in breeze and the same is the case with bathrooms and the kitchens and the cooking arrangements. The foreigner is given all comforts in everything which the national is denied. There is not much difference between a man living outside and one living inside these miserable huts. Has the 'Sherika' noticed this and tried to treat them equally? The national has a better claim to these comforts. Among the facilities and comforts which are enjoyed by the foreigner is one that if the foreigner worked for some time and is in class III he is promoted to class II and enjoys all the resultant comforts given by the 'Sherika' to those of that class. The national is not given such lifts even if he works hard. The 'Sherika' finds that the national is not competent so that he can be given such lifts! It can be noticed that the 'Sherika' has given special transport for the transport of Indians from the working place to Manāmah every day with the Jews who are classed under class III. There are nationals who are working with them (the Jews) at the same place and doing the same work, yet the national is forbidden to obtain these facilities. In truth this is a simple matter but we wanted to bring this to your notice, bring to your notice the plight of nationals even in simple matters such as these.

4. Many of the Americans and Englishmen have dashed

or run their cars over Bahrain subjects and our Government is quiet about it. The 'Sherika' does not pay any compensation at all. The poor people! This is the result of the non-existence of a committee which will go through such matters and wrest the right of the national.


5. Three fourths of the workmen in the 'Sherika' are now foreigners while there are many nationals without work! If there existed a committee it would have preferred the national to the foreigner who claims Bahrain nationality when he wants work and lives at the expense of the national!

APPENDIX 7 *

	Americans	Europeans	Indians	Iraqis	Iranians	Baluchis	Bahrainis	
On 1st January 1936	49	26	60	20	179	5	1207	
On 1st January 1937	153	157	325	61	509	6	3622	
On 1st January 1938	128	305	445	39	511	10	2993	
On 1st January 1939	97	246	414	47	278	9	1920	

* IOR: R/15/2/176

APPENDIX 8 *



* IOR: R/15/2/176

APPENDIX 9 *

This Year	Oil Royalty	Customs Receipts
	Rs.	Rs.
1938	1,816,180 **	1,158,547
1939	3,174,833	1,056,532
1940	3,000,000	700,000
1941	2,500,000	675,000
1942	2,600,000	700,000
1943	2,600,000	610,000
1944	2,622,000	860,000
1945	2,700,000	1,560,000

* The Shaikhdom revenue found in the Bahrain Administration Review Reports for 1938-1945.

** This amount of royalty was paid to the Bahrain Government for the first half of 1938, royalty of the second half unknown

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- R/15/2/127
- R/15/2/131
- R/15/2/176
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